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Cover -- Copyright Page -- Title Page -- Dedication -- Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Basic Notation -- Social Choice -- Game Theory -- Game Forms are Voting Rules -- The Quest for Truthful Voting -- Strategyproofness and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem -- Voting Manipulations -- The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem -- Frequency of Manipulation -- Group Manipulations -- Safe Manipulations -- Irresolute Social Choice Correspondences -- Exercises -- Regaining Truthfulness in Voting -- Domain Restriction -- Single-Peaked Preferences on a Line -- Other Single-Peak Domains -- Dichotomous Preferences -- Complexity Barriers -- Few Candidates and Coalitional Manipulations -- Randomized Voting Rules -- Gibbard's Characterization -- Stronger Impossibility Results -- Output Approximation -- Almost-Strategyproof Rules -- Approximation with Almost-Strategyproof Rules -- Differential Privacy -- Exercises -- Voting and Mechanism Design -- Payments -- The VCG Mechanism -- Range Voting -- Approximation by Randomized Voting Rules -- Facility Location -- Location in a General Metric Space -- Location on a Line -- Location on a Circle -- Other Variations -- Judgment Aggregation -- Formal Framework -- Incentives and Manipulation -- Exercises -- Voting Equilibrium Models -- Simultaneous Voting Games -- Desiderata for Voting Models -- Implementation -- Nash Implementation -- Strong Implementation -- Implementation in Undominated Strategies -- Other Notions of Implementation -- Fallback Strategies -- Truth Bias/Partial Honesty -- Laziness and the Paradox of Voting -- The ``Calculus of Voting'' -- The Expected Value of Voting -- Equilibrium Stability -- Social Networks -- Quantal Response Equilibrium -- Other Equilibrium Models -- Minimax Regret -- Robust Equilibrium -- Iterated Removal of Dominated Strategies -- Exercises.

We estimate a model of strategic voting and quantify the impact it has on election outcomes. Because the model exhibits multiplicity of outcomes, we adopt a set estimator. Using Japanese general-election data, we find a large fraction (63.4 percent, 84.9 percent) of strategic voters, only a small fraction (1.4 percent, 4.2 percent) of whom voted for a candidate other than the one they most preferred (misaligned voting). Existing empirical literature has not distinguished between the two, estimating misaligned voting instead of strategic voting. Accordingly, while our estimate of strategic voting is high, our estimate of misaligned voting is comparable to previous studies. (JEL D72)

"Strategic Voting Versus Sincere Voting" published on by Oxford University Press.

Prior research on 'strategic voting' has reached the conclusion that unanimity rule is uniquely bad: it results in destruction of information, and hence makes voters worse off. We show that this conclusion depends critically on the assumption that the issue being voted on is exogenous, i.e., independent of the voting rule used. We depart from the existing literature by endogenizing the proposal that is put to a vote, and establish that under many circumstances unanimity rule makes voters better off. Moreover, in some cases unanimity rule also makes the proposer better off, even when he has diametrically opposing preferences. In this case, unanimity is the Pareto dominant voting rule. Voters prefer unanimity rule because it induces the proposing individual to make a more attractive proposal. The proposing individual prefers unanimity rule because the acceptance probabilities for moderate proposals are higher. We apply our results to jury trials and debt restructuring.

We investigate strategic voting at German Bundestag elections. The common intuition about strategic voting holds that supporters of small party candidates split their ticket and cast a constituency vote for the candidate of a viable large party. We show that there is more potential for strategic voting than previously admitted. Based on the multiparty calculus of voting framework, we formulate a decision-theoretic model that allows us to take the full range of situations into account, that voters may encounter in their local constituencies. Applying this model to survey data from the 1998 and 2002 federal elections, we find that voters make use of sophisticated balloting, given the chance to influence the outcome of the constituency election. While the focus of this paper is on Germany, the approach we take is applicable to single seat elections in other countries as well. [Copyright 2008 Elsevier Ltd.]

"We investigate strategic voting at German Bundestag elections. The common intuition about strategic voting holds that supporters of small party candidates split their ticket and cast a constituency vote for the candidate of a viable large party. We show that there is more potential for strategic voting than previously admitted. Based on the multiparty calculus of voting framework, we formulate a decision-theoretic model that allows us to take the full range of situations into account, that voters may encounter in their local constituencies. Applying this model to survey data from the 1998 and 2002 federal elections, we find that voters make use of sophisticated balloting, given the chance to influence the outcome of the constituency election. While the focus of this paper is on Germany, the approach we take is applicable to single seat elections in other countries as well." (author's abstract)

We theoretically and experimentally study voter behavior in a setting characterized by plurality rule and mandatory voting, where voters choose from three options. We are interested in the occurrence of strategic voting in an environment where Condorcet cycles may occur. In particular, we focus on how information about the distribution of preferences affects strategic behavior. We also vary the relative importance of the second preferred option to investigate how this affects the strategic vote. Quantal response equilibrium analysis is used to analyze the game and proves to be a good predictor for the experimental data. Our results indeed show that strategic voting arises, the extent of which depends on (i) the availability of information; (ii) the relative importance of the intermediate candidate; (iii) the electorate's relative support for one's preferred candidate; and (iv) the relative position of the plurality-supported candidate in a voter's preference ordering. Our results show that information serves as a coordination device where strategic voting does not harm the plurality-preferred candidate's chances of winning.

In this paper we extend the research on happiness and spatial theory of voting by exploring whether strategic and sincere voting affect subjective well-being. We conduct the analysis with data on a large sample of individuals over 50 elections in 16 OECD countries. The results of the analysis show the existence of a negative effect of strategic voting on subjective well-being. In addition, the likelihood of being satisfied decreases when individuals vote strategically for a political party that wins the electoral race. Furthermore, when we analyse separately left-wing and right-wing voters, we find that the described effect holds for left-wing voters but no for right-wing voters. We discuss this evidence in the light of expressive voting theory (Hilman, 2010) and lack of empathy with future selves (Kahneman and Thaler, 1991). Our results are robust to different measures of strategic voting and subjective well-being.