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In recent years, the Swedish Armed Forces have produced and distributed highly edited video clips on YouTube that show moving images of military activity. Along- side this development, mobile phone apps have emerged as an important channel through which the user can experience and take an interactive part in the staging of contemporary armed conflict. This article examines the way in which the aes- thetic and affective experience of Swedish defence and security policy is socially and (media-)culturally (co-)constructed and how the official representation of Swedish military intervention (re)produces political and economic effects when these activi- ties are distributed through traditional and social media such as YouTube and digital apps. Based on Isabela and Norman Fairclough's thoughts on political discourse, Michel Foucault's dialectic idea of power/knowledge, and Sara Ahmed's concept of the affective, I discuss how the Swedish digital military aesthetic is part of a broader political and economic practice that has consequences beyond the digital, the semi- otic, and what might at first glance appear to be pure entertainment. ; In recent years, the Swedish Armed Forces have produced and distributed highly edited video clips on YouTube that show moving images of military activity. Alongside this development, mobile phone apps have emerged as an important channel through which the user can experience and take an interactive part in the staging of contemporary armed conflict. This article examines the way in which the aesthetic and affective experience of Swedish defence and security policy is socially and (media-)culturally (co-)constructed and how the official representation of Swedish military intervention (re)produces political and economic effects when these activities are distributed through traditional and social media such as YouTube and digital apps. Based on Isabela and Norman Fairclough's thoughts on political discourse, Michel Foucault's dialectic idea of power/knowledge, and Sara Ahmed's concept of the affective, I discuss how the Swedish digital military aesthetic is part of a broader political and economic practice which has consequences beyond the digital, the semiotic and what might at first glance appear to be pure entertainment.

I denne artikkelen deler Bjørn Tore Godal sine erfaringer fra da han, som handelsminister, undertegnet EØS-avtalen i Porto i Portugal den 2. mai 1992 på Norges vegne. Han viser hvordan EØS avtalen kan forstås som en forlengelse av en norsk utenrikspolitisk tradisjon der forholdet til Europa alltid har vært komplisert og sammensatt. Mens internasjonalt samarbeid har hatt stor støtte, har det også vært en dyp skepsis mot unioner og stormakter. Som AUF-leder tidlig på 1970-tallet kjempet han også mot norsk medlemskap i EF. Som handelsminister mente han lenger enn en del andre politiske aktører at EØS kunne være et varig alternativ til EU-medlemskap. I dette bidraget viser Godal hvordan EØS-avtalen har fungert, og særlig hvordan han har erfart avtalen i sine ulike roller.
Abstract in English:EEA – in RetrospectIn this article, Bjørn Tore Godal shares his experiences from when he, as Minister of Commerce, signed the EEA Agreement in Oporto, Portugal on May 2, 1992, on behalf of Norway. He shows how the EEA Agreement can be understood as a natural prolongation of Norwegian foreign policy tradition where relations with Europe always have been complex and complicated. While international cooperation has been highly supported, there has also been a deep skepticism of unions and great powers. As a leader of AUF (the social-democratic youth league) in the early 1970s, he also fought against Norwegian membership in the EC. As a Minister of Commerce, he believed that the EEA could be a lasting alternative to EU membership. In this contribution, Godal shows how the EEA Agreement has worked and how he has experienced the functioning of this agreement in his various roles.

Det er en pågående debatt i akademia om hvorvidt og hvordan man kan benytte avskrekkingsteori i cyberdomenet. Avskrekking var originalt en teori utviklet for å unngå konvensjonell eller nukleær krig. I diskusjonen om cybersikkerhet har det blitt påpekt en rekke tekniske problemer med å overføre en teori fra den fysiske verden til cyberdomenet. Vi anerkjenner disse tekniske utfordringene ved avskrekking i cyberdomenet, men i denne artikkelen ønsker vi å belyse et annet aspekt ved avskrekking, nemlig samspillet mellom sosiale og tekniske faktorer ved avskrekking i cyberdomenet. I denne artikkelen vil vi diskutere hvordan avskrekking som strategi i cyberdomenet vil påvirkes av den spesifikke strategiske kulturen i et land. For å belyse argumentet vil vi benytte Kina som en casestudie. Motsetninger mellom kinesisk og «vestlig» strategisk kultur resulterer i konkrete forskjeller i hvordan Kina og vestlige land agerer i cyberdomenet. Ved å benytte fire komponenter av avskrekkingsteori (nektelse, gjengjeldelse, gjensidig avhengighet og normer) ønsker vi å vise hvordan en dyptgående innsikt i en stats sikkerhetspolitikk og strategiske kultur kan anvendes til å skreddersy en mer effektiv avskrekkingsstrategi og styrke evnen til å forhindre uønsket aktivitet.
Abstract in English
There is an ongoing debate in academia about if and how deterrence theory may be used in cyberspace. Deterrence was originally a theory developed for avoiding conventional and nuclear war. In the current discussion on cyber security, there has been pointed out a range of technical problems of transferring a theory about the physical world to cyberspace. We recognize these challenges of deterrence in cyberspace, but in this article we want to shed light on a different aspect of deterrence. That is the interplay between social and technical factors of deterrence in cyberspace. In this article we will discuss how deterrence as a strategy in cyberspace is influenced by the specific strategic culture of a country. We will use China as a case study to showcase our argument. Contrasts between Chinese and "Western" strategic culture results in concrete differences in how Chinese and Western countries act in cyberspace. By utilizing four components of deterrence theory (denial, punishment, entanglement and norms), we will show how an in-depth knowledge of a state's security policy and strategic culture may be used to tailor a more effective deterrence and enforce the capacity of hindering unwanted activity.