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The article presents, in a synthetic manner, the mechanism of introducing the Stalinist system in Poland and describes its essence. It points to the importance of – until now given less value in the relevant literature – the mechanism of elimination of institutions and persons representing the constitutional order and state-creating social fabric, as well as introducing in their place representatives of the lowest social classes and institutions impersonating Polish centres of power, but in fact fully dependent on the USSR. The text focuses on political and social issues, as well as on the extensive ­repression apparatus. ; The article presents, in a synthetic manner, the mechanism of introducing the Stalinist system in Poland and describes its essence. It points to the importance of – until now given less value in the relevant literature – the mechanism of elimination of institutions and persons representing the constitutional order and state-creating social fabric, as well as introducing in their place representatives of the lowest social classes and institutions impersonating Polish centres of power, but in fact fully dependent on the USSR. The text focuses on political and social issues, as well as on the extensive ­repression apparatus.

The current mode of life in Russia combines the features of desperately daring steps in geopolitical domain with an amazing shyness of thought when facing the tiniest changes in theoretical constructs. Today, crowds of laymen, officials and many "learned" dignitaries in the West and in the East face the need to reject the prejudices concocted using dirty data techniques. The time has come to release Stalin from the Nazi captivity and to reinstate his Membership within the Great Triplett of Roosevelt Stalin Churchill. The call for serious changes in the theoretical constructs has become a vital demand for the survival of mankind. Both the West and Russia have to act urgently. Periculum in mora. As of today, having been brought to bay, the correct estimation of the genuinely large merits by Stalin before Motherland and Humanity is popping up irresistibly, as if it were a moth piercing through the pupa, dumping as a useless shell the prejudices like "Stalin equals Hitler". This concerns primarily the evolution of the shy Stalinism by Putin. The time has come to update the judgments on Stalin at the governmental level. The bigotry by Brzezinski is to be terminated. The Destiny of Russia is at stake.

In this essay I will investigate how the legacy of Stalinism still affects Angola today, arguing that it negative- ly impacts the current possibility of an actual national Marxist-Leninist movement taking root in Angola. I furthermore argue that the four main institutions through which the party in control of the Angolan gov- ernment holds power—that is, the institutions of presidential patronage, the elite government bureaucracy, denial of the legitimate rights of ethnicities, and severe restrictions on the press and political freedoms— were inherited from Stalinism, and it is these four institutions that also serve to demobilize and demoralize workers. Stalinism has not only led to the collapse of the national workers' movement there, however; it has also paved the way for an incredibly corrupt, bureaucratic, and authoritarian form of crony capitalism that deprives the great majority of Angolan people their most basic social and economic rights. This in and of itself makes it even more difficult for the workers' movement to be revived and for a truly Marxist-Le- ninist revolution to take place. It can be said, then, that overall the legacy of Stalinism has deprived Angola the opportunity to become actually independent and free.

International audience ; Au coeur de l'été 1937, Nikolaï Ejov, le commissaire du peuple aux affaires intérieures (le NKVD), chef de la police politique stalinienne, signe une série de décrets qui organisent la répression contre les ennemis supposés de l'Union soviétique, dont les autorités du pays souhaitent se débarrasser « une fois pour toutes » (Junge, Binner 2003 : 85). Il s'agit de l'apogée d'une violence politique et sociale qui frappe le pays depuis la consolidation au pouvoir du clan stalinien. La collectivisation de l'agriculture au tournant des années 1920 s'était accompagnée d'une répression féroce (Viola 2005), la lutte contre les ennemis politiques, réels ou supposés, avait pris une nouvelle ampleur après l'assassinat, le 1 er décembre 1934, de Serguei Kirov, le premier secrétaire du parti communiste de la région de Leningrad. Entre août 1937 et novembre 1938, les arrestations se multiplient, donnent lieu à des procès expéditifs qui souvent se traduisent par des verdicts de mort. Au total, 700 000 personnes sont passées par les armes au cours de ces opérations qui durent donc un peu plus d'un an. Les traces de cette « Grande terreur » (Conquest, 1968) ont pourtant été minutieusement masquées par les autorités, et ce, dès la mise en oeuvre de la politique de répression. Il suffit de se rappeler des mots d'un responsable sibérien de la police politique, Serguei Mironov, en juillet 1937 à la veille des opérations : « Notre appareil même ne doit absolument pas savoir où les individus ont été exécutés, ni combien ont été exécutés, personne ne doit rien savoir. » (Junge, Binner 2003 : 83) Bien loin d'une terreur visible destinée à manifester la toute-puissance de l'État, la grande terreur stalinienne se fondait essentiellement sur le secret et la disparition. Derrière le fracas de la propagande entourant les grands procès de Moscou et la répression contre les élites politiques et administratives du pays, le quotidien de la violence est fait d'arrestations nocturnes, d'exécutions et d'enfouissement des ...

