Hladni rat je predstavljao rat ideologija bez presedana u istoriji. Nijedan drugi rat, ni pre ni posle ovog višedecenijskog hladnog sukoba između Sjedinjenih Američkih Država i Saveza Sovjetskih Socijalističkih Republika, nije bio rat koji se vodio u tolikoj meri u sferi meke moći kao Hladni rat. Odsustvo neposrednog oružanog sukoba između Sjedinjenih Američkih Država i Sovjetskog Saveza učinilo je da se Hladni rat odvija kao takmičenje u sferi ekonomije, tehnologije i nauke, kao trka u nuklearnom i konvencionalnom naoružanju i kao svemirsko nadmetanje. Pored takmičenja u sferi tvrde moći, Sjedinjene Američke Države i Sovjetski Savez vodili su intenzivnu bitku u oblasti meke moći. Ovo je bio sukob između američke liberalno-demokratske ideologije i sovjetske marksističke ideologije. Svaka od ove dve zemlje težila je tome da ubedi građane one druge zemlje da je njen društveni i ekonomski sistem idealan i da je bolji i pravedniji od sistema njenog glavnog suparnika. Uzrok propasti Sovjetskog Saveza i komunizma u istočnoj Evropi nikada sa sgurnošću neće moći da bude određen. Okolnosti koje su dovele do raspada Sovjetskog Saveza, pada Berlinskog zida 1989. godine i urušavanja komunizma u Evropi ne mogu se svesti na skup vojnih, političkih, ekonomskih i društvenih činilaca koji su, nezavisno jedni od drugih, doveli do tektonskih promena u međunarodnim odnosima. Svi ovi činioci zajedno, isprepletani u kompleksnu mrežu poluga, učinili su da se Sovjetski Savez uruši i da Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama prepusti ulogu pobednika u Hladnom ratu. Pritom, Amerika nije bila samo vojni i ekonomski pobednik. Amerika je iz Hladnog rata izašla kao moralni i ideološki pobednik. Hladni rat predstavlja temu izuzetno velikog broja radova, ali mali broj tih radova se bavi analizom američko-sovjetskog sukoba u sferi meke moći. Stoga je cilj ovog istraživanja i rada rasvetljavanje, objašnjene i tumačenje poluga meke moći koje su Sjedinjene Američke Države institucionalizovale, pokrenule i upotrebile u ideološkoj borbi protiv Sovjetskog Saveza u vreme Hladnog rata. Međutim, Sjedinjene Američke Države nisu od svog nastanka u drugoj polovini 18. veka do Hladnog rata osmišljeno primenjivale svoju meku moć. Do Hladnog rata upotreba poluga meke moći bila praksa kojom su se Sjedinjene Američke Države bavile isključivo u vreme učešća u oružanim sukobima. Tek sa Hladnim ratom u Americi se javlja potreba za namenskom i osmišljenom upotrebom poluga meke moći. Odmah nakon Drugog svetskog rata Sovjetski Savez je počeo da vrši uticaj na druge zemlje šireći marksističku ideologiju i komunističke ideje. Osim širenja marksističke ideologije Sovjetski Savez je vodio i dobro osmišljenu kampanju protiv Sjedinjenih Američkih Država i američkog načina života. Američka administracija je kao odgovor na sovjetsku spoljnu politiku u periodu od 1946. do 1950. godine stvorila politiku obuzdavanja Sovjetskog Saveza i sovjetskog uticaja u svetu svim sredstvima. Ovo je podrazumevalo kako upotrebu poluga tvrde moći tako i primenu poluga meke moći. U to vreme u američkom društvu postojao je konsenzus o upotrebi političkih, vojnih i ekonomskih oruđa u borbi protiv Sovjetskog Saveza, ali je upotreba poluga meke moći bila predmet duge javne rasprave. Jedna od izuzetno važnih poluga meke moći su državni programi informisanja, odnosno ono što se u Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama smatra propagandom, a propaganda se od nastanka Sjedinjenih Američkih Država do danas smatra nečasnom delatnošću autokratskih režima. Sjedinjene Američke Države su u periodu neposredno nakon Drugog svetskog rata sprovele zakonske, institucionalne i strukturalne promene koje su omogućile trajno ustanovljavanje poluga meke moći zarad širenja američkih vrednosti, ideja i kulture i zarad ideološke borbe protiv Sovjetskog Saveza i sovjetske marksističke ideologije. Zakoni doneti u to vreme su na snazi i danas i pružaju okvir za mnogobrojne programe i aktivnosti na polju primene poluga meke moći po celom svetu. ; The Cold War was a war without precedent in the history. No war before this prolonged cold conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union was waged that much in the realm of soft power as the Cold War. In the absence of an immediate armed conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Cold War was conducted as a competition in the areas of economy, technology and science, nuclear and conventional weapons, as well as the space race. Besides the competition in the realm of hard power, the United States and the Soviet Union pursued an intensive battle in the realm of soft power. This was a conflict between the American ideology of a liberal democracy and the Soviet Marxist ideology. Each of the two attempted to persuade the citizens of the other country that its social and economic practice was an ideal one, better and more just than the other one. The source of the collapse of the Soviet Union and communism in Eastern Europe will never be fully determined. The circumstances that brought about the break-up of the Soviet Union, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the fall down of communism in Europe cannot be summarized as an aggregation of military, political, economic and social factors that independently from each other led to the colossal changes in the world order. All of these