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Mohamed Amara received his master's degree in economic modeling from the Higher Institute of Management of Tunis in 2004, before undertaking a PhD in Geography at the University of Paris I and a PhD in management (quantitative Methods) at the University of Tunis in 2010. His research focuses on development economics, regional sciences, labor market, youth and gender in MENA region, and applied micro-econometrics. He has published in a range of journals on a variety of topics such as the Annals of Regional Science, Social Indicators Research, Annals of Economic and Statistics, Growth & Change, Papers in regional science, Middle East development Journal, and Letters in Spatial and Resource Sciences.

Altmetrics are generally seen as indicators for online engagement and attention. However, taking the field of political science as an example, Gustav Meibauer, Kiran Phull, Audrey Alejandro & Gokhan Ciflikli use altmetrics to analyse the dynamics of knowledge production in the field. Finding that altmetrics show a highly hierarchical and gendered spread of attention to … Continued

Open science is increasingly becoming a policy focus and paradigm for all scientific research. Ismael Rafols, Ingeborg Meijer and Jordi Molas-Gallart argue that attempts to monitor the transition to open science should be informed by the values underpinning this change, rather than discrete indicators of open science practices. Following a flurry of policies and investments … Continued

Contributor(s): Dr Tali Sharot, Dr Joan Costa-Font, Professor David de Meza, Dr Chris Kutarna |
Despite our growing collective pessimism about the state of the world, when it comes to our own lives, research suggests we are generally optimistic.

After a year that will remain synonymous with anxiety, isolation, endless devastating news reports, and for too many – loss, this episode of LSE IQ asks: is optimism is good for us? And, beyond the effects on our wellbeing, is optimism an accurate lens through which to view the world?

Addressing these issues are: Dr Tali Sharot, Professor of Cognitive Neuroscience at UCL; Dr Joan Costa-Font, Associate Professor in Health Economics at LSE; Dr David de Meza, Professor of Management at LSE; and Dr Chris Kutarna, author of Age of Discovery: Navigating the Risks and Rewards of our New Renaissance.


Contributors

Dr Tali Sharot
Dr Joan Costa-Font
Professor David de Meza
Dr Chris Kutarna
Research

The Optimism Bias: Why we're wired to look on the bright side by Tali Sharot.
Neither an Optimist Nor a Pessimist Be: Mistaken Expectations Lower Well-Being by David de Meza and Chris Dawson in the Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin.
Why optimism and entrepreneurship are not always a good mix for business by David de Meza and Chris Dawson in The Conversation.
Optimism and the perceptions of new risks by Elias Mossialos, Caroline Rudisdill and Joan Costa-Font
in the Journal of Risk Research.
Explaining optimistic old age disability and longevity expectations by Joan Costa-Font and Montserrat Costa-Font in Social Indicators Research.
Does optimism help us during a pandemic? by Joan Costa-Font.
Age of Discovery: Navigating the Risks and Rewards of Our New Renaissance by Chris Kutarna and Ian Goldin.

Since the election of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to power in the federal elections in India in 2014, the country's performance in key indicators of democratic quality has suffered. Over the course of its two terms in power, the party has sought to subvert key institutions for accountability, enact an ethno-cultural majoritarian electoral agenda, and use federal law enforcement agencies against their political opponents. While there is extensive literature on the erosion of civil-political rights in the past ten years, the effects of the BJP government on social rights like education and healthcare remain under-explored. Therefore, in this post, I explore three striking dimensions of primary educational policy under the BJP government.

Just one flagrant American ESG violation among countless others.This news story from Bloomberg had me laffing so hard it hurt: Despite the action being rather novel--banning investment in US Treasuries over environmental, social and governance [ESG] grounds--it is undoubtedly true that America is an ESG disaster. Offhand, we can cite endless ESG offenses that the US has perpetuated on its citizens and the rest of the world. Among others:Environmental: Being the world's second-largest carbon emitter and, historically speaking, by far the world's largest;Social: Maintaining a persistent racial underclass of nearly half of blacks who have experienced inter-generational poverty despite accounting for less than 15% of the overall population;Governance: Inflicting far more gun deaths annually than any other country by allowing largely unfettered sale and ownership of military-style weapons. Now, it is not news to anyone that the US is a super-polluting, racialized and hyper-violent nation. However, it is news when others like the German state of Baden-Württemberg start calling a spade a spade... and put their money where their mouth is at: That's because the new environmental, social and good governance filters
have resulted in US Treasuries ending up on an investing blacklist, due
to America's failure to ratify a number of treaties in areas including
women's rights and controversial weapons...The bulk of Baden-Württemberg's exclusions impact its equity and
corporate bond portfolios. The law establishes the United Nations
Sustainable Development Goals, the European Union's Taxonomy Regulation
and the Paris Agreement on climate change as the basis for future
investment decisions.Lest you think it's just one German state objecting to America, Inc., there are others:Back in Germany, meanwhile, other states have taken similar steps.
Baden-Württemberg, the only one of Germany's 16 states with a coalition
government led by the Greens, was inspired by a similar law in the
smaller state of Schleswig-Holstein, where bans apply to US Treasuries
as well as to fossil-fuel companies. And the pension funds of
Brandenburg, Hesse and Germany's richest state North Rhine-Westphalia
are this year allocating as much as €11 billion to Paris-aligned stock
indexes that exclude ESG laggards alongside Baden-Württemberg. While I do not doubt the sincerity of these actions, I am not convinced that what international ESG-related treaties a country has ratified should constitute the basis for assigning ESG ratings to sovereign debt. Solability, for instance, has a "Global Sustainable Competitiveness Index" (GSCI) that takes into account a number of indicators similar to conventional bond credit ratings.Ah well, I guess it's the thought that counts for these Germans.  

I've received many requests for some kind of journal rankings list from readers.

Readers will be aware of several different rankings of philosophy journals. These include the Australian Research Council's (ARC) now disused ERA rankings and European Science Foundation's (ESF) European Research Index for the Humanities (ERIH).  Plus, there have been different polls by Brian Leiter and the Brooks Blog (and this more comprehensive poll of 140+ journals). Other blogs discussing journal rankings include Certain Doubts, Lemmings, Thoughts, Arguments, and Rants, and this.

Each metric has its limitations and such a discussion would merit a long blogpost of its own. Let me be clear from the beginning that I believe that journal rankings are the crudest of indicators. If you want to assess the quality of something, then read it.

What I propose here is a ranking of rankings. Journals will be grouped in tiers based upon various metrics. There is broad agreement between different lists and I don't believe this list will prove controversial. The journals that score best are those journals that have consistently ranked highly across the major studies both European (ERIH), International (ARC ERA), and major opinion polls of thousands of philosophers (Brooks Blog, Leiter Reports). We find wide consistency across most indicators, but taken together we can find a strong "core" that come out top again and again. Those that perform less well is often a result of inclusion on some indicators, but not others. Comments are most welcome and the list (with information on how data was collected) is below. Enjoy!
Some proposed journal rankings for philosophy *

Rated 'A*' (maximum 25 points):
Ethics
Journal of Philosophy
Mind
Nous
Philosophical Review
Philosophical Quarterly
Philosophical Studies
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Rated 'A' (20-24 points):

Analysis (24)
Australasian Journal of Philosophy (24)
Philosophy and Public Affairs (24)
Canadian Journal of Philosophy (23)
American Philosophical Quarterly (22)
Monist (22)

Rated 'B' (15-19):

European Journal of Philosophy (19)
Synthese (19)
Journal of the History of Philosophy (18)
Philosophers' Imprint (18)
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (18)
Ratio (18)
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (17)
Journal of Political Philosophy (17)
Midwest Studies in Philosophy (17)
Philosophy of Science (17)
Journal of Ethics (16)
Journal of Moral Philosophy (16)
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (16)
Philosophical Topics (16)
Utilitas (16)
Journal of Philosophical Logic (15)

Rated 'C' (10-14 points):

British Journal for the History of Philosophy (14)
Erkenntnis (14)
Mind and Language (14)
Kant-Studien (13)
Philosophy (13)
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (12)
Philosophical Papers (12)
Phronesis (12)
Southern Journal of Philosophy (12)
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy (11)
Review of Metaphysics (11)
Hume Studies (10)
Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (10)
Journal of Philosophical Research (10)

N/a ranked (9 or less points):

Metaphilosophy (9)
Philosophical Investigations (9)
History of Philosophy Quarterly (8)
International Journal of Philosophical Studies (8)
Philosophy Compass (7)
Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (5)
Philosophia (4)


* Note on rankings:

I have weighted the journals in the following way:

ARC ERA list:
Journals are ranked A*, A, B, C. Points awarded: A* = 5, A = 4, B = 3, C = 2.

Brooks Blog list (1):
Journals ranked 1-50. Points awarded: #1-10 = 5, #11-20 = 4, #21-30 = 3, #31-40 = 2, #41-50 = 1.

List (2) ranks journals 1-50. Points awarded: #1-10 = 5, #11-20 = 4, #21-30 = 3, #31-40 = 2, #41-50 = 1, #51-143 = 0.

ERIH list:
Journals are (now) ranked Int1, Int2, Nat. Points awarded: Int1 = 5, Int2 = 4, Nat = 3.

Leiter Reports list:
General philosophy journals ranked only in top 20. Points awarded: #1-10 = 5, #11-20 = 4. Leiter has an additional list in ethics which raises complications. Journals are not double-counted and keep score if on general list. Points awarded: #1-10 = 5, #11-20 = 4, #21-30 = 3 where journals not on list 1. While this will cover general journals and journals that publish in ethics, there is need for a list in other areas especially mind/language and philosophy of science.

Notes: There are two lists for the Brooks Blog. List 2 is original list and surveys top 143 journals from a broad range. The top 50 in this poll were polled a second time in List 1.

QUERY FOR READERS: Do the weightings seem appropriate? What would you change? What journal rankings would you add?

UPDATE: Do readers believe the rankings are an accurate reflection of the field? Any surprises? 

