We show the existence of a twin peaks relation between trust and the size of the welfare state that stems from two opposing forces. Uncivic people support large welfare states because they expect to benefit from them without bearing their costs. But civic individuals support generous benefits and high taxes only when they are surrounded by trustworthy individuals. We provide empirical evidence for these behaviors and this twin peaks relation in the OECD countries.
We show the existence of a twin peaks relation between trust and the size of the welfare state that stems from two opposing forces. Uncivic people support large welfare states because they expect to benefit from them without bearing their costs. But civic individuals support generous benefits and high taxes only when they are surrounded by trustworthy individuals. We provide empirical evidence for these behaviors and this twin peaks relation in the OECD countries.
We show the existence of a twin peaks relation between trust and the size of the welfare state that stems from two opposing forces. Uncivic people support large welfare states because they expect to benefit from them without bearing their costs. But civic individuals support generous benefits and high taxes only when they are surrounded by trustworthy individuals. We provide empirical evidence for these behaviors and this twin peaks relation in the OECD countries.
We show the existence of a twin peaks relation between trust and the size of the welfare state that stems from two opposing forces. Uncivic people support large welfare states because they expect to benefit from them without bearing their costs. But civic individuals support generous benefits and high taxes only when they are surrounded by trustworthy individuals. We provide empirical evidence for these behaviors and this twin peaks relation in the OECD countries.
In February 1997 the Australian media disclosed that the Papua New Guinea government had engaged a private company-Sandline International-to supply mercenaries and military equipment to eliminate secessionist leaders on Bougainville island and repossess the giant Panguna mine. Events took a further dramatic turn on 17 March 1997 when the commander of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force, Brigadier General Jerry Singirok, announced publicly that he would no longer cooperate with what he called the government's 'corrupt deal'. Singirok's act of defiance precipitated the most serious political crisis in Papua New Guinea's twenty two years of independence. This volume presents the impressions of a number of ANUbased scholars of Papua New Guinea politics who watched closely as these events unfolded. It also sets out a chronology of the main events and reproduces some of the key documents relating to the Sandline Affair. It will provide a useful resource to researchers and others interested in this remarkable episode in Papua New Guinea's postindependence political history.
The exponential growth of temporary migration to Australia since the late 1990s has unsettled the model of permanent migration, state supported settlement and multicultural citizenship on which Australia has been built. This article draws attention to the emergence of a gulf between Australia's immigration policies and social policy frameworks for migrant integration in the course of Australia's transition from a permanent to a temporary migration paradigm. It does so through an analysis of interviews with migrants, government officials at federal and local levels, and migrant service providers. It argues that the system by which temporary migration has been governed in Australia has enabled the Australian state to strategically divest itself of responsibility for the social welfare of temporary migrants and the long-term outcomes of temporary migration policies. Specifically, this has been achieved through the construction of temporary migrants as disposable, risk-bearing subjects, the exclusion of temporary migrants from social policy frameworks for migrant integration, and the elision of long-term social outcomes of migration policies through a focus on short-term economic outcomes. It concludes by pointing to changes required for instituting a temporal re-orientation of government policies from short-term economic outcomes towards the long-term social outcomes of migration.
It is now common in the sociology of punishment to lament that comparative penology has not matured as an area of research. While there have been seminal works in the comparative canon, their conceptual tools tend to be drawn from grand narratives and macro-structural perspectives. Comparative researchers therefore lack concepts that can help capture the complexity of penality within a single nation, limiting the cross-national perspective. Why is this relative lack of comparative refinement still the case? This article investigates this question by looking specifically at penal exceptionalism, a concept central to comparative penology. While punitiveness as a comparative and descriptive category has been critiqued, its converse, penal exceptionalism remains prevalent but undertheorised. Examining exceptionalism reveals that it is not merely the macro-structural approach to comparison that has limited the development of cross-national sociology of punishment, but the Anglocentric assumptions, which are the bedrock of comparative penology. In this essay, I argue that penal exceptionalism versus punitiveness is an Anglocentric formulation. These taken-for-granted assumptions have become so central to the comparative enterprise that they act as a barrier to developing new innovative comparative frameworks and concepts. The article concludes by suggesting some methodological strategies that are intended as a way of helping comparative penology to expand its toolkit and support the ongoing development of more equitable criminological knowledge.
It is now common in the sociology of punishment to lament that comparative penology has not matured as an area of research. While there have been seminal works in the comparative canon, their conceptual tools tend to be drawn from grand narratives and macro-structural perspectives. Comparative researchers therefore lack concepts that can help capture the complexity of penality within a single nation, limiting the crossnational perspective. Why is this relative lack of comparative refinement still the case? This article investigates this question by looking specifically at penal exceptionalism, a concept central to comparative penology. While punitiveness as a comparative and descriptive category has been critiqued, its converse, penal exceptionalism remains prevalent but undertheorised. Examining exceptionalism reveals that it is not merely the macro-structural approach to comparison that has limited the development of cross-national sociology of punishment, but the Anglocentric assumptions, which are the bedrock of comparative penology. In this essay, I argue that penal exceptionalism versus punitiveness is an Anglocentric formulation. These taken-for-granted assumptions have become so central to the comparative enterprise that they act as a barrier to developing new innovative comparative frameworks and concepts. The article concludes by suggesting some methodological strategies that are intended as a way of helping comparative penology to expand its toolkit and support the ongoing development of more equitable criminological knowledge.
