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The theme of "instrumentation between science, state and industry" does not square well with the venerable discourse which opposes "science" and "technology" in social studies of science. In this discourse, "technology" stands for the contrary of "science"; it represents the practical uses of science in society at large and is understood as separate from the somehow autonomous sphere of "science" (Layton 1971a). This vocabulary, widespread as it may be, is not very useful for our purposes, and, for that matter, for any inquiry into the role of instruments. Technology, in the sense of technical instruments and the knowledge systems that go with them, pervades all societal systems. There are technologies of science, of industry, of state, and so forth, and it would be ill-advised to assume that, in the end, they all flow out of "science." But even if the crude opposition of science and technology has little analytic value, the dual problem remains: how to effectively conceive the dynamic relationship between scientific spheres and other societal spheres, and how to conceive the role that technological matters play in this relationship.

Throughout this volume, we have pointedly focused on accountability as a process of control rather than as >FTRI>an outcome, but both dimensions are clearly significant. The first part of this chapter more closely examines democratic accountability outcomes. Thereafter, we integrate the primary insights of this book about parliamentary democracy's strength & weaknesses, trends in parliamentary governance, & modifications to how we study political institutions. In the last section we contextualize this study amid present macro societal challenges, including the information technology revolution, the increasing power of the EU, globalization, & the growing capriciousness but also greater expectations of voters. 10 Tables, 89 References. K. Coddon

The question concerning whether consociational democratic & corporatist government systems adequately represent societal interests is addressed. Overviews of existing literature on consociational democracies & corporatism are presented; in addition, the central features of each representative democratic system are highlighted. The extent of consociationalism & corporatism in various democracies (N = 36) throughout the world is then measured. Although some scholars assert that consociationalism & corporatism are nearly identical forms of government, it is demonstrated that significant differences exist between the two kinds of democracy. Several factors responsible for the emergence (eg, the use of compromise in fragmented societies) & eventual decline (eg, the arrival of new conflicts that have replaced old ones) of both forms of democracy are identified. Additional attention is dedicated to determining whether consociationalism & corporatism are actually important forms of negotiation democracy. It is concluded that despite its many disadvantages, negotiation democracy will persist in the future. 3 Tables, 2 Figures. J. W. Parker

The connection between a democratic government's societal performance & its structure is examined. After discussing multiple definitions of government, it is contended that government should be understood as the mechanisms that facilitate collective decisions made through public action for the benefit of a society. It is argued that government is a central component of society & that it largely determines the nature of public governance. The institutions, leadership styles, & standards embodied within presidential, parliamentary, & dual power government systems are then studied with the intent of determining how these different systems can ensure adequate government performance. An analysis of the state format of various liberal democracies (N = 52) is performed to demonstrate how structural variables affect democratic governance. The findings revealed that structural deficiencies, not various economic or social problems, are primarily responsible for a democratic government's inability to resolve such difficulties. Additional results indicating how levels of democratic governance & government organization influence policy performance are reported; moreover, findings concerning how democratic institutions affect levels of "democraticness" & citizens' quality of life are presented. The study's implications for future research are considered. 10 Tables, 1 Appendix. J. W. Parker

A definition & a genealogical analysis of the notion of civility are presented. It is contended that civility is a type of societal organization, not necessarily connected with capitalism, different from liberalism & democracy, & related to the concept of modernity. Although civil society originally surfaced in Western nations, its foundations were unstable, as exemplified by the destruction of Europe after WWI & WWII. The US managed to preserve civil society during the 20th century, but its cultural homogeneity has produced a less than exemplary model. Contrary to the popular position that civil society is ready to infiltrate all global societies, it is argued that ideological differences & social problems of many non-Western nations, especially countries with strong Islamic traditions, will prevent the global spread of civil society. J. W. Parker