Health epidemics have a multilayered, long-standing impact on society as a whole, and an inordinate impact on women. Particularly in a country like Iraq where progress on women's rights and issues has been slowly gaining more traction in recent years, the coronavirus threatens to halt progress on these key issues and give lower priorities to women's concerns that are still vital during such a time of crisis. While more men than women seem to get infected with the new coronavirus globally--there is no gender-disaggregated data for Iraq--, the social impact of the virus in countries that already have been through the worst of the pandemic can serve as important indicators for Iraq.

The social impact of the coronavirus has had an uneven impact on women more than men in the first countries hit by the coronavirus in East Asia. Notably, in South Korea, women have taken on a larger burden than men in taking care of children forced to stay at home due to school closures, as societal norms more often place the burden for childcare on women. Not only does this put greater pressure on women who are in many cases already the primary caretakers at home, but it makes them more likely to lose their jobs as they are forced to divert more time to childcare. These societal norms also mean women are more likely to be exposed by the virus, as they are stuck in a caretaker role for sick family members and makeup over 70% of the healthcare sector according to a World Health Organization Report.

Women forced to stay home and work less in order to dedicate more time to caretaking also means that women are more likely to suffer from the economic impact of the virus, whether that means job loss or wage reductions. This means that even after the virus has effectively contained, women are more likely to suffer from the economic fallout than men long after the virus is gone.

In addition, in China, rights activists reported an increase in domestic violence cases, as lockdowns and economic pressure have increased tensions in many households. Particularly at the epicenter of the virus in Wuhan, China, activists reported a threefold increase in domestic abuse cases. The quarantine measures in place, while cases were at their height in China, made it difficult for activists to provide aid, and diverted police attention away from assisting women who suffered from domestic abuse. This disruption of support networks makes it more difficult for women to report domestic abuse cases and to get away from their abusers.

Social, cultural, and political barriers to women's participation in Iraq might lead to disproportionate effects based on gender. First, there have already been voices raising concerns that some families might not allow women who had tested positive for the virus to be quarantined, as more traditional culture is against women to remain unaccompanied. Not only would this present a serious threat to the health of individual women, but such refusals by conservative families to follow the recommendations of medical personnel may contribute to undermining the government measures to contain the virus. Second, women's representation in government is already limited in Iraq, and with a limited voice in the decision-making chambers of government, their gender-sensitive concerns will likely be less of a priority to Iraq's policy makers. And finally, Iraq's economic situation that was in decline even before the outbreak might further impact the poor economic opportunities already facing women in Iraq.

Beyond the loss of life and social and economic impacts on men and women in Iraq, the crisis is also an opportunity for the government and civil society to increase engagement with the most vulnerable groups, including women, and bring them in as a major element of preventing the spread of the virus. Societal norms placing women into the primary caretaker role in homes means they will have a greater awareness of how the virus is spreading, so they can report more accurate information. In addition, polling conducted in several countries suggests that women are more concerned with the spread of the virus than men. The government could take advantage of this trend by bringing women into the process of raising awareness and concern about the virus among Iraq's population.

Given the unequal impact, the social impact of coronavirus will have on women, the Iraqi government and civil society partners should prioritize making sure issues that impact women are not sidelined during the crisis. Support networks should strengthen their outreach efforts and make resources for women's health and domestic abuse support more accessible, ideally with government backing. It is especially important that the government prioritize getting out accurate information on the coronavirus and work with the support of tribal and religious leaders to encourage families to follow quarantine procedures for women who test positive for the virus.


Women participating in NDI's National Reconciliation Program prepare food baskets in Kirkuk to help their community cope with movement restrictions taken in response to COVID-19

Gender, Women and Democracy, Countries: Iraq

This year, CEGA was recognized by the American Economic Association (AEA) for our efforts to promote diversity and inclusion in the field of economics and within our center. In this post, Maya Ranganath, Associate Director of Global Networks and Inclusion, reflects on CEGA's inclusion strategy, pointing to unequal power dynamics in global development research and discussing how CEGA ensures that our work — externally and internally — is consistently aligned with our core values.CEGA Fellows, from left to right: Jaah Mkupete, Fola Aina, Hellen Namawejje, Caroline Sitienei Koech, Arnold Musungu, Ojiri Enahoro Innocent, and Muthoni Ng'ang'a, alongside Maya Ranganath at PacDev 2024 | Credit: CEGAAt CEGA, we regularly reflect on what it means to produce evidence for decision-makers in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) from our position at an elite academic institution in the United States. In recent years, we have increasingly focused on how scientific narratives are "owned" by privileged groups and have updated our diversity, equity, inclusion, and justice (DEIJ) strategy to address this dynamic. While inclusion has always been core to CEGA, we have consistently updated our strategies to match evolutions in the development research ecosystem.CEGA's theory of change centers our DEIJ goals: our third pillar is to "make the evidence ecosystem more inclusive." We pursue three interlocking objectives in support of this:To center the voices of underrepresented groups — including researchers, decision-makers, and study participants in LMICs — in social science research and policy debates.To ensure that rigorous evidence exists to help decision-makers in LMICs address injustices in society.To create a diverse and welcoming community at CEGA, respect and reflect the communities in which we live and work, and encourage the broader evidence-informed policy ecosystem to seek the same.We pursue these objectives by investing in LMIC scholars and institutions, supporting inclusive and equitable research, promoting ethics in research, diversifying our networks and team, and creating an environment where our staff and researchers feel a sense of belonging. Below we highlight some of the most important aspects of our DEIJ strategy.Investing in LMIC Scholars and InstitutionsSince 2008, CEGA's Global Networks initiative has bolstered the leadership of scholars from Africa, South Asia, and other low-income regions by equipping them with the tools, skills, networks, and funding they need to thrive. We organize short-course workshops, host semester-long fellowships, and provide extensive follow-on support. To date, CEGA has hosted 85 scholars at UC Berkeley, Northwestern University, and virtually. The fellowships provide the opportunity to audit relevant courses, present work in seminars, apply to competitive funding calls, receive mentorship, and network with faculty members and students. These scholars have received nearly $2 million in grant funding to promote their independent research activities and mainstream of development research globally. Program alumni started the Network of Impact Evaluation Researchers in Africa (NIERA) in 2018, an independent organization of former fellows that works to advance decision-focused evaluations in sub-Saharan Africa.Importantly, the capacity-strengthening support we provide to LMIC scholars is designed to meet the demand for training and mentorship in the short- and medium-term. Longer term, we are eager to support the transfer of ownership of these types of programs to LMIC institutions, to leverage their growing capacity and resources to train and mentor the next generation of African scholars.As a learning organization, CEGA is committed to pursuing open inquiry and debate about the barriers to — and opportunities for — inclusion across the evidence-informed policy ecosystem. Through our Collaboration for Inclusive Development Research (CIDR), we are working with NIERA to develop an evidence-based theory of change for inclusion that delineates which stakeholders are best placed to add value at various stages of the research-to-policy pipeline.Supporting Inclusive and Equitable ResearchMany research approaches in development economics reinforce Western notions of "epistemic superiority" over indigenous ways of knowing. CEGA has long encouraged an inclusive approach and a plurality of methods and disciplines that, together, make our research more accessible and more relevant to a broader range of stakeholders. While we continue to prioritize the use of impact evaluations where feasible and appropriate, we also support studies that leverage quasi-experimental methods, qualitative methods, data science, and mixed-methods approaches.As a re-granting institution, we recognize our power to fund research equitably and inclusively and support research that challenges unequal power structures. Our research granting policy formalizes how and when research teams should consider DEIJ criteria when awarding new grants. Typically, when evaluating research proposals, we include criteria that assess the diversity of the research team and of the larger portfolio. We have also developed a "co-authorship statement" with our grant awards outlining how researchers should be credited for their contributions, encouraging greater equity within research teams.CEGA prioritizes research activities that address persistent inequities and injustices in society. This means moving beyond sub-group analysis and conducting research with transformational potential for traditionally disadvantaged groups. For example, CEGA recently established a "Gender & Agency" theme to support gender transformative research aimed at dismantling harmful power structures and promoting gender equity. Additionally, our domestic-facing portfolio, the Opportunity Lab, hosts an initiative on "Racial Equity in the Labor Market," which examines the role of state and federal wage and employment policy in reducing racial disparities and promoting greater equity of economic opportunity in the United States.CEGA's Berkeley Initiative for Transparency in the Social Sciences (BITSS) works to democratize the way social science is produced, scrutinized, and shared by realigning incentives for knowledge generation and use. For example, the BITSS catalyst program invests in scholars from LMICs to encourage transparent and reproducible research. Tools and standards that foster open access to data, code, and published research make it easier for LMIC researchers to access and advance new research. Additionally, the Social Science Prediction Platform (SSPP) provides a tool for sourcing input from community members, amplifying local knowledge, and helping to inform better research.Diversifying our Network and TeamCEGA continues to pursue a more diverse staff and network of affiliates. We have audited and refined our hiring processes, writing more inclusive job descriptions, disseminating them to diverse institutions, and developing a more equitable interview process. While the work of diversifying our organization will never be "finished," our efforts have yielded some progress: currently, 27% of our staff come from underrepresented backgrounds (as defined by UC Berkeley), up from 9% only three years ago. To track our progress, we conduct annual demographic surveys with staff, measure staff perceptions of the Center's equity and inclusivity, and enable anonymous feedback mechanisms. Meanwhile, we recently revamped our compensation framework to ensure that staff of different backgrounds are compensated equitably and transparently. We also audited and adapted our affiliate nomination process to ensure it is equitable and conducive to a diverse network. Importantly, we maintain a variety of staff forums to discuss our positionality in development research and reflect on current events in our communities.CEGA's DEIJ work is managed by a dedicated working group that I lead as the Associate Director of Global Networks and Inclusion, and guided by an internal DEIJ strategy and set of key performance indicators. We are energized by the AEA's recognition of our efforts over the years, while acknowledging that we have a long way to go to achieve our DEIJ goals. In this spirit, we welcome your comments and feedback on our approach. We further commit to sharing our learnings, including our challenges and failures, openly and transparently. Please stay tuned for more updates on DEIJ in the near future.CEGA's Award-Winning Approach to Promoting Diversity and Inclusion was originally published in CEGA on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.

