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While a great deal of attention is devoted to the Pacific region as the new chessboard of international politics, Pakistan remains a key actor in terms of both threat and potential. Two observations back this argument: first, Pakistan's fundamental roles as a state are challenged by its ongoing conflict with India and internal insurgencies. Second, due to a power-status gap, Pakistan experiences difficulties in holding specific self-conceived roles. In addition to hampering its socio-economic potential, these developments prevent Pakistan's quest for normalization in the system. As a consequence, we argue that engaging with Islamabad should be a priority for Washington so as to prevent the country from further aligning with Beijing, thus reinforcing China's regional leadership and status as peer-competitor to the United States. Indeed, as the potential for deviance in the international system arises from its normative dimension, the US, as the global leader, counts among its roles that of norm-setter and primary socializer for most states. Our research proposes to look at an old puzzle with new theoretical insights. By addressing the question of Washington's engagement towards non-conforming states, we aim to document a set of socialization processes as intervening variables linking American global role as leader and primary socializer to Pakistan's process of social integration (normalization/deviance). Drawing from sociology and social psychology, the paper seeks to explore the ability of the leader to act as a primary source of role location and status recognition towards non-conforming states so as to integrate them (back) into the US-led system.

The participation of non-state actors to international politics has been investigated since the creation of international institutions. Yet, the rules, principles and norms of global governance are no more discussed in single, isolated institutions. Rather, with the proliferation of international regimes and organisations, international issues are now negotiated in a context of institutional interactions known as "regime complexes". This poses new questions, in particular on the negotiation burden that these new processes place on international actors. To answer this question, this contribution compares non-state participation in both contexts (single regimes and regime complexes), using the international forest negotiations as a case study. It uses quantitative methods to measure the negotiation burden of single regimes and compare it to the negotiation burden of regime complexes. The negotiation burden of single regimes is found insignificant with political interest being the major motivation for participation, while the negotiation burden of regime complexes is found relevant, requiring a certain type of material and organisational resources for non-state actors to participate. Yet a certain diversity of non-state representation is maintained within regime complexes, with non-governmental organisations being dominant with respect to business groups.

This article investigates what happens when governmental actors foster the participation of non-state actors (NSAs) in treaty ratification and implementation decisions. NSAs, being non-governmental organisations, business groups, citizens, or research institutions among others represent interests that will be ultimately impacted by policy choices. While governments have long consulted them on an ad hoc basis, a "deliberative turn" happened in the 2000s to encourage their involvement, for greater legitimacy and transparency, through among others, the use of public consultations. This proactive turn raises questions about public consultations: are such instruments effective? Do they encourage new thinking? Do they matter for final decisions? This article answers these questions by investigating, using among others lexicometry tools, the public consultation organised by the European Commission in 2011 prior to the ratification of the Nagoya Protocol on access and benefit sharing (ABS) by the European Union in 2014. The results are mixed. While the studied public consultation favoured the expression of small national NSAs the process is still poorly inclusive. NSAs did not propose any fresh ideas on the ABS issue and their final influence on European decision-makers is blurred by the diversity of interests expressed.

In October-November 2010, more than 5000 Belgian students from both side of the linguistic border have been asked to "draw Belgium" – no other guidelines were given. In addition to this rather unusual question, the students were surveyed on their political interest, political knowledge, identities, political perceptions and preferences as well as their attitudes towards Belgium and her future. The drawings show that half of the students drew Belgium with the language border and half did not. What explains this difference is not the language one speaks (so there was no difference between Dutch-speakers and French-speakers) but the level of political knowledge and the identity of the respondents (students who feel Belgian only draw Belgium without the language border and students who feel Flemish only are more likely to draw the language border). One further dimension needs to be explored (when applicable): the size of Flanders and of Wallonia. Does the size tell us anything about the political attitudes of the students towards Belgium? Does it relate anyhow to their identities? Or is rather a matter of political knowledge? Or is it even simply due to the shape of Belgium where Wallonia – the largest in size – region is more easily cut down when quickly drawn? Above all, with this research we can indirectly explore the processes – of socialization – behind the formation of political preferences and more specifically how socio-demographics, political knowledge, political interest, voting behaviour interact with the students' representations and attitudes vis-à-vis their country and its future.

