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In this study we empirically tested the effects of the use of third-person perceptions in the context of the stock market using a sample of 109 professional stock traders and 130 members of the lay public. Findings show that people perceived anonymous information recommending stocks
on the Internet as having a greater influence on others than on themselves. Additionally, participants demonstrated a third-person perception when "others" were novice investors with little knowledge or experience in stock trading than when "others" were presumed to
be experienced investors. Professional stock traders perceived a greater influence on others than did the lay public. We also found support for the relationship between third-person perceptions and attitudes toward support for warnings about anonymous information.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to investigate what and how intellectual capital information (ICI) conveyed through analyst reports varies by the type of stock recommendation. It draws on the theory of impression management.Design/methodology/approachContent analysis is used to investigate ICI in the full text of sell‐side analysts' initiating coverage reports. It categorises ICI by type and three qualitative characteristics: evidence; time orientation; and news‐tenor. It explores how the extent, types and qualitative characteristics of ICI found in analyst reports vary by the type of stock recommendation accompanying the analyst report.FindingsGiven the conflicting interests facing analysts and relative amenability of ICI, it was found that analysts use ICI to manage perceptions. In particular, analysts attempt to use ICI in their reports to subdue the pessimism associated with an unfavourable recommendation, increase credibility of favourable recommendations and distinguish sell from hold recommendations.Practical implicationsThe paper contributes to the literature on impression management by extending its application to the study of sell‐side analysts' decision processes and it alerts future researchers to the wider role played by ICI beyond its use in generation of forecasts and valuations. The paper's findings have implications for consumers of analyst reports, as the level of negativity/positivity of forecasts and recommendations may be altered as a result of the semantics associated with ICI.Originality/valueThis paper explores analysts' use of ICI conditional on the type of stock recommendation accompanying the report. Findings are explained using the theory of impression management.

This article analyzes the provision of information acquisition and truthful reporting incentives to a financial analyst who can privately trade on own account. In a binary message and state space, I show that the analyst's reward scheme essentially provides him with a portfolio endowment traded in the market. Regardless of the true signal, the analyst issues the report that corresponds to the portfolio endowment with maximum market value, given security prices. The analyst's information acquisition incentive is driven only by private portfolio considerations: he acquires information only if he will be holding a large enough position in the stock he covers.