It's not too early to declare some winners
and losers in Louisiana's state elections this cycle, primarily because so
many contests already have been decided or wrote on the wall what will come in next
month's runoff elections.

WINNER: Jeff Landry. The Republican attorney
general wiped out all opposition in the gubernatorial race, in the most
impressive display of the 1974 Constitution era. He became the first first-time
candidate ever to win without a runoff and joining only Democrat Edwin Edwards
(1983), Republican Mike Foster (1999), and Republican Bobby Jindal (2007 and
2011) in pulling off the feat of a general election triumph. That he did so
bodes well for his powers of persuasion in herding the Legislature, which
almost certainly will deliver supermajorities for his party, towards delivering
on an agenda that looks to be the most transformative in a century.

WINNER: Billy Nungesser.
The chattering class (see Loser below) thought he could give Landry a run for
his money and were somewhat surprised when the Republican passed on that race
to win reelection as lieutenant governor. Perhaps he knew something that other
like GOP Treas. John Schroder
and GOP state Sen. Sharon Hewitt
didn't, that Landry would win. His big win keeps him in office while others
retire or hope to bag jobs in the Landry Administration.

WINNER: Jefferson Parish GOP legislators.
Too often, a majority of this group abandoned a conservative agenda in favor of
licking the boots of Democrat Gov. John Bel Edwards, which
made a few of them targets in their reelection campaigns of conservative insurgents.
Those challenged all survived, from narrowly to easily. Now they conveniently can
flip-flop to back Landry's agenda (with one exception: closed primaries that
threaten their continued service) since they know they can't stop it and thus
try to keep their political careers alive.

LOSER: Louisiana Democrats. The party's
ruling white powerbrokers ran a poor gubernatorial candidate in the form of former
cabinet member Shawn Wilson, knowing they had to have some black face to head
the ticket to stave off extremist left insurgent black competitors. The
inevitability of Landry also discouraged turnout, dooming any chance to prevent
Republicans from doing no worse in legislative contests that ensured retention
of a supermajority. Landry's win and separate Board of Elementary and Secondary
Education campaigns that also weren't close now gives the GOP a commanding 9-2
edge on that body. And Republicans after Nov. 18 will have swept all statewide
offices, after all but one of these contests put them within a few points of
winning outright in the general election, if not Landry and Nungesser winning
then.

Two other indicators demonstrate the reality of this
rout. A white Democrat minister named Danny Cole raised and spent no money in
running for governor, conducting his campaign solely through free social media
and personal appearances, yet grabbed 3 percent of the vote, such was the dissatisfaction
with Wilson. And in Caddo Parish, for sheriff former Shreveport city councilor
Republican John Nickelson racked up
45 percent of the vote against black Democrat former Shreveport chief
administrative officer Henry Whitehorn's 35 percent, even though Nickelson has
no law enforcement experience and Whitehorn has decades of it, in a parish
with a solid Democrat plurality and bare white plurality. Statewide Democrats
had zero coattails, and the results sends the strongest signal yet that unless
it abandons its far-left agenda it will have no impact on policy-making on
state issues.

LOSER: Legacy media. Whatever generally left-leaning
newspaper and television outlets did, in terms of story selections trying to
slow Landry or cajoling him to turn out for debates hoping to catch him off guard,
failed. Landry as well as a number of conservative candidates simply ignored
media requests and campaigned emphasizing cutting out intermediaries like the
media – Landry showed up for exactly one of several media-sponsored candidate
forums – by going directly to voters. As a result, the state's chattering class
had almost no influence on election outcomes and face increasing irrelevancy in
trying to shape policy outcomes going forward.

LOSER: Clay Schexnayder.
After four years of serving as House of Representative speaker kissing up to
Edwards on budget and several other major issues, although the dictates of the
GOP supermajority more often pushed policy in a conservative direction, Schexnayder
hoped that this triangulation legacy could retain enough conservatives and capture
enough non-conservatives in the electorate to attain the secretary of state's
office, aided by business-as-usual monied interests, to extend his political
career and set himself up for future advancement. Instead, he finished a dismal
fourth that extinguishes his hopes.

Marc Joffe


With so many people obtaining Medicaid coverage in the wake of the Affordable Care Act and during the pandemic, it is worth investigating whether this expanded eligibility is improving health outcomes. Overall, decreases in the proportion of uninsured individuals over the last decade are not being matched by improved life expectancy. Indeed, life expectancy at birth in 2021 was lower than it was when the Affordable Care Act passed. But this fact tells us little about the benefits of Medicaid coverage since the decline has been driven in large part by COVID-19 deaths among elderly patients (often not on Medicaid) as well as increased mortality from accidents and drug overdoses.
To better gauge the benefits of Medicaid, it is necessary to look at more specific health indicators. The federal Center for Medicaid and CHIP Services (CMCS) compiles a large variety of healthcare quality measures that could help us analyze outcomes. Unfortunately, most of these measures are not available for all states and all years, making it difficult to assess performance in a systematic way.
One indicator that is generally available is the rate of low birth weight, which is the percentage of newborns weighing less than 2500 grams, or about five pounds eight ounces. Low birth weight (LBW) babies have "a higher risk of morbidity, stunting in childhood, and long‐​term developmental and physical ill health including adult‐​onset chronic conditions such as cardiovascular disease." Consequently, reducing the incidence of LBW should improve public health, but Medicaid services are not achieving this outcome.
A 2019 study in JAMA found no correlation between Affordable Care Act Medicaid expansion and LBW. The authors used administrative records to obtain rates of LBW (and some other adverse birth outcomes) before and after Medicaid expansion in states that accepted the expansion and those that did not. The change in LBW rates in expansion states was not significantly different than that in non‐​expansion states. The authors did find some improvement for Black infants in expansion states, but not for white or Hispanic infants.
Overall, the US is not among the countries that have had the best success in minimizing low birth weight. A 2015 World Health Organization analysis ranked the US 64th among 146countries, with such less affluent nations as Albania. China, and Cuba performing better. Poor US outcomes have been attributed to the use of fertility drugs (which increases the likelihood that a mother will give birth to twins or triplets) and the high rate of Caesarian sections.
According to data from the CDC WONDER Database, 8.3% of US babies born in 2019 were low birth weight. The LBW rate among Medicaid patients was substantially higher, coming in at 9.8% (WONDER also has 2020 and 2021 data, but I chose 2019 data to avoid any pandemic‐​related affects).
In the District of Columbia, the LBW disparity between Medicaid‐​financed births and those with other types of coverage is especially stark. In 2019. DC's overall LBW rate was 9.9%. For Medicaid births, it was 12.7% and for non‐​Medicaid births it was only 7.4%. And, it does not appear that this disparity is caused by a lack of access to government‐​paid medical services: the Medicaid and CHIP Payment and Access Commission (MACPAC) reports that (in 2018) 99.3% of DC Medicaid births took place in a hospital and that 91.7% were attended by a physician, with almost all of the remainder attended by a Certified Nurse Midwife.
The risk of low birth weight can be minimized through proper nutrition, not smoking, and avoiding narcotics. These risks can be controlled with non‐​medical interventions. For example, at‐​risk mothers can be accommodated at maternity homes, where their diet and substance use can be carefully supervised. The widespread use of maternity homes in Cuba may explain the low rate of LBW in that country (although Cuba's health statistics have been subject to criticism).
WONDER provides statistics on tobacco use in pregnant women. In DC, the LBW rate among Medicaid tobacco users was 23.7%. Unfortunately, data are not available for other types of substance abuse or malnutrition, however Wallethub recently ranked DC's drug use fifth among all states (plus DC).
Some states are devoting Medicaid resources to the "social determinants of health", funding non‐​medical services such as housing and nutrition that are intended to address health inequities. DC has an Office of Health Equity that supports "projects, policies and research that will enable every resident to achieve their optimal level of health — regardless of where they live, learn, work, play or age." But these added efforts are not making a dent in LBW.
Despite spending over $3 billion on Medicaid annually, DC (like other parts of the US), has pregnancy outcomes that are on a par with or even below those of developing countries. It appears that providing costly pregnancy services cannot substitute for the basic health precautions we hope all expectant mothers will take.

All the ignorance, fibbing, and emoting doesn't change
the facts that make Republican state Rep. Gabe Firment's
HB 463
worth enacting, if not vitally so, into law.

The bill would prohibit any procedure that physically
or hormonally changes the sexual physiology of a minor, except in the very rare
instances of disorder of sex development or dealing with the consequences of
previous attempts to change sex. Science unimpeachably
supports
the proposition behind the bill that these permanent alterations to children almost
always cause more harm than good, and out of an abundance of caution under the
watchful waiting protocol typically practiced in Europe that plays out to allow for developing physical, mental, and maturity until adulthood for those who at some
point believe they want to try to change their sex, this protects children from rash decision-making by them and others affecting their adolescent
lives.

Unfortunately, this area of investigation suffers from
a plague of poor research quality. Common problems of these studies feature
unrepresentative samples, lack of adequate controls, and unjustified inferential
leaps. The efforts that do the best in avoiding these pitfalls shatter common myths
circulated by advocates of making permanent physical changes to children who at
some point identify as transgender.

One myth concerning about these children is they
have an elevated desire for suicide and related indicators of harm solely
because they feel their identity mismatched with their sex. In fact, that risk
is comparable to that of other psychological conditions such as depression, anorexia,
and autism that predisposes them to suicide, and in some cases differ little significantly
from the population without these conditions.

