Suchergebnisse

The term 'speciesism' first appeared in 1970 on a printed pamphlet made by psychologist Richard Ryder for a protest against animal experimentation [1] and refers to discrimination on the grounds of belonging to a certain species. Thus, speciesism includes the assignment of different values, rights, or special consideration to individuals based solely on their species membership. Continuing the analogy to discriminatory practices like racism, sexism, classism, and others, the term was further popularised by philosopher Peter Singer in his 1975 book Animal Liberation [2]. Since then, the term 'speciesism' has been usually appropriated with regard to practices of human domination over animals and the exclusion of all nonhuman animals from the rights and freedoms that are granted to humans. In thinking about ideologies that aim to abandon speciesism, we are facing questions about what such a world would look like. What are the ethical and political consequences of a non-speciesist society? How would it affect human consumption and daily life? How would animal encounters between different species be structured differently?Within the academic discourse of critical posthumanism, the discussions that emerge from reflections on human/animal relationships are grounded in different theoretical frameworks and have different orientations and agendas [3]. For example, on the one hand, discussions that stem from critical animal studies (CAS) focus on the relationships between human and nonhuman animals and the notion of speciesism. These CAS discussions are usually firmly grounded in theories of intersectionality, thus politically and structurally situating the oppression of animals in relation to the oppression of other humans [4]. This means that reflections on animal exploitation and oppression are discussed and analysed in their relation to critical theory about other forms of oppression (such as sexism, classism, and racism) with the aim to revolutionize current societal and political norms. Extending this intersectional focus, the field of posthumanism, from a more general perspective, can be understood as aiming more broadly at deconstructing the category 'human' as something unique, distinct, and at the centre of the world [5]. This field focuses on the symbolic, discursive, institutional, and material arrangements that produce anthropocentrism and involves scholarly engagement from areas such as Science and Technology Studies (STS), material feminism, cultural studies, continental philosophy, geography, animal studies, and more [6].This entry provides an introduction to discussions of (non-)speciesism, specifically within the fields of (critical) posthumanism and CAS. Following the work of CAS scholar Helena Pedersen, the goal of this text is to highlight the importance of a joined approach towards discussions surrounding the notion of speciesism, where critical attention is given to the treatment of animals in our society while at the same time remaining open to embracing the complexity that arises when human and nonhuman animals meet.As posthumanist theorist Cary Wolfe argued: "debates in the humanities and social sciences between well-intentioned critics … almost always remain locked within an unexamined framework of speciesism" [7]. Even though scholarly attention has been focused on animals with the aim of abandoning humanism, Wolfe writes that even if it is our aim to expose how animals have been misunderstood and exploited, we are continuing to reframe our relationships with other beings through anthropocentric frameworks [8]. Wolfe proposes that a posthumanist bioethics should focus on the vulnerability and finitude that both human and nonhuman animals share [9].Extending this view, feminist/posthumanist scholar Manuela Rossini states that it is in fact quite sobering that "the most radical metaposthumanists (and the humanities more broadly) do not quite manage to make an epistemological break with liberal humanism, insofar as their writing is also marked by an unquestioned 'speciesism'" [10]. Rossini then argues that an anti-speciesist strand of posthumanist thinking should involve a focus on two aspects:zoontology (drawing from Wolfe: meaning a broadening of ontological focus on animals that investigates both sameness and difference outside of humanist parameters);and companion speciesism (drawing from feminist STS scholar Donna Haraway: embracing the positive configurations of the unavoidably close encounters between humans, animals, machines, and hybrids in an attempt to establish responsive and responsible relationships with 'companion species') [11].While emphasizing a general concern towards animal oppression, these broader theoretical approaches aim to reframe the conversation away from our accustomed political stratifications, towards the more complex systemic phenomena that compose a living planet [12]. However, with regards to the notion of speciesism itself, CAS scholars have in turn questioned and criticised these theoretical approaches towards the oppression of animals. In general, they argue that rather than conceptually romanticising our relationships with other beings and theorizing the beauty of our shared encounters, we should focus on real animals and their actual life situations: more than 150 billion animals get slaughtered every year and this number is still rising [13].In other words, CAS scholars propose to, first and foremost, reject the welfare position (or green ideology) in which exploitation of animals under proper conditions is justified or encouraged. Critics describe it as just another way to routinely sustain speciesist hegemony [14], while posthumanists argue that violence towards both human and nonhuman animals should be part of our investigations into shared entanglements [15]. What both lines of thinking with nonhumans seem to have in common is that we should emphasize that any tendency towards subject boundary dissolution and shared engagements between human and nonhuman animals are never symmetrical and therefore cannot be innocent [16]. This is perhaps where common ground can be found between the two discourses in relation to the notion of speciesism.With the aim to further this compatibility, Pedersen proposes that the edges between posthumanism and CAS could do the productive work of knowledge development in symbiotic relationship with each other. For example, the field of posthumanism could influence CAS with some healthy impurity, indeterminacy, and openness towards different political perspectives on speciesism [17]. Whereas posthumanism could be more rooted in some (un)firm political soil with consistent and committed critical attention towards oppression of human and nonhuman animals [18]. In arguing for finding compatibility between different fields that concern themselves with the lives of nonhuman animals, further discussions that are centred around the notion and meaning of (non-)speciesism play a central role in maintaining a focus on the politics that are involved in critical posthumanism. Renewed attention towards finding common grounds and productive dialogue between CAS and (critical) posthumanism can offer a space for relevant discussions on this topic.

