Suchergebnisse

Theory of social choice mechanisms is a comparatively new theory. The first results were obtained as early as the beginning of the seventies. The book contains the most important results of the theory. In two main topics the book describes what mechanisms allow equilibrium solutions at any agents` preference profiles, and what outcomes can be implemented. The answer depends on the equilibrium concept. Furthermore the four equilibrium concepts Nash equilibrium, strong Nash equilibrium, equilibrium in dominant strategies, and the core were described in detail

1: Introduction -- 1.1. Rational Choice -- 1.2. The Theory of Social Choice -- 1.3. Restrictions on the Set of Alternatives -- 1.4. Structural Stability of the Core -- 2: Social Choice -- 2.1. Preference Relations -- 2.2. Social Preference Functions -- 2.3. Arrowian Impossibility Theorems -- 2.4. Power and Rationality -- 2.5. Choice and Functions -- 3: Voting Rules -- 3.1. Simple Binary Preference Functions -- 3.2. Acyclic Voting Rules on Restricted Sets of Alternatives -- 3.3. Manipulation of Choice Functions on Finite Sets of Alternatives -- 3.4. Restrictions on the Preferences of Society -- 4: The Core -- 4.1. Existence of a Choice -- 4.2. Existence of a Core in Low Dimensions -- 4.3. Convex Preferences -- 4.4. Non-Convex Preference -- 4.5. The Necessity of the Dimension Constraint -- 5: Local Cycles -- 5.1. Voting Cycles in Dimension v(?)—1 -- 5.2. Implementation of Choice Functions in Dimension v(?) — 1 -- 5.3. Cycles and the Stability Dimension -- 5.4. The Stability Dimension v*( ?) -- 6: Structural Stability -- 6.1. Plott Symmetry Conditions -- 6.2. Structural Stability of the Optima Set -- 6.3. Structural Instability of the Optima Set -- 6.4. Stability of the Core and of Cycles -- 7: Classification of Voting Rules -- 7.1. The Stability and Instability Dimensions -- 7.2. Voting Rules in Low Dimensions -- 7.3. Majority Rule with an Infinite Electorate -- 8: Democratic Theory -- 8.1. Liberalism and Populism -- 8.2. Populist Democracy and Institutionalism -- 8.3. Liberal Theory and Electoral Politics -- 8.4. Preferences and Beliefs -- Glossary of Concepts -- Index of Authors -- Index of Terms and Definitions.

Since World War II the subject of social choice has grown in many and surprising ways. The impossibility theorems have suggested many directions: mathematical characterisations of voting structures satisfying various sets of conditions, the consequences of restricting choice to certain domaines, the relation to competitive equilibrium and the core, and trade-offs among the partial satisfactions of some conditions. The links with classical and modern theories of justice and, in particular, the competing ideas of rights and utilitarianism have shown the power of formal social choice analysis in illuminating the most basic philosophical arguments about the good social life. Finally, the ideals of the just society meet with the play of self interest; social choice mechanisms can lend themselves to manipulation, and the analysis of conditions under which given ideals can be realised under self interest is a political parallel to the welfare economics of the market. The contributors to these volumes focus on these issues at the forefront of current research.

First published in 1971, Social Choice is both a text and reference containing the proceedings of a conference dealing with contemporary work on the normative and descriptive aspects of the social choice problem. This reissue will be of interest to advanced undergraduate and graduate courses on group decision making and social choice. Economists, social psychologists, political scientists and sociologists will welcome this valuable work

How is a social decision made out of individual members'' decisions? This is one of the primary questions in the social sciences. Logic and Social Choice provides an answer to the topic by the application of mathematical logic. Yasusuke Murakami formulates social decision-making in logical terms, and shows that an analysis of social decision is equivalent to a logical calculus in many-valued logic. The logical conditions are then derived for various types of societies, especially for democracy. This foundation enables the author to discuss such topics as the relation between direct democracy a

This is a textbook introducing selected topics in formal social choice theory. Social choice theory studies group choices that are based on information about preferences of members of the group (voting rules being one important special case). This involves economics, which provides the method of modelling individual decision making; political philosophy, which provides criteria about the allocation of decision-influencing power; and game theory, which provides a framework for thinking about the strategies individuals employ in trying to influence the group choice. The goal of this book is to take basic ideas like impossibility theorems, rights exercising and strategy proofness and give the student just enough technical background to be able to understand these ideas in a logically rigorous way. This is done through a set of 250 exercises that constitute the heart of the book and which differentiate this book from all other texts in social choice theory