Where elevated levels are observed in large part occur
because of the high degree of association of transgender identification with
these and other psychological disorders. (Also associated: natal sex, where
girls are significantly more likely to report a desire to change sex.) As for a
counter hypothesis that societal attitudes create a stigma driving confused
children to self-harm, quality research simply doesn't support that and this notion
runs counter to experiences in previous historical periods where even greater societal
pressures operated on children to conform to certain sex roles yet the child
suicide rate was much lower.

The best, most recent research reveals that transgendered-identified
youth respond well to traditional psychotherapy in alleviating psychological
distress, whereas long-run studies of those who underwent medical transition show
this doesn't reduce and perhaps even exacerbates distress. Other research
indicates that social contagion or psychological difficulties with
parents encourages adopting identification differing from sex as a response
to these stimuli.

Another myth is that the rate of suicide and other
contemplated harmful behavior decreases with physical alterations. Collectively,
quality research suggests a "honeymoon" period in the short run, but the sparse
long-term research available paints a disturbing picture where harmful thinking
returns, with those who underwent surgery or medication having a significantly higher
rate of suicide attempts, pointing to the underlying mental health causes
associated with a desire to change sex.

Finally, there is the myth that those who do undergo
physical transition overwhelmingly are satisfied. Again, when reviewing the
best research, there is no evidence of this, and there is plenty of anecdotal
evidence demonstrating a significant number of those altered surgically or
medicinally having regrets. Further, any observed childhood dysphoria if left
untreated physically typically turns
into desisting from a desire to change sex and by adulthood those who had it
most likely will adopt homosexuality.

In other words, given the state of quality
research, claims that preference must be given to the wishes of children at a
given moment that they should undergo physical and endocrinological mutilation
are reckless and irresponsible, built upon myth and ideological opportunism,
and that medical professionals complicit in this shamefully either are ignorant
about the area in which they assert to have expertise or they are driven by
motives unrecognizable from those associated with the Hippocratic Oath.
Regrettably, several such individuals appeared to testify against the bill.

(Also deserving of opprobrium is a study,
requested by a resolution Firment had pass last year, by the Department of
Health utilizing Medicaid data which it largely contracted out that did provide
some useful data but completely botched an assessment of outcomes, due to search
criteria that ignored research quality and limited substantially the number evaluated
while including studies with the problems listed above. This stood in stark
contrast to a much more comprehensive and careful study
compiled for the Florida Agency for Healthcare Administration last year that
didn't largely waste taxpayer dollars.)

The emoting part was left to a parade of allegedly
potentially aggrieved adults over these restrictions. They represent the
children of intellectual trends that have invaded the academy and public square
that place primacy on people's feelings and perceptions rather than evidence-based
data and critical thinking in the making of policy, a mindset that increasingly
marks the thinking of the political left.

Even so, some leftist allies didn't buy it. This
week, the House
Health and Welfare Committee passed
the bill by substitute with only a couple of Democrats, state Reps. Jason Hughes
and Larry
Selders, and the most roguish Republican in the chamber, state Rep. Joe Stagni,
opposing the other 14 members (including recent new Democrat Roy Daryl Adams).
This poses a big political problem for Democrat Gov. John Bel Edwards,
who two years ago said he
would veto that kind of bill and others restricting a transgender agenda.

That's because last
year with Democrats aiding Republicans, he capitulated on a bill he vetoed the
year before that prevented biological males from competing in athletic events restricted
to biological females and also had
a veto overturned, demonstrating if the numbers are enough he can't stop
bills from becoming law. The committee vote's overwhelming nature compels the
bill's moving forward until it becomes law, and rightly so. Children's welfare
and lives depend upon it.

NDI's Chris Fomunyoh is once again joined by Ambassador Johnnie Carson as they discuss the steps that can be taken to strengthen democracy. They continue their conversation with their thoughts on the key challenges and opportunities facing Africa this year.
Find us on: SoundCloud | Apple Podcasts | Spotify | RSS | Google Play
Johnnie Carson: When female voices are not heard, the conversation is crippled, the policy is crippled, the institutions are crippled and the results are crippled.
Chris Fomunyoh: I'm Chris Fomunyoh, senior associate and regional director for Central and West Africa at the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, NDI. Welcome to this edition of DemWorks.

Again we're joined by Ambassador Johnnie Carson, a proud member of the board of directors of The National Democratic Institute, NDI with a 37 year career in the U.S. Foreign Service focus on Africa. In our previous episode, you spoke about the risk of back sliding. So for this episode, we will focus on the steps that can be taken to strengthen democracy in Africa.

I'd like us to pivot a little bit to the Sahel because in Tanzania we see the back sliding that's coming from political actors themselves, but there's something happening in the Sahel, which is a region in which we see a lot of political commitment to democratic governance, whether it's from the leaders and activists in Niger Republic, in Burkina Faso and in Mali, but at the same time these countries are coming under tremendous pressure from violent extremists who are coming across the desert and destabilizing what would be an emerging democracy and what concerns do you have and how do you think organizations like NDI, like USIP and others that have the self-power expertise, so to speak can contribute to the efforts to counter violent extremism like Sahel and also the whole of Africa?

JC: Chris you're absolutely right and we should all be concerned about outside forces that can come in and destabilize a country, its politics, its economy and its society and across the Sahel we in fact see this happening. The challenges to stability, to democracy to holding free and transparent and creditable elections and having democratic systems that work, are not only challenged by sometimes authoritarian leaders seeking to maintain power and control, we also can see this emerging as a result of exogenous forces coming in from outside, and here we see non-state actors undermining stability across the Sahel, which is creating tension for democracies and tensions for states.

I think one of the things that is absolutely critical in addressing the problems with the Sahel is for government to reconnect with their citizens, to put in place the kinds of services that citizens are looking for and are demanding and expecting. They need to be responsive to the needs that they, citizens believe are not there and they have to have these connections in order to build up resilience, to build up strength against the ideologies and to the negative forces that are brought in by extremist groups.

It is extremists groups across the Sahel are taking advantage of the absence of good services and good connectivity between government and citizens and one of the things that must accompany the security response is in fact a development and government response. Security alone cannot end the problems in the Sahel. It's an important ingredient but the most important ingredient is government going in and establishing responsible connections, providing services, education, healthcare, sanitation, water cattle feeding stations and services that citizens require and are being deprived of.

So one of the things that must be hand in hand and be out front is not the military response and the security response but the governance response, the social service response and if that is absent, the security response will be deficient and will not work.

CF: In fact, I'm so thankful you say that, because I know that you and other members of our board, Secretary Albright, in particular the chair of our board, you've been emphasizing reinforcing this message about democracy and development component as part of the toolkit in conquering violent extremism and in fact, that's the approach that NDI is taking to its work in the Sahel because we currently have ongoing programs in Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, and our focus, the main focus of that piece of work is on people, processes and the politics and trying to create platforms where governments can reconnect with citizens at a grassroots level.

So in a number of cases we've set up platforms where civil society with legislatures and members of the executive branch, including representatives of the security services get together regularly to figure out what the challenges are in various communities and how to foster inter-communal dialogue and better relationships between the security services and the populations that they seek to serve, because you may remember there was a UN study that said that in many of the cases where violent extremism persist, that 70% of the people who join extremist organizations, are reacting to poor performance by security services and you have paid a lot of attention to Nigerian and the whole Boko Haram phenomenon.

I don't know how this would fit into our conversation with regards to the Sahel as well.


JC: I think it also very pertinent for Nigeria, and I too have seen studies of some very distinguished organizations, Mercy Corps and others that talk about why people are recruited and indeed, the authoritarian sometimes brutal nature of security forces towards communities that they should be protecting drives individuals away from the government and into the hands of Boko Haram.

Even the origin of the current violence in Northern Nigeria has its origins in the brutal extrajudicial killing of Boko Haram's first leader in 2009. His apprehension, his questioning, his interrogation, torture and mistreatment were all recorded on someone's cellphone and became widely seen throughout the country and throughout the north. Two years later, after that event in 2009 we saw and upsurge in 2011 and the activities of Boko Haram and indeed people continued to say that the brutal nature in which the security forces sought to root out Boko Haram, in fact generated more recruits for Boko Haram than it did for support for the government's efforts.

It is absolutely critical, it's absolutely critical that security forces recognize that they have a responsibility to protect the civil liberties and the human rights of the citizens of the state that they are protecting and that the way they treat the individuals in areas that they go into, may have an impact on their ability to ultimately win the conflict, but one thinks of Nigeria and particularly of the North East and there again weak institutions of corruption of lack of social services are all playing a major part in why the conflict in that region continues.

In the north east of Nigeria particularly and the three most affected states, Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. Those three states have the lowest social indicators of any of Nigeria's 36 states, less access to education, to healthcare, to water resources and to jobs and access and this all plays out as well. Governments needs to be responsive to their citizens and while a security response is important, governance and providing social services and the needs to citizens to build resilience is critical as well.

CF: This seems like a good place to take a short break. For well over 35 years NDI has been honored to work side by side with courageous and committed pro-democracy activists and leaders around the world to help contribute to develop the institutions practices and skills necessary for democracy's success.

I realize it's many countries to cover but in the few minutes that are left, I just see if you have any parting words for four countries that we haven't really focused that much on and those are Ethiopia, Kenya, The Democratic Republic of Congo and we'll exit with Cameroon. What are your thoughts?

JC: My thoughts on Ethiopia. It is absolutely essential that those of us who support a democracy and democratic progress lend all of our efforts to those of the Ethiopian government to ensure that the democratic experiment that is underway is successful. Prime Minister Abiy won the Nobel Prize for bringing about peace with Eritrea but the more important thing is that we, outside step up our effort to help him ensure that his legislative elections, this year, are successful and that we do what we can to strengthen his country's democratic progress.

He has appointed and outstanding leader, Birtukan, former opposition leader, spent many years in jail as his country's election commissioner. We need on the outside to provide the kind of technical and financial and advocacy support that she might need to put in place the architecture for running the country's elections. It will in fact be the first real serious elections in that country since the collapse of the Derg in the early 1990s. So it's important that we help do this.

