Suchergebnisse

The paper analyses the interaction between economic incentives and work norms in the context of social insurance. If the work norm is endogenous in the sense that it is weaker when the population share of beneficiaries is higher, then voters will choose less generous bene.ts than otherwise. We also discuss welfare-state dynamics when there is a time lag in the adjustment of the norm in response to changes in this population share, and show how a temporary shift in the unemployment rate may cause persistence in the number of beneficiaries.

A model is developed to understand how norms can be influenced by norm entrepreneurs, e.g. lawmakers, government agencies, unions etc. Two instruments of influencing the dynamics of normfollowing behavior are analyzed, namely transforming the (monetary) incentives and changing the meaning or the reputational value of following a norm. First, incentives can be introduced (e.g. fines or subsidies imposed by government agencies) to violate existing norms or follow a new code of behavior. Second, actors can be convinced by norm entrepreneurs, e.g. using moral suasion, that following the existing norm is inappropriate or that following a certain new norm is appropriate. Both forms of norm regulation are incorporated into Akerlof's model of social custom (1980) in order to derive the comparative static properties of norm destruction and norm creation for different types of norms.

A model is developed to understand how norms can be influenced by "norm entrepreneurs", e.g. lawmakers, government agencies, unions etc. Two instruments of influencing the dynamics of normfollowing behavior are analyzed, namely transforming the (monetary) incentives and changing the meaning or the reputational value of following a norm. First, incentives can be introduced (e.g. fines or subsidies imposed by government agencies) to violate existing norms or follow a new code of behavior. Second, actors can be convinced by norm entrepreneurs, e.g. using moral suasion, that following the existing norm is inappropriate or that following a certain new norm is appropriate. Both forms of norm regulation are incorporated into Akerlof's model of social custom (1980) in order to derive the comparative static properties of norm destruction and norm creation for different types of norms

The paper studies tax evasion in an evolutionary setting. In addition to standard variables such as the fine individuals may have to pay if found guilty or the probability of being audited, agents' inclination to engage in tax evasion may also be affected by social interactions. Moreover, expected payoffs may include reputational costs or rewards awarded by society after an individual is audited. The paper shows how (i) social norms may play a very important role in defining the long-run evolution of tax evasion and, consequently, that (ii) policymakers should consider reforms that would increase social awareness and information rather than more (financially and politically) expensive traditional auditing instruments; in addition, (iii) fiscal/auditing policies should be carefully tailored to the particular economic and social setting in place in a country. ; Web of Science ; 89 ; 4 ; 405 ; 385

Research Question/Issue: We study the relationship between informal rules (represented by social norms and social cohesion in a community) and corporate governance. A community is a large social unit characterized by a distinct set of informal rules. Specifically, three hypotheses are tested: (1) Communities with stronger social norms will have more open firm-level corporate governance, (2) More socially cohesive communities will have more open firm-level corporate governance, and (3) The relationship between social norms and corporate governance will be mediated by social cohesion.

Research Findings/Insights: Unlike previous studies, we use data from a single, culturally diverse country, Ukraine, in order to isolate the effect of informal rules. The country's provinces are used as proxies for communities. We develop our measures of social norms and social cohesion by performing a factor analysis on the measures commonly used in previous research (social capital, religiosity, total fertility, ethnic homogeneity, linguistic homogeneity, and homicide rate). All three hypotheses are supported, whether using composite or individual measures of social norms and cohesion. The mediation is partial, suggesting that the hypothesized effect of social norms on corporate governance may (i) partly come through cohesion and (ii) partly be direct. The results are highly significant and robust, and they hold very well when controlled for economic development, firm characteristics, and industry.

Theoretical/Academic Implications: We contribute to the large literature on institutional determinants of corporate governance by proposing that informal rules may have a substantial impact on firm-level corporate governance. We also identify specific sources of informal rules: social norms and cohesion. Testing our insights in other countries and in cross-country settings would help to further understand what rules matter for corporate governance and whether informal rules may substitute for formal rules. Another research opportunity, perhaps best exploited through case-based research, is the deeper enquiry into the very mechanism by which informal rules may affect firm-level corporate governance.

Practitioner/Policy Implications: Manipulating informal rules, such as norms and cohesion, is an unlikely option for corporate governance reform. If that is the case, the policy should consist in adjusting the governance system to fit them. As this fit will differ across communities and countries, international convergence of corporate governance appears unlikely.

Social norms affect almost every aspect of people's lives, and can be an obstacle to or support economic development. This paper outlines what social norms are and how they work, providing examples from everyday life and from development case studies. Sometimes not much can be done about changing undesirable social norms. In those cases, development economists need to be aware of how the existence of those norms can impact the effects of the policies they advocate. But of particular importance to development economists is the ways in which social norms can be changed, at least under some circumstances. Understanding of social norm change is still patchy at best, but the paper outlines the theoretical underpinnings of change, with empirical evidence from various policies aimed at changing social norms. However, some of those policies raise ethical concerns that would require attention.

This paper discusses the intrinsic and instrumental value of governance and social norms to the well being of New Zealanders. The interaction between informal social norms and formal institutions is also discussed. An attempt is made to identify the channels and precise mechanisms through which governance and social norms respectively may impact on well-being. Empirical evidence on these effects is cited, and the relevance of the evidence to New Zealand is assessed. A range of suggestions is then presented for strengthening the governance of public institutions in New Zealand, focusing on improvements to transparency, accountability and integrity within existing constitutional arrangements. Finally, some tentative remarks are made on the potential role of government in influencing the evolution of social norms, and managing tensions between conflicting norms in New Zealand.