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Pierre Legros et François Glansdorff ont fait leurs études ensemble à la faculté de droit de l'Université libre de Bruxelles, et leurs carrières académique et d'avocat ont connu des parcours similaires et parallèles. En autres, tous deux ont été professeurs à l'ULB et bâtonniers du barreau de Bruxelles (Ordre français). Comme l'écrit le bâtonnier en exercice, « une amitié indéfectible les lie et c'est peut-être cette amitié qui les a conduits à réaliser identiquement les mêmes rêves l'un après l'autre, sans jamais prendre le risque de faire à l'autre une quelconque part d'ombre ». C'est cette proximité entre eux qui explique et justifie ce Liber Amicorum que leurs amis ont à juste titre voulu commun.La richesse de ce volume est le reflet de leurs affinités et domaines respectifs : le droit privé pour François Glansdorff, le droit public et les droits de l'homme pour Pierre Legros ; et pour tous deux, la déontologie du barreau et la... musique.

Intro -- Présentation -- Chapitre 1 -- Le normativisme pur de Kelsen et l'identité du droit et de l'État -- Chapitre 2 -- Normes juridiques et État dans la Sociological Jurisprudence et chez Ehrlich -- Chapitre 3 -- Normes juridiques et État chez Duguit et dans la tradition fonctionnaliste -- Chapitre 4 -- Normes juridiques et État d'un point de vue « réaliste » -- Chapitre 5 -- Le normativisme « impur » de Hart et le droit étatique comme paradigme

Can there be such a thing as a European sociology of law? The uncertainties which arise when attempting to answer that straightforward question are the subject of this book, which also overlaps into comparative law, legal history, and legal philosophy. The richness of approaches reflected in the essays (including comparisons with the US) makes this volume a courageous attempt to show the present state of socio- legal studies in Europe and map directions for its future development. Certainly we already know something about the existence of differences in the use and meaning of law within and between the nation states and groups that make up the European Union. They concern the role of judges and lawyers, the use of courts, patterns of delay, contrasts in penal 'sensibilities', or the meanings of underlying legal and social concepts. Still, similarities in 'legal culture' are at least as remarkable in societies at roughly similar levels of political and economic development. The volume should serve as a needed stimulus to a research agenda aimed at uncovering commonalities and divergences in European ways of approaching the law.

Introduction: Studying European Ways of Law -- A - Theorising 'European' Legal Culture. 1. Images of Europe in Sociolegal Traditions ; 2. American and European Ways of Law: Six Entrenched Differences ; 3. La place paradoxale de la culture juridique Americaine dans la mondialisation ; 4. Globalisation and the Rise of Procedural Informalism in Europe and America ; 5. American and European Forms of Social Theory reflecting Social Practice -- B - Re-constructing Europe. 6. 'Cold War Law': Legal Entrepreneurs and the Emergence of a European Legal Field (1945-1965) ; 7. The Transformation of Sub-State Nationalism in Conflicted Societies: the Impact of European Constitutionalism ; 8. Is There the Spirit of the European Laws? Critical Remarks on the EU Constitution-making, Enlargement and Political Culture ; 9. How to Conceptualise Law in European Union Integration Processes? Perspectives from the Literature and Empirical Research -- C - European Styles of Legal Regulation. 10. EU Ways of Governing the Marketing of Pharmaceuticals-a Shift towards more Integration, Better Consumer Protection and Better Regulation? ; 11. Embedded and Disembedded Rationality: Contributions to Global Governance from European and US American Legal Cultures ; 12. Dutch Legal Culture and Technological Transitions-the Impact of Dutch Government Interventions ; 13. Early Intervention and the Cultures of Youth Justice: A Comparison of Italy and Wales.

