Suchergebnisse

Introduction -- On the concepts of law and human rights -- A new concept of evolutive and static interpretation -- The legitimacy of evolutive interpretation revisited -- The criticism against evolutive interpretation revisited -- The argument of constitutionalism -- The constitutional nature of the ECHR -- Three basic constitutional principles of the ECHR -- Setting the scene for balancing at the interpretation stage -- The balancing model for evolutive and static interpretation -- External justification -- The right to divorce -- The right to assisted suicide -- The right to preservation of the environment -- Conclusion.

How should international treaties be interpreted over time? This book offers fresh insights on this age-old question. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) sets out the rules for interpretation, stipulating that treaties should be interpreted inter alia according to the 'ordinary meaning' of the text. Evolutive interpretation has been considered since the times of Gentili and Grotius, but this is the first book to systematically address what evolutive interpretation looks like in reality. It sets out to address how and under what circumstances it can be said that the interpretation of a treaty evolves, and under what circumstances it remains static. With the VCLT as its point of departure, this study develops a functional reconstruction of the rules of treaty interpretation, and explores and analyses how the International Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights have approached the issue

Two paths to interpretative method -- Suggested solutions -- Mode of inquiry : functional reconstruction -- Historical account of the means of interpretation -- Cardinal cores of the rule : features of the process -- Interpretative knots : the system of the VCLT revisited -- Shout of encore : evolutive interpretation in the context of the VCLT -- Profiling courts : a framework of analysis -- The International Court of Justice : peacemakers and disputants -- The European Court of Human Rights : an aging activist -- Summary and conclusions

The article provides an analysis of dynamic profit (income from operations) and examines the methods of its generation. The distribution of expenses by periods and corporate accounting policies have been identified as subjective factors affecting this indicator. The static interpretation of the financial performance of an organization (return on investment) has been analyzed. The concepts of capital maintenance recommended by IFRS have been reviewed in the context of their application in Russia, taking into account the effect of inflation. It has been concluded that in Russia neither static nor dynamic profit is formed in its pure form. The study is based on the analysis of fundamental accounting assumptions (the theories of static and dynamic balance-sheet), research papers on accounting, and the legislation of the Russian Federation governing the business activities of legal entities. The study has justified the use of both dynamic and static profits in the creation of financial statements and proposed a way to represent these data in a single reporting format.

Legal interpretation is discovering the solution to the given cases in accordance interpretation with the law now in force. Interpretation is always necessary since there are no clear cases and those who have the task of deciding the interpretation of the law are the judges and civil servants who have to resolve the cases presented to them for their consideration. This characteristic underlines that legal interpretation is the search for a solution based on equity. Another of the tasks of interpretation is the solution of conflicts and, in this sense, the appeal to principles and the logic of reason provides the acceptable solution. This dialectic among the legislature, the judges, the doctrine and public opinion make up the life of the law, in this way reconciling stability and change. ; La interpretación jurídica consiste en descubrir la solución en los supuestos dados con arreglo al derecho vigente. La interpretación es siempre necesaria porque no existen casos claros y a quien incumbe la tarea de decidir la interpretación del derecho es a los jueces y funcionarios, al resolver los casos que se presentan a su consideración. Una característica destacable de la interpretación judicial es la búsqueda de una solución basada en la equidad. Otra de las tareas de la interpretación es la solución de conflictos y, en este sentido, el recurso a los principios y a la lógica de lo razonable suministra la solución aceptable. Esta dialéctica entre el legislativo, los jueces, la doctrina y la opinión pública constituyen la vida del derecho, conciliando de este modo la estabilidad y el cambio.

We develop an augmented Olley–Pakes (OP) decomposition that allows us to examine how entering and exiting firms contribute to the popular OP covariance measure of allocative efficiency. Applying the decomposition to a comprehensive micro‐level data, we find that a large part of the OP covariance component can be attributed to entrants and exiting firms. We also build a model of firm dynamics that is consistent with our main empirical results. In the model economy, the standard OP covariance component tends to increase with certain type of distortions because of endogenous changes in firm entry and exit.

