Suchergebnisse

U političkome trenutku kada se Europska unija percipira kao specifična politička organizacija kompleksnoga multirazinskog sustava vlasti koji prevladava nacionalne i manjinske probleme, pojavile su se tendencije unutarnjega identitetskog i političkog komešanja kod pojedinih država članica. Španjolska predstavlja izuzetan primjer recentne političke nestabilnosti proizvedene uslijed najava referendumskih izjašnjavanja građana Katalonije o potencijalnoj neovisnosti. Ekonomska kriza koja je pogodila Španjolsku zasigurno je katalizator spomenutih tendencija, ali nipošto jedini ili odlučujući faktor u političkome zahtjevu za neovisnošću ili barem povećanom autonomijom unutar Španjolske. Potonja ima dugu povijest sukobljavanja centralističkih i regionalno-federalističkih tradicija, a njezina identitetska kompleksnost nipošto ne odgovara centralističkomu sustavu vlasti i političke teritorijalizacije. Stoga su izazovnost tematike španjolskoga regionalnog modela, njegova problematika i zahtjevi za revidiranjem suviše važna tematika koja zahtijeva pažljivo proučavanje mnoštva aspekata koje ovaj model podrazumijeva. Ovaj rad nema namjeru sveobuhvatne analize španjolskoga regionalnog ustrojstva, već kratak presjek najznačajnijih elemenata koji su reaktualizirani u novijim događajima te njihovo smještanje u odgovarajuće teorijske modele radi lakšega razumijevanja i interpretacije. ; In today's political situation when the European Union is percevied as a specific political organization with a complex multilevel system of authority which overcomes national and minority problems, certain identity and political restlesness started to emerge in some member states. Spain is an excellent example of recent political instability created due to the announcement of the citizens referendum on potential self-determination in Catalonia. Economic crisis which has affected Spain is definitely a catalyst of the mentioned tendencies, but by no means the only and decisive factor in the political claims for independence or at least greater autonomy within Spain. The latter has a long history of conflict between centralist and regional-federal traditions, and the complexity of its identity in no way corresponds to the centralized system of government and political territorialization. Therefore, the challenging themes of Spanish regional model, its problems and requirements for its revisionism are extremely important issues which require careful study from multiple aspects that such model implies. This paper is not a comprehensive analysis of Spanish regional organization, but a brief overview of its most significant elements reaffirmed in the most recent events as well as their positioning within appropriate theorethical models for easier understanding and interpretation.

Ekonomsku krizu koja je prisutna u Španjolskoj od 2008. godine pratilo je povećanje nejednakosti i stope siromaštva. Cilj rada je odrediti najranjivije društvene skupine u smislu siromaštva u Španjolskoj. Empirijska analiza koristi informacije iz Ankete o uvjetima života iz 2015. godine, kako bi objasnila varijablu siromaštva koja je katalogizirana u tri kategorije (teško siromaštvo, umjereno siromaštvo i bez rizika od siromaštva) kod osoba starijih od 16 godina; eksplanatorne varijable su sociodemografske i radne, te predstavljaju različite skupine španjolskog stanovništva. Studija primjenjuje multinomični logistički regresijski model na posljednje podatke Ankete o životnim uvjetima, koji će nam omogućiti procjenu vjerojatnosti da je osoba starija od od 16 godina u stanju umjerenog siromaštva, teškog siromaštva ili je bez rizika od siromaštva za različite analizirane kategorije. Postoji nekoliko razlika u siromaštvu ovisno o spolu; kategorije koje najviše pogađa umjereno i / ili teško siromaštvo su razdvojene i razvedene osobe, stranci koji nisu iz Europske unije, osobe s niskom razinom obrazovanja i privremenim zaposlenjem. Moramo prihvatiti da u situacijama poteškoća postoje neke skupine koje su zbog svojih gospodarskih uvjeta u lošijem položaju za suočavanje s nepovoljnim situacijama. ; The economic crisis present in Spain since the year 2008 has come accompanied by increases in inequality and in the rates of poverty. The objective of this paper is to determine the most vulnerable social groups in terms of poverty in Spain. The empirical analysis uses the information of the Survey of Living Conditions from 2015, in order to explain poverty catalogued as severe poverty, moderate poverty and without risk of poverty for persons older than 16 years; the explanatory variables are of socio-demographic and labour types, and they represent different groups of the Spanish population. The study applies an ordinal logistic regression model to the data of the Survey of Living Conditions, which will allow us to estimate the probabilities that an over-16 individual is in a situation of moderate poverty, severe poverty, or with no risk of poverty for the different categories analysed. There are a few differences in poverty depending on gender; the categories most affected by the moderate and/or severe poverty are separated and divorced persons, foreigners not from the European Union, persons with low training levels, and those with a temporary contract. We must accept that in the situations of difficulty, there are some groups that, due to their economic conditions, are at a disadvantage to face adverse situations.

Nove stranke, koje su se pojavile nakon pokreta 15-M te kao odgovor na mjere štednje u Španjolskoj, žele se razvijati kao stranke otvorene za sudjelovanje i deliberaciju svih građana. U kojoj se mjeri ostvaruju ti ideali? Cilj je ovog članka opisati i vrednovati procese online deliberacije dviju najvažnijih stranaka u Španjolskoj, Podemos i Barcelona En Comú, na temelju uobičajenih kriterija u literaturi kojima se mjeri online deliberacija. Konkretno, analizirali smo dva prijedloga o kojima se najviše glasovalo na online platformi Plaza Podemos te online razvoj izbornog programa stranke Barcelona En Comú. Provedena je analiza sadržaja 713 objava s online platforme Plaza Podemos i 563 objave koje se tiču izbornog programa stranke Barcelona En Comú. Obje platforme posjeduju strukturne i tehničke kriterije za poticanje deliberacije, ali je vanjski utjecaj vidljiv samo u slučaju stranke Barcelona En Comú. Kvaliteta deliberativne komunikacije je dobra, ali kriteriji refleksivnosti, inkluzije i pluralnosti nisu zadovoljeni. ; The new parties that emerged following the 15-M movement and against the austerity measures in Spain want to build parties open to the participation and deliberation for all the citizenry. To what extent are these ideals being fulfilled? The aim of this article is to describe and assess some of the main online deliberative processes of the two most important parties, Podemos and Barcelona En Comú, following commonly accepted criteria in the literature for measuring online deliberation. Specifically, we have examined the two most-voted proposals from the online platform Plaza Podemos and the online development of the electoral programme of Barcelona En Comú. Thus, we have conducted a content analysis of 713 (Plaza Podemos) and 563 (Barcelona En Comú) posts. Both platforms meet the structural and technical criteria for fostering deliberation, but the external impact is high only in the case of Barcelona En Comú. The deliberative quality of the communication is good but not the criteria of reflexivity, inclusion and plurality.