La question de l'interprétation juridique occupe une place paradoxale. Elle est à la fois centrale et peu questionnée au-delà de quelques cercles de spécialistes souvent proches de la sociological jurisprudence ou du réalisme américain. Le résultat est une sorte de consensus (qui sert également de principe politique) de la communauté universitaire autour de cette idée d'un rôle subsidiaire de l'activité d'interprétation dans la production normative – production normative qui ressortit donc presque exclusivement au pouvoir législatif. Pourtant, cette idée que seul le législateur crée le droit est contredite par les faits et surtout par une série de travaux de la philosophie de la traduction qui, dans le prolongement du grand tournant herméneutique initié dans la seconde moitié du XXe, met en évidence un tout autre paradigme : l'interprète ne peut être étranger au texte et il faut combattre l'idée selon laquelle il n'ajouterait jamais à ce que l'auteur ou le premier lecteur aurait pu avoir en tête ; le texte doit être replacé au centre du débat de l'interprétation et on ne peut plus en faire un « prétexte » ou un élément secondaire dans la prise de décision du juge. Enfin, la théorie de la traduction condamne de manière ferme le recours à l'intention de l'auteur. ; The status of legal construction may at first appear paradoxical. Although essential, matters of legal interpretation are seldom addressed, except by a few specialists often very close to the sociological jurisprudence or the American Realism movements. The result is a kind of general consensus (which equally serves as a political principle) of the academic community upon the subsidiary role of interpretation in the law-making process – whereby the law-making process is deemed to fall almost entirely into the realm of the legislative branch of government. Yet, this idea that the legislative branch is the sole source of law-making is somehow at odds with the facts. This idea is above all contradicted by a set of works drawn from the philosophy of translation which, in the wake of the "hermeneutic turn" dating from the second half of the twentieth century, has brought to light a different paradigm : the interpreter is not alien to the text, and the idea that he could never add to what the author or the first reader could have had in mind should be denounced ; the text is not a "pretext" or a secondary concern in the decision-making process and should be taken seriously by legal hermeneutics. Finally, the theory of translation firmly rejects the use of the author's intention for interpretative purposes.

Natural law is a set of rights that every human being possesses by virtue of his or her nature as a human being, and this outside of any institution. It is a right that is absolute. It emanates from a human nature and not from human conventions. Man possesses natural rights by virtue of the existence of his person. According to the philosophers, natural law or jusnaturalism is subdivided into classical natural law which is based on the nature of things and modern natural law which is the work of reason. The classical natural law is that of Aristote, Saint-Thomas-d'Aquin, Stammler and Geny. According to Ciceron, there is a law that comes from God. As for modern natural law, it is the work of Grotius and Samuel Von Pufendorf. As for the concept of positive law, it is a law that is applied by considering the legislative rules and the state of jurisprudence. It designates the set of rules of a given society, created and applied by men. It is based on standards and has a legal value. It applies in time and space. The rules of positive law are the result of a choice, of a culture. Those of natural law come from human nature. Natural law is criticized by legal and sociological positivism. Legal positivism, according to Hans Kelsen and Carré de Malberg, depends much more on respect for procedures, on the legal standard to establish the validity of a legal rule. From this point of view, law is the invention of a human activity. According to legal positivism, positive law is real law. Sociological positivism, on the other hand, is interested in the content of procedures to see if it corresponds to the dominant values of society, to validate the legal rule. It refutes the metaphysical conception of law. According to them, the only law that exists is positive law. The justification and application of positive law can sometimes lead to a conflict with natural law. ; Le droit naturel est un ensemble des droits que chaque être humain possède du fait de sa nature d'être humain, et cela en dehors de toute institution. C'est un ...