International audience ; Au coeur de l'été 1937, Nikolaï Ejov, le commissaire du peuple aux affaires intérieures (le NKVD), chef de la police politique stalinienne, signe une série de décrets qui organisent la répression contre les ennemis supposés de l'Union soviétique, dont les autorités du pays souhaitent se débarrasser « une fois pour toutes » (Junge, Binner 2003 : 85). Il s'agit de l'apogée d'une violence politique et sociale qui frappe le pays depuis la consolidation au pouvoir du clan stalinien. La collectivisation de l'agriculture au tournant des années 1920 s'était accompagnée d'une répression féroce (Viola 2005), la lutte contre les ennemis politiques, réels ou supposés, avait pris une nouvelle ampleur après l'assassinat, le 1 er décembre 1934, de Serguei Kirov, le premier secrétaire du parti communiste de la région de Leningrad. Entre août 1937 et novembre 1938, les arrestations se multiplient, donnent lieu à des procès expéditifs qui souvent se traduisent par des verdicts de mort. Au total, 700 000 personnes sont passées par les armes au cours de ces opérations qui durent donc un peu plus d'un an. Les traces de cette « Grande terreur » (Conquest, 1968) ont pourtant été minutieusement masquées par les autorités, et ce, dès la mise en oeuvre de la politique de répression. Il suffit de se rappeler des mots d'un responsable sibérien de la police politique, Serguei Mironov, en juillet 1937 à la veille des opérations : « Notre appareil même ne doit absolument pas savoir où les individus ont été exécutés, ni combien ont été exécutés, personne ne doit rien savoir. » (Junge, Binner 2003 : 83) Bien loin d'une terreur visible destinée à manifester la toute-puissance de l'État, la grande terreur stalinienne se fondait essentiellement sur le secret et la disparition. Derrière le fracas de la propagande entourant les grands procès de Moscou et la répression contre les élites politiques et administratives du pays, le quotidien de la violence est fait d'arrestations nocturnes, d'exécutions et d'enfouissement des cadavres à l'abri des regards, d'informations minimales ou erronées des proches sur le devenir des personnes arrêtées. Il n'est guère surprenant, dès lors, que le souvenir de cette répression ait peiné à trouver des lieux de mémoire, des lieux de deuil, des lieux d'incarnation (Lanzmann 2009 : 757).