Ethiopia is Africa's second most populous country behind Nigeria and it's important that we help democracy there. It's also a key and strategic state in the region bordering a number of other countries that will look to the success of what happens here. So we need to support.

Kenya, will have elections next year. It is important that there be a continuation in the improvement of the country's electoral agencies. The shadow of the flawed and failed and controversial and violent elections of 2007 and 2008 continue to be a shadow. The controversies associated with the last elections and court decisions there continue to hang over. It is important to continue to support civil society, support the electoral commission and work with the Kenyan government to ensure an outcome.

It appears very clearly that President Kenyatta wants to leave a positive legacy of progress, economically, politically and electorally. This will be a challenge but we should support the process moving forward. The features are still there.

CF: In fact, I should say before end up with the last two countries that for listeners, Ethiopia has got a parliamentary system of government. That's why the parliamentary elections are extremely important, the national elections for Ethiopia and also with regards to Kenya, as you say, President Uhuru Kenyatta would like to leave a good legacy. He's coming to the end of his second term and NDI working with partners on the continent has been very strong on the issue constitutionalism, respect for rule of law. In fact, we had a continent wide conference in Niamey, Niger Republic last October on the whole question of presidential term limits and we'll be having a second conference in Botswana in June to discuss term limits with former African heads of states and various other partners on the continent.

Just to say that, as leaders relinquish power when their terms come to an end, they help consolidate and strengthen democratic practices and institutions. So, with the two remaining countries-

JC: I applaud President Kenyatta for saying very early on that he would adhere to the constitution, he would serve two terms and step down. This is an important message for the most important country in East Africa, especially looking at the neighboring states, particularly Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda where leaders there have found ways to extend themselves in office. He recognizes the importance of transition at the top and allowing the citizens of the country to select new leadership on a constitutional basis rather than trying to alter the constitution to eliminate term limits, age limits and perpetuate themselves in power.

So I hope others in the region are in fact looking at Kenya's model. One jumps across to West Africa and looks at President Paul Biya who's been in power for three decades, plus shows no desire whatsoever to leave office. Here is a man who has lost touch with his citizens and the communities of his country and because he has lost touch with his citizens, because there have been structural deficiencies and weaknesses and the institutions that he is responsible for, we now see a country that is suffering from three or four major political crisis, crisis with the English speaking portion of this country in the south west, the emergence of Boko Haram and radicalism across the border from Nigeria in the north west and problems of herders and farmers driven by drought and climate conditions.

President Biya has lost touch with the needs of his citizens and his government has not been responsive to anyone but himself and a small political elite. I think it is important for the international community to point out the failures and the flaws of his governance, the corruption that underpins it and to support those internally who are pushing for a constitution and political policies that fundamentally change the nature and structure of society, political architecture in society.

CF: You're so right, because that's one country that it's got tremendous potential but that it's not pulling its weight at all and because of its strategic location, invariably weakens other countries in the central Africa sub region, as well as in West Africa too and it's now taking full advantage of what could be real opportunities to improve the wellbeing of its citizens.

We'll be right back after this quick message.

And let's end with the country right in the heart of the continent, The Democratic Republic of Congo. I was in Kinshasa in October and met with political leaders and opinion leaders across the board, civil society, religious leaders who are very powerful in the Congo, very influential and I came away, I should say, a little more optimistic than I was going in. I was quite apprehensive given what has transpired in the 2018 presidential elections but after talking to the Congolese, I got a sense that a genuine attachment to reform.

Everybody wants some reforms of the political process or the electoral process and the key question is whether they are going to be able to set aside their personal agendas and actually get together to help this country, which has got tremendous resources and tremendous potential get back on its feet. I was very impressed by the fact that most of the leaders in Congo are pretty young. I know that you and I have talked about Congo for many, many times and when you were still in the administration you had to deal with some of their crisis.

I don't know what you take is on the present leadership and the present challenges but also the opportunities that present themselves in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

JC: Let me say that The Democratic Republic of the Congo has more unrealized potential than any other large state in Africa and that potential has continued to be in held in check and not realized because of the poor nature of the politics that have occurred there since the 1960s.

The 2018 elections were deeply flawed and irregular and not representative, I think, of the vote of the people. The one thing that one can say about the process that it did lead to President Kabila stepping down and a new younger president, Tshisekedi coming into power. There was immediately after the election a strong feeling that Tshisekedi was going to be instrument of Kabila going forward in that his leadership and his authority and his ability to do things would be substantially constrained. Tshisekedi has shown some degree of independence.

It is again important to recognize that there is little we can do to rerun that election or to reverse it but there is something that all of us can do going forward, and that to put pressure on President Tshisekedi to ensure that the electoral commission is strengthened, it has more independence, more technical capacity and more of an ability to deliver a more responsible, fair and transparent election going forward.

It is also important that he continue the fight against corruption, that he begin to put in place the kind of economic reforms that are going to unleash the potential of the Congo and to provide the people, The Democratic Republic of the Congo an opportunity to realize so many of the opportunities that they have been denied in the past. He has shown more independence than I thought but it is important that he not stop, that he continue to move forward, that he open up political space and continue to open it up for civil society, for the opposition, for the media, that he not constrain but unleash the country's potential and that he continue to show both in reality and fact his independence away from Kabila and those who were around him in the past.

He will be judged on the next four years very keenly, but it's important that the institutions of democracy to the extent that we can help civil society strengthen them, that they be nurtured and pushed forward. Elections and democracy...Democracy doesn't depend essentially, solely on elections. It is institutions that must be strengthened and we can help the DRC and civil society move those forward.

Again, working effectively with religions groups, Catholic Church, a very powerful instrument, working with women's groups, with working youth groups across the DRC and working with an emerging entrepreneurial class of young Congolese as well. We have to nurture and strengthen and push them forward. These next elections will be able to tell us whether there's been progress. President Tshisekedi needs to continue to move forward.

CF: Thank you very much Ambassador Johnnie Carson. It's really been an honor to have you do this tutor for us on the entire continent. Of course there still would always be ground to cover. As you were speaking, I thought about what late President John F Kennedy said about democracy as a never ending endeavor, and so NDI and similar organizations will continue to work side by side with our African partners to make sure that we can support them, give them the support and share experiences that they need so that we can all collectively, continue to work to strengthen and support democracy in countries like the DRC, Ethiopia, Sudan and across the entire continent.

Thank you also for being a member of our board of directors. We are extremely proud of that and extremely proud of the partnership that NDI has with USIP and hope that our two organizations would continue to work together to support the growth of democracy across Africa and to our listeners, can I just say thank you for sharing in this edition of DemWorks, to follow our next podcast. Please check us out on our website www.NDI.org.

Thank you for listening.