U većini zemalja svijeta gdje se uzgajaju agrumi, pa tako i u Hrvatskoj, prisutni su pojedini štetni organizmi koji mogu ograničavati proizvodnju i prodaju agruma. Među njima, najpoznatiji je Citrus tristeza virus (CTV) koji uzrokuje smanjenje rodnosti i bujnosti stabala. Cilj ovog rada je na primjeru Španjolske prikazati velike razmjere posljedica koje je prouzrokovao CTV tijekom 20. stoljeća. Zbog intenzivnog širenja virusa unutar plantažnih nasada u razdoblju od 10 godina propalo je više od 44 milijuna stabala agruma nacijepljenih na podlogu gorke naranče (Citrus aurantim L.). Prikazati će se pristupi kojima su se u Španjolskoj rješavali problemi zaraze velikih uzgojnih područja agruma. Temeljem španjolskih iskustava prikazati će se mogućnosti provođenja sustavnih stručnih mjera na područje doline Neretve, najvažnijeg uzgojnog područja agruma u Hrvatskoj, kojima bi se širenje CTV-a svelo na najmanju moguću mjeru. Na području doline Neretve od 2005. do 2019. godine proveden je veći broj istraživanja prisutnosti i raširenosti CTV-a. Tijekom tog razdoblja, najveći postotak raširenosti virusa zabilježen je 2006. godine, kada je CTV utvrđen u 80 % uzoraka. Virus je redovito utvrđen u dolini Neretve u svim godinama u kojima su istraživanja provedena. Problem CTV-a je prisutan već dugi niz godina i patogen se i dalje širi, što nam ukazuje na potrebu poduzimanja mjera sprječavanja njegovog širenja. Među najvažnijim stručnim mjerama je kontrola prisutnosti virusa u sadnom materijalu i sadnja zdravog sadnog materijala prema odredbama Pravilnika o stavljanju na tržište reprodukcijskog sadnog materijala i sadnica namijenjenih za proizvodnju voća (NN 9/17, 39/20) u kojem su sadržane direktive Europske unije 2008/90/EZ, 2014/96/EU, i 2014/98/EU. ; In most countries of the world where citrus fruits are grown, including Croatia, several viruses and virus-like agents exist limiting the production and sale of citrus fruits. The most common among them is Citrus tristeza virus (CTV) which causes a decrease in tree fertility and lushness. The aim of this paper is to illustrate the large scale of consequences caused by the CTV in Spain during the 20th century. More than 44 million citrus trees grafted on sour orange (Citrus aurantim L) rootstock sourhad decayed over a period of 10 years due to the intensing spread of CTV. The approaches that addressed the problem of infection of large citrus growing areas in Spain will be presented. Based on the experience in Spain, this paper will show the possibilities of implementing systematic expert measures which would eradicate or minimize the presence of CTV in the area of the Neretva valley, the most important citrus growing area in Croatia. A large number of researches have been carried out on the presence and the outspread of CTV in the Neretva Valley from 2005 to 2019. During this period, the highest percentage of virus outspread was observed in 2006, when CTV was detected in 80% of the collected samples. The virus was regularly detected in the Neretva valley in all the years the research was conducted. The problem of CTV has been present for many years and the pathogen is still spreading, which indicates the need to take some measures to prevent this continuous spreading. Among the most important and effective measures is the control of viral diseases in the propagation materials and the mother blocks and planting virus-free plants in accordance with the provisions of the Ordinance on placing reproductive planting material and seedlings intended for fruit production on the market (OG 9/17, 39/20), which contain European Union Directives 2008/90 / EC, 2014/96 / EU, and 2014/98 / EU

Članak analizira proces suočavanja s prošlošću pokušavajaći odgovoriti na tri pitanja – što znači suočavanje s prošlošću, kako to učiniti i zašto. Nakon objašnjenja samog pojma, kao primjer zemlje koja je provela sveobuhvatan i uspješan proces suočavanja s prošlošću analizira se Njemačka. Pokušavajući odgovoriti na pitanje zašto se suočavamo s prošlošću, autorica intervjuira Vesnu Teršelič, voditeljicu Documente – Centra za suočavanje s prošlošću, Vesnu Alaburić, odvjetnicu, i Teresu Forcades, benediktinku koja se suočavanjem s prošlošću bavi u svojoj zemlji, Španjolskoj, koja se krajem sedamdesetih godina prošlog stoljeća odlučila za politiku zaborava. Iskustvo Njemačke i Španjolske pokazuje da je suočavanje s prošlošću neizostavan dio ozdravljenja svake države nakon sukoba, ali i to da je riječ o procesu koji se ne može ukalupiti, već da je za svaku zemlju potreban jedinstveni tailor-made koncept. Uspješnost procesa ovisi o tome dolazi li potreba za njim iznutra (od samog naroda), o tome koliko su instrumenti tranzicijske pravde prožeti kulturom naroda te o podršci nacionalnih političkih elita, crkve, medija, znanstvenog kruga i civilnog društva. ; The article analyses the process of dealing with the past by trying to answer three questions: what it means to deal with the past, how and why to do it. After the explanation of the term itself, there follows the analysis of the process of dealing with the past in Germany as an example of a country that faced the past most thoroughly and successfully. In order to answer the question why to deal with the past, the author interviewed Vesna Teršelič, the director of Documenta – Centre for dealing with the past, the lawyer Vesna Alaburić and Teresa Forcades, a Benedictine nun actively involved with dealing with the past in her own country, Spain, which at the end of the seventies chose not to deal with Franco's era. The experiences of Germany and Spain show that dealing with the past is an integral part of a country's healing process after conflict. However, the article also shows that dealing with the past is a process that cannot be applied to all countries in the same way but that for each country a specific, tailor made approach is required. The success of the process depends on whether the need to deal with the past comes from the inside (the people themselves), whether the instruments of transitional justice integrate the country's culture, and whether the whole process is supported by the political elite, the church, the media, the scientific circles and the civil society.