Speciesism should play no role in determining welfare outcomes. Cognition may vary within species as well as between species, but broad classifications such as invertebrates are functionally meaningless in this context. Cognition should relate to welfare only to the extent that it relates to the capacity to suffer or to experience pleasure.

I argue that despite Ng's claim that we should postpone the defense of those animals that live in the wild, we do have reasons to start spreading concern for them now. We can do it by (i) changing public attitude by heightening awareness of speciesism, by which we will also challenge animal exploitation; and (ii) by disseminating information about the situation of animals in the wild.

The present article examines a concern I have had for some time about the compatibility of humanistic psychology with the emerging animal rights movement. Beyond working out my position, the paper has the additional educational and, frankly, political purpose of bringing animal rights issues to the attention of humanistic psychologists. The article applies certain concepts of contemporary animal rights philosophy, notably "speciesism," to both the philosophy of humanism and humanistic psychology. While on a philosophical level, certain concepts are discussed that would likely block a rapprochement, I feel that humanistic psychologists as individuals are likely to extend their compassion to nonhuman animals. A review of philosophical humanism reveals that its important concept of individuality excludes nonhuman animals. Within this conception, animals simply are not individuals. In fact, animals are employed as a categorical foil representing precisely the absence of reason and relative autonomy, hallmarks of individuality. In humanistic psychology, the concept of self actualization is open to similar charges. A compatability and, hence a reconciliation, is suggested through a phenomenological rendering of empathy, a second concept critical to humanistic psychology.

We articulate a posthuman politics of hope to unpack the richly embodied personal experiences and web of relationalities formed through repeated encounters with insects. Interrogating insect speciesism teaches us to extend our compassion and live symbiotically with insects. We focus the narrative of insect decline as impacted by colonialism and white supremacy, enabling insect speciesism to flourish alongside exploitation of other human and nonhuman creatures. We pay particular attention the use of everyday language and framing of insects to 'other' them, thereby trivialising and demonising their existence, including 'it's *just* a bug' or 'they are pests'. Insect speciesism employs similar rhetoric reinforcing discrimination patterns of other nonhuman animals and humans. We focus on the unexpected encounters with insects in domestic spaces, such as an office desk, and through the multispecies space of 'the allotment'. We reflect on two possible posthuman futures: one where insect speciesism is entrenched and unrepentant; the second a decolonized society where we aspire to live a more compassionate and non-violent existence amidst these remarkable and brilliant creatures we owe our very existence on Earth. One of the most profound lessons of the crisis-driven epoch of the Anthropocene is this: our existence on earth is intimately bound with the flourishing of all forms of life. This includes complex multispecies encounters between humans and insects, an area of enquiry widely neglected across the social sciences. Faced with imminent catastrophic decline and extinction of insect and invertebrate populations, human relationships with these fellow Earthlings are deserving of further attention.