Ambassador Johnnie Carson





Peace, Security and Democratic Resilience,

Last month, CEGA held its ninth annual Measuring Development (MeasureDev) conference on "Mitigating the Risks and Impacts of Climate Change," in partnership with the World Bank's Development Impact Evaluation (DIME) Department, Data Analytics and Tools Unit (DECAT), and the University of Chicago's Development Innovation Lab (DIL). Speakers showcased innovative approaches for measuring and tracking climate-related risk, developing effective responses, and evaluating outcomes in data-sparse environments. Sean Luna McAdams, CEGA's Data Science for Development Program Manager, shares key insights from the event here.Climate change is disrupting weather patterns around the world. Look no further than the unhealthy levels of smoke in the Northeast's skies last week. The impacts on human activity require urgent investments in mitigation and resilience for those most vulnerable. Last month, CEGA, DIL, and the World Bank brought together some of the most innovative social and natural scientists working on this existential challenge to share how they are pushing the frontiers of data collection, for example by using remote sensing technologies, engaging in participatory data collection, and effectively (and meaningfully) integrating different data streams.University of Chicago's Rachel Glennester emphasized the importance of measurement to help diagnose, mitigate, and adapt to climate change, particularly to incentivize green investments in LMICs. Credit: World Bank.A Call for Better Measurement"Mitigation is one of the true global public goods," noted the University of Chicago's Rachel Glennester in her keynote address. Indeed, the efforts by one country or group of countries to reduce carbon emissions will have benefits that are felt worldwide. Recognizing that low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) — who have historically contributed little to climate change — nevertheless face growing opportunities to mitigate emissions for the whole planet, Rachel suggested high-income countries could fund highly costeffective mitigation efforts in LMICs. These payments should not be considered aid as they benefit the world and offset high income countries' damage to the atmosphere. To do this effectively we need scalable approaches to measuring emissions, among many other critical indicators.Cost-Effective Measurement with Remote SensingMany speakers addressed the challenge of cost-effective measurement through the use of remote sensing. CEGA Affiliate Tamma Carleton highlighted the promise of satellite imagery and machine learning (SIML) to improve climate management. Her own work on MOSAIKS demonstrates the potential for these data and predictive models to increase the spatial coverage and resolution of survey and administrative georeferenced data, while lowering barriers to access for decision-makers in low-resource settings. Similarly, Dieter Wang showcased how higher resolution and frequency satellite imagery alongside cloud-penetrating sensors can improve estimates of how well conservation policies in the Brazilian Amazon are preventing deforestation. Better measurement in this case makes it possible to reward governments through bonds whose rates are tied to mitigation performance. Kangogo Sogomo discussed a novel approach that leverages satellite imagery to predict maize yields at a finer scale with less computational resources.Since 2010, new satellites have come online that increase both sensor resolution and cloud-free revisit rate. These advances provide researchers with more granular and frequent imagery data to incorporate into their analyses. Credit: Burke et al, Science 2021.Of course, remote sensing is not just limited to satellites and can inform adaptation and resilience alongside mitigation. Samuel Seo, for example, compared measurement strategies for methane emissions from a large, unmanaged landfill in Dakar, Senegal by collecting data using human enumerators, drones, and satellites. Across the board, these measurements suggest that current approaches used by the IPCC underestimate total emissions from these sites by more than half. Bridget Hoffman instead used low-cost air pollution sensors along bus routes and within buses in Dakar to understand the effects of an infrastructure project on air quality. Drones, stationary sensors, and other instruments can all provide rich data at scale to improve the evaluation and monitoring of climate mitigation and adaptation strategies.The Role of Participatory Data CollectionResearchers and climate practitioners not only think creatively about the sensors they use to collect data, they also innovate data collection and its infrastructure to make it more participatory. Kangogo Sogomo noted increasing mobile phone use and internet penetration across the global South suggesting, "climate action is urgent… there is still an opportunity for having participatory methods [for data collection]." Tom Bewick, for example, has trained indigenous communities in Africa and Latin America how to collect georeferenced data on planted trees to improve the monitoring of their growth and local collective governance. Similarly, Kenneth Mubea, who works to conserve mangrove forests, discussed how his research assembled teams of students to work with local communities to collect georeferenced data. Participatory approaches can extend to model validation, as with the case of Alejandra Mortarini. She worked with organizations that have long-standing relationships with communities living in informal settlements in Honduras to help validate the outputs of the predictive model and calibrate it to improve its performance. By incorporating local actors into data collection efforts, we can increase its frequency, provide greater access, and contribute to a local culture of evidence-use.New Approaches to Data IntegrationA third strategy to make data collection cheaper and more effective relies on exploiting efficiencies generated by integrating different data streams. The World Bank's Stéphane Hallegatte stressed the opportunity of integrating different data sources in his remarks."We have all this fantastic progress in measurement with remote sensing and big data, we have these household surveys that are playing an absolutely critical role to measure what we are doing and to prioritize," said Hallegatte. "One of the big challenges is to make them completely interlinked and to flow smoothly from the spatial to household surveys, and have household surveys that can be more flexible when there is a shock that can use data coming from satellites to maybe focus and do dedicated surveys in places that have been affected by a shock."In particular, Hallegatte stressed that traditional measures of vulnerability may lead us to miss some individuals who may be critically underprepared to face the "long tails" of climate shocks. Adaptive research designs can help us understand which interventions work best in particular contexts and communities, improving our understanding of how climate systems affect those who are socioeconomically and environmentally most vulnerable and how we may build resilience together.Hallegatte stressed how different metrics of climate vulnerability can lead policy makers to prioritize different areas. Here we see how four different risk indicators — annual asset risk, annual consumption poverty increase, socioeconomic resilience, and annual well-being risk — map onto the Philippines. Source: Hallegatte 2023.Paola Agostini, Mohammed Basheer, and Erwin Knippenberg simulated physical and social systems in their research designs. These simulations enabled each of them to estimate new quantities of interest, like the decision-space of negotiations for potential dam designs in the Nile River Basin, the cost-per-benefit of different land restoration interventions in Tajikistan, or the percentage of the population at risk of falling into poverty due to weather shocks in Afghanistan. Ben Brunckhorst showed how the incorporation of weather predictions unlocks the possibility of anticipatory cash transfers with demonstrable effects on household resilience to flooding in Bangladesh.Through better measurement we can improve our collective efforts to meet the challenge of climate change. As Hallegatte reminded us in his keynote remarks, how we construct these measures of impact fundamentally affects what regions, communities, and interventions we prioritize. A critical part of this effort will be to leverage measurement strategies highlighted during MeasureDev 2023 to channel resources to the places and communities where interventions to mitigate and adapt to climate change will have the greatest impact. In so doing, measurement can contribute to a more equitable future by incentivizing green investments in LMICs.How does Measurement Contribute to a Habitable Planet for All? was originally published in CEGA on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.