Natural law is a set of rights that every human being possesses by virtue of his or her nature as a human being, and this outside of any institution. It is a right that is absolute. It emanates from a human nature and not from human conventions. Man possesses natural rights by virtue of the existence of his person. According to the philosophers, natural law or jusnaturalism is subdivided into classical natural law which is based on the nature of things and modern natural law which is the work of reason. The classical natural law is that of Aristote, Saint-Thomas-d'Aquin, Stammler and Geny. According to Ciceron, there is a law that comes from God. As for modern natural law, it is the work of Grotius and Samuel Von Pufendorf. As for the concept of positive law, it is a law that is applied by considering the legislative rules and the state of jurisprudence. It designates the set of rules of a given society, created and applied by men. It is based on standards and has a legal value. It applies in time and space. The rules of positive law are the result of a choice, of a culture. Those of natural law come from human nature. Natural law is criticized by legal and sociological positivism. Legal positivism, according to Hans Kelsen and Carré de Malberg, depends much more on respect for procedures, on the legal standard to establish the validity of a legal rule. From this point of view, law is the invention of a human activity. According to legal positivism, positive law is real law. Sociological positivism, on the other hand, is interested in the content of procedures to see if it corresponds to the dominant values of society, to validate the legal rule. It refutes the metaphysical conception of law. According to them, the only law that exists is positive law. The justification and application of positive law can sometimes lead to a conflict with natural law. ; Le droit naturel est un ensemble des droits que chaque être humain possède du fait de sa nature d'être humain, et cela en dehors de toute institution. C'est un ...

Natural law is a set of rights that every human being possesses by virtue of his or her nature as a human being, and this outside of any institution. It is a right that is absolute. It emanates from a human nature and not from human conventions. Man possesses natural rights by virtue of the existence of his person. According to the philosophers, natural law or jusnaturalism is subdivided into classical natural law which is based on the nature of things and modern natural law which is the work of reason. The classical natural law is that of Aristote, Saint-Thomas-d'Aquin, Stammler and Geny. According to Ciceron, there is a law that comes from God. As for modern natural law, it is the work of Grotius and Samuel Von Pufendorf. As for the concept of positive law, it is a law that is applied by considering the legislative rules and the state of jurisprudence. It designates the set of rules of a given society, created and applied by men. It is based on standards and has a legal value. It applies in time and space. The rules of positive law are the result of a choice, of a culture. Those of natural law come from human nature. Natural law is criticized by legal and sociological positivism. Legal positivism, according to Hans Kelsen and Carré de Malberg, depends much more on respect for procedures, on the legal standard to establish the validity of a legal rule. From this point of view, law is the invention of a human activity. According to legal positivism, positive law is real law. Sociological positivism, on the other hand, is interested in the content of procedures to see if it corresponds to the dominant values of society, to validate the legal rule. It refutes the metaphysical conception of law. According to them, the only law that exists is positive law. The justification and application of positive law can sometimes lead to a conflict with natural law. ; Le droit naturel est un ensemble des droits que chaque être humain possède du fait de sa nature d'être humain, et cela en dehors de toute institution. C'est un ...

This contribution tries to understand Henri Lévy-Bruhl's scientific trajectory from the history of the right to the sociology of law, linking it to the evolution of the legal history of law in the first half of the last century. The aim here is to understand what the disciplinary tightening has had as an impact on the career of a researcher, although dedicated, but increasingly viewed as a 'heretic', that is to say, deploying research practices and methods in breach of the dominant scientific representations. ; This paper attempts to understand the scientific career of Henri Lévy-Bruhl, which took place in the first half of the Twentieth century, when French legal history was in construction (objects, methods). It tries to understand the consequences of the evolution of this discipline upon the career of Levy-Bruhl, who devoted his works to legal history and to sociology of law. It aims to show how, while being recognized, he also has been considered as an "heretic", employing practices in contradiction with the dominant scientific representations. ; This contribution tries to understand Henri Lévy-Bruhl's scientific trajectory from the history of the right to the sociology of law, linking it to the evolution of the legal history of law in the first half of the last century. The aim here is to understand what the disciplinary tightening has had as an impact on the career of a researcher, although dedicated, but increasingly viewed as a 'heretic', that is to say, deploying research practices and methods in breach of the dominant scientific representations. ; Cette contribution tente de comprendre la trajectoire scientifique d'Henri Lévy-Bruhl, de l'histoire du droit à la sociologie du droit, en la mettant en relation avec l'évolution de la discipline histoire du droit dans la première moitié du xxe siècle. Il s'agit ici de comprendre ce que le resserrement disciplinaire a eu comme conséquences sur la carrière d'un chercheur, certes consacré, mais regardé de plus en plus comme « hérétique », c'est-à-dire déployant ...