The People's Republic of China is often cited as an unprecedented success story as far as rural poverty is concerned. Despite recent reports of sometimes violent protests in rural areas over illicit land seizures and pollution, since implementing reforms in 1978, China has seen rural poverty rates fall from xxx to yyy, as economic growth increased zzz on average each year, according to World Bank estimates. Some have ascribed liberal policy prescriptions based on open markets and pro-market government policies as are largely responsible, even as they forwent expensive, large-scale mass welfare programs. Starting with their initial round of fundamental reform of China's land policy, based since the mid-1960s on collective agriculture and an all-encompassing communal system, China's leadership enhanced the role of the market in order to spur agriculture production and growth in China's economy. They accomplished this through market reforms centered on a "Household Responsibility System," under which local governments reallocated land to China's peasant families through long-term leases, allowing them to sell agriculture production over set quotas on a free market based on gradually reformed prices.
With almost one-fifth of the world's population living in India, the health status and the drivers of health loss are expected to vary between different parts of the country and between the states. Accordingly, effective efforts to improve population health in each state require systematic knowledge of the local health status and trends. While state-level trends for some important health indicators have been available in India, a comprehensive assessment of the diseases causing the most premature deaths and disability in each state, the risk factors responsible for this burden, and their time trends have not been available in a single standardised framework. The India State-level Disease Burden Initiative was launched in October 2015 to address this crucial knowledge gap with support from the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare of the Government of India. This is a collaborative effort between the Indian Council of Medical Research, Public Health Foundation of India, Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, and experts and stakeholders from about 100 institutions across India. The work of this Initiative is overseen by an Advisory Board consisting of eminent policymakers and involves extensive engagement of 14 domain expert groups with the estimation process. Based on intense work over two years, this report describes the distribution and trends of diseases and risk factors for every state of India from 1990 to 2016.
The idea that saving is the force driving private investment and economic growth has become ever more entrenched in mainstream economic thought as well as in the minds of policymakers and the general public. Even though the empirical evidence that increased household saving will directly stimulate private investment and economic growth is scant, the idea remains prominent and underlies policy debates on topics ranging from Social Security to a balanced federal budget to reducing the national debt. The popular theory underlying these cuts is countered by evidence that private sector investment is financed primarily out of business retained earnings, not household saving, which explains why current policies aimed at raising household saving via cuts to social spending programs have been unsuccessful at raising saving rates. Moreover, government spending on social programs does not necessarily reduce economic growth. Higher government spending could be supported, and a greater degree of investment spending stimulated, through a combination of lower taxes on business income and higher taxes on personal incomes of upper-income households.
This article examines the development of general practice in the latter half of the 20th century, documenting the issues of concern to both the profession and the state. General practice developed hand in hand with the welfare state in Australia. As the structural changes associated with restructuring of the welfare state have advanced, so have the fortunes of general practice declined, despite significant attempts in the 1970s and 1980s to 'save' general practice by both the profession and the state. These structural changes have operated on two fronts, the economic and the cultural. On the economic, changes to the employment of general practitioners clearly indicate ongoing proletarianization, particularly in a changing environment of labor-capital relations. At the cultural level, development of the self-help and the women's movements and the elective affinity of these groups with the individualism of the new right are leading to deprofessionalization. The author advances this argument in a review of general practice over the last 40 years and in a case study of community health services. Theoretically he argues for a combination of the proletarianization and the deprofessionalization theses.
This article examines the development of general practice in the latter half of the 20th century, documenting the issues of concern to both the profession and the state. General practice developed hand in hand with the welfare state in Australia. As the structural changes associated with restructuring of the welfare state have advanced, so have the fortunes of general practice declined, despite significant attempts in the 1970s and 1980s to 'save' general practice by both the profession and the state. These structural changes have operated on two fronts, the economic and the cultural. On the economic, changes to the employment of general practitioners clearly indicate ongoing proletarianization, particularly in a changing environment of labor-capital relations. At the cultural level, development of the self-help and the women's movements and the elective affinity of these groups with the individualism of the new right are leading to deprofessionalization. The author advances this argument in a review of general practice over the last 40 years and in a case study of community health services. Theoretically he argues for a combination of the proletarianization and the deprofessionalization theses.
It has been well over a decade since the world attempted to save Somalia from the dustbin of "failed states." During that decade, one re-gion of Somalia has pulled away from its post-colonial union with Somalia, established its own government, kept the peace, and managed to flourish in a kind of stability that is only a faint memory to most Somalians outside the region. Somaliland, once a British colony, argues it should be recognized as an independent state. This Note explores the legal conception of statehood, from the Montevideo Convention to the more recent emphasis on self-determination, and then turns to the case of Somaliland, arguing that Somaliland should be recognized as a state by the international community.
This commentary focuses primarily upon the views expressed by Justice Rehnquist in his de Hirsch Meyer lecture. The author argues that a corollary to Justice Rehnquist's view that the judiciary should defer to the authority of private institutions over the individual, to protect those institutions, would be to adopt a judicial attitude of supporting private institutions against legislative interference. An examination of Justice Rehnquist's judicial opinions in the area of constitutional family law reveals exactly the opposite position. The author concludes that Justice Rehnquist's position of judicial deference to legislative decisions over the family may lead to destruction of the institution rather than to preservation of the family and suggests ways of accommodating the interests of individual family members, the interest of the family as an institution and the legitimate police power and parens patriae regulations of the state.
