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Part 5: Security Management and Human Aspects of Security ; International audience ; Individuals' compliance with information security policies is important for the overall security of organizations. It has been suggested that obedience cultures exist in organizations and that social processes and structures play a role for the compliance intentions and compliance behavior of individuals. This paper investigates if individuals' compliance intention is more homogenous within social groups in the workplace than they are within the workplace overall workplace and the effect these groups have are in line with the theory of planned behavior. The results show that a considerable portion of variance in information security policy compliance intentions is explained by the respondents' organizational department (15%), professional knowledge area (17%), and the same lunch room (18%). While sizeable and significant effects can be found on intentions the effects on attitudes, norm and perceived behavior control are less clear. The only statistically significant (p<0.05) effect is from department on attitudes and perceived norm, each with 6% explained variance. This suggests that the theory of planned behavior fails to account for factors tied to these types of social groups.

The aim of this article is to explore the various ways in which people represent social groups. The author shows that a prominent role in such processes is played by psychological essentialism. People represent some of their social identities as inherent qualities that are based on the sharing of a presumed 'essence': something unobservable, diffi cult to remove, irreversible, and causally responsible for overt behaviours. Empirical evidence suggests that no particular causal process of essence acquisition is constitutive for essentialism in folk models of society. Some authors believe that folk essentialism is necessarily connected with the presumed innateness of an essence (its biological transmission across generations). Innate potential and biological inheritance, however powerful they may be for the human cognitive mind in the domain of folk models for biology, are far from necessary in essentialist folksociological classifications. Essentialism in folk sociology is not defined by any particular causal process of essence acquisition. Even when it is possible to detect that a given group of people claim the innate essence of a particular folk sociology, it is always necessary to look for other features of essentialism (inherence, sharp boundaries, the immutability of identity, etc.). The article reviews some influential cognitive proposals concerning folk models of society (Astuti, Gil-White, Hirschfeld) and ethnicity, and provides arguments and empirical evidence collected in Western Ukraine in support of the claim that presumed innateness is not the constitutive part of folk models of society, let alone of psychological essentialism.