Suchergebnisse

"Israel faces economic and social challenges. The government has not routinely developed and successfully implemented strategic responses to socioeconomic problems that demand longer-term, coordinated policy action. Effective means to respond to such longer-term challenges may require a more systematic government approach to policymaking. Researchers developed detailed recommendations related to institutions, processes, supporting information, outputs, and implementation for the Israeli government to apply a strategic perspective toward socioeconomic issues and develop a formal socioeconomic strategy for Israel should the government desire to do so. They mapped the institutions and processes in the formation of socioeconomic strategy in the state of Israel as they existed at the time of the project in 2011; described the information used to support strategy formation; analyzed the evaluation and monitoring processes in current strategy formation; identified the gaps in current strategy formation institutions, processes, information, and evaluation and monitoring; conducted international case studies of strategy formation; and compared Israeli practices with international practices"--Publisher's description

Michalis P. Liberatos, The Greek Communist Party and the SlavophonesMinority in West Macedonia during the German Occupation (1941-194The existence of a Christian Slavic-speaking population in West Macedoniaafter the exchanges of populations in 1923-1924 and its confrontationwith Greek residents affected not only the relations between Greeceand the neighbouring Balkan countries but also determined the attitudeof KKE towards the Greek political stage and its relations with the otherpolitical parties. Especially during the German Occupation in Greece thecontroversies were enforced because of the existence of Bulgarian occupationalauthorities in the region and the attempt of Germans to treatethnic differences as an instrument of oppression. On the contrary, theGreek resistance forces that acted in Macedonia attempted to avert theaccession of Slavophones to Bulgarian nationalism and tried to compromisethe contradictions between the minority and the Greek population.The main resistance movement in the region, EAM, an organisationthat included KKE as the stronger part of it, had the advantage thatit was acceptable to the minority. On the other hand, other Greek organisations,like PAO, caused a feeling of fear, insecurity and mistrust tothe minority as representatives of Greek nationalism. KKE, because of itspolitical attitude towards the defence of the social rights of the minorityin the Inter-War period, had gained the confidence of that population,something extremely useful for the purposes of the liberation struggle.Nevertheless, the other political forces in Greece suspected that KKEhad returned to its attitude about the «Autonomy» of Macedonia fromthe Greek State, which KKE had declared in the decade 1925-1935. Thatwas a great obstacle for a political party that for a long period exerteditself to prove that it had abandoned that policy and especially in relation with EAM, which was based primary on its patriotic character. In orderto avoid the charges that it favoured the Slavophones separatists andthe possibility of an internal crisis that might have dissolved the politicalalliance of EAM, KKE pursued to incorporate the Slavophones into theGreek liberation movement on purpose to create a state of mutual confidencebetween the two populations. At the same time, it tried to isolatethe minority from the propaganda of Bulgarian separatists and destroythe corresponding armed groups.The problems regarding the relations between the minority and theGreek resistance movement became more complicated because of theinvolvement of Tito's regime in Yugoslavia. Tito and his partisans attemptedto use their ideological connection with EAM as a means to persuadeGreeks to accept the existence of minority as a cause of a new arrangementof the borders between Greece and Yugoslavia in the post Warperiod. On the other hand, the leaders of EAM tried to avoid Tito's accusationsthat Greeks impeded the development of a Balkan resistanceco-operation against Axis and strove to confine the massive accession ofSlavophones to the Yugoslavian resistance army by incorporating membersof the minority in organisations of EAM. It was a very difficulttask and often caused more problems than it resolved. ; Michalis P. Liberatos, The Greek Communist Party and the SlavophonesMinority in West Macedonia during the German Occupation (1941-194The existence of a Christian Slavic-speaking population in West Macedoniaafter the exchanges of populations in 1923-1924 and its confrontationwith Greek residents affected not only the relations between Greeceand the neighbouring Balkan countries but also determined the attitudeof KKE towards the Greek political stage and its relations with the otherpolitical parties. Especially during the German Occupation in Greece thecontroversies were enforced because of the existence of Bulgarian occupationalauthorities in the region and the attempt of Germans to treatethnic differences as an instrument of oppression. On the contrary, theGreek resistance forces that acted in Macedonia attempted to avert theaccession of Slavophones to Bulgarian nationalism and tried to compromisethe contradictions between the minority and the Greek population.The main resistance movement in the region, EAM, an organisationthat included KKE as the stronger part of it, had the advantage thatit was acceptable to the minority. On the other hand, other Greek organisations,like PAO, caused a feeling of fear, insecurity and mistrust tothe minority as representatives of Greek nationalism. KKE, because of itspolitical attitude towards the defence of the social rights of the minorityin the Inter-War period, had gained the confidence of that population,something extremely useful for the purposes of the liberation struggle.Nevertheless, the other political forces in Greece suspected that KKEhad returned to its attitude about the «Autonomy» of Macedonia fromthe Greek State, which KKE had declared in the decade 1925-1935. Thatwas a great obstacle for a political party that for a long period exerteditself to prove that it had abandoned that policy and especially in relation with EAM, which was based primary on its patriotic character. In orderto avoid the charges that it favoured the Slavophones separatists andthe possibility of an internal crisis that might have dissolved the politicalalliance of EAM, KKE pursued to incorporate the Slavophones into theGreek liberation movement on purpose to create a state of mutual confidencebetween the two populations. At the same time, it tried to isolatethe minority from the propaganda of Bulgarian separatists and destroythe corresponding armed groups.The problems regarding the relations between the minority and theGreek resistance movement became more complicated because of theinvolvement of Tito's regime in Yugoslavia. Tito and his partisans attemptedto use their ideological connection with EAM as a means to persuadeGreeks to accept the existence of minority as a cause of a new arrangementof the borders between Greece and Yugoslavia in the post Warperiod. On the other hand, the leaders of EAM tried to avoid Tito's accusationsthat Greeks impeded the development of a Balkan resistanceco-operation against Axis and strove to confine the massive accession ofSlavophones to the Yugoslavian resistance army by incorporating membersof the minority in organisations of EAM. It was a very difficulttask and often caused more problems than it resolved.