International audience ; Au coeur de l'été 1937, Nikolaï Ejov, le commissaire du peuple aux affaires intérieures (le NKVD), chef de la police politique stalinienne, signe une série de décrets qui organisent la répression contre les ennemis supposés de l'Union soviétique, dont les autorités du pays souhaitent se débarrasser « une fois pour toutes » (Junge, Binner 2003 : 85). Il s'agit de l'apogée d'une violence politique et sociale qui frappe le pays depuis la consolidation au pouvoir du clan stalinien. La collectivisation de l'agriculture au tournant des années 1920 s'était accompagnée d'une répression féroce (Viola 2005), la lutte contre les ennemis politiques, réels ou supposés, avait pris une nouvelle ampleur après l'assassinat, le 1 er décembre 1934, de Serguei Kirov, le premier secrétaire du parti communiste de la région de Leningrad. Entre août 1937 et novembre 1938, les arrestations se multiplient, donnent lieu à des procès expéditifs qui souvent se traduisent par des verdicts de mort. Au total, 700 000 personnes sont passées par les armes au cours de ces opérations qui durent donc un peu plus d'un an. Les traces de cette « Grande terreur » (Conquest, 1968) ont pourtant été minutieusement masquées par les autorités, et ce, dès la mise en oeuvre de la politique de répression. Il suffit de se rappeler des mots d'un responsable sibérien de la police politique, Serguei Mironov, en juillet 1937 à la veille des opérations : « Notre appareil même ne doit absolument pas savoir où les individus ont été exécutés, ni combien ont été exécutés, personne ne doit rien savoir. » (Junge, Binner 2003 : 83) Bien loin d'une terreur visible destinée à manifester la toute-puissance de l'État, la grande terreur stalinienne se fondait essentiellement sur le secret et la disparition. Derrière le fracas de la propagande entourant les grands procès de Moscou et la répression contre les élites politiques et administratives du pays, le quotidien de la violence est fait d'arrestations nocturnes, d'exécutions et d'enfouissement des cadavres à l'abri des regards, d'informations minimales ou erronées des proches sur le devenir des personnes arrêtées. Il n'est guère surprenant, dès lors, que le souvenir de cette répression ait peiné à trouver des lieux de mémoire, des lieux de deuil, des lieux d'incarnation (Lanzmann 2009 : 757).

Inspirées des événements historiques du XXe siècle, Les Aventures de Tintin (1929-1976) introduisent au politique. La rencontre entre Tintin et Staline était inévitable. Hergé élabore ainsi certains scénarios staliniens, écho des peurs de ses contemporains envers le « communisme » et le totalitarisme. Ce mémoire s'interroge sur la nature et l'évolution de la représentation du stalinisme à des fins scénaristes. Il reconnaît les propositions théoriques majeures du totalitarisme stalinien d'Arendt, de Friedrich, de Brzezinski et d'Aron, à l'origine de l'école totalitariste; les différents courants historiographiques et l'ouverture partielle des archives soviétiques. Son cadre opératoire regroupe trois grandes variables staliniennes : l'idéologie, la terreur et le dictateur. En raison de la nature de la bande dessinée, il propose deux niveaux d'analyse: le lisible et le visible. Ses stratégies de vérification recourent au paradigme de l'indice de Ginzburg (1980) et à la représentation de l'ennemi soviétique dans le cinéma américain de la Guerre froide de Ballion (2014). Jamais, à notre connaissance, la représentation du stalinisme ne fut étudiée pour l'ensemble des albums Tintin. Notre analyse recense six albums « staliniens » sur les vingt-trois complétés. Ils constituent 26% du corpus Tintin, proportion significative. Or, à aucun moment Hergé ne personnifie Staline, sa figure s'incarnant plutôt dans celle des représentants officiels soviétiques. Le lecteur croise ces derniers sur 56% des pages du corpus étudié. Notre analyse discursive de la représentation hergéenne du stalinisme conclut qu'elle priorise la terreur et le dictateur, l'écart séparant ces deux variables s'avérant moins grand qu'anticipé. Réaliste, elle participe partiellement à la socialisation politique du jeune lecteur, le bédéiste y développant un discours politique convenu à l'égard de Staline et de l'Union soviétique. C'est en recourant à la dissémination d'indices dormants qu'Hergé le compose, soulevant l'intérêt du lecteur avisé à la recherche de différents niveaux de lecture. Ce discours politique dans la représentation du stalinisme d'Hergé n'atteint toutefois pas la complexité de celui du genre romanesque stalinien de Koestler, de Gheorghiu, d'Orwell, de Weisberg, de Soljenitsyne ou de London. Ce ne fut là nullement sa prétention. ; Inspired by historical events of the twentieth century, Les Aventures de Tintin (The Adventures of Tintin) (1929-1976) introduces to politics. The encounter between Tintin and Stalin was inevitable. Hergé elaborates some Stalinist scenarios, echoing the fears of his contemporaries towards "communism" and totalitarianism. This thesis questions the nature and the evolution of the representation of Stalinism for screenwriting purposes. It acknowledges the major theoretical propositions of Stalinist totalitarianism (Arendt, Friedrich, Brzezinski and Aron of the totalitarian school), the different historiographic currents and the partial opening of the Soviet archives. Its operative framework identifies three major Stalinist variables: ideology, the terror and the dictator. Because of the nature of the comic book, it proposes two levels of analysis: the readable and the visible. Its verification strategies appeal to the indiciary paradigm (Ginzburg, 1980) and to the representation of the Soviet enemy in American Cold War cinema (Ballion, 2014). To our knowledge, the representation of Stalinism has never been studied in the entirety of the Tintin albums. Our analysis identifies six Stalin albums, representing 26% of the corpus Tintin. At no time is Stalin featured, his figure being personified in that of the official Soviet representatives on 56% of the corpus pages. This Hergean representation of Stalinism focuses on the terror and the dictator, the gap between these two variables is being less than anticipated. Realistic, it partially participates in the political socialization of young readers, while raising the interest of the advised reader with disseminating of dormant indices. However, this representation doesn't reach the complexity of Stalin's literary fiction genre (Koestler, Gheorghiu, Orwell, Weisberg, Soljenitsyne, London). This was in no way his pretense.