Different models of democracy have been thought to make collective decisions: representative, participatory, deliberative or elitist, to give a few but the main ones. These models are justified, criticized, transformed by political theorists. But what do citizens expect from democracy? Since the beginning of the 2000s, an increasing number of studies are interested by citizens' attitudes towards democratic models. What do they think about the mechanism of election and delegation, the idea of a more participatory democracy, the role of political parties and the ideal place of experts in the democracy of tomorrow? However empirical studies provide contradictory results. Some considers that citizens don't want to participate more (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002), while others argue that they are looking for new opportunities of involvement (Neblo, Esterling, Kennedy, Lazer, & Sokhey, 2010). Researchers begin to analyze this element in the European context and the objective of this paper is to present the case of Belgium. Relying on the PARTIREP voter survey of 2014 we analyze three dimensions of this issue. First, we map the attitudes towards different kinds of democratic models in Belgium. Second, we seek to explain why people develop these different preferences. Third, we compare the result in the North and in South to look if the different political dynamics in Walloon and Flanders are related to different public attitudes towards democracy.

The Red Devils, chocolate or beer and the King, such is the typical answers given to the oft-asked question of what is still holding Belgium together. To these three symbols, two extra elements are often added: the debt and Brussels, the capital of the country and of the Flemish Region/Community, the French Community (politically but not constitutionally the Wallonia-Brussels Federation), the European Union (to be more specific, one of the three capitals, along with Strasbourg and Luxemburg), while being as well the seat of the Brussels Capital Region. Generally, the list of factors of unity in Belgium ends with this short list. Is it already too long, or on the contrary, is it really too short? This is the main question of this chapter. Paradoxically, although this question often arises, there are very few scientific writings analyzing it. To do so, this chapter will discuss six sets of factors: historical, identity, socio-economic, political, international and symbolic. Nonetheless, it is important to take into account that such enterprise seeks to be informative and not prescriptive. This chapter does not assume that Belgium should be united. There are several points of view about what Belgium should be, and this contribution merely wishes to nurture the political debate by conveying an original approach on six types of factors.

Abstention is a key issue for any representative democracy. Turnout has a direct impact on the input legitimacy of the democratic system, but also eventually on the output legitimacy, that is on the policies that are designed and implemented. This issue has long sparked debate about the determinants of abstention in elections and its consequences both for politics and for policies. Yet, a multi-level approach is often missing. While the second-order elections theory has shown that different levels of elections mean different levels of turnout, it has been criticized theoretically for its so-called nationalist – i.e. in favor of national elections – bias and methodologically because it typically assesses elections not held on the same day. The last elections held in Belgium offer a fertile ground of investigation for multi-level abstention as the regional, federal and European elections were organized the very same day, under the rule of compulsory voting. This paper aims at presenting and discussing the real abstention rates at the three levels of elections, as well as for the local elections. The 2014 PartiRep voter survey offers an original way to explore the potential abstention – that is electoral participation in the absence of compulsory voting – as the respondents were not asked the typical single question about their potential electoral participation if compulsory voting was to be abolished, but a fourfold question asking them whether they would always, often, sometimes or never vote at the local, regional, federal and European elections. The results will show that there is a significant amount of the voters who would vote differently: 437 of them (22%) would always vote at one – level of – election, but not always at the other ones. The paper seeks to assess this potential multi-level abstention in light of socio-demographic and political (namely party) variables. This contribution will thus shed new light on the issue of abstention – both real and potential – in its multi-level dimension.

Δεν παρατίθεται περίληψη στα ελληνικά. ; The declaration of the establishment of the «Kingdom of Serbs, Groats and Slovenes» on the 1st of December, 1918 —which in 1929 was renamed to Yugoslavia— fulfilled the long standing desire for the political unification of all South-Slavs. However, the new State which apart from the three old kingdoms of Serbia, Montenegro and Croatia included the entities of the former Hungarian Vojvodina, the former Austrian Slovenia and Dalmatia and the Serbian Macedonia had to tackle certain problems. Its subjects were divided into several ethnic groups: Serbs, Croats and Slovenes —who constituted three quarters of its entire population— and Germans, Hungarians and Albanians as well as other ethnic minorities. The population of the new state was also divided into three religious categories: 47% were Orthodox Christians, 39% Catholics, and 11% Muslims. This paper attempts to analyze five constructive crises which came about in interwar Yugoslavia, and are characteristic of any modern state: 1) The crisis of identity of the state itself and of the various ethnic groups. The ideology of Yugoslavian unification failed to bridge the differences between the ethnic and religious groups; 2) The crisis of legitimacy. This is related with the nature of the regime. From 1918 until the dictatorship of 1929 twenty three governmental crises occured; 3) The crisis of integration, as reflected in the policies and the electoral results of the various political parties which had clear ethnic and geographical limits. During the interwar period none of the existing political parties attained to play this integrating role by securing mass support throughout the country; 4) The crisis of participation of individuals and social groups in controlling the public affairs and manning the state apparatus; 5) The crisis of distribution of goods and services. The ethnic and political contradictions between the Slovenes and Croats in the North and Serbs in the South resulted in the uneven development between these two geographical districts of the state.