Preface -- Acknowledgements -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Fuzzy Social Choice -- 1.1 The Purpose and Plan of the Book -- 1.2 General Concepts -- 1.2.1 Sets -- 1.2.2 Subsets -- 1.2.3 Relations -- 1.2.4 Fuzzy Intersection and Union -- 1.2.5 Residuum -- References -- Classical Social Choice Theorems -- 2.1 Arrows Theorem -- 2.2 Discussion -- 2.3 Gibbard-Sattherthwaite Theorem -- 2.4 The Median Voter Theorem -- 2.5 The Maximal Set -- References -- Rationality of Fuzzy Preferences -- 3.1 The Structure of Fuzzy Preference Relations -- 3.2 Consistency of Fuzzy Preferences and the Fuzzy Maximal Set -- 3.3 Empirical Application I: Deriving an FWPR from a Fuzzy Preference Function -- References -- Arrow and the Aggregation of Fuzzy Preferences -- 4.1 Fuzzifying Arrow's Conditions -- 4.1.1 Transitivity -- 4.1.2 Weak Paretianism -- 4.1.3 Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives -- 4.1.4 Dictatorship -- 4.2 Making and Breaking Arrow's Theorem -- 4.3 Empirical Application II: The Spatial Model and Fuzzy Aggregation -- References -- Characteristics of Strategy-Proof Fuzzy Social Choice -- 5.1 Fuzzy Choice and Manipulation -- 5.2 Fuzzy Social Choice: Definitions and Concepts -- 5.2.1 Fuzzifying ASB II -- 5.2.2 Relaxing the Conditions of Abdelaziz et. al. -- 5.3 Findings -- 5.4 Implications for the Spatial Model -- 5.5 Conclusions -- References -- Fuzzy Black's Median Voter Theorem -- 6.1 The Structure of Fuzzy Rules and Strict Preference -- 6.2 Basic Definitions and Concepts -- 6.3 New and Old Fuzzy Voting Rules -- 6.4 Single-Peaked Preferences and the Maximal Set -- 6.5 Extending Black's Median Voter Theorem -- 6.6 An Application -- 6.7 Conclusions and Spatial Models -- References -- Representing Thick Indifference in Spatial Models -- 7.1 Stability and Thick Indifference in Individual Preferences

This volume comprises papers presented at the Symposium on Collective Choice, by leading experts in this field. It presents recent advances in Social Choice Theory and Welfare Economics. The papers are classified in two broad groups: (1) those dealing with the ethical aspects of the theory of social choice and (2) those concerned with the positive aspects.The papers in the first part are concerned with the Arrow-type aggregation problem or aspects of it and with more specific questions relating to optimality, justice and welfare. In part II several papers discuss the problem of strategic misre

This book offers a comprehensive overview and critique of the most important political and philosophical interpretations of the basic results of social choice, assessing their plausibility and seeking to identify the links between the theory of social choice and the more traditional issues of political theory and philosophy. In this regard, the author eschews a strong methodological commitment or technical formalism; the approach is instead based on the presentation of political facts and illustrated via numerous real-life examples. This allows the reader to get acquainted with the philosophical and political dispute surrounding voting and collective decision-making and its links to social choice theory.

Intro -- COWLES COMMISSION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS -- DEDICATION -- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION -- 1. THE TYPES OF SOCIAL CHOICE -- 2. SOME LIMITATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS -- CHAPTER II - THE NATURE OF PREFERENCE AND CHOICE -- 1. MEASURABILITY AND INTERPERSONAL COMPARABILITY OF UTILITY -- 2. A NOTATION FOR PREFERENCES AND CHOICE -- 3. THE ORDERING OF SOCIAL STATES -- 4. A DIGRESSION ON RATIONALITY AND CHOICE -- CHAPTER III - THE SOCIAL WELFARE FUNCTION -- 1. FORMAL STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL CHOICE -- 2. POSITIVE ASSOCIATION OF SOCIAL AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES -- 3. THE INDEPENDENCE OF IRRELEVANT ALTERNATIVES -- 4. THE CONDITION OF CITIZENS' SOVEREIGNTY -- 5. THE CONDITION OF NON-DICTATORSHIP -- 6. THE SUMMATION OF UTILITIES -- CHAPTER IV - THE COMPENSATION PRINCIPLE -- 1. THE PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION -- 2. THE POSSIBILITY OF COMPENSATION -- CHAPTER V - THE GENERAL POSSIBILITY THEOREM FOR SOCIAL WELFARE FUNCTIONS -- 1. THE NUMBER OF ALTERNATIVES -- 2. TWO INDIVIDUALS AND THREE ALTERNATIVES -- 3. PROOF OF THE GENERAL POSSIBILITY THEOREM -- 4. INTERPRETATION OF THE GENERAL POSSIBILITY THEOREM -- CHAPTER VI - THE INDIVIDUALISTIC ASSUMPTIONS -- 1. STATEMENT OF THE ASSUMPTIONS -- 2. THE POSSIBILITY THEOREM UNDER INDIVIDUALISTIC ASSUMPTIONS -- 3. QUASI-ORDERINGS AND COMPATIBLE WEAK ORDERINGS -- 4. AN EXAMPLE -- 5. A ONE-COMMODITY WORLD -- 6. GROUP CHOICE IN THE THEORY OF GAMES -- 7. DISTRIBUTIONAL ETHICS COMBINED WITH INDIVIDUALISM -- CHAPTER VII - SIMILARITY AS THE BASIS OF SOCIAL WELFARE JUDGMENTS -- 1. COMPLETE UNANIMITY -- 2. THE CASE OF SINGLE-PEAKED PREFERENCES -- 3. THE IDEALIST POSITION AND THE CONCEPT OF CONSENSUS -- 4. KNOWLEDGE AND THE MEANING OF SOCIAL ALTERNATIVES -- 5. PARTIAL UNANIMITY -- 6. THE DECISION PROCESS AS A VALUE -- REFERENCES.