This article argues that 'intersectionality' is at the end of the day derived from the People's Front policy of the 1930s Comintern, as modified by late 1960s–1970s 'soft Maoism', and then adopted in the late 1970s–1980s by the political representatives of US capital as an ideological colouration for the growth of economic inequality under financialisation. In the result, the project is self-defeating, giving way to 'white identity politics' and similar formations.

Western theories of biopolitics focus on its liberal and fascist rationalities. In opposition to this, Stalinism was oriented more towards transforming life in accordance with the communist ideal, and less towards protecting it. Sergei Prozorov reconstructs this rationality in the early Stalinist project of the Great Break (1928–32) and its subsequent modifications during High Stalinism. He then relocates the question of biopolitics down to the level of the subject, tracing the way the 'new Soviet person' was to be produced in governmental practices and the role that violence and terror would play in this construction. ; Peer reviewed

Aside from casual references to Soviet biopolitics in the work of Foucault, Agamben, and Esposito, the theoretical literature on biopolitics has largely ignored the Soviet experience, while empirical research in Russian studies has rarely addressed biopolitics. The article examines the experience of Stalinism as an important case for the study of biopolitics that helps resolve a problem preoccupying scholars from Foucault onward: the proximity of biopolitics to its opposite, the thanatopolitics of the mass production of death. How is it that a mode of power presenting itself in terms of care, augmentation, and intensification of life so frequently end up negating life itself? The article addresses this question in the context of the confluence of two political rationalities in the project of Soviet socialism, the revolutionary transcendence of the old order and the biopolitical immanentism of the construction of new forms of life. Focusing on the catastrophic policies of the Great Break (1928–1932), it argues that this combination is ultimately aporetic, leading to the violent destruction of the very lives that were to be transformed. The conclusion considers the contemporary relevance of the lessons to be learnt from Stalinist biopolitics. ; Peer reviewed

Book review. Reviewed work: Biopolitics of Stalinism: Ideology and Life in Soviet Socialism / by Sergei Prozorov. - Edinburgh : Edinburgh University Press, 2016. ; Non peer reviewed

This book is a comparative framework for interpreting the relationship between late Stalinism and the communist takeovers in former Eastern Europe. A bonus for the volume is that it also provides detailed, sectorial analyses for the Romanian case, something that the field particularly lacks. The structure of the volume provides grounds for both reinterpretation and an input of fresh insights and research on the nature, dynamics, and consequences of Stalinism in Eastern and Central Europe. It contains three types of contributions: (a) general analyses of phenomena associated with the category of Stalinism; (b) case studies focusing upon aspects of establishment of communist regimes in each of the Eastern European countries; (c) historiographical evaluations of the literature dealing with the targeted period of time.