Baski, manjinski narod sa svojim zasebnim jezikom i kulturom, stoljećima je podijeljen između Španjolske i Francuske. U Francuskoj Baski nemaju status manjine ni institucionalnu autonomiju. U Španjolskoj, međutim, nakon teškog razdoblja Francove diktature i preustrojstva Španjolske 1978. na kvazifederalnom načelu, španjolski Baski dobivaju priznanje nacionalne posebnosti te znatnu institucionalnu autonomiju kroz tzv. Autonomnu zajednicu (AZ) Baskiju. Unatoč zadovoljavanju većine aspiracija Baska u Španjolskoj, u španjolskoj Baskiji i dalje je prisutan secesionizam, dok taj fenomen u francuskom dijelu Baskije gotovo da i ne postoji. Cilj disertacije bio je, binarnom studijom i dizajnom najsličnijih slučajeva, koristeći se kvalitativno-kvantitativnom metodom, istražiti je li autonomija, umjesto zadovoljavanja španjolskih Baska statusom u okviru Španjolske, pridonijela jačanju njihova nacionalizma i secesionizma. Ovi fenomeni obrađeni su kroz tri prizme: izgradnju subdržavnih institucija, izgradnju subdržavnih identiteta i izgradnju lokalnih elita. Uočeno je da je autonomija u španjolskoj Baskiji pridonijela izgradnji protodržave, od demokratski izabranog Parlamenta, preko izvršne vlasti, do djelomično izgrađenog sigurnosnog aparata. Iako usporen rascjepima u baskijskom društvu uslijed demografske heterogenosti, na djelu je proces izgradnje subdržavne baskijske nacije. Autonomija je omogućila i izgradnju lokalnih elita, dolazak baskijskih nacionalista na vlast, kao i stranačko nadmetanje u baskijskom nacionalizmu. Sve to omogućilo je i da AZ Baskija krene izrazito "baskijskim" smjerom. Ona je potencijalno samo korak do pune neovisnosti, kojoj nedostaje još "prozor mogućnosti", koji se dogodio npr. raspadom bivših komunističkih federacija. U francuskoj Baskiji ne postoji teritorijalna, odnosno institucionalna autonomija. Ne dajući im "prozor mogućnosti" za razvoj i jačanje, građanska i unitarna država u Francuskoj odigrale su značajnu ulogu u ublažavanju baskijskog nacionalizma i secesionizma. Slučajevi španjolske i francuske Baskije pokazali su kako (ne)postojanje autonomije znatno utječe na periferni nacionalizam i secesionizam, kao i na potencijal za secesiju. ; In the last couple of years, the rise of secessionism in several democratic, Western European countries - from the United Kingdom (Scotland) and Belgium (Flanders) to Spain (Catalonia and the Basque Country) has been noted. All of them have something in common. In addition to having a heterogeneous ethnic structure, that is, the existence of distinct historical ethnic communities, all of these states have also, in the last couple of decades, gone through dramatic administrative and structural changes. From unitary states they had once been, they have transformed in a way which resulted in the introduction of either a certain degree of devolution or even in federalization. Consequently, historical ethnic communities have achieved a certain degree of autonomy, ranging from a partial and asymmetric decentralization ("devolution") as in the case of Scotland, to an extensive autonomy of the so-called autonomous communities of Spain. The intention of the central state and the legislator has been, inter alia, to safeguard the state unity and strengthen the state by accommodating the grievances of ethnic communities and their elites. The final outcome, however, has often been adverse to initial intentions. In the newly formed administrative units, "proto-states" of the ethnic minorities, there has been a rise in nationalism and secessionism. The purpose of this dissertation is to tackle this phenomenon and explore the causal relationship of autonomy and nationalism/secessionism. That is, the idea whether the autonomy itself strengthened nationalism and secessionism in the autonomous territories, thus acting as "subversive institutions" towards the central State, has been examined. In order to test the hypothesis and the arguments of the theory of subversive institutions, a dual comparison of two cases, Spanish and French Basque Country, and the most similar systems design have been used. The most similar systems design holds that the two cases share many common features and differ in only one. For instance, French and Spanish Basque Country are situated in the same region, share common language and ethnic origins; they are both parts of wider nation-states, face situation of diglossia etc. A differing feature, in this case, autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country – Autonomous Community of the Basque Country –Euskadi, is held responsible for the different outcome (stronger peripheral nationalism and secessionism). The choice of these two cases has been prompted by the fact that they may be considered the most similar cases in extremis, given that it is the same people on the two sides of the state border.The Basques, minority group with their own language and culture, for centuries have been divided among Spain and France. In France of today the Basques enjoy neither status of a national minority nor an institutional autonomy. In Spain, however, after a difficult period of Franco's dictatorship and the country's restructuring in 1978 on a quasi-federal principle, the Spanish Basques got acknowledgement of their national uniqueness (through a status of a nationality), and the Basque Country gained a significant institutional autonomy through so-called Autonomous Community of the Basque Country. In spite of the accommodation of most of the Spanish Basques' grievances, both on a tangible level (economic, political and cultural) and on a symbolic level (national and state symbols), the Spanish Basque Country still faces secessionism, while that phenomenon is hardly visible in its French counterpart. The dissertation explores whether the autonomy, instead of accommodating the Spanish Basques in the framework of the Spanish State, has contributed to the growth of their nationalism and secessionism. Conversely, the dissertation explores also whether the French civic state has contributed to attenuation of the peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. In France there are no "autonomic" institutions, but as a result of political and societal changes in France and external pressure from the South, i.e. from the Spanish Basque Country (spill over effect or Galton's problem), a "new governance" with specially designed institutions has been developed to partially accommodate the Basque grievances. Deprived of any substantial competences, executive or financial, they are a pale shadow of their Spanish counterparts. However, precisely for that, they serve as a good example to make comparative research in order to show the immense difference the autonomy per se can make. The research relies on the Valerie Bunce' s theory of "subversive institutions", which she tested on the cases of the former communist federations Soviet Union (USSR), Czechoslovakia (CSFR) and Yugoslavia (SFRY). Valerie Bunce (1999), explaining the collapse of former communist federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY, put forward a thesis that their design created preconditions for creating states within state. Consequently, the structure itself brought about the collapse of the communist bloc, and within it, of the federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY. Therefore, Bunce holds that the federalism created nations at the republican level or, if they had already been "defined", the federalism strengthened them. In other words, federal structure where the autonomous/federal units enjoyed relatively wide autonomy, in the long term acted centrifugally and finally led to the collapse of states (federations). With the advent of Gorbatchev and perestroika, consequent abandoning of the Brezhnev doctrine, and array of events that brought upon the collapse of communism and of federations, federal units – new "nations-in-the-making", took advantage of the situation ("window of opportunity") and proclaimed their independence.Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) after the 1978 Constitution, possess almost the entire state administration. One of the 17 autonomous communities, Autonomous Community of the Basque Country - Euskadi has a clearly defined territory, a democratically elected Parliament (officially called the Basque Parliament), a Government, officially called the Basque Government, ministries (called departamentos, departments, headed by consejeros, counselors), a Prime Minister, Lehendakari, with some prerogatives of a President, including state honours and palace. His office includes a mini Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Acción Exterior – External Action), with its delegations abroad. Thus, the Basque Government can project its image abroad. The autonomous administration has some 60 000 employees, to which one has to add the 30 000 employees of the provincial and communal administration, and disposes of a 10.6 billion € budget. At the same time, the central state administration in the Basque Country counts only 15 000 employees. Euskadi disposes of its own police forces Ertzaintza. As mentioned before, several authors argue that with such a developed administrative apparatus, a "segment-state", in our case the Spanish Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi, has been in power for most of the post-1978 Constitution period. Its institutions are consequently able to act as centrifugal ("subversive") institutions, transmitting nationalist messages through media, education system, and regional institutions. But their nationalist message is not of Spanish, but of peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. Given the specific, unfavourable linguistic situation of diglossia, and the importance of language for national (and Basque) identity, the Basque Governments took it as a mission to restore to the Basque language a status of a full-fledged official and education language, in a sense of Gellner's "language of high culture" (1998). (Re)Introducing the Basque language, not only in schools and universities, but literary everywhere, rebasquisating Euskadi, a Basque identity has been (re)enforced. Nowadays almost all institutions under the competence of local, autonomous institutions in the Spanish Basque Country are obliged to adopt Action plans or Five-year plans on the language normalization, that is, reinforced use of the Basque language. The Basque Government, in that way projects certain ideology and builds up and strengthens the Basque national identity. A new, Basque nation is being built.The statistics speak for themselves. Before the autonomy, that is, before 1978/1980, education language was 100% Spanish. Nowadays, only a tiny 0.5% of students study exclusively in Spanish (so called Model X), and 15.3% in Model A, with education in Spanish, and Basque language as one of the subjects. 18.9% study in bilingual schools (Model B) and the high 65.3% study in Basque schools (Model D), with Spanish language as one of the subjects. The presence of the Basque language is enforced in other areas as well. For instance, in public administration the targeted percentage of Basque speakers should be 48.46% and it should increase with the rise of knowledge of the Basque language in general population. Moreover, the presence of the Basque language is checked regularly in yearly evaluation reports. In the Parliament, in 2005-2009 legislature, 56% of deputies spoke Basque, while in 2013 the percentage rose to 68,5%. At the University of the Basque Country, in Academic year 1995/1996, 27.2% of the students studied in Basque, while in 2013/2014 the percentage rose to 64.3%. The number of bilingual professors (Basque and Spanish) rose from 35.1% in 2006 to 47.8% in 2013. Similar processes can be followed everywhere.As far as identity is concerned, the 35% of the interviewees in the opinion polls conducted by the University of the Basque Country declare themselves as "only Basques", 21% as "more Basque than Spanish", 35% "equally Basque and Spanish", 3% "more Spanish" and 3% "only Spanish". As it can be noted, Basque identity prevails, with a significant percentage of dual identity. Spanish identity (more or exclusively Spanish) is quite low. Opinion polls also testify of the presence of a strong local (Basque) patriotism, and at the same time, mistrust in Spanish State institutions. For example, 62% of the interviewees show trust in the Basque Government, 61% in the Basque Parliament and Basque police Ertzaintza, while only 39% in the King, 15% in the Spanish Cortes and 11% in the Spanish Government. Trust in the Basque Prime Minister is 56%, while in the Spanish Prime Minister it is only 7%. Regarding the attitude towards secessionism, 35% of interviewees support the present autonomous status, 29% favour federation (which understands a more autonomy), 7% favour more centralization and 25% favour secession. Although the latter percentage alone seems low as to provide proof of secessionism in stricto senso, the sum of the all percentages, except for 7% for centralization, should be taken into consideration if secessionism were to be regarded in a wider sense (as peripheral nationalism; autonomism and secessionism; Horowitz, 1985). From the data above, the conclusion can be drawn that the process of Basque nation-building maybe has not finished yet, but is well under way and that there is a "Basque direction" of the Euskadi. As for the Basque language in the French Basque Country, though it is increasingly present in its schools, public institutions and society, it still does not enjoy an official status. The improvement of linguistic situation is only partially due to the incitement on the part of the authorities. There is an immense difference from Spain. The French state after 1980-s allowed more freedom and space for "regional languages" to be taught, but did not impose it, force it by "dictate", as has been in the case of Euskadi. The main credit for the improvement of status of the Basque language is due to the efforts of the civil society, associations and citizens themselves. The results, comparing the Spanish and the French Basque Country, vary accordingly. Only 36,6% of school children attend some Basque language classes, while in Spanish Basque Country it is 99,5%. There is the Public Office of the Basque Language (OPLB), that helps and promotes teaching Basque language in the French Basque Country, but it has no authority to impose the Basque language in education as the Viceconsejería de Política Lingüística of the Gobierno Vasco and the Gobierno Vasco in the Spanish Basque Country. Only 11% of the interviewees feel "only Basques", 5% "more Basques", 24% "equally Basques and French", 16% "more French and 36% "only French". In the French Basque