factors, entangled together in a complex net, caused the implosion of the Soviet Union which left the United States as the winner in the Cold War. Yet, the United States was not only a military and economic victor, it resurfaced as a moral and ideological champion, as well. The Cold Was has been a theme of numerous papers but only a handful of these papers tackled the American-Soviet conflict in the realm of soft power. Thus, the objective of this research and dissertation is to shed the light, explain and construe the instruments of soft power that the United States institutionalized, put into motion and deployed in the ideological battle against Soviet Union in the Cold War. However, since its birth in the 18th century until the Cold War, the United States had not wielded its soft power strategically. Up to the Cold War, the soft power instruments were used exclusively during the times when the United States was involved in an armed conflict. Only in the Cold War, the need for intentional and thoughtful use of soft power instruments emerged. Soon after the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union got set off to exert its influence by diffusing its Marxist ideology and communist values. In addition to spreading its ideology, the Soviet Union led a well-planned campaign against the United States and the American way of life. From 1946 to 1950, in response to the Soviet policy towards the United States, the American administration coined the policy of containment of the Soviet Union and the Soviet influence in the world. The policy of containment included both the use of the instruments of hard power and of soft power. At that time, there was a consensus in the American society on the use of political, military and economic means in fighting the Soviet Union, while the use of soft power instruments was a subject of a prolonged public discourse. Government information programs, perceived as propaganda in the United States, have always been a very important soft power instrument, and propaganda has been considered by Americans to be a dishonest activity of autocratic governments. In the period right after the Second World War, the United States implemented legislative, institutional and structural changes that allowed for permanent establishment of the soft power instruments. These foreign policy instruments made it possible for the United States government to diffuse American values, ideas and culture and to wage an ideological war against the Soviet Union and its Marxist principles. The acts adopted at that time are in place nowadays, and provide a legal framework for numerous programs and activities in the realm of soft power.
Apart from the former EFTA members (Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway and Switzerland) and afew former republics of the Soviet Union (Bjelorussia, Moldova and Ukraina) the countries ofthe Western Balkans are the only European states outside of the European Union. They are verykeen to join the Union. The Balkans have always been the poorest part of Europe. The appeal ofthe wealthy European Union is apparent. Access to the largest market in the world, investment,modern technologies and generous regional funds give a hope that by joining the EU the WesternBalkans countries will join the rich club. At the moment performance of the Western Balkancountries does not guarantee that they will become rich by joining the European Union. Theircurrent production and trade structure makes it likely that the Western Balkan countries will belocked in inter-industry trade in which they will export products of low and medium technologicaland developmental level and import products of high technological and developmental level. Thismight lead to divergence rather than convergence between them and the European Union. Inother to overcome this problem the Western Balkan countries need to conduct radical reformsin the public sector, fiscal policy, industrial trade and investment policy. They also need to tacklecorruption, simplify administrative procedure, strenghten property rights and the lawful state. Allthis with the aim to change economic structure and shift from achievements of the second andthird to fourth technological revolution. Only if these reforms are successfuly implemented theWestern Balkan countries can hope to avoid the Greek scenario and possibly experience the Irishscenario.
Shanghai Cooperation Organization was founded in 2001 under a Declaration signed by the leaders of five independent states from the territory of former Soviet Union and the President of the People's Republic of China. The Charter, adopted by the organization's member states as their basic document, emphasizes their commitment to strengthen their mutual trust and good-neighborliness and friendly cooperation; to keep and maintain the peace, stability and security of the region; as well as to fight together against all forms of terrorism, separatism and extremism. Although there are significant differences between the member states in almost all matters of social and governmental organization, over its ten-year existence the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has proved its vitality and has become respectable entity not only of the regional but also of international cooperation on the whole. In recent years all main actors of contemporary international relations have tried to establish and develop the cooperation with this important intergovernmental association. What the further development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization will be like and where the organization will be positioned within the future world order is difficult to be definitely determined. Apart from the role of the two leading states of this organization - Russia and China, its eventual position will be greatly influenced by other major international factors as well, which, in the era of unstable energy and other forms of security, find the area of Central Asia ever more significant and attractive.