Δεν παρατίθεται περἰληψη στα ελληνικά. ; Lina Venturas – Dimitria Groutsis, The Cold War and international migration regulation: The establishment of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration The immediate post WWII period saw the establishment of the Inter-governmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) (now International Organisation for Migration, IOM), as a key organisation in the management of post WWII migration. This paper examines the debates and policies surrounding the creation of the ICEM as an agent responsible for the facilitation and administration of labour migration from parts of Europe to a variety of overseas countries. At the conclusion of the Second World War, the problems surrounding 'surplus population' and unemployment in Europe were discussed in many international forums. It was from these discussions that a consensus emerged which saw emigration as a viable solution. To this end, in 1951, the International Labour Organisation convened a Migration Conference in Naples, bringing together key stakeholders. The Naples Conference failed, an outcome driven mainly by the US. The US was particularly concerned with economic stagnation and mounting social unrest related to the 'surplus population' in European countries in this Cold War period. At the same time however, it strived at limiting international influence over migration and refugee policies and on receiving countries retaining their sovereign immigration policies. In spite of the disagreements and through a process of negotiation, the US subsequently led the creation of an intergovernmental body, which was established at a conference convened in Brussels in 1951. This newly formed organisation, initially named the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe (PICMME), was open only to states with a 'liberal' political regime and had specifically designed functions based on inter-governmental negotiations. The US ensured its predominance in the organization through budgetary control and other means. In 1953, the PICMME became a permanent 'fixture' of migration regulation and was renamed the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM). Hereafter, ICEM offered operational and financial assistance for migrants' transportation, language training, reception facilities, settlement services and labour market placement.

Δεν παρατίθεται περίληψη στα ελληνικά. ; The declaration of the establishment of the «Kingdom of Serbs, Groats and Slovenes» on the 1st of December, 1918 —which in 1929 was renamed to Yugoslavia— fulfilled the long standing desire for the political unification of all South-Slavs. However, the new State which apart from the three old kingdoms of Serbia, Montenegro and Croatia included the entities of the former Hungarian Vojvodina, the former Austrian Slovenia and Dalmatia and the Serbian Macedonia had to tackle certain problems. Its subjects were divided into several ethnic groups: Serbs, Croats and Slovenes —who constituted three quarters of its entire population— and Germans, Hungarians and Albanians as well as other ethnic minorities. The population of the new state was also divided into three religious categories: 47% were Orthodox Christians, 39% Catholics, and 11% Muslims. This paper attempts to analyze five constructive crises which came about in interwar Yugoslavia, and are characteristic of any modern state: 1) The crisis of identity of the state itself and of the various ethnic groups. The ideology of Yugoslavian unification failed to bridge the differences between the ethnic and religious groups; 2) The crisis of legitimacy. This is related with the nature of the regime. From 1918 until the dictatorship of 1929 twenty three governmental crises occured; 3) The crisis of integration, as reflected in the policies and the electoral results of the various political parties which had clear ethnic and geographical limits. During the interwar period none of the existing political parties attained to play this integrating role by securing mass support throughout the country; 4) The crisis of participation of individuals and social groups in controlling the public affairs and manning the state apparatus; 5) The crisis of distribution of goods and services. The ethnic and political contradictions between the Slovenes and Croats in the North and Serbs in the South resulted in the uneven development between these two geographical districts of the state.