Country, the French identity and the French language in both education and society prevail. There is no "Basque direction" or Basque nation-building process. The third argument of the theory of subversive institutions is about elites' building. In Euskadi, there is the local (Basque) Parliament, where the Basque nationalists have dominated since the first elections after the establishment of autonomy (1980), with an average of 60% of votes/seats, except for the period 2009-2012 (due to a ban of the Basque radicals before the elections). In the current legislature, 2012-2016, the nationalists (moderate PNV-EAJ and radical EH Bildu) have 48 out of 75 seats. That means that they have been able to impose a "Basque direction", e.g. policies of rebasquization (termed language normalization), or vote the Ibarretxe Plan. There are also numerous examples of party competition in nationalism and local patriotism, e.g. the issue of Basque language use, flag, coat of arms or anthem. In the French Basque Country, due to non-existence of a local Parliament or self-rule, there are no such phenomena. There have been since decades Basque nationalist parties, and they score up to 10% of the votes. Nowadays, there is also a Basque nationalist party, AB (Abertzaleen Batasuna), which is relatively successful at the lower, communal level, having around 100 councillors. However, the non-existence of a Basque administrative unit,département, and centralist French electoral and administrative system, result in a situation where only two Basque nationalist councillors managed to enter the General Council of the Département Pyrénées-Atlantiques, of which French Basque Country is a part. And there they are only two of the 54 councillors. Therefore, even if at the lower, communal level, Basques nationalists can enter the local communes and be part of ruling coalitions, or form associations of local councillors and mayors, they cannot impose a more "Basque direction" of the whole French Basque Country, like their Spanish Basque counterparts. The autonomy, embodied in the Euskadi's Basque parliament, enabled Basque nationalists in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country – Euskadi) to come to power at the local level and to direct the (Spanish) Basque Country towards a "Basque direction". In addition, it helped also to build up their own elites – party elites and leaders, Government and Parliament dignitaries, above all the Prime Minister- Lehendakari, local public company managers, University, Academy, institutes' directors etc. If a potential future new country needs the infrastructure (i.e. state administration, the framework), it also needs identity/ideology and leaders (the contents and experts). And here they are! Not only are they in place, but they are in power! Finally, having their own Basque University will help to reproduce new Basque elites. In contrast, the French Basque Country does not possess almost any of the above. Indeed, the difference produced by autonomy is immense. A special attention has been given to the Ibarretxe Plan which represents at the same time a peak of the autonomy, but also shows its limits. Juan Jose Ibarretxe, Euskadi's Prime Minister (Lehendakari) from 1999 to 2009, put forward in 2003 his Proposal for Reform of the Political Statute of Community of Euskadi, popularly known as Ibarretxe Plan. It was actually a proposal for a confederation between the Basque Country and Spain. The relations between them would be based on a "free association"(Art.1). Without going into details of the Proposal, suffice it to say that, had it been enacted, even without a completely independent Basque Country, it would mean the end of Spain as we know it today. The Plan was approved by the Basque Government in 2003, and a year later, by the Basque Parliament, although with a narrow majority of 39 out of 75 votes. However, in order to be enacted, the Proposal should have passed in the Spanish Parliament. It was not surprising that the Spanish Parliament had rejected any discussion about it. Today a Spanish "carte blanche" for an independent Basque Country seems completely unimaginable. Nevertheless, remembering the "velvet divorce" of Czech and Slovak Republics and bearing in mind as well the development of situation in Catalonia, one cannot exclude, under different circumstances and leadership in Madrid and Euskadi, a possibility of a "new Ibarretxe Plan" leading to a "velvet divorce" and eventually to an independent Basque Country. To conclude, the autonomy enabled institutions (Parliament/Argument 1), nurtured Basque identity (Argument 2), enabled Basque nationalists to come to power, created a space for Basque elites and leaders and created space or even incentives for party competition in Basque nationalism (Argument 3). The thing the autonomy has not produced, and that lacks for secessionists, is a "window of opportunity" (Bunce, 1999). But if the "window" opens, as in the case of e.g. Czechoslovak "velvet divorce", an opportunity for a potential sovereign Basque state could be created. The comparative analysis has showed more sharply the differences between the two cases resulting from the existence of the autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi) and its absence in the French Basque Country. While in Euskadi the nationalists have since 1980 scored around 60% of the votes in the Basque Parliament and dominated local politics for most of the time, in the French Pays Basque they never score more than 10% and have always been quite irrelevant at the regional local level (except for the lower local level of municipalities). The Basque identity prevailed in Euskadi and French in the Pays Basque. The Basque nationalists have been able to impose a "Basque direction" and an intensive "basquization" within the language normalization policy in Euskadi, which has not been the case in Pays Basque. Finally, a serious sovereignist/secessionist attemps – Ibarretxe Plan occurred, materialized, and was voted in the Basque Parliament of Euskadi, while in the Pays Basque anything of a kind is beyond imagination. There is no French Basque Government to conceive such a plan, no French Basque Parliament as a forum where such a Plan could be voted and no prevalence of Basque nationalists to vote such a plan…All of these phenomena are direct or indirect results of the autonomy or were allowed and fostered by the autonomic institutions in the Spanish Basque Country. Conversely, they are missing in the French Basque Country due to lack of autonomy. The two cases confirmed the hypothesis that the autonomy in ethno-federal arrangements fosters peripheral nationalism and secessionism and a potential for secession, while civic State attenuates them. Interestingly enough, even the consultative institutions of the French "new governance", initially quite powerless, managed to acquire some of the features of the "subversive institutions". They have become increasingly "Basque" and have taken a "Basque direction". However, the civic, centralised and unitary State prevented these institutions stripped of a real power from taking a lead in the Basque nationalism, to gain any significant power, or to direct the French Basque Country in any "Basque direction". The civic State in France indeed acted in attenuating peripheral, Basque nationalism by not providing it a "window of opportunity" to grow.

