Suchergebnisse

3 The value of courts in light of the alternativesI Introduction; II The prima facie benefits of legal accountability; III The courts and social change; A Significant social change; B Impact and administrative justice; C A pathology of legalism?; D A hollow hope for the poor?; IV Alternatives to courts: partner or substitute?; A Specialised adjudication -- tribunals; B Ombudsmen; C Alternative dispute resolution (ADR); V Conclusion: the role of law in an incrementalist approach; 4 A basic interpretive approach; I Introduction; II Constitutional social rights: a basic interpretive approach.

THIS ARTICLE ARGUES THAT IF ONE IS COMMITTED TO CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, ONE MUST ALSO ADVOCATE THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF SOCIAL RIGHTS. IT MAKES A CASE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL SOCIAL RIGHTS AND CLARIFIES THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CIVIL, POLITICAL, AND SOCIAL RIGHTS, AND BETWEEN NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE RIGHTS. IT ARGUES THAT A DUTY DISTINCTION IS VALID AND THAT THE JUDICIARY CAN LEGITIMATELY DEAL WITH CONSTITUTIONAL SOCIAL RIGHTS.

AbstractIn Chile, many commentators, academics and political leaders have spent years arguing that the limited nature of the social rights in the national constitution is partially responsible for the country's economic and social inequality. It is thus unsurprising that changing the scope of the country's social rights was a major focus of the recently failed constitutional reform effort. However, we argue that the long-running claim that Chile's social problems were due to the limited nature of social rights can be thought of as social rights scapegoating, by which we mean that commentators blamed outcomes on constitutional rights, even though there is little evidence that countries' socio-economic outcomes are a product of their social rights.

"States that now contemplate constitutional reform often grapple with the question of whether to constitutionalise social rights. This book presents an argument for why, under the right conditions, doing so can be a good way to advance social justice. In making such a case, the author considers the nature of the social minimum, the role of the court among other institutions, the empirical record of judicial impact and the role of constitutional text. He argues, however, that when enforcing such rights, courts ought to adopt a theory of judicial restraint structured around four principles: democratic legitimacy, polycentricity, expertise and flexibility. These four principles, when taken collectively, commend an incrementalist approach to adjudication. The book combines theoretical, doctrinal, empirical and comparative analysis, and is written to be accessible to lawyers, social scientists, political theorists and human rights advocates"--