After the cold war, when the Eastern block collapsed, considerable changes were made in the world security architecture. Althought it seemed like a beginning of more certain and secure era, cold war ending didn't fulfill expectations neither the main actors in the cold war conflict, nor the expectations of the rest of the world. Besides, collapse of one block, didn't stop growth dynamic of new power centers. Tendencies for power are not new and unfamiliar to human. When bypolar system collapsed, other subjects started fighting for the positions. PRC role with her enormous people potential, growing economy and strengthened military is evident. Soviet Union, accordingly Russian Federation, believed that there was no more need for strenghtening the other block, especially when the opposite doesn't exist. But, former partners included the opposite side, and that made more tensions between Russia and United States. Rest of the world didn't get better chance to create own future. On the contrary, especially for the peripheral and semiperipheral countries, new threats appeared that destabilized individual and collective security. Efforts to make human community rational, were always idealism and those efforts were considered utopian, but under the given circumstances, for the international stability, the most accseptable model is model of global triangle - China, Russia, USA. Reason why this three countries is ther specific potention: USA is powerful technological, military and political center, RF is worlds warehouse' and China is the worlds manufacture. In the globalism domination over nationalism era that model could be the optimal 'braking and balance' system in the international relations- political ideal that all liberal schools wanted to acchievestarting Lock, Montesquieu, Rousseau till today.
Doktorska disertacija Jugoslovenska politika prema zemljama narodne demokratije u susedstvu 1953 – 1958. godine zasnovana je na jugoslovenskim arhivskim izvorima iz Arhiva Srbije i Crne Gore, Diplomatskog arhiva Ministarstva spoljnih poslova Republike Srbije i Vojnog arhiva kao i na relevantnoj domaćoj i stranoj literaturi. Disertacija se bavi jugoslovenskom politikom prema Albaniji, Bugarskoj, Rumuniji i Mađarskoj u periodu normalizacije odnosa Jugoslavije sa ovim zemljama posle Staljinove smrti tj. posle petogodišnjeg perioda tokom koga su njihovi odnosi bili u gotovo potpunom prekidu. Ona predstavlja pokušaj da se sagleda odnos Jugoslavije prema neposrednom susedstvu u uslovima hladnog rata i sadejstva jugoslovenskih interesa sa jedne i spoljnih faktora poput uloge Sovjetskog Saveza u procesu normalizacije odnosa Jugoslavije sa pomenutim zemljama ili uloge vodećih zapadnih zemalja i njihovih interesa u Jugoslaviji i susednim zemljama "narodne demokratije" sa druge strane. U nekoliko faza kroz koje su od marta 1953. do aprila 1958. godine prošli odnosi Jugoslavije sa Albanijom, Bugarskom, Rumunijom i Mađarskom (od Staljinove smrti do potpisivanja Beogradske deklaracije, od potpisivanja Beogradske deklaracije do XX kongresa KPSS-a, od XX kongresa KPSS-a do izbijanja događaja u Mađarskoj 1956. godine i od događaja u Mađarskoj do kritike novog Programa SKJ) jugoslovenska politika se menjala u skladu sa okolnostima zadržavajući kao konstante izražen interes za normalizaciju odnosa i insistiranje na tome da sve susedne zemlje "narodne demokratije" javno osude svoju raniju politiku prema Jugoslaviji i rehabilituju sve koji su na montiranim sudskim procesima osuđeni zbog špijunske delatnost u korist Jugoslavije. Osnovni cilj rada na ovoj dioktorskoj disertaciji je bio da pruži nova znanja o ovoj temi, nove poglede na jugoslovensku spoljnu politiku i ponudi novi ugao gledanja na odnose Jugoslavije sa SSSR-om i Varšavskim paktom u celini. U vezi sa tim definisan je i drugi cilj ovog rada koji se odnosi na rekonstrukciju jugoslovenske politike prema ovim zemljama i na pokušaj da se uoče specifičnosti, metode i ciljevi te politike koji su se razlikovali u odnosu na jugoslovensku politiku prema ostalim istočnoevropskim zemljama. Treći cilj na temu jugoslovenske politike prema susednim zemljama "narodne demokratije" od 1953. do 1958. godine bio je i sistematizacija postojećih znanja o ovoj temi i njihova evaluacija s obzirom na veći stepen dostupnosti izvora nego što je to bio slučaj pre više decenija kada su nastali najznačajniji radovi koji su se delimično bavili pojedinim segmentima ove teme. Četvrti cilj istraživanja bio je utvrđivanje hronološki jasno određenih faza kroz koje su prolazili odnosi Jugoslavije sa Mađarskom, Rumunijom, Bugarskom i Albanijom u posmatranom periodu i identifikacija faktora koji su na to uticali. U trenutku Staljinove smrti, susedne