Of all the lessons that our crisis-driven epoch of the Anthropocene is teaching us, one of the most profound is this: our very existence on earth is intimately bound with, and indeed dependent upon, the flourishing of all forms of life. This holds particularly true with respect to the complex multispecies encounters between human and insect communities, an area of enquiry which is almost entirely entirely neglected across the social sciences. Regrettably it is only now, faced with the imminent catastrophic decline and extinction of insect and invertebrate populations that our human relationships with these fellow Earthlings are finally being seen as deserving enough to draw the attention of critical scholars, broader activist and policy-making communities alike. In trying to address some of this considerable gap in knowledge and understanding we focus the narrative of insect decline as an impact of colonialism and anti-Indigenous white supremacist policies across the world, enabling insect speciesism to flourish alongside the exploitation of myriad other human and nonhuman creatures. The aim of the paper is to contribute to this emerging literature by articulating a posthuman politics of hope: born of a desire to unpack both the richly embodied personal experiences, and web of relationalities formed through repeated encounters with insects, more fully. Crucially, this entails focusing on ordinary sites and places that will be familiar to most people. It is here, we argue, that to interrogate insect speciesism can teach us important lessons in how we can meaningfully extend our compassion, and broaden our intersectional approaches to social justice, to live more meaningfully and non-violently with insects as fellow Earthlings. The paper argues as long as there is discrimination towards even the smallest creatures of earth, there will also be discrimination towards humans and larger nonhuman animals. To this end the paper pays particular attention to explores the use of everyday language and framing of insects, and how this is used to 'other' them, and thereby trivialise or demonise their existence, such as "it's *just* a bug" or they are all "pests". In doing so we show how this employs the same rhetoric and framing reinforcing broader discrimination patterns of larger nonhuman animals and humans. We evidence this by focusing on the unexpected encounter with other insects in domestic spaces, such as an office desk, and through the multispecies space of 'the allotment'. This discussion then opens up to reflect on two possible posthuman futures, one where insect speciesism is still entrenched and unrepentant; the second a decolonized society where we have aspired to live a more compassionate and non-violent existence amidst these remarkable, brilliant and incredible lives that we owe our very existence on Earth as we know it.

Starting from the conceptual distinction between human and non-human animal, this article seeks to account for a dimension of the animal question that goes beyond problems related to specism. While the specific practices harm non-human animals by the mere fact of not belonging to the human species, the aspect of the discussion that is sought to account in this work corresponds to the conceptual apparatus that sustains these practices and whose scope have important consequences also in the life of human beings. How involved are we in the animal issue? Following the proposal by Corine Pelluchon in Manifiesto Animalista (2018), this article raises the animal issue as a political strategy or program. The animal issue and the recognition of our shared condition of finite beings can be the philosophical and normative orientation for new horizons of coexistence, social and political organization. ; Partiendo desde la distinción conceptual entre humano y animal no-humano, el presente artículo busca dar cuenta de una dimensión de la cuestión animal que va más allá de los problemas relacionados con el especismo como tal. Mientras las prácticas especistas perjudican a los animales no-humanos por el mero hecho de no pertenecer a la especie humana, el aspecto de la discusión del cual se busca dar cuenta en el presente trabajo corresponde al aparato conceptual que sostiene dichas prácticas y cuyos alcances tienen consecuencias importantes también en la vida de los seres humanos. ¿Qué tan implicados estamos en la cuestión animal? Siguiendo la propuesta por Corine Pelluchon en Manifiesto Animalista (2018), el presente artículo plantea la cuestión animal como una estrategia o programa político. La cuestión animal y el reconocimiento de nuestra condición compartida de seres finitos pueden constituir una orientación filosófica y normativa para nuevos horizontes de convivencia, organización social y política.

Globalization has exacerbated speciesism both socially and economically. Veganism and its subsequent labeling schemes have arisen as an important political site of resistance to growing non-human animal inequality. This paper explores globalization's impact on non-human animals, veganism and vegan labeling, as well as important divides within the modern non-human animal rights movement in regards to utopian and pragmatic approaches to alleviating growing speciesism.