Ce working paper propose une première analyse des modalités d'interaction sur un forumd'entraide consacré à la « Réglementation thermique 2012 », la réglementation régissant lescaractéristiques thermiques des bâtiments. Les données concernent la période 2013-2018, etelles ont fait l'objet d'une collecte par webscrapping. Les traitements quantitatifs (analysefactorielle, classification et statistique textuelle) s'attachent à décrire le travaild'intermédiation que ce forum met en oeuvre. Les analyses qualitatives du matériaupermettent une étude des formes du raisonnement juridique qui se manifestent dans un teldispositif.Cet article reprend largement notre communication présentée au Congrès 2019 de l'AFS« Classer, déclasser, reclasser », dans le cadre du réseau thématique « Sociologie du droit etde la justice » (RT13), Aix-en-Provence – 27-30 aout 2019

at the interface between sociology of law, sociology of social movements and sociology of public action, the concept of rights policies proposed by Stuart Scheingold in his founding book The Politics of Rights has been defined and used in different ways. Emphasis could be placed, as Scheingold himself proposed, on the mobilising dimension of the reference to rights, enabling individuals' citizenship to be activated and political balances to be undermined. From a different perspective, several works have defined rights policies as a style of public policy, promoting a specific framework for mobilisation, facilitating access for certain categories of actors and certain challenges to arenas in shaping public policies, and producing specific policy feedback. These two ways of defining rights policies call for consideration to be given to the reconfigurations that the use of rights produces, in relations between governing institutions, in the structures of the State and in relations between institutions and social movements. These three perspectives are at the heart of this issue. ; À l'interface entre sociologie du droit, sociologie des mouvements sociaux et sociologie de l'action publique, la notion de politiques des droits proposée par Stuart Scheingold dans son ouvrage fondateur The Politics of Rights a été définie et utilisée de différentes façons. L'accent a pu être mis, comme Scheingold lui-même le proposait, sur la dimension mobilisatrice de la référence aux droits, permettant d'activer la citoyenneté des individus et de bousculer les équilibres politiques. Dans une perspective différente, plusieurs travaux ont défini les politiques des droits comme un style de politique publique, favorisant un cadrage spécifique des mobilisations, facilitant l'accès de certaines catégories d'acteurs et de certains enjeux à des arènes de formation des politiques publiques, et produisant des effets (policy feedback) spécifiques. Ces deux façons de définir les politiques des droits invitent à s'interroger sur les ...

International audience From the case of a drug that caused serious damage over large populations-diethylstilbestrol-this article offers a sociological analysis of victims legal mobilizations. It is conducted in two aspects: on the one hand, the work produced by victims within and on law, on the other hand the back effects of law on victims, their collective and their causes, through the different stages of legal procedures. We highlight a constant tension between a singular judicial experience, marked by isolation and opacity, and the development of a "DES litigation" which plays a key role in the collectivization and the publicization of a public health cause. ; À partir du cas d'un médicament ayant entraîné des dommages sur de vastes populations – le distilbène-cet article propose une analyse sociologique des mobilisations de victimes sur la scène judiciaire. Elle est menée sous deux aspects : d'une part le travail produit par les victimes avec et sur le droit, d'autre part les effets en retour du droit sur les victimes, leurs collectifs et leur(s) cause(s), aux différentes étapes de l'engagement judiciaire et de la procédure. Nous mettons en lumière une tension permanente entre une expérience judiciaire singulière, marquée par l'isolement et l'opacité, et l'élaboration d'un « contentieux distilbène » qui joue un rôle déterminant dans la collectivisation et la publicisation d'une cause de santé publique.