zemlje "narodne demokratije" bile su daleko od centra pažnje jugoslovenske spoljne politike jer je , između ostalog, i njihov značaj za nju u uslovima prekida međudržavnih odnosa bio mali. Međutim, promene koje su ubrzo posle Staljinove smrti usledile u Sovjetskom Savezu omogućile su početak normalizacije odnosa Jugoslavije i "prve zemlje socijalizma" što je za sobom povuklo i mogućnost da Jugoslavija normalizuje svoje odnose i sa susednim zemljama "narodne demokratije". Kada su u pitanju bile te zemlje, primarni jugoslovenski interes nije se nalazio u sferi politike i ekonomije kao u slučaju Sovjetskog Saveza već u sferi praktičnih međudržavnih pitanja koja su teško opterećivala Jugoslaviju. Na prvom mestu to je bio interes da se što pre otkloni vojna pretnja na granicama i stanje na zajedničkoj "liniji razgraničenja" koje je u godinama posle 1948. iziskivalo velika materijalna i kadrovska ulaganja. Osim toga, Jugoslavija je jasan interes imala i po pitanju poboljšanja položaja pripadnika jugoslovenskih manjina u susednim zemljama "narodne demokratije" kao i po pitanju normalizacije saobraćaja. Razlog što Jugoslavija nije pokazivala izražen interes za političku i ekonomsku saradnju sa ovim zemljama ležao je u činjenici da je ona u međuvremenu, u vreme godina sukoba, uspela da pronađe alternativu kako u sferi spoljne politike tako i u sferi ekonomije i na taj način obesmisli blokadu kojoj je bila izložena sa Istoka. Međutim, cena iznalaženja te alternative bila je visoka i pretila je da ugrozi monopol vlasti Saveza komunista Jugoslavije što je za Tita i njegovo najbliže okruženje bilo neprihvatljivo. Iz tog razloga, mogućnost da se nađe zajednički jezik sa Moskvom predstavljao je za Tita priliku da uspostavi ravnotežu kada je u pitanju bio jugoslovenski položaj prema suprotstavljenim blokovima u zaoštrenoj hladnoratovskoj atmosferi. Odnos Jugoslavije prema SSSR-u, i obrnuto, može se smatrati jednim od najznačajnijih faktora koji su uticali na oblikovanje jugoslovenske politike prema susednim zemljama "narodne demokratije" sa jedne i na kreiranje politike koje su sve istočnoevropske zemlje vodile prema Jugoslaviji sa druge strane. Drugi značajan faktor koji je uticao na jugoslovensku politiku prema zemljama "narodne demokratije" u susedstvu od 1953. do 1958. godine bio je u tesnoj vezi sa jugoslovensko-sovjetskim odnosima a ticao se prevashodno ideologije i s tim u vezi destaljinizacije. Kreirajući u godinama sukoba sa Informbiroom sopstveni model "samoupravnog" socijalizma, Jugoslavija tokom procesa normalizacije odnosa nije pristajala na "jedinstvo lagera" i povratak u njega što je bio glavni kamen spoticanja u njenim odnosima kakao sa SSSR-om tako i sa drugim istočnoevropskim zemljama pa i susednim kao što su bile Albanija, Bugarska, Mađarska i Rumunija. S tim u vezi je i destaljinizacija, odnosno njen napredak i dubina u susednim "zemljama" narodne demokratije kao i njihova spremnost da se distanciraju od staljinističke ideologije, predstavljala jedan od glavnih faktora koji su uticali na oblikovanje jugoslovenske politike prema tim zemljama. Najzad, važan činilac koji je uticao na jugoslovensku spoljnu politiku uopšte pa i na njenu politiku prema delu ili celini Istočnog bloka bili su i njeni odnosi sa Zapadom, koji su iz pragmatičnih razloga tokom godina sukoba sa Informbiroom bili poboljšani do te mere da su Jugoslaviju, iako nevoljno, doveli na rub uključenja u zapadni vojni savez. Zapad je bio taj kome se nije dopadalo jugoslovensko približavanje SSSR-u i istočnoevropskim zemljama i u periodu normalizacije njihovih odnosa svaki korak koji je vodio približavanju dveju do tada suprotstavljenih strana izazivao je na Zapadu sumnje u iskrenost Jugoslavije i zebnju kada je u pitanju bila budućnost odnosa Zapada i Jugoslavije. Kao rezultat sadejstva nekoliko najvažnijih spoljnih faktora i jugoslovenskih interesa u neposrednom susedstvu iz okvira socijalističkog "lagera" nastajala je jugoslovenska politika prema Istoku uopšte pa i prema Albaniji, Bugarskoj, Rumuniji i Mađarskoj ponaosob, onakva kakva je bila. U periodu od 1953. do 1958. godine ta politika je bila aktivna i pozitivna ali ne i bez ograda. Tih godina, Jugoslavija je bez sumnje pokazivala interes da normalizuje svoje odnose sa susedima sa kojima je osim granice delila i ideologiju ali najčešće nije želela da ona bude ta koja će dati inicijativu za konkretne korake u tom procesu. Smatrajući da su međusobni odnosi narušeni ne njenom već krivicom suseda, ona je strogo poštovala načelo (koje je inače zastupala i kada je u pitanju bila njena politika prema SSSR-u) da prvi korak treba da učini onaj koji je odgovoran za prekid normalnih dobrosusedskih odnosa. Imajući u vidu sve interese, želje i aspiracije koje je Jugoslavija imala kada je u pitanju bio prostor neposredno uz njene granice kao i faktore koji su neminovno uticali na njenu politiku, može se reći da je Jugoslavija prema zemljama "narodne demokratije" u susedstvu u periodu normalizacije međusobnih odnosa od 1953. do 1958. godine vodila politiku mogućeg. Ta politika, međutim, iako osmišljena na isti način, nije uvek bila ista prema svakoj pojedinačnoj zemlji u susedstvu iz prostog razloga što u njima nije nailazila na istovetne uslove i mogućnosti. Tamo gde su mogućnosti bile veće, Jugoslavija je postizala više. Međutim, kako je vreme odmicalo i kako je Jugoslavija bivala