Accepted Date: 30/08/2016; Version: Author Manuscript / Post-Print; Exceptions: None. © 2016, European Journal of Personality. This is an author produced version of a paper published in/accepted for publication in European Association of Personality Psychology uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self- archiving policy. The final published version (version of record) is available online via Wiley Online Library at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/per.2069/abstract. Some minor differences between this version and the final published version may remain. We suggest you refer to the final published version should you wish to cite from it. ; Recent research and theorizing suggest that desires for group-based dominance underpin biases towards both human outgroups and (non-human) animals. A systematic study of the common ideological roots of human-human and human-animal biases is, however, lacking. Three studies (in Belgium, UK, and USA) tested the Social Dominance Human-Animal Relations Model (SD-HARM) proposing that Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) is a key factor responsible for the significant positive association between ethnic outgroup attitudes and speciesist attitudes towards animals, even after accounting for other ideological variables (that possibly confound previous findings). Confirming our hypotheses, the results consistently demonstrated that SDO, more than right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), is a key factor connecting ethnic prejudice and speciesist attitudes. Furthermore, Studies 2 and 3 showed that both SDO and RWA are significantly related to perceived threat posed by vegetarianism (i.e., ideologies and diets minimizing harm to animals), but with SDO playing a focal role in explaining the positive association between threat perceptions and ethnic prejudice. Study 3 replicated this pattern, additionally including political conservatism in the model, itself a significant correlate of speciesism. Finally, a meta-analytic integration across studies provided robust support for SD-HARM and offers important insights into the psychological parallels between human intergroup and human-animal relations.

Harry Potter (HP) is arguably the favourite children's book series of a whole generation of now young adults. But it is not only a children's story about a magical world – it contains highly political themes like power, race, class and fascism. As it can be fruitful to take a look at how certain topics are presented to readers at a young age, I will try to open up a new, linguistic perspective on the construction of power in HP by employing methods of a literary linguistic analysis. A close look at how power relations are constructed linguistically is necessary since language is an important means to reproduce, enforce and create power. Or as Dumbledore says: "Words are, in my not-so-humble opinion, our most inexhaustible source of magic. Capable of both inflicting injury, and remedying it" (Harry Potter, 01:34:57-01:35:08).In order to answer the question of how power is constructed along the concepts of race, class and speciesism in Harry Potter and the Chamber of Secrets, the analysis will be structured as follows: First, the literary linguistic analysis of the construction of power will be presented, touching brieflyupon the theoretical background of the methods used for analysis along the way. Then, the findings will be discussed from an intersectional perspective.In the end, I will provide a summary of the linguistic features primarily contributing to the construction of power hierarchies in the novel. The analysismainly focuses on the second novel of the series because issues of racial or class differences begin to play a central role there. When the Chamber ofSecrets has been opened, racially motivated attacks on students begin, and the topic of power structures moves to the centre of the story.

Rarely does the death of animals cause conflict between governments. However, the killing of some animals, such as seals, wolves, and other exotic wildlife, can cause heated conflict over whether the act of killing is itself justifiable.This paper provides an overview of a recent disagreement along these lines – between the EU and Sweden over the management of wolves. It juxtaposes the recent politicalization of the wolf hunt with an overview of two very different moral frameworks that humans use to conceive of the value of animals. This paper argues that these two moral frameworks share in employing a human-centrism which consequently restricts how the issue of justice can be introduced into policy discussions regarding the treatment of animals. However, the primary assertion made here is that while these two frameworks are constituted by anthropocentrism, they represent two different incarnations of anthropocentrism which as is illustrated by the debate surrounding the justifiability of the wolf hunt, provide very different points to which questions of justice are truncated or introduced. Therefore the assertion made in this paper is that the conflict between the EU and Sweden, over the justifiability of the wolf hunt stems from competing articulations of anthropocentrism.