Describes new forms of trading in provincial Russia, arguing that they have caused a fundamental shift in perceptions of societal organization. Domination of the post-Soviet Russian economy by "merchant capital" shows how the recent explosion of petty trade has contributed to a breakup of former state enterprises without effectively replacing the functions of state-planned internal exchange. The result is a burgeoning of minimally profitable trade existing within a unique configuration of disorder. Although a few large government-connected firms have realized significant profits, small traders have magnified regional autonomies, causing uneven development that has invited exploitation from outsiders, & spawned a plethora of regional attempts to restrict & regulate the outsiders. Different types of traders discussed include business people who run new private conglomerates, brokers who operate on behalf of government enterprises, "shuttlers" (traveling salespeople), trader-retailers (kiosk operators), entrepreneurs, & those who have purchased trading licenses but are not yet trading. Prospects for the future are discussed. 23 References. J. Lindroth

"The editor argues that the convergence claim characterising classic modernization theory is not tenable anymore unless it is lifted onto a discursive level. It can be rescued for contemporary modernization theory only if it is linked to the development of practices of critical examination of the modernization project itself. Rather than the emergence of certain structural patterns or interpretive templates and attitudes, modernization theory can take as its point of departure the general tendency toward the development of immanent criticism of society that characterises modernising and modernised societies. Recent theoretical work highlights the inescapability of conflicts in modern societies. Thereby it is not so much the differences between different types of societal modernization patterns that cause conflicts in the contemporary world, but instead the different claims and attitudes within modernised and modernising societies that are increasingly confronting each other. What therefore generates conflicts is not so much the factual (non-)convergence of societal processes but rather a 'sense of involvement in the project of universalism' (J. Alexander) the consequences of which are open to dispute. The emergence of a critical potential within society that turns the various modernization projects into reflexivity and confronts them with their own aims and means is therefore common to all processes of societal modernization. The commonality of 'different' modernities is the acceleration of fundamental politicisation that brings about immanent criticism of the modernization project itself. This approach contests the following shortcomings of modernization theory so far: its latent Eurocentric bias due to which some societies are 'more modern' than others; the 'container metaphor' which tends to treat societies as self-sufficient systems; the teleological and/ or evolutionary tendency that explicitly or implicitly characterises most approaches toward societal modernization: at the moment that the 'critical stage' is achieved evolutionary constructions of social change become themselves a field of political contestation." (author's abstract)

"Participation in governance is a new trend term. The following essay examines different versions of the concept and outlines their corresponding opportunities and limits. On this basis, it will be shown that society is a knowledgeable resource as well as a valuable advisor. Including citizens' perspectives may increase both the quality and legitimacy of political decision-making. Because of that, continuous participation can and should be secured within political systems in order to improve the basis of Information upon which political decisions are made. These considerations lead to a concept of policy-oriented participatory societal consultation which is suggested as a supplement to more traditional ways of policy advice." (author's abstract)

While the notion of digital sovereignty is loaded with a multitude of meanings referring to various actors, values and contexts, this paper is interested in how to actualize individual digital sovereignty. We do so by introducing the concept of agency affordances, which we see as a precondition for achieving digital sovereignty. We understand this notion as the ability to exercise power to, as autonomy and agency for (digital) self-sovereignty, and as power over the infrastructural sovereignty of the privately owned automated decision-making systems (ADM) systems of digital media platforms. Building our characterization of digital sovereignty on an empirical inquiry into individuals' requirements for agency, our analysis shows that digital sovereignty consists of two distinct but interrelated elements - data sovereignty and algorithmic sovereignty. Enabling practicable digital sovereignty through agency affordances, however, will require going beyond the just technical and extending towards the wider societal (infra)structures. We outline some initial steps on how to achieve that.

The advent of social media has increased digital content - and, with it, hate speech. Advancements in machine learning help detect online hate speech at scale, but scale is only one part of the problem related to moderating it. Machines do not decide what comprises hate speech, which is part of a societal norm. Power relations establish such norms and, thus, determine who can say what comprises hate speech. Without considering this data-generation process, a fair automated hate speech detection system cannot be built. This chapter first examines the relationship between power, hate speech, and machine learning. Then, it examines how the intersectional lens - focusing on power dynamics between and within social groups - helps identify bias in the data sets used to build automated hate speech detection systems.