Cilj je ovoga istraživanja bio analizirati situaciju u ekološkom stočarstvu u Republici Hrvatskoj i Europi. U europskim zemljama 2017. u ekološkim uzgojima, evidentirano je oko 4,5 milijuna goveda, 5,2 milijuna ovaca, oko 1 milijun svinja te oko 50 milijuna peradi. Najveći udio ekološki registriranih domaćih životinja u usporedbi s ukupnom populacijom u Europi i EU-28 je za goveda (3,5% i 5,2%) i ovce (3,4% i 5,0%), a najniži za svinje (0,6% i 0,7%). Najviši udio u Republici Hrvatskoj je ovaca (8.57%), a najniži peradi (0,02%). Najveće povećanje u zadnjih deset godina u EU je broja peradi (za 103%), a najmanje broja svinja (za 47,6%), dok je povećanje broja goveda i ovaca bilo oko 76% i 74%. U Republici Hrvatskoj u ekološkim uzgojima najviše je povećan broj ovaca (za oko 65,0%), dok je broj goveda i peradi porastao za oko 62 i 64%, a najmanje je povećan broj svinja (za oko 24%). Najviše je ekološkog mesa svih domaćih životinja proizvedeno u Francuskoj i Velikoj Britaniji, a ekološkog mlijeka u Njemačkoj i Francuskoj. Tijekom 2018. godine proizvedeno je najviše ekološkog goveđeg mesa u Velikoj Britaniji i Francuskoj, ekološkog svinjskog mesa u Francuskoj i Finskoj, ekološkog ovčjeg mesa u Španjolskoj i Velikoj Britaniji, ekološkog kozjeg mesa u Španjolskoj, a ekološkog mesa peradi u Francuskoj i Velikoj Britaniji. Utvrđeno značajno povećanje broja domaćih životinja u ekološkim uzgojima u Europi i u RH ukazuje na sve veći interes za ekološkim stočarstvom ne samo uzgajivača i prerađivača nego i konzumenata ekoloških proizvoda u europskim zemljama. ; The aim of the present study was to analyze the situation in organic livestock farming in Croatia and Europe. In the European countries in the year 2017, around 4.5 million cattle, 5.2 million sheep, 1 million pigs and 50 million poultry were registered in organic farming. The highest share of organically registered domestic animals compared to the total population in Europe and the European Union-28 was in cattle (3.5% and 5.2%) and sheep (3.4% and 5.0%), and the lowest in pigs (0.6% and 0.7%). In Croatia the highest share is in sheep (8.57%) and the lowest in poultry (0.02%) number. The largest increase in recent ten years in the EU has been in the number of poultry (by 103%) and the smallest in the number of pigs (by 47.6%), while the increase was the number of cattle and sheep was around 76% and 74%, respectively. In Croatia organic sheep production increased the most (by 65.0%), while the number of cattle and poultry increased by 62 and 64%, and the smallest increase is in the number of pigs (by 24%). The majority of organic meat of all species of domestic animals is produced in France and in United Kingdom, while organic milk is produced mostly in Germany and France. During the year 2018, most organic beef was produced in the UK and France, organic pork in France and Finland, organic sheep meat in Spain and the UK, organic goat meat in Spain, while most of organic poultry was produced in France and in the UK. A significant increase in the number of livestock in organic farming in Europe and in Croatia indicates an increasing interest in organic livestock farming, not only increase of farmers and processors but also increase of consumers of organic products in European countries.

Sve veća nepovezanost građana i donositelja odluka gura politiku u smjeru koji će dovesti do preoblikovanja institucionalnog aranžmana. Komunikacijski alati mogu imati važnu ulogu u razvijanju novih prostora za participaciju građana. Postoje različiti modeli kojima vlada i javna administracija mogu poduprijeti građansku participaciju: e-vlada, otvorena vlada i specifičan dizajn digitalne demokracije. Otvorena vlada može biti jedan od načina za ponovno povezivanje građana i političkih institucija, ali u isto vrijeme može biti i "privlačan" alat za institucionalizaciju participacije odozdo prema gore i njezino umrtvljivanje. Cilj je ovog rada predstaviti prva saznanja međunarodnog istraživačkog projekta na temu otvorene vlade i participacijskih platformi u četiri europske države (Francuskoj, Italiji, Španjolskoj i Ujedinjenom Kraljevstvu). Istraživanje nastoji otkriti mogu li platforme za participaciju poboljšati kvalitetu demokracije i može li otvorena vlada doprinijeti demokratizaciji demokracije. ; The growing disconnection between citizens and decision-makers is pushing politics towards a re-shaping of institutional design. New spaces of political participation are sustained and even reinforced by communication, especially by digital communication. Governments and public administrations can find and use different models to facilitate citizens' participation; e-government, open government and a specific design of digital democracy. In this respect, open government can constitute a way to re-connect citizens and political institutions, but at the same time, it can also be an "appealing" tool to institutionalize bottom-up participation and so anesthetizing it. The aim of this article is to present the first findings of an international research project about open government and participatory platforms in four European countries (France, Italy, Spain, the UK). The study tries to understand if participatory platforms can improve the quality of democracy, and if open government can contribute to democratizing democracy.