This book studies a large economy. It deals with a static microeconomic model of an exchange market with pure competition. Instead of the sigma-additive theory, the finitely additive theory, the general Jordan content and the general Riemann integration are used respectively. By a specialized probability model, the author obtains a precise interpretation strictly based on microeconomic methods of measurement. In particular, the meaning of an agent and of a coalition is explained and the Core-Walras equivalence is deduced. The author elaborates an elementary representation by broken continuous functions and the classical Riemann integral. A conjecture concerning the reduction of the dynamical case onto generalized differential equations is added

Judges interpreting statutes evidence a certain ambivalence whether they are interpreting the texts before them as artifacts whose meaning was fixed as of their date of enactment, or as present-day texts whose meaning may be shaped by subsequent events – whether intervening judicial decisions, or the adoption of new statutes (as distinct from amendments, an easy case) whose instructions bear on the issues they present. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council stridently referred the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act's rulemaking provision back to the political compromise struck at its enactment in 1946; the opinion insisted that judges are not free to vary its terms by common-law improvisations based on their reasoning about the procedural needs of contemporary rulemaking. Motor Vehicle Mfrs' Assn v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. almost as impatiently dismissed the argument that judicial standards for reviewing agency rulemakings are those that prevailed when the APA was enacted (equating review of rulemaking with highly permissive review of economic legislation), rather than the "hard look" understandings that had grown up in the 1970s, primarily in the D.C. Circuit. The particular tension has long been a puzzle for administrative law scholars; yet it seems to reflect a general unease about how judges ought best interpret Congress's words as they age. This essay explores that tension, first in the context of thoughts about the judicial-legislative interface appearing in the literature, both today's and yesterday's, and then using the concrete APA example. It argues that in its very occasional forays into the construction of particular statutes, the Supreme Court should accord substantial weight to contemporary consensus the profession and lower courts have been able to develop in interpreting law. The dominant characteristic of particular statutory issues in the Court today is that they are very infrequently, and usually tardily, presented. The Court's certiorari choices, like the contemporary Congress's legislative choices, are driven by the disputes that are live and important at any given moment. If the uncontroversial does not command the Court's attention, it nonetheless becomes a part of the living law known to lawyers advising clients, to Congress choosing its legislative opportunities, to agencies deciding how to make procedural choices, and to lower courts that cannot so easily evade the responsibilities of decision. Were the Court honestly to face the implications of its reservation of authority to choose which statutory issues to consider, it might conclude that its refusal to credit intervening statutory and lower court case-law developments, more than its insistence on a static view of original meaning, profoundly mistakes its proper contemporary role.

.[T]he lesson of the past two hundred years is that we will do well to be on our guard against all-purpose theoretical solutions to our problems. As lawyers we will do well to be on our guard against any suggestion that, through law, our society can be reformed, purified, or saved. The function of law, in a society like our own, is altogether more modest and less apocalyptic. It is to provide a mechanism for the settlement of disputes in the light of broadly conceived principles on whose soundness, it must be assumed, there is a general consensus among us. If the assumption is wrong, if there is no consensus, then we are headed for war, civil strife, and revolution, and the orderly administration ofjustice will become an irrelevant, nostalgic whimsy until the social fabric has been stitched together again and a new consensus has emerged. But, so long as the consensus exists, the mechanism which the law provides is designed to insure that our institutions adjust to change, which is inevitable, in a continuing process which will be orderly, gradual, and, to the extent that such a thing is possible in human affairs, rational. The function of the lawyer is to preserve a skeptical relativism in a society hell-bent for absolutes. When we become too sure of our premises, we necessarily fail in what we are supposed to be doing. When we think of our own or of any other legal system, the beginning of wisdom lies in the recognition that the body of the law, at any time or place, is an unstable mass in precarious equilibrium. The study of our legal past is helpful to lawyers and judges and legislators in the same way that the study of recorded games is helpful to a chess player. But the principal lesson to be drawn from our study is that the part of wisdom is to keep our theories open-ended, our assumptions tentative, our reactions flexible. We must act, we must decide, we must go this way or that. Like the blind men dealing with the elephant, we must erect hypotheses on the basis of inadequate evidence. That does no harm – at all events it is the human condition from which we will not escape – so long as we do not delude ourselves into thinking that we have finally seen our elephant whole.

The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we generalize the notion of capital requirement, originally formulated in a regulatory framework, in order to unify other apparently diverse financial concepts. Second, we stress the interpretation of a capital requirement as a measure of risk, providing a link with the theory of coherent risk measures. We define a capital requirement as the minimal initial cost of a hedging action that makes the original position acceptable. Three basic elements are involved in such a methodology: a system of prices, a class of permitted hedging actions and a criterion of acceptability. Our approach is very general, because we construct capital requirements on vector spaces. However, we will give some concrete applications related, in particular, to the availability of a financial market, to the presence of different business units in an institution or to the fact that pay‐offs are spread over different dates.