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Social conflict, as opposed to armed conflict, has received less attention in the field of quantitative research. This paper investigates the structural causes of political violence in 35 African states using data from the Social Conflict in Africa dataset and the Beck and Katz panel corrected standard errors time series regression model. Theoretically, a closed political opportunity structure, combined with a weak state unable to provide public goods, should together produce high levels of social conflict. The independent variables attempt to operationalize these concepts from four different angles. In this analysis Access to Education and Infrastructure (AEI), Ethno Linguistic Fractionalization (ELF), Freedom in the World Political Rights (FIW), and National Material Capabilities (NMC) were all significant predictors of social conflict. This study found that as the level of ethnic fractionalization and material capabilities within states rose, the frequency of social conflict events also increased. However, as access to infrastructure and political rights declined, the number of social conflict events increased. Wald chi-square and R-square values suggest that the model is complete and has substantial explanatory power. ; 2014-08-01 ; B.A. ; Sciences, Dept. of Political Science ; Bachelors ; This record was generated from author submitted information.

Current migrations in Europe are the result of numerous geostrategic, political, regional, local and individual causes. They are multidimensional phenomena, whose research requires an interdisciplinary approach. The work examines the social conflicts between the domestic and the settled population, especially those based on religious fundamentalism. Firstly, the most important characteristics of contemporary Christianity and Islam, as the most dominant religions in post-secular Europe are analyzed, described and explained. It points to their prevalence, basic values, and religious (non) tolerance. It is emphasized that the misunderstanding of these religions is often the cause of religious and other conflicts. Then the social conflicts in different environments and the place the religion has in them are explored. The authors proceed from the thesis that conflicts between the domestic population (regardless of religiosity) and contemporary migrants are the result of historical, cultural, political and other social factors. Conflicts in the name of religion are just one type of social conflict, which often conceals other causes. In short, the root causes of the conflict of the local population and migrants in the areas where the aforementioned religions are dominant are explored. The most important forms, dynamics and consequences of these conflicts are listed. It is concluded that religious conflicts and contemporary migrations are another factor in the crisis and (dis)integration of Europe.

This paper investigates the empirical role of violent conflicts for the causal effect of democracy on economic growth. Exploiting within-country variation to identify the effect of democratization during the Third Wave, we find evidence that the effect of democratization is weaker than reported previously once one accounts for the incidence of conflict, while the incidence of conflict itself significantly reduces growth. The results show in turn that permanent democratic transitions significantly reduce the incidence and onset of conflict, which suggests that part of the positive growth effect of democratization arises because democratization reduces conflict incidence. When accounting for the role of violence during democratization, we find evidence that peaceful transitions to democracy have a significant positive effect on growth that is even larger than reported in the previous literature, while violent transitions to democracy have no, or even negative, effects on economic growth.

The background of this research is the conflict began with an inharmony between political party leaders and legislators, especially those who have become legislative members and intend to advance again as legislative candidates from the same party. It aims to provide solutions for political parties in the election nomination. It reveals conflict in the preparation of candidates in the elections of 2019. Researchers collect data from political party information and media coverage by comparing news. The method is qualitative with analysis using Paul Conn's conflict structure theory to produce alternative solutions. The results is a difference in expectations and designs between political party leaders and incumbent legislators, according to political party leaders that legislative incumbents need to have an evaluation so they are displaced from candidates for those who were not optimally fighting for political parties, different perspectives of incumbent legislators because they feel have struggled be serious and prepare for second (more) contestation. The legislative incumbent who should be eligible to advance back from the same electoral district then tries to find a new path by advancing again as a legislative candidate by using other political parties. The Conclusion is shifting legislative candidates and changes in the acquisition of election results show the dynamics of political party conflict affect the outcome.

This research aimed to find out the social conflict that exist in the novel of Kembang Jepun. This research focused on forms of social conflict in novels and the causes of social conflict. This study used a sociological literature approach. The source of data in this research was the novel of Kembang Jepun by Remy Sylado. The results of the study showed that the form of social conflict which showed the existence of child trafficking carried out by Janjte and Kotaro Takimura figures, violence and fights that occurred in Shinju, arrest by police at the Tjahaja Soerabja office. The reason of this social conflict was the greed character of Janjte's figure, Kotaro Takamura, who wanted his place of business to be crowded again and Tjak Broto's writing which was considered to have provoked the community to hate the Dutch government.

We introduce distributive justice into a simple model of growth and distribution. Two groups ('classes') of otherwise identical, capital-rich and capital-poor individuals ('capitalists') and ('workers') are in conflict over factor (labour-capital) shares. Capitalists' (workers') ideal labour share is low (high) – but always tempered by the recognition that everyone supplies one unit of labour inelastically and desires a wage; and that the labour share impacts growth negatively in our 'AK' production economy. Social conflict is defined as the difference between the ideal labour shares of the two classes. This conflict is resolved by the two positive and three normative criteria we consider. Thus, the macroeconomy (growth, factor shares, distribution), social conflict and the methods of its resolution are jointly determined in a complete socio-economic equilibrium. We believe both this approach and our rich set of results are novel. We consider two positive (probabilistic voting and Nash bargaining, encapsulating electoral politics and socio-political bargaining) and two normative (justice) criteria (utilitarian and Rawlsian) of conflict resolution. Greater impatience, intensified status comparisons and negative consumption externalities, greater wealth inequality and a decline in productivity exacerbate social conflict. Status comparisons and wealth inequality tend to raise the labour share under all positive and normative criteria. Finally, we propose and analyse a criterion of 'justice as minimal social friction'. Under the plausible assumption that the capitalists' overall socio-political influence (numerical strength aside) is at least as high as that of workers, all positive methods imply a smaller labour share and more inequality than all our three criteria of distributive justice. We offer a numerical illustration of the key points.

In this paper we examine the link between ethnic and religious polariza- tion and conflict using interpersonal distances for ethnic and religious attitudes obtained from the World Values Survey. We use the Duclos et al (2004) polar- ization index. We measure conflict by means on an index of social unrest, as well as by the standard conflict onset or incidence based on a threshold number of deaths. Our results show that taking distances into account significantly improves the quality of the fit. Our measure of polarization outperforms the measure used by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) and the fractionalization index. We also obtain that both ethnic and religious polarization are significant in explaining conflict. The results improve when we use an indicator of social unrest as the dependent variable. ; Financial support from the Axa Research Fund, the Government of Catalonia, and the CICYT project n. SEJ2006-00369. Financial support from the CICYT project n. SEJ2006-00369. ; Peer reviewed