Nezadovoljstvo građana političkim institucijama rezultiralo je sve izraženijim udaljavanjem demokratskih institucija od građana koje one zastupaju, ali i proporcionalnim porastom građanskih inicijativa usmjerenih prema zadobivanju većeg stupnja participacije u javnom životu. Zbog neravnoteže koja se javlja u okviru predstavničke demokracije pojavila se potreba za poboljšanjem načina na koji institucije komuniciraju. Cilj je ovoga istraživanja ocijeniti lokalnu komunikaciju u regijama Murcia i Navarre kroz analizu razine transparentnosti mrežnih stranica njihovih institucija. Primijenit će se ukupno 41 indikator, temeljen na španjolskoj platformi Mapa Infoparticip@ (www.mapainfoparticipa.com), kako bi se u te dvije autonomne zajednice, koje imaju svaka po jednu provinciju, utvrdile sličnosti i razlike na temelju kriterija transparentnosti i participacije. Rezultati istraživanja pokazuju deficit u implementaciji normativa transparentnosti, što utječe na ulogu tih institucija kao izvora javnih informacija, kao i na građansku participaciju, što je osobito vidljivo u općinama s manjim brojem stanovništva. ; Citizens' disaffection with political institutions has resulted in an ever more pronounced distancing between the represented and their representative democratic institutions, with a commensurate increase in citizens' initiatives aimed at obtaining a higher degree of participation in public life. The imbalance experienced by representative democracy in this respect accounts for the need to improve the way in which institutions communicate. This study aims to assess local communication in the regions of Murcia and Navarre by analysing the level of transparency of their institutional websites. The 41 indicators that underpin Mapa Infoparticip@ (www.mapainfoparticipa.com) in Spain are used to see what similarities and differences can be identified when applying the criteria of transparency and participation in these two single-province Autonomous Communities. The findings show a deficit in implementing norms of transparency. This fact affects the role these institutions play as sources of public information and citizen participation, and it appears in a clearer way in municipalities with a smaller population.

Regardless of the earlier assumptions about the obsolescence of the classic federal theory, the paper emphasizes the contemporary significance and relevance of federalism. Europe is the epicentre of modern federalization processes, not only when it comes to the European Union, but also a number of European countries such as Belgium, Spain and the United Kingdom. The paper points out the fundamental distinction between the classic and modern federalism, which has its origin in the fact that federal systems 'arise' differently as a result of opposite processes of federalization and that in this sense we can distinguish between classic "integrative" and modern "devolutive" federalism. The basic assumptions of the paper are that 1) these two federalism patterns originally differ in the character of the basic constitutive act of the federal union with regard to the subject of creating a federation, and 2) because contemporary federations are "federal states without a federal foundation" this difference is not noticeable today. On the contrary, it has largely disappeared, and in this way, the difference between classic and modern federalism is actually bridged. ; Bez obzira na ranije postavke o zastarjelosti klasične federalne teorije u radu se naglašava suvremeni značaj i aktualnost federalizma. Upravo je Europa epicentar suvremenih procesa federalizacije, ne samo kada je riječ o Europskoj uniji, već i nizu europskih država poput Belgije, Španjolske i Ujedinjene Kraljevine. U radu se ukazuje na temeljno razlikovanje klasičnog i suvremenog federalizma, koje ima ishodište upravo u činjenici da federalni sustavi različito "nastaju" kao rezultat suprotnih procesa federalizacije i da u tom smislu možemo razlikovati klasični "integrativni" i suvremeni "devolutivni" federalizam. Temeljne su postavke rada da 1) između ta dva obrasca federalizma izvorno postoji suštinska razlika u karakteru temeljnog konstitutivnog akta federalnog saveza s obzirom na subjekta stvaranja federacije, i 2) s obzirom na to da su suvremene federacije "savezne države bez federalnog temelja" ta razlika danas više nije zamjetna, već je ona, naprotiv, u velikoj mjeri nestala i na taj način zapravo se premošćuje razlika između klasičnog i suvremenog federalizma.

Bez obzira na ranije postavke o zastarjelosti klasične federalne teorije u radu se naglašava suvremeni značaj i aktualnost federalizma. Upravo je Europa epicentar suvremenih procesa federalizacije, ne samo kada je riječ o Europskoj uniji, već i nizu europskih država poput Belgije, Španjolske i Ujedinjene Kraljevine. U radu se ukazuje na temeljno razlikovanje klasičnog i suvremenog federalizma, koje ima ishodište upravo u činjenici da federalni sustavi različito "nastaju" kao rezultat suprotnih procesa federalizacije i da u tom smislu možemo razlikovati klasični "integrativni" i suvremeni "devolutivni" federalizam. Temeljne su postavke rada da 1) između ta dva obrasca federalizma izvorno postoji suštinska razlika u karakteru temeljnog konstitutivnog akta federalnog saveza s obzirom na subjekta stvaranja federacije, i 2) s obzirom na to da su suvremene federacije "savezne države bez federalnog temelja" ta razlika danas više nije zamjetna, već je ona, naprotiv, u velikoj mjeri nestala i na taj način zapravo se premošćuje razlika između klasičnog i suvremenog federalizma. ; Regardless of the earlier assumptions about the obsolescence of the classic federal theory, the paper emphasizes the contemporary significance and relevance of federalism. Europe is the epicentre of modern federalization processes, not only when it comes to the European Union, but also a number of European countries such as Belgium, Spain and the United Kingdom. The paper points out the fundamental distinction between the classic and modern federalism, which has its origin in the fact that federal systems 'arise' differently as a result of opposite processes of federalization and that in this sense we can distinguish between classic "integrative" and modern "devolutive" federalism. The basic assumptions of the paper are that 1) these two federalism patterns originally differ in the character of the basic constitutive act of the federal union with regard to the subject of creating a federation, and 2) because contemporary federations are "federal states without a federal foundation" this difference is not noticeable today. On the contrary, it has largely disappeared, and in this way, the difference between classic and modern federalism is actually bridged.