sve uspešnija u pronalaženju svog sopstvenog "trećeg puta", čini se da joj je sve manje i manje bilo stalo do sadržajnije saradnje sa većinom suseda od kojih je (budući da su sve bile deo Istočnog bloka), u skladu sa svojom novom spoljnopolitičkom strategijom koja je ekvidistancu prema blokovima predviđala kao imperativ, trebalo da napravi određeni otklon. ; The Ph.D. thesis Yugoslav Policy Towards the Neighboring Countries of People's Democracy 1953-1958 is based on Yugoslav archival sources from the Archives of Yugoslavia, the Diplomatic Archives of the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Serbia and the Military Archives, as well as on the relevant domestic and foreign literature. The thesis deals with Yugoslav policy towards Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary during the period of normalization of relations between these countries and Yugoslavia after Stalin's death, i.e. after a five years' period of almost complete interruption in bilateral relations. It is an attempt at a study of the interplay of Yugoslavia's relations with immediate neighborhood during the Cold War and Yugoslav interests on the one hand, and interests of foreign factors, such as the Soviet Union and the leading Western nations in Yugoslavia and in the neighboring countries within the framework of the normalization of Yugoslavia's relations with the above mentioned countries. During the several phases the Yugoslav relations with Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary went through between March 1953 and April 1958 (from Stalin's death until the signing of the Belgrade Declaration, from then to the 20th congress of the CP of the USSSR, from then until the beginning of the events in Hungary in 1956 and from then until the critique of the new Program of the CP of Yugoslavia), the Yugoslav policy changed in accordance with the situation, preserving the interest in normalizing relations and insisting that all neighboring countries of "people's democracy" should condemn their former policy towards Yugoslavia and rehabilitate all those who had been sentenced as Yugoslav spies at show trials. The main goal of this Ph.D. thesis was to provide new knowledge of the topic, new views on Yugoslav foreign policy and to propose a new vantage point on the Yugoslav relations with the Soviet Union, and on relations with the Warsaw Pact as a whole. Connected with this was another goal of the thesis that concrens the reconstruction of Yugoslav policy toward these countries and the attempt to pinpoint the characteristics, methods and goals of that policy that were different from those of Yugoslav policy toward other east European countries. The third goal of the topic of Yugoslav policy toward the neighboring countries of "people's democracy" between 1953 and 1958 was also to systematize the existing knowledge on the subject in view of better accessability of sources as compared with the situation of several decades ago when the most important works touching upon some aspects of this topic were written. The fourth goal of the research was to determin chronologically clearly defined phases that the Yugoslav relations with Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania had gone through during the researched period and to identify the factors that influenced the process. At the time of Stalin's death the countries of "people's democracy" were far from the focus of the Yugoslav foreign policy, because, among other things, their importance was small due to the severed inter-state relations. However, the changes that set in the Soviet Union soon after Stalin's death made the beginning of normalization of relations with the "first country of socialism" possible. This entailed the possibility that Yugoslavia also normalizes its relations with neighboring countries of "people's democracy". When these countries were in question, Yugoslavia's primary interest didn't lie in political or economic spheres as in the case of the Soviet Union, but rather in the sphere of practical inter-state matters weighting heavily on Yugoslavia. Supreme was the interest to do away as soon as possible with the military threat on the borders and to change the situation on the "line of demarcation" that had required much material and human resources in the years after 1948. Furthermore, Yugoslavia had a clear interest in improving the situation of members of Yugoslav minorities in the neighboring countries of "people's democracy", as well as in normalization of trafic. The reason why Yugoslavia showed no great interest in political or economic cooperation with these countries lay in the fact that she had in the meantime, during the years of conflict, found alternative solutions in the spheres of foreign policy and economy, reducing thus to insignifficance the blocade imposed on her from the East. However, the price of that alternative solution was high and it threatened to endanger the power monopoly of the Union of the Communists of Yugoslavia, which was unacceptable for Tito and his innermost circle of collaborators. For that reason, the possibility of finding common grounds with Moscow was for Tito an oportunity to balance Yugoslavia's position between the two competing blocs in a worsened Cold War atmosphere. Yugoslavia's relation to the USSSR and vice versa, can be seen as one of the most important