Dimitrios Stamatopoulos, The Church as State: representations of the Orthodoxmillet and the model of constitutional monarchy (second half of thenineteenth century)The institutionalised introduction of secular elements into the administrationof the Patriarchate of Constantinople after the ratification ofthe General Regulations (1860-1862) created the conditions for the emergenceof a discourse aimed at the internal reorganization of ecclesiasticalinstitutions based on the state model. This model was adopted not onlyby reform-minded circles but also by representatives of the clericalistwing, each with completely different political aims. The model of constitutionalmonarchy appeared as the most «functional» for solving thecentral political problem posed by the clericalist wing in the discussion:how could a regime of patriarchal centralization be applied without confutingthe essence of reform. This model of constitutionality prevailednot only because the reformers preferred it as an alternative version ofrestructuring the millet but because the clericalists espoused and promotedit in the form of a state model: that of the constitutional monarchy.And their aim was not only to prevent the domination of thelay element but also to avoid the formation of a public sphere, whichin any case in Eastern and Southeastern Europe was inherent in theemergence of a discourse on nation and nationalism. ; Dimitrios Stamatopoulos, The Church as State: representations of the Orthodoxmillet and the model of constitutional monarchy (second half of thenineteenth century)The institutionalised introduction of secular elements into the administrationof the Patriarchate of Constantinople after the ratification ofthe General Regulations (1860-1862) created the conditions for the emergenceof a discourse aimed at the internal reorganization of ecclesiasticalinstitutions based on the state model. This model was adopted not onlyby reform-minded circles but also by representatives of the clericalistwing, each with completely different political aims. The model of constitutionalmonarchy appeared as the most «functional» for solving thecentral political problem posed by the clericalist wing in the discussion:how could a regime of patriarchal centralization be applied without confutingthe essence of reform. This model of constitutionality prevailednot only because the reformers preferred it as an alternative version ofrestructuring the millet but because the clericalists espoused and promotedit in the form of a state model: that of the constitutional monarchy.And their aim was not only to prevent the domination of thelay element but also to avoid the formation of a public sphere, whichin any case in Eastern and Southeastern Europe was inherent in theemergence of a discourse on nation and nationalism.

Δεν παρατίθεται περίληψη στα ελληνικά. ; Photini Danou, The words of the voiceless Did ordinary men and women in pre-modern England have an opinion about politics? What was "politics" for the common people at a time when they had not any say in choosing who would rule them? Was popular engagement in state politics only to secure subsistence? Were "knife and fork" politics of the masses so separate from issues of "high politics" of the State? Was pre-modern commoners' mentality, "pre-political" as well? This paper discusses early modern popular political awareness. I argue that commoners in Tudor England pursued their own political agenda, by exploiting the sovereign's self-image as the "protector of the poor". However, as I set out to show, in pursuing their political agenda commoners also raised issues on the content of Englishness, common good, patriotism, legitimate governance and the right of resistance. The political identity of the lower strata was not an entity fixed in its essence. On the contrary, plebeian political identity was rather shifting, changeable, and always constituting its content in particular historical contexts. The commoners' commitment to the ideal of the"nation", their loyalty to the government, their allegiance to their Queen, their obedience to her laws, or their active participation in the enforcement of state policies were not unconditional. The ways they practiced their political identity was interrelated to their superiors' behavior and draw its legitimacy from the public transcript of the English Common wealth. Common prosperity, reciprocity, solidarity and, in general, protection of the poorer and weaker members of English society were ideals that constituted the meaning of "common wealth" in the plebeian mind. Those ideals were prerequisites for their giving of devotion and loyalty to the state. Thus, the commoners' political mentality and behavior ranged from national loyalty to indifference or even animosity to state officials; from cooperation and acquiescence to covered or overt forms of opposition and active resistance.

