Suchergebnisse

Introduction -- Elementary Logic -- Sets, Relations, Functions -- Binary Relations -- Social Choice Theoretic Framework and Arrow Impossibility Theorem -- Some Important Value-Judgments, Rules and Theorems -- Implications of Weakening of Some of Arrow Conditions -- The Method of Majority Decision: Conditions for Transitivity and Quasi-Transitivity -- Strategic Aspects -- Summary and Concluding Remarks.

description Develops many subjects from Volume 1 (2002) while introducing new themes in welfare economics and social choice theory Features four sections: Foundations, Developments of the Basic Arrovian Schemes, Fairness and Rights, and Voting and Manipulation Appeals to readers who seek introductions to writings on human well-being and collective decision-making Presents a spectrum of material, from initial insights and basic functions to important variations on basic schemes

International audience ; Social choice theory is the field of scientific inquiry that studies the aggregation of individual preferences toward a collective choice. For example, social choice theorists— who hail from a range of different disciplines, including mathematics, economics, and political science—are interested in the design and theoretical evaluation of voting rules. Questions of social choice have stimulated intellectual thought for centuries. Over time, the topic has fascinated many a great mind, from the Marquis de Condorcet and Pierre-Simon de Laplace, through Charles Dodgson (better known as Lewis Carroll, the author of Alice in Wonderland), to Nobel laureates such as Kenneth Arrow, Amartya Sen, and Lloyd Shapley.

International audience ; Social choice theory is the field of scientific inquiry that studies the aggregation of individual preferences toward a collective choice. For example, social choice theorists— who hail from a range of different disciplines, including mathematics, economics, and political science—are interested in the design and theoretical evaluation of voting rules. Questions of social choice have stimulated intellectual thought for centuries. Over time, the topic has fascinated many a great mind, from the Marquis de Condorcet and Pierre-Simon de Laplace, through Charles Dodgson (better known as Lewis Carroll, the author of Alice in Wonderland), to Nobel laureates such as Kenneth Arrow, Amartya Sen, and Lloyd Shapley.

Since World War II a large literature has arisen that uses the methodology of economics to examine the behavior of governments and the actors in them. Some scholars refer to their research as public choice, some as social choice, and still others as political economy. This article discusses the distinctions among these three terms. It concludes that all of the research falling under these three headings has much in common, and that people who refer to their work as public choice or political economy are essentially employing identical methodologies. Contributions to public choice, narrowly defined, are more often positive and empirical analyses of government behavior than those in social choice, narrowly defined.

The rapidly growing field of computational social choice, at the intersection of computer science and economics, deals with the computational aspects of collective decision making. This handbook, written by thirty-six prominent members of the computational social choice community, covers the field comprehensively. Chapters devoted to each of the field's major themes offer detailed introductions. Topics include voting theory (such as the computational complexity of winner determination and manipulation in elections), fair allocation (such as algorithms for dividing divisible and indivisible goods), coalition formation (such as matching and hedonic games), and many more. Graduate students, researchers, and professionals in computer science, economics, mathematics, political science, and philosophy will benefit from this accessible and self-contained book.

THIS PAPER CONTRASTS THE LIBERAL CONCEPTION OF DEMOCRACY AS THE AGGREGATION OF INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES WITH THE DELIBERATIVE CONCEPTION OF DEMOCRACY AS A PROCESS OF OPEN DISCUSSION LEADING TO AN AGREED JUDGEMENT ON POLICY. SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY HAS IDENTIFIED PROBLEMS--THE ARBITRARINESS OF DECISION RULES, VULNERABILITY TO STRATEGIC VOTING--WHICH ARE OFTEN HELD TO UNDERMINE DEMOCRATIC IDEALS. CONTRARY TO COMMON OPINION, THE AUTHOR ARGUES THAT DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IS LESS VULNERABLE TO THESE DIFFICULTIES THAN LIBERAL DEMOCRACY. THE PROCESS OF DISCUSSION TENDS TO PRODUCE SETS OF POLICY PREFERENCES THAT ARE SINGLE PEAKED; AND WITHIN A DELIBERATE SETTING IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO VARY THE DECISION RULE ACCORDING TO THE NATURE OF THE ISSUE TO BE DECIDED.