Theory Talk #75: Tarak Barkawi on IR after the West, and why the best work in IR is often found at its marginsIn this Talk, Tarak Barkawi discusses the importance of the archive and real-world experiences, at a time of growing institutional constraints. He reflects on the growing rationalization and "schoolification" of the academy, a disciplinary and epistemological politics institutionalized within a university audit culture, and the future of IR in a post-COVID world. He also discusses IR's contorted relationship to the archive, and explore future sites of critical innovation and inquiry, including the value of knowledge production outside of the academy. PDF version of this TalkSo what is, or should be, according to you, the biggest challenge, or principal debate in critical social sciences and history?Right now, despite thinking about it, I don't have an answer to that question. Had you asked me five years ago, I would have said, without hesitation, Eurocentrism. There's a line in Chakrabarty's Provincializing Europe where he remarks that Europe has already been provincialized by history, but we still needed to provincialize it intellectually in the social sciences. Both sides of this equation have intensified in recent years. Amid a pandemic, in the wreckage of neoliberalism, in the wake of financial crisis, the defeats in Iraq and Afghanistan, the events of the Trump Presidency, and the return of the far right, the West feels fundamentally reduced in stature. The academy, meanwhile, has moved on from the postcolonial to the decolonial with its focus on alternative epistemologies, about which I am more ambivalent intellectually and politically. Western states and societies are powerful and rich, their freedoms attractive, and most of them will rebound. But what does it mean for the social sciences and other Western intellectual traditions which trace their heritage to the European Enlightenments that the West may no longer be 'the West', no longer the metropole of a global order more or less controlled by its leading states? What kind of implications does the disassembling of the West in world history have for social and political inquiry? I don't have an answer to that. Speaking more specifically about IR, we are dealing now with conservative appropriations of Eurocentrism, with the rise of other civilizational IRs (Chinese, European, Indian). These kinds of moves, like the decolonial one, foreground ultimately incommensurable systems of knowing and valuing, at best, and at worst are Eurocentrism with the signs reversed, usually to China. I do not think what we should be doing right now in the academy is having Chinese social sciences, Islamic social sciences, Indian social sciences, and so on. But that's definitely one way in which the collapse of the West is playing out intellectually. How did you arrive at where you currently are in your thinking about International Relations?By the time you get to my age you have a lot of debt, mostly to students, to old teachers and supervisors, and to colleagues and friends. University scholars tend not to have very exciting lives, so I don't have much to offer in the way of events. But I can give you an experience that I do keep revisiting when I reflect on the directions I've taken and the things I've been interested in. When I was in high school, I took a university course taught by Daniel Ellsberg, of the Pentagon Papers. As many will know, before he became involved in the Vietnam War, and later in opposing it, he worked on game theory and nuclear strategy. I grew up in Southern California, in Orange County, and there was a program that let you take courses at the University of California, Irvine. I took one on the history of the Roman Empire and then a pair of courses on nuclear weapons that culminated with one taught by Ellsberg himself. I actually had no idea who he was but the topic interested me. Nuclear war was in the air in the early 1980s. Activist graduate students taught the preparatory course. They were good teachers and I learned all about the history and politics of nuclear weapons. But I also came to realize that these teachers were trying to shape (what I would now call) my political subjectivity. Sometimes they were ham handed, like the old ball bearings in the tin can trick: turn the lights out in the room, and put one ball bearing in the can for each nuclear warhead in the world, in 1945 this many; in 1955 this many; and so on. In retrospect, that's where I got hooked on the idea of graduate school. I was aware that Ellsberg was regarded as an important personage. He taught in a large lecture hall. At every session, a kind of loyal corps of new and old activists turned out, many in some version of '60s attire. The father of a high school friend was desperate to get Ellsberg's autograph, and sent his son along with me to the lecture one night to get it. It was political instruction of the first order to figure out that this suburban dad had been a physics PhD at Berkley in the late '60s and early '70s, demonstrating against the Vietnam War. But now he worked for a major aerospace defense contractor. He had a hot tub in his backyard. Meanwhile, Ellsberg cancelled class one week because he'd been arrested demonstrating at a major arms fair in Los Angeles. "We stopped the arms race for a few hours," he told the class after. I schooled myself on who Ellsberg was and Vietnam, the Cold War, and much else came into view. Meanwhile, he gave a master class in nuclear weapons and foreign policy, cheekily naming his course after Kissinger's book, I later came to appreciate. I learned about RAND, the utility of madness for making nuclear threats, and how close we'd come to nuclear war since 1945. My high school had actually been built to double as a fallout shelter, at a time when civil defense was taken seriously as an aspect of a credible threat of second strike. It was low slung, stoutly built, with high iron fences that could be closed to create a cantonment. We were not far from Seal Beach Naval Weapons Station and a range of other likely targets. All of this sank in as I progressed in these courses. Then one day at a strip mall bookstore, I discovered Noam Chomsky's US foreign policy books and never looked back. At Cambridge, I caught the tail end of the old Centre of International Studies, originally started by an intelligence historian and explicitly multi-disciplinary. It had, in my time, historians, lawyers, area studies, development studies, political theory and history of thought, and IR scholars and political scientists. Boundaries certainly existed out there in the disciplines. But there weren't substantial institutional obstacles to thinking across them, while interdisciplinary environments gave you lots of local resources (i.e. colleagues and students) for thinking and reading creatively. What would a student need to become a kind of specialist in your kind of area or field or to understand the world in a global way? Lots of history, especially other peoples' histories; to experience what it's like to see the world from a different place than where you grew up, so that the foreign is not an abstraction to you. I think another route that can create very interesting scholars is to have a practitioner career first, in development, the military, a diplomatic corps, NGOs, whatever. Even only five years doing something like that not only teaches people how the world works, it is intellectually fecund, creative. People just out of operational posts are often full of ideas, and can access interesting resources for research, like professional networks. How, in your view, should IR responding to the shifting geopolitical landscape?  The fate I think we want to avoid is carrying on with what Stanley Hoffmann called the "American social science": the IR invented out of imperial crisis and world war by Anglo-American officials, foundations and thinkers. Very broadly speaking, and with variations, this was a new world combination of realism and positivism. This discipline was intended as the intellectual counterpart to the American-centered world order, designed, among other things, to disappear the question of race in the century of the global color line. The way it conceived the national/international world obscured how US world power worked in practice. That power operated in and through formally sovereign, independent states—an empire by invitation, in the somewhat rosy view of Geir Lundestad—trialed in Latin America and well suited to a decolonizing world. It was an anti-colonial imperium. Political science divided up this world between IR and comparative politics. This kind of IR is cortically connected to the American-centered world fading away before our eyes. It is a kind of zombie discipline where we teach students about world politics as if we were still sitting with the great power peacemakers of 1919 and 1944-45. It is still studying how to make states cooperate under a hegemon or how to make credible deterrence threats in various circumstances. Interestingly, I think one of the ways the collapse of US power is shaping the discipline was identified by Walt and Mearsheimer in their 2013 article on the decline of theory in IR. In the US especially but not only, IR is increasingly indistinguishable from political science as a universal positivist enterprise mostly interested in applying highly evolved, quantitative or experimental approaches to more or less minor questions. Go too far down this road and IR disappears as a distinct disciplinary space, it becomes just a subject matter, a site of empiricist inquiry. Instead, the best work in IR mostly occurs on the edges of the discipline. IR often serves as cover for diverse and interdisciplinary work on transboundary relations. Those relations fall outside the core objects of analysis of the main social science and humanities disciplines but are IR's distinctive focus. The mainstream, inter-paradigm discipline, for me, has never been a convincing social science of the international and is not something I teach or think much about these days. But the classical inheritances of the discipline help IR retain significant historical, philosophical and normative dimensions. Add in a pluralist disposition towards methodology, and IR can be a unique intellectual space capable of producing scholars and scholarship that operate across disciplines. The new materialism, or political ecology, is one area in which this is really happening right now. IR is also a receptive home for debating the questions thrown up by the decolonial turn. These are two big themes in contemporary intellectual life, in and beyond the academy. IR potentially offers distinct perspectives on them which can push debates forward in unexpected ways, in part because we retain a focus on the political and the state, which too easily drop out of sight in global turns in other disciplines. In exchange, topics like the new materialism and the decolonial offer IR the chance to connect with world politics in these new times, after the American century. In my view, and it is not one that I think is widely shared, IR should become the "studies" discipline that centers on the transboundary. How do we re-imagine IR as the interdisciplinary site for the study of transboundary relations as a distinct social and political space? That's a question of general interest in a global world, but one which few traditions of thought are as well-equipped to reflect on and push forward as we are.That's an interesting and forceful critique which also brings us back to a common thread throughout your work: questions of power and knowledge and specifically the relation between power and knowledge in IR and social science. I'm interested in exploring this point further, because so much of your critique has been centered on how profoundly Eurocentric IR is and as a product of Western power. Well, IR's development as a discipline has been closely tied to Western state power. It would seem that it has to change, given the shifts underway in the world. It's like Wile E. Coyote in the Road Runner cartoons - he's run off the cliff. His legs are still moving, but he hasn't dropped, yet. That said, there's no singularly determinate relation between power and the historical development of intellectual traditions. Who knows what kind of new ideas and re-imagining of IR's concepts we might see? As I say, I think one reflection of these changes is that we're already seeing North American IR start to fade into universal quantitative social science. As Hoffmann observed, part of IR's appeal was that the Americans were running the world, that's why you started a social science concerned with things like bipolarity and deterrence, and with analyzing the foreign policy of a great power and its interests and conflicts around the world. Nowadays the Americans are at a late Roman stage of imperial decline. Thinking from the command posts of US foreign policy doesn't look so attractive or convincing when Emperor Nero is running the show, or something altogether darker is waiting in the wings. IR is supposed to be in command of world politics, analyzing them from on high. But what I've seen over the course of my education and career is the way world politics commands IR. The end of the Cold War torpedoed many careers and projects; the 1990s created corps of scholars concerned with development, civil war and humanitarian intervention; in the 2000s, we produced terrorism experts (and critical terrorism studies) and counterinsurgency specialists and critics, along with many scholars concerned in one way or another with Islam. What I have always found fascinating, and deeply indicative, about IR is the relative absence until relatively recently of serious inquiry into power/knowledge relations or the sociology of knowledge. In 1998 when Ole Waever goes to look at some of these questions, he notes how little there was to work from then, before Oren, Vitalis, Guilhot and others published. It's an astounding observation. In area studies, in anthropology, in the history of science, in development studies, in all of these areas of inquiry so closely entangled with imperial and state power, there are long-running, well developed traditions of inquiry into power/knowledge relations. It's a well-recognized area of inquiry, not some fringe activity, and it's heavily empirical, primary sourced based, as well as interesting conceptually. In recent decades you've seen really significant work come out about the role of the Second World War in the development of game theory, and its continuing entwinement with the nuclear contest of the Cold War. I'm thinking here of S.M. Amadae, Paul Erickson, and Philip Mirowski among others. The knowledge forms the American social science used to study world politics were part and parcel of world politics, they were internal to histories of geopolitics rather than in command of them. Of course, for a social science that models itself on natural science, with methodologies that produce so-called objective knowledge, the idea that scientific knowledge itself is historical and power-ridden, well, you can't really make sense of that. You'd be put in the incoherent position of studying it objectively, as it were, with the same tools. IR arises from the terminal crisis of the British Empire; its political presuppositions and much else were fundamentally shaped by the worldwide anti-communist project of the US Cold War state; and it removed race as a term of inquiry into world politics during the century of the global color line. All this, and but for Hoffmann's essay, IR has no tradition of power/knowledge inquiry into its own house until recently? It's not credible intellectually. Anthropologists should be brought in to teach us how to do this kind of thing. You've been at the forefront of the notion of historical IR, and in investigating the relationship between history and theory – why is history important for IR?Well, I think I'd start with the question of what do we mean when we say history? For mainstream social science, it means facts in the past against which to test theories and explanations. For critical IR scholars, it usually means historicism, as that term is understood in social theory: social phenomena are historical, shaped by time and place. Class, state, race, nation, empire, war, these are all different in different contexts. While I think this is a very significant insight and one that I agree with, on its own it tends to imply that historical knowledge is available, that it can be found by reading historians. In fact, for both empiricism and historicism there is a presumption that you can pretty reliably find out what happened in the past. For me, this ignores a second kind of historicism, the historicism of history writing itself, the historiographical. The questions historians ask, how they inquire into them, the particular archives they use, the ways in which they construct meaning and significance in their narratives, the questions they don't ask, that about which they are silent, all of these, shape history writing, the history that we know about. The upshot is that the past is not stable; it keeps changing as these two meanings of historicism intertwine. We understand the Haitian revolution now, or the indigenous peoples of the Americas, entirely differently than we did just a few decades ago.That raises another twist to this problem. Many IR scholars access history through reading historians or through synthetic accounts; they encounter history by and large through secondary sources. One consequence is that they are often a generation or more behind university historians. Think of how Gaddis, for instance, remains a go to authority on the history of the Cold War in IR. In other disciplines, from the 1980s on, there was a historical turn that took scholars into the archives. Anthropologists and literary scholars used historians' tools to answers their own questions. The result was not just a bunch of history books, but entirely new readings of core questions. The classic example is the historical Shakespeare that Stephen Greenblatt found in the archives, rather than the one whose texts had been read by generations of students in English departments. My point