After years of political crises and negotiations, the deep-rooted conflict between Dutch- and French-speaking parties recently led to the 2011 agreement concerning a further reform of the Belgian state. This reform mainly furthers decentralises the – already federal – state structure, including the allocation of additional competences and fiscal powers to sub-national entities (Regions and Communities). But this new state reform also brings about a radical reform of the upper house: the Belgian Senate. Since 1995, the Senate was composed of three different types of members: Senators directly elected by two linguistically separated electorate (the Dutch-speaking and the French-speaking electorates), Senators indirectly elected by the Community parliaments and Senators coopted by the two other types. The French- and German-speaking linguistic minorities had a fixed amount of seats in this assembly. The reform of the state radically changed the legislative competences of the Senate and its composition as its members will now be designated by Regional and Community parliaments (plus 10 coopted senators). Broadly speaking, the appointment of the majority of the Senators moved from a system of direct and language-based election to a system of indirect and mixed regional and language-based designation. This change is not without consequence for the representation of linguistic minorities. In May 2014, regional, community and federal elections will be organised in Belgium, testing for the first time this new system of designation of Senators by regional and community parliaments. This paper intends to present the 2013 reform of the Senate in Belgium and its consequence for the representation of linguistic minorities. The situations before and after the reform of the Senate will be compared, not only in terms of the way Senators are appointed but in terms of its consequence on the linguistic aspects of the regional and community elections campaign and of the profile of the appointed Senators.

Today few people deny the existence of regional substate diplomacy (Criekemans 2010). But there is still no common agreement on a region's right to do so and, above all, on their scope of action. This question goes against what used to be the dominant approach in international relations, the state-centric approach that leads to the logic of speaking with one voice. Increasingly, a multilevel-governance approach has contested this state-centric view and proposes an alternative logic of multiple actors speaking with their voice, nuancing strongly the seminal distinction between "sovereignty-bound" and "sovereignty-free" actors (Rosenau 1990). From the 1970s, the world has seen the growing presence of sovereignty-free actors in international relations. Among these actors, non-central or, better, substate, governments of federal states have developed intensive foreign relations. These governments are using a range of techniques: from shaping the federal government's foreign policy to establishing themselves directly in the international arena (Blatter et al. 2008). For minority nation governments this is particularly a challenge, as they have to act internally – where they have developed full-fledged legislative powers within a multinational federation – and externally – where international and national laws are often still reluctant to recognise their right of action (Lejeune 2003). Yet some minority nations have thrived in developing their own international relations. Bavaria, Catalonia, Flanders, Quebec, Scotland and Wallonia are often seen as successful international players even if they are not fully sovereignty bound (Michelmann 2009; Criekemans 2010). The international actions of these minority nations have been characterised under the umbrella of "identity paradiplomacy" (Paquin 2003); that is, a willingness to use international relations to foster a nation-building process within a multinational state. This observation was particularly prevalent for minority nations strongly in competition with a federal government about their nationbuilding process, albeit for different reasons, namely Flanders, Quebec and Scotland (Paquin 2004). The case of Wallonia seems to fits less well into the identity paradiplomacy framework, which therefore raises the question of alternative roads to international relations. This is the core question of this chapter: is identity paradiplomacy the only way to go for minority nations? Quebec and Wallonia are both well known for their active foreign relations.

Some states are widely recognized by policy makers and scholars as middle powers. The characteristics that were highlighted for these countries have become the basic guidelines for understanding middle powermanship and developing the corresponding theory. While those analyses offer rich in-depth insights into the foreign policy of specific countries, they have so far lacked a further step of generalization. When establishing such power-based rankings, we assume the possibility to determine states' capacities so as to identify their position in said ranking. As appealing as this theoretical model may be, the reality of international politics increasingly challenge it. Thus, we argue that this theoretical inadequacy is due to the fact that middle power theory as it has been developed so far should be understood as an inductive, not a deductive, approach . Consequently, the contemporary reality calls for yet another stage of development in this theory. The choice of Pakistan as our case study arises from the observation that while Pakistan can hardly fit into the current classification(s) of middle powermanship due to its poor economic and development performances, it is a nuclear state and is –at least– in the top twenty armies of the world. Moreover, we find several cases in which Pakistan has used the diplomatic tools characterizing middle powers, such as mediation or niche diplomacy. Our paper aims at answering two questions: (1) can middle power theory bring some light on Pakistan's positioning in world politics? (2) Alternatively, what does the case of Pakistan tell us about the (ir)relevance of middle power theory? We build upon role theory to develop the case of middle powermanship as a status-role bundle, by analyzing three specific cases of Pakistan's foreign policy: Pakistani nuclear posturing, its Afghan policy and its posturing vis-à-vis the Saudi-Iranian regional competition.