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This article develops a theorization of "speculative policing": an experimental, future-oriented form of policing that connects crime prevention to real-estate speculation and other forms of negotiating urban risk and uncertainty. Speculative policing works to establish a specific sociopolitical order; renders economically productive the differentiated and dynamic value of urban spaces and populations; and involves flexible, provisional interventions that anticipate failure and skirt the edges of the law. Speculative policing combines three future-oriented phenomena that engage with risk and uncertainty in different ways: preventive policing, realestate speculation, and experimental modes of governance. These phenomena are in themselves not necessarily new; the specificity of speculative policing lies in the conjunction of these three phenomena in contemporary cities. Their combination implies the emergence of a new mode of urban security governance, a form of political and economic rationality that is speculative both in its underlying logic and in its everyday implementation.

This paper presents a model of rational Bayesian agents with speculative attacks in a regime of exchange rate which is pegged within a band. Speculators learn from the observation of the exchange rate within the band whether their mass is sufficiently large for a successful attack. Multiple periods are necessary for the existence of speculative attacks. Various defense policies are analyzed. A trading policy by the central bank may defend the peg if it is unobserved and diminishes the market's information for the coordination of speculators.