This paper uses Bayesian methods to estimate the sovereign default probability for Greece and Italy in the post-EMU period. We build a real business cycle model that allows for interactions among fiscal policy instruments, sovereign default risk, and a "fiscal limit," which measures the maximum level of debt the government is willing to finance. We estimate the full nonlinear model using likelihood inference methods. Although we find that Greece historically had a lower default probability than Italy for a given debt level, our estimates suggest that the Italian government is more willing to service debt than the Greek government.
This paper analyzes the impact of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) on sovereign bond returns of 25 emerging markets from 1993 to 2016. Under a BIT, foreign investors can use an international arbitration scheme to enforce compensation claims against the domestic government in case of direct or indirect expropriation. We focus on the so far unexplored effects of legal risk associated with BITs on sovereign creditworthiness. We find small unconditional effects of BITs on sovereign bond returns. Taking the heterogeneity of BITs and political regimes into account, we find robust and strong negative effects. In countries with high political risk of expropriation (measured by low executive constraints), we find that the implementation of investor-friendly BITs is associated with a significantly negative impact on sovereign bond returns, accounting for roughly 15% of bond returns' standard deviation.
PurposeThis paper aims to investigate the nexus between banks' foreign assets and sovereign default risk in a panel of 15 developed economies. The empirical evidence suggests that banks' foreign exposure is an important determinant of sovereign default probability.Design/methodology/approachUsing data from the consolidated banking statistics (total foreign claims on ultimate risk basis) by the Bank of International Settlements, the author constructs a measure of bank international exposure to peer countries. This measure is then used as the target variable in a panel regression for sovereign credit default swaps. The model includes 15 European and non-European developed economies. Identification is discussed extensively in the paper.FindingsQuantitatively, a 1% increase in banks' cross-border claims increases sovereign default risk by about 0.19%. The relationship is weaker when banks are more capitalised. On the other hand, governments are more vulnerable to credit risk spillovers from banks' international portfolios when having higher debt to GDP ratios.Originality/valueTo the best of the author's knowledge, this is the first paper that attempts explicitly to establish an empirical connection between banks' international assets and sovereign default risk. To the author's opinion, this paper represents a contribution to our understanding of how sovereign credit risk spills over across countries. It also extends significantly the existing literature on the determinants of sovereign risk (that primarily focused on fundamentals, market characteristics – such as liquidity – and global factors). This paper ultimately sheds some new light on the role of intermediaries in the international transmission of credit risk, also adding to today's discussion about the linkages between banks and sovereigns.
This paper analyzes the impact of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) on sovereign bond returns of 25 emerging markets from 1993 to 2016. Under a BIT, foreign investors can use an international arbitration scheme to enforce compensation claims against the domestic government in case of direct or indirect expropriation. We focus on the so far unexplored effects of legal risk associated with BITs on sovereign creditworthiness. We find small unconditional effects of BITs on sovereign bond returns. Taking the heterogeneity of BITs and political regimes into account, we find robust and strong negative effects. In countries with high political risk of expropriation (measured by low executive constraints), we find that the implementation of investor-friendly BITs is associated with a significantly negative impact on sovereign bond returns, accounting for roughly 15% of bond returns' standard deviation.
We examine monetary policy options for a small open economy where sovereign default might occur due to intertemporal insolvency. Under interest rate policy and floating exchange rates the equilibrium is indetermined. Under a fixed exchange rate the equilibrium is uniquely determined and independent of sovereign default.
This paper seeks to understand the interplay between banks, bank regulation, sovereign default risk and central bank guarantees in a monetary union. I assume that banks can use sovereign bonds for repurchase agreements with a common central bank, and that their sovereign partially backs up any losses, should the banks not be able to repurchase the bonds. I argue that regulators in risky countries have an incentive to allow their banks to hold home risky bonds and risk defaults, while regulators in other "safe" countries will impose tighter regulation. As a result, governments in risky countries get to borrow more cheaply, effectively shifting the risk of some of the potential sovereign default losses on the common central bank.