factors influencing Yugoslav policy toward the neighboring countries of "people's democracy" on the one hand, and on the other, one that was decisively shaping their policy towards Yugoslavia. Another important factor influencing Yugoslav policy toward the countries of "people's democracy" in the vicinity between 1953 and 1958 was closely connected with the Yugoslav-Soviet relations and it concerned primarily ideology and, in that context, destalinization. Having created her own model of "self-managing" socialism during the years of conflict with the Cominform, during the process of normalization Yugoslavia didn't accept the unity of the Eastern Bloc and the matter of her return to it was one of the main stumbling blocks both in her relations with the USSR and with the neighbors such as Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. In that context, destalinisation, i.e. its progress and depth in the neighboring countries of "people's democracy" and their willingnes to distance themselves from the Stalinist ideology was one of the major factors influencing Yugoslavia's policy toward those countries. Finally, the important factor influencing Yugoslav foreign policy in general, including part of the Eastern Block or it as a whole, were Yugoslavia's relations with the West that had been so improved during the years of conflict with the Cominform, that they led Yugoslavia, although unwillingly, to the brink of joining the western military alliance. The West was unhappy with Yugoslav rapprochement with the USSR and eastern European countries and every step that brought closer the two once confonted parties during the process of normalization of their relations, caused the West to doubt Yugoslavia's sincerety and cause fears for the future relations between the West and Yugoslavia. As a result of interplay of several major foreign political factors and Yugoslav interests in the imediate socialist block neighborhood, the Yugoslav policy toward the East in general and toward Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary individually, emerged in the given form. Between 1953 and 1958 that policy was active and positive, but not without restrains. During those years Yugoslavia clearly showed interest in normalizing her relations with the neighboring countries with whom she shared not only borders, but ideology too, but in most cases she was not willing to be the one to initiate concrete steps in that process. Deeming that it had not been her fault but that of her neighbors that the bilateral relations had been spoiled, she observed strictly the principle (that she also championed in her relations with the USSR) that the side that had been responsible for the interruption of normal good neighborly relations should also make the first move. Having in mind all the interests, wishes and aspirations that Yugoslavia had concerning the space imediatly bordering on her territory as well as the factors necessarily infuencing her policy, it can be said that Yugoslavia led the policy of what was possible toward the neighboring countries of "people's democracy" during tthe period of normalization of bilateral relations 1953-1958. However, that policy wasn't always the same toward all these neighboring countries, for simple reason that it didn't meet with the same conditions and possibilities in them. Where possibilities were greater, Yugoslavia acheived more. However, as the time went by and as Yugoslavia became increasingly more successful in finding her own "third way", it seems she was increasingly less interested in substantial cooperation with most of the neighbors from whom (since they were all members of the Eastern Block) certain distance should be kept – in keeping with the new foreign political strategy that foresaw equidistance towards both blocs as a must.
The relations with Russia rank among the most important and most complex issues in the US and UK foreign policy. The years after the Second World War have been marked by an exhausting arms race between the Western and Eastern bloc that ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the break-up of the Soviet Union and the victory of the United States and its Western allies. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the relations between the US and the United Kingdom on the one hand, and Russia, on the other, during the mandate of President Trump and after Brexit and point to possible directions that these relations may take in the aftermath of Biden's victory in the 2020 US Presidential elections. The author proceeds from a hypothesis that the efforts of President Trump, who, contrary to his predecessors, felt that the relations with Russia should be based on interests rather than ideology, have failed. He has not been successful primarily due to the huge resistance mounted by the state structures, mainstream media and anti-Russian coalition forged by the Republican and Democratic parties. The relations between the UK and Russia remain cold after Brexit as well due to the severe problems between the two countries. The first part will deal with the strained relations between the United States and Russia following the West's victory in the Cold War, the efforts of President Trump to improve these relations and his failure to do so. The second part of the paper will address the relationship between the United