here is that working in archives was conceptually, theoretically significant for these disciplines and the subjects they studied. For example, historical anthropology has given us new perspectives on imperialism. While there is some archival work in IR of course, especially in disciplinary history, it is not central to disciplinary debates and the purpose is usually theory testing in which the past appears as merely a bag of facts. In sum, when I say history and theory, I don't just mean thinking historically. I mean actually doing history, being an historian—which means archives—and in so doing becoming a better theorist. Could you expand on these points by telling us about your recent work on military history? I think that military history is particularly interesting because it is a site where war is reproduced and shaped. Military history participates in that which it purports only to study. Popular military histories shape the identities of publics. Staff college versions are about learning lessons and fighting war better the next time. People who grow up wanting to be soldiers often read about them in history books. So our historical knowledge of war, and war as a social and historical process, are wrapped up together. I hope some sense of the promise of power/knowledge studies for larger questions comes through here. I'm saying that part of what war is as a social phenomenon is history writing about it. It's in this kind of context that the fact that a great deal of military history is actually written by veterans, often of the very campaigns of which they write, becomes interesting. Battle produces its own historians. This is a tradition that goes back to European antiquity, soldiers and commanders returning to write histories, the histories, of the wars they fought in. So this question of veterans' history writing is in constitutive relations with warfare, and with the West and its nations and armies. My shorthand for the particular area of this I want to look into is what I call "White men's military histories". That is, Western military history in the modern era is racialized, not just about enemies but about the White identities constructed in and through it. And I want to look at the way this is done in campaigns against racialized others, particularly situations where defeats and reverses were inflicted on the Westerners. How were such events and experiences made sense of historically? How were they mediated in and through military history? I think defeats are particularly productive, incitements to discourse and sense making. To think about these questions, I want to look at the place of veterans in the production of military histories, as authors, sources, communities of interpretation. My sandbox is the tumultuous first year of the Korean War, where US forces suffered publically-evident reverses and risked being pushed into the sea. In a variety of ways, veterans shape military history, through their questions, their grievances, their struggles over reputation, their memories. This happens at many different sites and scales, including official and popular histories, and the networks of veterans behind them as well as other, independently published works. Over the course of veterans' lives, their war throws up questions and issues that become the subject of sometimes dueling and contradictory accounts. Through their history writing, they connect their war experience to Western traditions of battle historiography. They make their war speak to other wars. This is what military history is, and how it can come to produce and reproduce practices of war-making, at least in Anglo-American context. Of course, much of this history writing, like narrations of experience generally, reflects dominant ideologies, in this case discourses of the US Cold War in Asia. But counter-historians are also to be found among soldiers. The shocks and tragic absurdities of any given war produce research questions of their own. At risk of mixing metaphors, the veterans know where the skeletons are buried. They bear resentments and grievances about how their war was conducted that become research topics, and they often have the networks and wherewithal to produce informed and systematic accounts. So as well as reproducing hegemonic discourses, soldier historians are also interesting as a new critical resource for understanding war.This shouldn't be that surprising. In other areas of inquiry, amateur and practitioner scholars have often been a source of critical innovation. LGBTQ history starts outside the academy, among activists who turned their apartments into archives. Much of what we now call postcolonial scholarship also began outside the academy, among colonized intellectuals involved in anti-imperial struggles. Let me close this off by going back to the archive. There are really rich sources for this kind of project. Military historians of all kinds leave behind papers full of their research materials and correspondence. The commanders and others they wrote about often waged extended epistolary campaigns concerned with correcting and shaping the historical record. But more than this, by situating archival sources alongside what later became researched and published histories, what drops out and what goes in to military history comes into view. What is silenced, and what is given voice? We can then see how the violent and forlorn episodes of war are turned into narrated events with military meaning. What is the process by which war experience becomes military history?Given the interdisciplinary nature of your work, what field you place yourself in? And are there any problems have you encountered when writing and thinking across scholarly boundaries?In my head I live in a kind of idealized interdisciplinary war studies, and my field is the intersection of war and empire. Sort of Michael Howard meets Critical Theory and Frantz Fanon. This has given me a particular voice in critical IR broadly conceived, and a distinctive place from which to engage the discipline. The mostly UK departments I've been in have been broadly hospitable places in practice for interdisciplinary scholarship and teaching, so long as you published rather than perished. Of course, interdisciplinary is a complicated word. It is one thing to be multi-disciplinary, to publish in the core journals of more than one discipline and to be recognized and read by scholars in more than one discipline. But work that falls between disciplinary centers, which takes up questions and offers answers recognized centrally by no discipline, that's something harder to deal with. I thought after Soldiers of Empire won prizes in two disciplines that I'd have an easier time getting funding for the project I described earlier in the interview. But I've gotten nowhere, despite years of applications to a variety of US, UK, and European funders. Of course, this may be because it is a bad project! My point, though, is that disciplines necessarily, and even rightly, privilege work that speaks to central questions; that's the work that naturally takes on significance in disciplinary contexts, as in many grant or scholarship panels. I think another point here is the nature of the times. Understandably, no one is particularly interested right now in White men's military histories. What I think has really empowered disciplines during my time in the UK academy has been the intersection with audit culture and university management. Repeated waves of rationalization have washed over the UK academy, which have emphasized discipline as a unit of measurement and management even as departments themselves were often "schoolified" into more or less odd combinations of disciplines. Schoolification helped to break down old solidarities and identities, while audit culture needed something on which to base its measures. The great victory of neoliberalism over the academy is evident in the way it is just accepted now that performance has to be assessed by various public criteria. This is where top disciplinary journals enter the picture, as unquestionable (and quantifiable) indicators of excellence. Interdisciplinary journals don't have the same recognition, constituency, or obvious significance. To put it in IR terms, Environment and Planning D or Comparative Studies in Society and History, to take two top journals that interdisciplinary IR types publish in, will never have the same weight as, say, ISQ or APSR. That that seems natural is an indicator of change—when I started, RIS—traditionally welcoming of interdisciplinary scholarship—was seen as just as good a place to publish as any US journal. Now RIS is perceived as merely a "national" journal while ISQ and APSR are "international" or world-class. This kind of thing has consequences for careers and the make-up of departments. What I'm drawing attention to is not so much an intellectual or academic debate; scholars always disagree on what good scholarship is, which is how it is supposed to be. It is rather the combination of discipline with the suffocating culture of petty management that pervades so much of British life. Get your disciplinary and epistemological politics institutionalized in an audit culture environment, and you can really expand. For example, the professionalization of methods training in the UK has worked as a kind of Trojan Horse for quantitative and positivist approaches within disciplines. In IR, in the potted geographic lingo we use, that has meant more US style work. Disappearing is the idea of IR as an "inter-discipline," where departments have multi-disciplinary identities like I described above. The US idea that IR is part of political science is much more the common sense now than it was in the UK. Another dimension of the eclipse of interdisciplinary IR has been the rise of quantitative European political science, boosted by large, multiyear grants from the ERC and national research councils. It's pretty crazy, strategically speaking, for the UK to establish a civilizational scale where you're always behind the US or its European counterparts. You'll never do North American IR as well as the North Americans do, especially given the disparity in resources. You'll always be trending second or third tier. The British do like to beat themselves up. Meanwhile, making US political science journals the practical standard for "international excellence" threatens to make the environment toxic for the very scholarship that has made British IR distinctive and attractive globally. The upshot of that will be another wave of émigré scholars, which the British academy's crises and reform initiatives produce from time to time. Think of the generation of UK IR scholars who decamped to Australia, an academy poised to prosper in the post-covid world (if the government there can get its vaccination program on track) and a major site right now of really innovative IR scholarship. To return to what you mentioned earlier regarding the hesitancy to go to the archives, this is also mirrored in a hesitancy to do serious ethnography, I think as well. Or there's this "doing ethnography" that involves a three-day field trip. This kind of sweet-shop 'pick and mix' has come to characterize some methodologies, because of these constraints that you highlight…A lot of what I'm talking about has happened within universities, it's not externally imposed or a direct consequence of the various government-run assessment exercises. Academics, eagerly assisted by university managers, have done a lot of this to themselves and their students. The implications can be far reaching for the kind of scholarship that departments foster, from PhDs on up. More and more of the UK PhD is taken up with research methods courses, largely oriented around positivism even if they have critical components. Already this gives a directionality to ideas. The advantage of the traditional UK PhD—working on your own with a supervisor to produce a piece of research—has been intellectual freedom, even when the supervisor wasn't doing their job properly. It's not great, but the possibility for creative, innovative, even field changing scholarship was retained. PhD students weren't disciplined, so to speak. What happens now is that PhD students are subject to a very strict four year deadline, often only partially funded, their universities caring mainly about timely completion not placement and preparation for a scholarly career, a classic case of the measurement displacing the substantive value. The formal coursework they get is methods driven. You can supervise interdisciplinary PhD research in this kind of environment, but it's not easy and poses real risks and creates myriad obstacles for the student. A strange consequence of this, as many of my master's students will tell you, is that I often advise them to consider US PhDs, just in other disciplines. That way, they get the benefit of rigorous PhD level coursework beyond methods. They can do so in disciplines like history or anthropology that are currently receptive both to the critical and the transnational/transboundary. That is not a great outcome for UK IR, even if it may be for critically-minded students. Outside of a very few institutions and scattered individuals, US political science, of course, has largely cleansed itself of the critical and alternative approaches that had started to flower in the glasnost era of the 1990s. That is not something we should be seeking to emulate in the UK.So yes, there's much to say here, about how the four year PhD has materially shaped scholarship in the UK. There is generally very little funding for field work. Universities worried about liability have put all kinds of obstacles in the way of students trying to get to field work sites. Requirements like insisting that students be in residence for their fourth year in order to write up and submit on time further limit the possibilities for field work. The upshot is to make the PhD dissertation more a library exercise or to favor the kind of quantitative, data science work that fits more easily into these time constraints and structures. Again, quite obviously, power sculpts knowledge. It becomes simply impossible, within the PhD, to do the kinds of things associated with serious qualitative scholarship, like learn languages, spend long time periods in field sites and to visit them more than once, to develop real networks there. Over time this shapes the academy, often in unintended ways. I think this is one of the reasons that IR in the UK has been so theoretic in character—what else can people do but read books, think and write in this kind of environment? As I say, the other kind of thing they can do is quantitative work, which takes us right back to the fate Walt and Mearsheimer sensed befalling IR as political science. Watch for IR and Data Science joint degrees as the next step in this evolution. Political Science in the US starts teaching methods at the freshman level. They get them young. We have discussed the rather grim state of affairs for the future of critical social science scholarship, at least in the UK and US. To conclude – what prospects for hope in the future are there?Well, if I had a public relations consultant pack, this is the point at which it would advise talking about children and the power of science to save us. I think the environment for universities, political, financial, and otherwise may get considerably more difficult. Little is untouchable in Western public life right now, it is only a question of when and in what ways they will come for us. The nationalist and far-right turns in Western politics feed off transgressing boundaries. There's no reason to suspect universities will be immune from this, and they haven't been. In the UK, as a consequence of Brexit, we are having to nationalise, and de-European-ise our scholarships and admissions processes. We are administratively enacting the surrender of cosmopolitan achievements in world politics and in academic life. This is not a plot but in no small measure the outcome of democratic will, registered in the large majority Boris Johnson's Conservatives won at the last general election. It will have far reaching consequences for UK university life. This is all pretty scary if you think, as I do, that we are nearer the beginning then the end of the rise of the right. Covid will supercharge some of these processes of de-globalization. I can already see an unholy alliance forming of university managers and introvert academics who will want to keep in place various dimensions of the online academic life that has taken shape since spring 2020. Often this will be justified by reference to environmental concerns and by the increased, if degraded, access that online events make possible. We are going to have a serious fight on our hands to retain our travel budgets at anywhere near pre-pandemic levels. I'm hoping that this generation of students, subjected to online education, will become warriors for in-person teaching. All of this said, it's hard to imagine a more interesting time to be teaching, thinking and writing about world politics. Politics quite evidently retains its capacity to turn the world upside down. Had you told US citizens where they would be on January 6th, 2021 in 2016, they would have called you alarmist if not outlandish. I think we're in for more moments like that. Tarak Barkawi is a professor of International Relations at LSE. He uses interdisciplinary approaches to imperial and military archives to re-imagine relations between war, armed forces and society in modern times. He has written on the pivotal place of armed force in globalization, imperialism, and modernization, and on the neglected significance of war in social and political theory and in histories of empire. His most recent book, Soldiers of Empire, examined the multicultural armies of British Asia in the Second World War, reconceiving Indian and British soldiers in cosmopolitan rather than national terms. Currently, he is working on the Korean War and the American experience of military defeat at the hands of those regarded as racially inferior. This new project explores soldiers' history writing as a site for war's constitutive presence in society and politics.PDF version of this Talk