Jedan od praktično i teorijski najvažnijih problema teritorijalne organizacije lokalne samouprave svodi se na dilemu uspostave jednog stupnja ili više stupnjeva lokalnih samoupravnih jedinica. Stupnjevanjem se odgovara na problem i potrebu integracije sustava lokalne samouprave te na potrebu povezivanja tog sustava sa širom državnom organizacijom. Nakon opće rasprave o prednostima i nedostacima stupnjevanja, opsežno je komparativno analizirano stanje u 39 zemalja, 23 razvijene i 16 tranzicijskih. Ustanovljena su četiri tipa teritorijalnih okvira za integraciju sustava lokalne samouprave, jednostupanjski, mješoviti ili segmentirani, dvostupanjski i trostupanjski. Kao glavni faktori koji uvjetuju izbor jednog od tih okvira u pojedinoj zemlji utvrđeni su: veličina lokalnih jedinica, njihovo monotipsko ili politipsko uređenje, veličina države izražena brojem stanovnika te oblik društvenog uređenja (federacije, unitarne države). ; The dilemma about the establishment of one or more levels of local self-government units is one of the most important problems of territorial organisation of local self-government. Levelling is structural answer to the problem and needs to integrate local self-government system itself and to integrate that system into a wider organisation of a state as a whole. At the beginning, the paper deals with general discussion about the advantages and disadvantages of levelling. The situation in almost forty countries has been analysed, including two groups of countries: developed democracies (Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, Island, Italia, Japan, Luxemburg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the USA) and transition countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Serbia). Four different types of territorial frames for local self-govern mentsystem integration have been identified: one-tier, mixed or segmented, two-tier, and three-tier systems. Decision to select one of them is conditioned by the average size of local units, monotypic or polytypic design of territorial division of a country, the size of a country in terms of the number of inhabitants, and form of political organisation (federation or unitary state).

Odlikovanja Španjolske u Zbirci odlikovanja Hrvatskoga povijesnog muzeja nisu zastupljena u velikom broju i ne mogu reprezentirati svu kulturnu raznolikost i umjetničko bogatstvo te zemlje. Nedostaju stari viteški redovi, poput Vojničkoga viteškog reda Alcantara, Vojnoga viteškog reda Calatrava, "noviji" ordeni, poput Vojnog ordena San. Fernanda i Vojnog ordena Sv. Hermenegilda. Kada bi se zbrojili svi španjolski redovi i odlikovanja tijekom stoljeća, njihovi stupnjevi i varijante, bilo bi ih impozantnih nekoliko stotina. Dakako, skupiti ih sve na jednom mjestu nemoguća je misija i za velike španjolske kolekcije odlikovanja, a kamo li za kolekcije u našoj sredini. Većina španjolskih odlikovanja potječe iz darovane Zbirke odlikovanja dr. Veljka Malinara, a nekoliko lijepih primjeraka stekli smo i razmjenom sa zagrebačkim kolekcionarom Tomislavom Muhićem. Do 1990. godine Hrvatski povijesni muzej nije imao niti jedno španjolsko odlikovanje, a sada ih ima ukupno dvadeset i tri. ; The Croatian History Museum does not have many Spanish decorations in its Collection of Decorations and they are not representative of all the cultural diversity and art wealth of this country. There are no old orders of chivalry such as the Military Knightly Order of Alcantara, Military Knightly Order of Calatrava, "newer" orders such as the Royal Military Order of St Ferdinand and the Royal and Military Order of San Hermengildo. If all the Spanish orders and decorations, their classes and variants during the centuries were to be added up, an imposing number of several hundred would be reached. Even the great Spanish collections of decorations find it almost impossible to collect them all in one place, let alone a collection in Croatia. Most Spanish decorations in the collection of the Croatian History Museum are part of the donated Collection of Decorations of Dr Veljko Malinar, and several fine specimens were acquired by exchange with the Zagreb collector Tomislav Muhić. Until 1990 the Croatian History Museum did not have any decorations from Spain, it now has a total of twenty-three.

ArchiteXt Mining: Spanish modern architecture through its texts (1939–1975) istraživački je projekt koji je financirala Vlada Španjolske putem poziva za "projekte izvrsnosti" Ministarstva gospodarstva i konkurentnosti 2015. godine. Projekt ima za cilj istražiti novo gledište i razmotriti posebnosti suvremene španjolske arhitekture. Unatoč sve većem uspjehu primjene analize podataka kao alata u nizu disciplina, istraživanja na području teorije arhitekture nikada se nisu najefikasnije koristila ovim tehnologijama. Španjolske i međunarodne okolnosti razvoja moderne arhitekture pomno su razmatrane kvalitativnim istraživanjem, koje je uspostavilo opće teorijske osnove. Sada je vrijeme za započinjanje novoga dubinskog istraživanja na temelju objektivnih podataka. Da bismo odgovorili na ovaj izazov, predlažemo primjenu tehnika "rudarenja teksta" (engl. text mining) kako bi se iskoristili najbolji izvori podataka na ovom području: arhitektonska periodika. Svrha je stvoriti snažnu bazu podataka koja će biti javno dostupna znanstvenoj zajednici na internetu. Dakle, ovaj projekt ispunjava nekoliko ciljeva e-istraživanja: olakšati informatizaciju istraživanja podataka, podržati svaku fazu prikupljanja podataka i upravljati analizama velikih podataka uz pomoć posebnih alata. ; ArchiteXt Mining: Spanish Modern Architecture through Its Texts (1939–1975) is a research project funded by the Government of Spain through the 2015 Call for "Excellence Projects" of the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness. This project aims to explore a new viewpoint and look into the special features of Spanish modern architecture. Despite the increasing success of using data analysis as a tool in a variety of disciplines, research on architectural theory has never made the most efficient use of these technologies. The Spanish and international circumstances of modern architecture development have been scrutinized through qualitative research, which has established a shared theoretical ground. It is now time to start a new in-depth research based on objective data. To address this challenge, we propose the application of text mining techniques to take advantage of the best data source in the field: architectural periodicals. The purpose is to create a powerful database hosted on a public website for the scientific community. Thus, this project fulfils several e-Research objectives: to facilitate the computerization of data research, to support every stageof data collection, and to manage big data analyses with thehelp of specific tools.