Suchergebnisse

Making money versus making goods, as Aristotle pointed out, constitutes the basic social audit of economic in stitutions and practices. Current discussions of tariffs, of in flation, of stock-market or land speculation, of subsidies and tax loopholes, of resource conservation, of the activities of regulatory commissions, of stock pile and military spending, of advertising, monopoly, and featherbedding, and of price and wage increases abound in round-robin recriminations about "ir responsible and unjustifiable action," "unearned income," "in jury to public welfare," "something for nothing," "too much for too little," "waste," and so on. Can the social perform ance of business be identified, estimated, measured? How? With what limitations? Four major currents of thought muddy public discussion. Some maintain that "business is business." Profits per se measure social performance. Others rely heavily on classical competitive equilibrium processes or other versions of the "invisible hand." A third group—rig orously mathematical exponents of the new welfare economics —are pessimistic about even the possibility of finding a useful social-welfare function. An emerging fourth group affirms the principle of social responsibility of business, some in frankly prescriptive value terms, other in what they convince them selves are scientifically determinable and operable, though im precise and variable, zones or paths for creative voluntarism.

There is a growing belief that the traditional separation of the private & public sectors of our society is becoming blurred. Corporate theorists have offered a variety of philosophies to replace the discarded notions of market constraints. The Sch of business statesmanship, for which A. Berle is the most articulate spokesman, looks to business executives to fulfill corporate responsibilities other than those traditionally owed to shareholders. Corporate managers, too, have voiced their acceptance of this new role, but the realities of business & politics belie their stated motivations for many allegedly altruistic acts. Although the evidence is not clear, the discernible pattern of individual incentives & restraints suggest the same conclusion. The alleged acts of corporate statesmanship do not actually represent basic changes in the nature of Amer enterprise. It is more likely that they indicate the pot vulnerability of industry today & the extent to which gov's use both the carrot & stick to gain desired results from business. The acquiescence of corporate leaders in the philosophy of business responsibility could ultimately result in the enforcement of such notions as legal obligations. AA.

There is a growing belief that the traditional separation of the private and public sectors of our society is becoming blurred. Corporate theorists have offered a variety of philosophies to replace the discarded notions of market constraints. The school of business statesmanship, for which Professor Adolf Berle is the most articulate spokesman, looks to business executives to fulfill corporate responsibilities other than those traditionally owed to shareholders. Corporate man agers, too, have voiced their acceptance of this new role, but the realities of business and politics belie their stated motiva tions for many allegedly altruistic acts. And, although the evi dence is not clear, the discernible pattern of individual incen tives and restraints suggests the same conclusion. The alleged acts of corporate statesmanship do not actually represent basic changes in the nature of American enterprise. It is more likely that they indicate the political vulnerability of industry today and the extent to which governments use both the car rot and stick to gain desired results from business. The ac quiescence of corporate leaders in the philosophy of business responsibility could ultimately result in the enforcement of such notions as legal obligations.