This paper presents a personal reflection on the role of non-human animals in relationships with men. In this sense, it seeks to identify some religious, legal and philosophical perspectives that allow to account for such relations; Thus, it is discussed from some moral and ethical arguments whether the inclusion of non-human animals in the legal field as true bearers of law while suffering beings is possible.As mentioned, the fundamental idea is in principle determine the role of animals within a positivized state legally, later to establish the existence of ethical and moral principles that govern man's relationship with animals and finally, account of the importance of animal protection organizations and their impact on the construction of legal provisions in the context of their legal protection.So, the importance of this issue lies in the philosophical ius discussion of the special status of animals in relation to a policy framework and the use of the same man in research and scientific advances, so that the essence theme reflects the interest aroused by the paradigm between progress, law and philosophy and bills seeking the criminalization of animal abuse.In this vein, it is part of the following questions: Do animals suffer? If so, does it have consciousness? What religion and philosophy say? and what is the role they play in the legislation and the concept of law as things or mere property? ; Este trabajo presenta una reflexión personal sobre el papel de los animales no humanos en las relaciones con el hombre. En este sentido, busca identificar algunas perspectivas religiosas, jurídicas y filosóficas que permitan dar cuenta de dichas relaciones; De este modo, se trata de discutir a partir de algunos argumentos morales y éticos si es posible la inclusión de los animales no humanos en la esfera jurídica como verdaderos portadores de derecho en tanto que seres sufrientes.Como se mencionó, la idea fundamental es en principio, determinar el papel que cumplen los animales dentro de un estado positivizado jurídicamente, para posteriormente establecer la existencia o no de principios éticos y morales que rijan las relaciones del hombre con los animales y por último, dar cuenta de la importancia de las organizaciones protectoras de animales y su incidencia en la construcción de disposiciones jurídicas en el contexto de su protección jurídica.Así las cosas, la importancia de este tema radica en la discusión ius-filosófica sobre el estatus particular de los animales con relación a un marco normativo y la utilización de los mismos por el hombre en las investigaciones y avances científicos, de suerte que la esencia del tema obedece al interés que suscita el paradigma entre progreso, derecho y filosofía y los proyectos de ley que buscan la penalización del maltrato animal.En este orden de ideas, se parte de las siguientes preguntas: ¿los animales sufren? De ser así, ¿poseen consciencia de ello? ¿Qué dice la religión y la filosofía? y ¿cuál es el rol que estos juegan en la legislación y en el concepto de derecho en tanto que cosas o meros bienes? ; Cet article présente une réflexion personnelle sur le rôle des animaux non humains dans les relations avec les hommes. En ce sens, il cherche à identifier des perspectives religieuses, juridiques et philosophiques qui permettent de rendre compte de ces relations; Ainsi, il est discuté de certains arguments moraux et éthiques si l'inclusion des animaux non humains dans le domaine juridique comme de véritables porteurs du droit tout en souffrant des êtres est possible.Comme mentionné, l'idée fondamentale est, en principe, de déterminer le rôle des animaux dans un état positivisée légalement, plus tard pour établir l'existence de principes éthiques et moraux qui régissent la relation de l'homme avec les animaux et, enfin, compte de l'importance des organisations de protection des animaux et de leur impact sur la construction des dispositions légales dans le cadre de leur protection juridique.Ainsi, l'importance de cette question réside dans la discussion de ius philosophique du statut spécial des animaux par rapport à un cadre de politique et de l'utilisation du même homme dans les progrès scientifiques et de recherche, de sorte que l'essence thème reflète l'intérêt suscité par le paradigme entre le progrès, le droit et la philosophie et projets de loi visant la criminalisation de la violence envers les animaux.Dans cette veine, il fait partie des questions suivantes: Est-ce que les animaux souffrent? Si oui, at-il conscience? Quelle religion et de la philosophie dire? et quel est le rôle qu'ils jouent dans la législation et le concept de droit comme des choses ou simplement la propriété?

İskoç oyun yazarı Stef Smith'in Human Animals (İnsan Hayvanlar) (2016) adlı oyunu, Londra'daki tüm hayvanları doğal ortamlarında ticari şantiyeler inşa etmek gibi pragmatik bir arayışla yok eden bir hükümetin kurgusal hikayesini anlatır. Son zamanlardaki düşünce eğilimleriyle uyumlu olarak, dramatik metinler, insan ve insan olmayan hayvanlar arasındaki ilişkinin farklı doğalarıyla daha fazla ilgilenmektedir. Bu doğrultuda, hayvan çalışmaları, Smith'in oyununun analizinde odak noktasını oluşturur. Hayvan çalışmaları, insanlarla hayvanlar arasındaki ve farklı statüdeki hayvanlar arasındaki bağlantıları dikkate alarak, edebiyat eserlerinde insanmerkezcilik ve türcülük kavramlarını sorunsallaştırmayı mümkün kılar. Bu çalışma, örnek bir eser olarak Stef Smith'in Human Animals oyununu geleneksel insan-hayvan ayrımına vurgu yaparak, kritik hayvan çalışmaları perspektiflerini kullanarak analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Makale, bu bağlamda, insan-merkezciliğin etkisini, insanlığın kâr ve kişisel çıkar uğruna tüm insan olmayan varlıkları ortadan kaldırmaya yönelik kötü planlarını örnekleyen bir olay aracılığıyla ortaya koymaktadır. Stef Smith, farklı bakış açılarına sahip karakterler aracılığıyla insanlığın insan merkezci doğasını dışa vurmaktadır. Smith'in bu distopik kurgusu sadece insan merkezci düşünce şeklini eleştirmekle kalmayıp, insanlığın tür ayrımcılığına yönelik eğilimlerini de yansıtmaktadır. ; Scottish playwright Stef Smith's Human Animals (2016) recounts the fictional story of a government exterminating all animals in London with the pragmatic pursuit of building commercial construction sites on their natural habitats. In line with recent trends of thought, dramatic texts are getting more engaged with different natures of the relationship between human animals and non-human animals. In this context, animal studies posit a focal place in the analysis of Smith's contemporary play, Human Animals. Animal studies take into account the interconnections between humans and animals, thereby making it possible to problematise the concepts of anthropocentrism and speciesism in works of literature. This study aims to analyse Stef Smith's Human Animals as an example by using critical animal studies perspectives with an emphasis on the essentialist human-animal divide. In a more specific context, the article reveals the impact of anthropocentrism through a case study that exemplifies humanity's vicious plans to eradicate all non-human beings for the sake of profit and personal interest. Stef Smith presents different characters which embody disparate viewpoints and exposes the anthropocentric nature of humanity. Smith's portrayal of a dystopian setting not only aims at criticising anthropocentric line of thought but also exposes humanity's tendencies towards speciesism.

