Energy is one of the key tools of Russian geopolitical advocacy that Russia can still use efficiently through the energy supply systems built up after WWII and that is still unavoidable. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the advocacy role of the Russian state has decreased however it has never completely lost its influence on the energy sector and thereby on the countries depending on it. We can speak about the active use of energy relations as a tool of political advocacy again since 2006, nonetheless we cannot observe a complete lack of use of these tools between 1990 and 2006 either. The former Soviet republics and the former satellite countries were the targets of these actions, which illustrates the long-term effects of energy dependency systems developed between 1945 and 1990. The 2006 Russian-Ukrainian conflict was the first, when Russia did not only threaten with but actually reduced the amount of natural gas transported. During the 2006 and the 2009 Russian-Ukrainian conflicts, it became clear that Russia actually uses limitation of supply and price policy pressure and not only as a means of threat in order to enforce its political interests, even accepting its negative consequences.
Considering the recent series of events and intensified diplomatic and economic relations, many experts envisage a new Cold War between the two superpowers of the twenty-first century. Although the Chinese-American relationship over the last half-century has experienced some great moments, it has mostly been characterised by less amicable or even hostile attitudes, as well as economically volatile competition. The pragmatic realist approach and diplomatic appeasement of the 1970s and 1980s served mutual interests for the two countries against their common foe, the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, concerning their political values and visions, the democratic US and the Marxist-Maoist People's Republic of China have proven to be two irreconcilable political and social experiments, worlds apart from each other's spheres and paradigms. Within the context of the drastically altered global political milieu of the new millennium, the two great powers have manoeuvred themselves into heated confrontational positions over the last decade, not even excluding the possibility of a severe clash of interests in the future.
Hungary is an extremely poor state in terms of energy resources; the energy policy of the country and the structure of energy resources used have been and are determined by the energy import dependence. After WWII, it could obtain its increased demand necessary to its extensive energyintensive industry established based on the Soviet model almost entirely from the Soviet Union. Hungary, just like other Central-European countries, tried to decrease its unilateral dependence on energy import linked to Russia through several measures in the past 25 years but these efforts achieved partial success only; the Russian energy import dependence of Hungary and of a large part of Central-Europe remained till the present days. The 'National Energy Strategy 2030' developed on the basis of the guideline, adopted in 2011, specified insurance of long-term sustainability, security and economic competitiveness as primary objective of the Hungarian energy policy. The Government intends to guarantee security of supply, to enforce environmental considerations and depending on the options of the country, to stand up for solving global problems through implementation of the strategy. The strategy intends to achieve the termination of the electricity import balance of the country until 2030 by this 'Nuclear-Coal-Green' scenario based on these three pillars.
A 20. század második felének bipoláris hatalma struktúráját (Amerikai Egyesült Államok versus Szovjetunió) követően a 21.században a két hagyományos nagyhatalom mellett egy újabb globális geopolitikai és geoökonómiai nagyhatalom is megjelent Kína gazdasági és katonai előtörésével. Az Amerikai Egyesült Államok vezető szerepe ugyanakkor (egyelőre) megkérdőjelezhetetlen, de Kína gazdaságilag tíz éven belül beérheti, Oroszország ásványkincs vagyona (földgáz, kőolaj) pedig függőségét jelent számos gazdasági hatalom számára. A három globális geopolitikai hatalom egymás közötti, bilaterális gazdasági és kereskedelmi kapcsolatai az elmúlt évtizedben nagyon heterogén módon alakultak: az amerikai-orosz relációban lineárisan csökkenő, az amerikai-kínai relációban jelentősen növekvő, majd a kereskedelmi háborúnak köszönhetően (talán átmenetileg) megtorpanó és csökkenő, az orosz-kínai relációban pedig folyamatosan növekvő trend figyelhető meg az elmúlt évtizedben. Az Oroszország által életre hívott gazdasági és kereskedelmi kezdeményezés a Szovjetunió felbomlását követő integrációs törekvések folytatása, az Eurázsiai Gazdasági Unió az elmúlt öt évben sikereket tud felmutatni, azonban már rövid távon is jelentős kihívásokkal néz szembe és kérdéses a további fejlődése. Előre tekintve új globális kockázati tényezők jelentek meg, melyek közül a legaktuálisabb és legnagyobb hatású a koronavírus járvány világszintű megjelenése és elterjedése. A globális szereplők egészségügyi és gazdasági járvány adott válasz lépései mind sebességet, mind mélységet tekintve heterogén képet mutatnak. Kérdés, hogy a jelenleg még mélyülő globális gazdasági válság a nemzetállamok szerepét fogja-e felerősíteni vagy új szövetségek jönnek létre a világban. Izgalmas, fordulatokkal teli évek következnek a globális geopolitikai színtéren, ahol a status quo megváltozása várható, új hatalmi központok jöhetnek létre, régi szövetségi rendszerek szűnhetnek meg illetve újak alakulhatnak ki, melyek a jelenlegi tripoláris világrendet alapjaiban változtathatják meg. Following the structure of bipolar power in the second half of the 20th century (United States versus the Soviet Union), in the 21st century, in addition to the two traditional superpowers, another global geopolitical and geoeconomic superpower emerged with the economic and military outbreak of China. At the same time, the leadership of the United States of America (for the time being) is unquestionable, but China can reach the nominal GDP of the US within ten years and still many economic powers depend on Russia's mineral wealth (natural gas, oil). Bilateral economic and trade relations between the three global geopolitical powers have evolved in a very heterogeneous manner over the last decade: linearly declining in the US-Russian relationship, significantly increasing in the US-China relationship, and then (possibly temporarily) due to the trade war stagnant and declining, and the Russian-Chinese relationship has been steadily increasing over the last decade. The economic and trade initiative launched by Russia is a continuation of the integration efforts following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the Eurasian Economic Union has been successful over the last five years, but it faces significant challenges in the short term and its further development is questionable. Looking ahead, new global risk factors have emerged, the most relevant and influential of which is the global emergence and spread of the coronavirus epidemic. The response of global actors to the health and economic epidemic shows a heterogeneous picture in terms of both speed and depth. The question is whether the global economic crisis, which is currently deepening, will strengthen the role of nation-states or create new alliances in the world. Exciting, turbulent years will follow on the global geopolitical scene, where the status quo is expected to change, new centers of power may emerge, old federal systems may disband, and new ones may be formed that can fundamentally change the current tripolar world order.