Kingdom and Russia, which is in many respects even more complicated than that between Russia and the US. After Brexit, the relations between the two countries continue to be plagued by the activities of the Russian agents in Great Britain, the crisis in Ukraine and different views on the war in Syria. In the third part, the concluding part of the paper, the author tried to answer the question of how the relations between the US and Russia will develop after Joseph Biden won the 2020 US Presidential elections. According to him, the new President will continue to pursue the traditional policy towards Russia agreed upon by both US parties. It can be expected that Biden will, despite the policy of sanctions pursued by his predecessors, Obama and Trump, engage more in supporting the opposition and civilian sector in Russia. Given the cold and strained relations between these two states, it may be assumed that Great Britain will readily follow a new, tougher course of action pursued by President Biden towards Russia and Putin. It is especially important for UK politics that Biden returns to the ideas of liberalism because, as we have seen on previous pages, in London, in addition to the actions of Russian agents on the UK territory, Putin is most resented precisely for his activities to overthrow the ruling liberal order. Despite the good ties between Prime Minister Johnson and the former US President who supported Brexit, Biden's victory will bring relief to the UK because of his commitment, as opposed to Trump, to bring back America to the world political stage, where London is likely to expect to find space for its new global role after leaving the EU. On the other hand, Moscow will probably continue with its past foreign policy strategy in anticipation of the moves to be taken by the new US President without high expectations regarding the future relations between the two countries. Russia has even fewer expectations when it comes to relations with the UK, given the gravity of the problems that burden the relations between the two countries.
The issue of security in the new social and political context has not stopped attracting the attention of strategic security studies, this time with the emphasis on contemporary concepts in response to non-military security issues, such as demographic changes or environmental degradation. It is obvious that we live in a world of fundamental political and economic changes in relations between states and non-state actors. Instability, military threats and conflicts are back in the focus of security policy, although in a completely new way that requires new understanding and a new attitude towards these categories, as well as a new response from the state and especially from the international community towards these kinds of threats or the use of force in a post-Cold-War order. In order to create a system in which all countries can function under the same rules, act in accordance with them and react in certain situations in compliance with those rules, it was necessary to create a single system of collective security. This system is a good basis for all countries to react according to the same rules and standards in certain situations when their safety is compromised. Integration processes and collective security are constants of a modern society and every country seeks to become a part of a specific system, whether it be a security-based, political or economic framework of integration. The main factor that was very important for the member states of NATO was the disappearance of the key danger coming from the East in the form of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. On the other hand, the issue of NATO's existence and future arose, as did the issue of justifying its existence, bearing in mind the absence of threats and enemies that might jeopardize the Western world. Academia and a number of scholars believed that NATO would cease to exist. For them the existence of such an alliance no longer made any sense, and they thought that it would be best for all the member states to stop being a part of such an Alliance. vi By the Declaration of Independence adopted by Parliament on June 3, 2006, Montenegro clearly committed itself to Euro-Atlantic Integration. Montenegro's membership of NATO and the EU is one of the foreign policy priorities of the Government of Montenegro. At a time when all South-East European countries are included in the Euro-Atlantic integration process, Montenegro's commitment to becoming a part of the regional and international security system (UN, NATO, EU, and OSCE) is a realistic and the best solution for achieving long-lasting stability and prosperity in the region. Montenegro's strategic goal is to build a modern and functional security system that has the ability to respond in the most efficient manner to the challenges, risks and threats to the state. For every country, the Constitution is the basis of its future path towards the democratization of the society and membership of international organizations. As the supreme law of the country, it is necessary to include all the standards that will clearly indicate the commitment of the state to the direction it wants to go, how it will develop, and which principles related to human rights and freedoms it must have. The Constitution of Montenegro does not question in