El presente artículo se propone abordar las relaciones entre feminismos y antiespecismos, en el contexto de la pregunta por el carácter sacrificial y normativo de lo humano. En primer lugar, se inscribirá la problematización del especismo en el marco de la deconstrucción del orden de poder que Donna Haraway denominó el "patriarcado capitalista blanco". En segundo lugar, se establecerán algunos límites de cierto discurso feminista antiespecista, particularmente el de Carol Adams, en lo que concierne tanto a su visión binaria del género, como a su postura frente al trabajo sexual. Finalmente, se reflexionará sobre la potencialidad de pensar las políticas antiespecistas y veganas en clave interseccional, para así apostar por "alianzas" que desplacen la producción cis-heteropatriarcal, racista, capacitista y especista de la norma humana, y que además apuesten por la resistencia al modo capitalista de producción. ; This article seeks to address the relations between feminisms and anti-speciesism, in the context of the question of the sacrificial and normative character of the human. In the first place, the problematization of speciesism will be inscribed in the framework of the deconstruction of the order of power that Donna Haraway called the "white capitalist patriarchy". In the second place, will be delimited some limits of certain anti-speciesist feminist discourse, particularly that of Carol Adams, concerning both her binary view of gender and her stance on sex work. Finally, it will be reflect on the potential of thinking anti-speciesism and vegan politics in an intersectional key, in order to bet on "alliances" that displace the cis-heteropatriarchal, racist, capacitist and specist production of the human norm, and that they also resist the capitalist mode of production.

Cetaceans are not meant to be in captivity. There are facilities all over the world that hold whales and dolphins as prisoners in man-made enclosures. The practice of keeping cetaceans in captivity is a major controversial issue, since many scientific and moral based arguments suggest that keeping them in confinement is inhumane and ethically wrong. There are those who can provide dozens of reasons for why cetaceans should be in captivity, including entertainment, research, or conservation based reasons. Underneath these reasons there is a larger one: a way of thinking called speciesism. Speciesism is practiced and believed by some humans towards non-human animals. Speciesism is the idea that membership in the human species is the criterion for moral standing: simply being human gives us superiority over all other beings. Among many actions, this means that humans approve and accept the concept that nonhuman animals can be placed in facilities that are not their natural habitat for our curiosity and entertainment. Captive dolphins and whales find themselves in the inhumane situations because most people have placed Homo sapiens' interest over cetaceans' freedom. Reducing a cetacean's freedom can be compared to reducing the freedom of women or racial minorities: in her book, The Dreaded Comparison: Human and Animal Slavery, Marjorie Spiegel writes, "The animals of the world exist for their own reasons. They were not made for humans any more than black people were made for whites or women for men." Speciesism has made cetaceans into display-only-beings. When really cetaceans are individuals with self-fulfilling, purposeful, and socially engaging lives in the wild: they do not exist to be put in captivity. Cetaceans need better treatment from those who cause them the most pain, humans. Cetaceans suffer many injustices and pains from human activity, but captivity is one of the worst. The cetacean captivity industry is a villainous business. The industry involves traumatic captures, small concrete tanks, high ...