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In this paper we draw attention to the important role technology plays in co-mediating institutions, opening up some courses of action and closing off others. Irrigation studies generally recognize the importance of institutions in making technologies work, but tend to take the precise functioning of institutions for granted. Studies that analyse institutions often do not pay enough attention to the mediating role of technology in allocating benefits, risks and burdens. We show in this paper that (irrigation) institutions are moulded by and come about through the interactions between the technical and the social in dynamic and often contested processes of adaptation to changing environments. We argue that a critical understanding of what institutions do requires more explicit and detailed attention to technologies. We base this argument on a detailed historical analysis of the functioning of Seguia Khrichfa, a farmer managed irrigation scheme in Morocco. Through time, irrigation institutions in the Seguia Khrichfa have undergone transformations to match the changing demands of a heterogeneous and growing group of irrigators, an increased command area and changing cropping patterns, and the introduction of new technologies such as drip irrigation. These institutional transformations consisted of recursive cycles of modifications in technological infrastructure and the rules of allocation and distribution. Technical adaptations prompt alterations in the water rotation schedule and vice versa. We anchor our case in descriptions of a specific technology that played a crucial role in co-steering institutional change: the introduction of open/closed gates. Our analysis of the co-evolution of society and technology in shaping institutions in the Seguia Khrichfa shows how technologies become enrolled in (sometimes implicit) processes of re-negotiating relations of authority and responsibility while obscuring institutional politics.

Efforts to promote forest conservation have focused on two separate types of policy reforms. Decentralization reforms have attempted to make local forest governance more accountable to demands from voters. Meanwhile, Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) schemes like the REDD program (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) have sought to use economic incentives to promote conservation. These programs make different assumptions about the incentives most likely to work in forest conservation. Decentralization reforms assume that citizen pressures on politicians will encourage conservation, while PES approaches assume that an economic incentive—money—is the best approach. Which type of incentive works best in settings with weak institutions? Here, using a unique longitudinal dataset of forest policy in 100 Bolivian municipalities, we examine the relationships between citizen pressures and economic incentives on forest policy. We find that both types of incentives are positively and significantly associated with government investments in forest conservation, and that the magnitudes of these relationships are similar. Further, we find that economic incentives may be especially effective at promoting conservation where citizen pressures are weak or absent.

Bricolage in natural resource governance takes place through the interplay of a variety of actors. This article explores the practices of a group whose agency as bricoleurs has received little attention, namely the government officers who represent the state in the everyday management of water, land, forests and other resources across rural Africa. Specifically we examine how local Environment Officers in Taita Taveta County in Kenya go about implementing the national environmental law on the ground, and how they interact with communities in this process. As representatives of "the local state", the Environment Officers occupy an ambiguous position in which they are expected to implement lofty laws and policies with limited means and in a complex local reality. In response to this they employ three key practices, namely (i) working through personal networks, (ii) tailoring informal agreements, and (iii) delegating public functions and authority to civil society. As a result, the environmental law is to a large extent implemented through a blend of formal and informal rules and governance arrangements, produced through the interplay of the Environment Officers, communities and other local actors.

Individuals increasingly rely upon the internet for basic economic interaction. Current cyber security mechanisms are unable to stop adversaries and hackers from gaining access to sensitive information stored on government, business, and public computers. Experts propose implementing attribution and audit frameworks in cyberspace to deter, prevent, and prosecute cyber criminals and attackers. However, this method faces significant policy and resource constraints. Social science research, specifically in law and economics, concerning common-pool resources suggests an organic approach to cyber security may yield an appropriate solution. This cyber commons method involves treating the internet as a commons and encouraging individuals and institutions to voluntarily implement innovative and adaptive monitoring mechanisms. Such mechanisms are already in use and in many cases have proven more effective than attribution mechanisms in resisting and tracing the source of cyber attacks.

This paper reflects on Elinor Ostrom's classic book, Governing the Commons, and much work in sociology, political science and organization studies that has appeared since its publication. We do so in order to expand our understanding of the conditions under which cooperation occurs resulting in the production of collective goods. We explore two issues that were underdeveloped in her book that have subsequently received much attention. First, we discuss how states can facilitate cooperative behavior short of coercively imposing it on actors. Second, we discuss how social capital can facilitate or undermine cooperative behavior. In both cases we focus on the important mechanisms by which each one contributes to the development of cooperative behavior and collective goods. We conclude by extending our arguments to a brief analysis of one of the world's newest and largest collective goods – the Internet.

Do processes of political and economic development hinder or promote the creation of common property institutions (CPIs) to govern common pool resources? Despite the seeming importance of this question, development sociologists have never really tried to answer it. This paper explores the intersection of development processes, the commons, and common property institutions and concludes that development has countervailing influences that both impede and promote the formation of CPIs. Institutional expansion centered around the state facilitates the formation of CPIs while market expansion through globalization and labor migration weakens CPIs. Business cycles have similar influences. Economic booms weaken CPIs while subsequent economic downturns increase the likelihood that resource users will form CPIs.