Ce texte propose un commentaire critique sur le plus récent livre de François OST : « À quoi sert le droit? Usages, fonctions, finalités ». La réflexion philosophique de François Ost l'a mené à la conclusion que l'importance sociale du droit réside essentiellement dans sa contribution à la poursuite de l'idéal humaniste. La tradition juridique occidentale a fait du droit une institution de second degré dont la fonction primordiale est de constituer symboliquement chaque être humain en sujet de droit et citoyen. Dans les rapports entre justiciables comme dans le fonctionnement des institutions politiques, le droit impose des exigences réflexives et procédurales qui traduisent l'aspiration de l'être humain à la liberté, à la rationalité et à l'engagement responsable au sein d'une communauté politique. L'autorité et la centralité du droit paraissent aujourd'hui décliner au profit de nouvelles normativités et techniques de régulation qui influencent les comportements sans faire appel à la conscience individuelle ni à la délibération démocratique. Dans ce contexte, la valeur morale et politique de l'humanisme juridique est indéniable. Il convient toutefois d'ajouter à la réflexion philosophique de François Ost une analyse foncièrement sociologique pour appréhender avec plus de réalisme la contribution du droit au fonctionnement des sociétés occidentales. Loin d'être incompatible avec les calculs pragmatiques, la mobilisation du droit contribue aujourd'hui à l'essor d'une régulation plus instrumentale que symbolique dans la plupart des sphères sociales, y compris dans les activités de l'État. Dans le contexte de la modernité avancée ou de la postmodernité, le droit se conçoit davantage comme une ressource pour l'action rationnelle en finalité qu'à titre de référence idéale pour l'action rationnelle en valeur. Certes, l'humanisme classique s'exprime encore en théorie du droit et dans certaines grandes décisions judiciaires fortement médiatisées. Mais, il ne faut pas se méprendre sur la portée sociologique de ces manifestations symboliques. Elles n'ont pas pour effet de soumettre l'action sociale ou politique au contrôle souverain du droit. Elles offrent plutôt aux élites et aux citoyens ordinaires un refuge psychosocial contre les vertiges moraux et existentiels qui vont de pair avec les avancées de la société technologique. ; Abstract: This paper proposes a critical commentary on François OST's most recent book: "À quoi sert le droit? Usages, fonctions, finalités". Ost's philosophical inquiry has led him to conclude that the social importance of law essentially turns upon its contribution to the pursuit of a humanist ideal. The Western legal tradition has established the law as an autonomous institution whose primary function is to symbolically constitute every human being as a legal subject and a citizen. In private relations between social actors as well as in the functioning of state institutions, the law imposes reflexive and procedural requirements which express the aspiration of human being to freedom, to rational action and to responsible membership within a political community. Today, the authority and centrality of the law seem superseded by new normativities and regulatory techniques that tend to govern the behavior of social actors without appealing to individual conscience nor to democratic decisionmaking. Notwithstanding its obvious moral and political value in the present context, Ost's idealist philosophy must be supplemented by a truly sociological analysis in order to appreciate more realistically the contemporary significance of law. Far from being incompatible with pragmatic considerations, the mobilization of law contributes today to the primacy of instrumental over symbolic regulation in most social spheres, including state institutions. In the context of advanced modernity or postmodernity, law is better apprehended as a technical resource for purposive action than as a reference model for value-rational conduct. Admittedly, the ideal of classical humanism is still present in jurisprudence and often plays a determinant role in highly publicized judicial decisions. However, the sociological significance of the current symbolic manifestations of law needs to be properly assessed. Those manifestations do not amount to subjecting social or political processes to the preponderant control of law. Rather, they provide elite members and ordinary citizens with a psychosocial refuge from the moral and existential vertigos which accompany the advancement of a technological society.