The article deals with the Soviet system of attestation of scientific and scientific-pedagogical staff of pre-war period through the activities of the Higher Attestation Commission (abbreviated as VAK), which was established in 1933 and controlled the awarding of advanced academic degrees and academic ranks in all of the USSR. This revising of VAK history is caused by the topicality of its modernization. Presently West European model of attestation is being extensively discussed in Russian society as more effective and democratic compared with currently existing. We think Soviet experience also deserves to be more carefully examined as a further alternative. The reviewed material has lead to the conclusion that the Soviet system of attestation of scientific and scientific-pedagogical personnel staff was not used as some kind of tool of "totalitarian" regime of Stalinism at the initial stage of its existence. That trend began to appear since 1936. With regard to period of 1933-1936 years we can consider the system of attestation as a rather democratic model. That also can be referred towards the Soviet science of that period when scientists actively published their scientific articles in international journals and made foreign scientific work trips. During the short period of 1933-1935 years the presence of public and scientific component was notable in the functioning of the attestation system. At that period of time the right of assignment of a number of titles and degrees was granted to councils of higher education institutions and research institutions either completely independently or with the approval of the qualification commissions of adequate People's Commissariats. In this case the Higher Attestation Commission acted as the highest court of cassation, and did not participate at first-hand in the process of assigning of titles and degrees except for doctoral degree and professor rank. What should be particularly emphasized is the role as coordinating center that played VAK in the Soviet era, coupling science with industry. VAK detected scarce specialties and aimed to provide the national economy with experts of economic and industrial sections. This feature has been obviously lost by now. As a result, high-tech sectors of the economy did not receive sufficient quantity of specialists, and scientific researches did not find an entry into the national economic market. In this lost peculiarity of VAK the author sees the main advantage of the Soviet system of certification of scientific and scientific-pedagogical personnel of the Soviet period, which was also free from the ideological component in the short period of 1933-1935 years.

Thirty-one years ago, in 1985, Manuel Sacristán died in Barcelona at the age of 59. After the publication in 2014 of a volume with some of his writings translated into English (Llorente 2014), it is time to help non-Spanish-speaking readers to know more about him. Yet it is not easy to explain to generations born after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 that Manuel Sacristán was a most important Marxist philosopher and at the same time one of the few pioneers introducing political ecology and antinuclear peace movement during the last quarter of the 20th century in Spain. Many people believe that Marxism, environmentalism and pacifism are views that exclude each other. Most of what has been said and done on behalf of Marxism since Stalin took over the leadership of the Communist Party of the USSR in the 1930s, up to its dissolution in 1991, contributes to sustaining this belief. The fast industrialization of the Old Russian Empire undertaken by the Soviet State was nowhere near taking into account ecological sustainability. Its socio-environmental impact turned out to be comparable or even worse than the ones caused by capitalist industrialization.

Abstract. The problem under discussion is sure to be relevant due to the fact that the Stalinism as a historical phenomenon represents a significant element of the Soviet and Russian reality without understanding of which the comprehensive research of problems of the present seems to be impossible. "The Stalinism era" is a definition that covers a phenomenon that attracts the unflagging attention of modern Russian society, as well as the wide thematic range of researches of modern Russian historians united by this term that has developed in historical science. This determines the problematic nature of the proposed review, in which historiography is viewed not as a closed system, but as a mobile research field that is subject to both external (social, political) and internal (scientific, historical,methodological) influence. The purpose of the article is to characterize modern national historical literature, which examines the history of Stalin's influence and Stalinism as a system for historical science in general and for certain aspects of it in particular. The authors came to the conclusion that modern Russian historians characterize this influence as a whole as negative (narrowing of pluralism, appearance of "forbidden" topics, repressions against historians), but some researchers also highlight positive aspects (restoration of the system of historical education). Equally contradictory assessment historians give to the position of historical science in the 1930s-50s: starting with the loss ofhistory its status of science to an important element in the system of government and society. The materials of the article can be useful for historians, university professors, teachers who deal with the history of Soviet (Russian) historical science and the history of Russia during the era of Stalin.Key words: Stalinism, history, historians, historiography, the cult of personality, totalitarianism.