This article introduces the Social-ecological systems meta-analysis database (SESMAD) project, which is the project behind the case studies and synthetic articles contained in this special issue of the International Journal of the Commons. SESMAD is an internationally collaborative meta-analysis project that builds on previous seminally synthetic work on small-scale common-pool resource systems conducted at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University. This project is guided by the following research question: can the variables found to be important in explaining outcomes on small-scale systems be scaled up to explain outcomes in large-scale environmental governance? In this special issue we report on our findings thus far through a set of case studies of large-scale environmental governance, a paper that describes our conceptual advances, and a paper that compares these five case studies to further examine our central research question.

Governance of marine resources is increasingly characterized by integrated, cross sectoral and ecosystem based approaches. Such approaches require that existing governing bodies have an ability to adapt to ecosystem dynamics, while also providing transparent and legitimate outcomes. Here, we investigate how the Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission (HELCOM), the international governing body for the Baltic Sea, could improve its prospects for working with the ecosystem approach, drawing from the literature on adaptive governance. We construct an ideal type of adaptive governance to which we compare the way in which HELCOM is operating and relate these dynamics to two other international marine environment governance organizations, the Coral Triangle Initiative on Coral Reefs, Fisheries and Food Security (CTI-CFF) and the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR). We conclude that HELCOM deviates from an ideal type of adaptive governance in several ways but also that the other two case studies provide empirical support for potential ways in which HELCOM could improve its adaptive capacity. Key aspects where HELCOM could improve include increasing stakeholder participation – both in information sharing and decision making. Further, HELCOM need to develop evaluation mechanisms, secure compliance to improve adaptive capacity and organizational effectiveness, which entails the development of structures for conflict resolution. Finally, HELCOM need to increase communication and harmonization between different levels of authority.

This paper explores the relationship between protected areas and commons arguing that protected areas can be seen as a form of new commons because of the different objectives and beneficiaries compared to traditional commons. If the purpose of traditional commons is sustainable resource exploitation, the primary objective of these new commons is the conservation of nature/protection of biodiversity. And if on traditional commons local resource users are the key beneficiaries, in new commons the public at large and future generations are the key beneficiaries as biodiversity is the common concern of human kind. Because of new commons' different purposes and different set of beneficiaries, normative questions need to be asked regarding who should have a say in their management and who is able to better represent the interests of nature. To answer these questions, the paper draws on deliberative democratic theory. To ground the theoretical insights empirically it presents a comparison between English protected areas at sea and on land designated under national law.

In the 19th century, the Spanish government, led by a liberal political project, put up for sale the common properties of villages, and deprived local village authorities of their capacities, powers and laws to manage common woodlands, which were passed to the Forestry Service. This paper, based on Ostrom's hypothesis that state intervention can have negative consequences for the conservation of common resources, is a case study of what happened in the province of León. It is shown that, although the conservation of common resources was endangered because those who were more directly concerned with protecting them were deprived of the means to do so, peasant communities staunchly defended the commons by maintaining traditional practices and uses in their commons.

This paper introduces an analytical framework for a special phenomenon: when a common-pool resource (CPR) institution and a large technical system (LTS) are connected and mutually interdependent. The CPR in this case is a node managed by its appropriators within a centrally planned and managed system; here named CPR-LTS constellations. Our framework is empirically derived from two historical investigations of CPR institutions within two LTSs, the agricultural-technical system and the road transport system of Sweden. By comparing similarities and differences it is possible to identify paths to successes and failures. To understand why one survived and the other disappeared we connect Elinor Ostrom's theories about management of CPRs with Thomas P. Hughes's theories about LTSs. We are proposing a framework that can bridge the gap between theories about management of CPRs and LTSs. By combining the two theories it should be possible to better understand how small-scale producers using bottom-up CPRs can be linked to top-down LTSs.We will argue that to fit within an LTS, a CPR needs alignment between different parts or components within the constellation/system and alignment with other systems and institutions in society. We propose three analytical levels to deal with the phenomenon of aligning a CPR project to an existing, large sociotechnical system:Local alignment (CPR): How are CPRs organized and managed at local sites?Sociotechnical alignment (CPR-LTS): How are CPRs connected to the sociotechnical system?Contextual alignment: How are CPR-LTS constellations aligned with neighboring institutions and systems in society?Our work indicates that for successful management of a CPR-LTS constellation it is important that the CPR be included in legislation and that government agencies support the CPR in alignment with the LTS. Legislators must recognize the CPR-part in the CPR-LTS constellation so that its institutional body is firmly established in society. In this study, we have used the framework ex-post; however, we anticipate that the framework could be a diagnostic tool ex-ante for CPR-LTS constellations.

Collaborative natural resource management institutions enable agents with diverse interests to come together to solve complex problems. These actors must overcome a series of collective action problems to create, maintain, and evolve these institutions. In addition to the challenge of heterogeneous actors, these commons social-ecological systems often face internal and external threats or disturbances. The institutional arrangements may be effective with problems that are internal to a social-ecological system – ones that they are designed to handle, but how do these arrangements cope with external disturbances, especially ones caused by large-scale political and economic decisions, events, and processes. Using ethnographic and archival data we conduct an institutional analysis outlining the existing and emerging collaboratives, the important actors, and ongoing efforts to cope with the five major challenges identified by rangeland actors. We trace the evolution of institutions on the western range with a focus on their ability to cope with challenges that are largely within the system – biodiversity, fire, and water management, and those that are driven externally by actors who are largely absent – border militarization and violence and exurbanization.