any of its parts Montenegro's commitment towards membership of NATO and the EU. This is very important not only from a constitutional point of view, but also from the point of view of the international standards and norms that apply in other countries and represent the democratic standards of developed countries. Also, in this way Montenegro as a country demonstrates that despite any possible change of government it will remain committed to the European and Euro-Atlantic integration processes. At this moment, this determination is very important, bearing in mind all other aspects that could potentially affect Montenegro's path towards the Euro-Atlantic family. Consideration of the changing security environment in Europe and worldwide, as well as the improvement of the security situation by a number of Eastern European countries entering the EU and NATO, which inter alia required a reform of their defense systems in accordance with NATO standards, raises the issue of the future use of the defense capacities of Montenegro. ; The issue of security in the new social and political context has not stopped attracting the attention of strategic security studies, this time with the emphasis on contemporary concepts in response to non-military security issues, such as demographic changes or environmental degradation. It is obvious that we live in a world of fundamental political and economic changes in relations between states and non-state actors. Instability, military threats and conflicts are back in the focus of security policy, although in a completely new way that requires new understanding and a new attitude towards these categories, as well as a new response from the state and especially from the international community towards these kinds of threats or the use of force in a post-Cold-War order. In order to create a system in which all countries can function under the same rules, act in accordance with them and react in certain situations in compliance with those rules, it was necessary to create a single system of collective security. This system is a good basis for all countries to react according to the same rules and standards in certain situations when their safety is compromised. Integration processes and collective security are constants of a modern society and every country seeks to become a part of a specific system, whether it be a security-based, political or economic framework of integration. The main factor that was very important for the member states of NATO was the disappearance of the key danger coming from the East in the form of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. On the other hand, the issue of NATO's existence and future arose, as did the issue of justifying its existence, bearing in mind the absence of threats and enemies that might jeopardize the Western world. Academia and a number of scholars believed that NATO would cease to exist. For them the existence of such an alliance no longer made any sense, and they thought that it would be best for all the member states to stop being a part of such an Alliance. vi By the Declaration of Independence adopted by Parliament on June 3, 2006, Montenegro clearly committed itself to Euro-Atlantic Integration. Montenegro's membership of NATO and the EU is one of the foreign policy priorities of the Government of Montenegro. At a time when all South-East European countries are included in the Euro-Atlantic integration process, Montenegro's commitment to becoming a part of the regional and international security system (UN, NATO, EU, and OSCE) is a realistic and the best solution for achieving long-lasting stability and prosperity in the region. Montenegro's strategic goal is to build a modern and functional security system that has the ability to respond in the most efficient manner to the challenges, risks and threats to the state. For every country, the Constitution is the basis of its future path towards the democratization of the society and membership of international organizations. As the supreme law of the country, it is necessary to include all the standards that will clearly indicate the commitment of the state to the direction it wants to go, how it will develop, and which principles related to human rights and freedoms it must have. The Constitution of Montenegro does not question in any of its parts Montenegro's commitment towards membership of NATO and the EU. This is very important not only from a constitutional point of view, but also from the point of view of the international standards and norms that apply in other countries and represent the democratic standards of developed countries. Also, in this way Montenegro as a country demonstrates that despite any possible change of government it will remain committed to the European and Euro-Atlantic integration processes. At this moment, this determination is very important, bearing in mind all other aspects that could potentially affect Montenegro's path towards the Euro-Atlantic family. Consideration of the changing security environment in Europe and worldwide, as well as the improvement of the security situation by a number of Eastern European countries entering the EU and NATO, which inter alia required a reform of their defense systems in accordance with NATO standards, raises the issue of the future use of the defense capacities of Montenegro.
