Suchergebnisse

AbstractManuscript TypeEmpiricalResearch Question/IssueWe examine determinants of cash holdings in Chinese subsidiaries of US multinational corporations (MNCs), a setting where growth opportunities make cash holdings desirable for investment opportunities but also vulnerable to potential expropriation because of poor investor protection.Research Findings/InsightsWe show that headquarters accumulate larger cash holdings in foreign subsidiaries with locally registered patents and in foreign subsidiaries operating in the same industry as corporate headquarters. Further, foreign cash holdings are higher when these are safeguarded by a subsidiary board. Moreover, the effect of shared industry on subsidiary cash holdings is larger when a board is installed in the subsidiary. Finally, the positive relation between a subsidiary's capability to innovate and to transfer knowledge and its level of cash holdings is stronger when the subsidiary is led by US expatriate CEOs.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsOur results indicate that MNCs accumulate cash in foreign subsidiaries with innovation and knowledge transfer capabilities. Furthermore, and in line with agency theory, we find that MNCs safeguard foreign cash via the installing of subsidiary boards and expatriate CEOs. These findings suggest that the installing of monitoring devices are crucial in reducing the potential expropriation risk of foreign cash holdings.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsOur study highlights the importance of considering foreign subsidiaries' positions in innovation and in knowledge transfer when MNCs make decisions on the levels of overseas cash holdings. It offers insights regarding the importance of subsidiary boards and expatriate CEOs in monitoring and controlling foreign subsidiaries.

Within contemporary research on the multinational corporation (MNC), the topic of headquarters' involvement has grown considerably in importance. As the central organisational unit in the MNC, headquarters has the potential to add value to the firm by performing an administrative and entrepreneurial role. While the administrative role concerns synergetic coordination and control activities, the entrepreneurial role pertains to developing and implementing new innovations such as management innovations at the corporate-wide level. Existing literature has generated valuable insights into headquarters' administrative and entrepreneurial role and the potential to create value for the MNC. However, more research is needed on how headquarters can advantageously involve itself and integrate subsidiaries to ensure that their activities are aligned with the MNC strategy without impinging upon subsidiaries' autonomy and without incurring their resistance to headquarters' coordination, control, and innovation activities. This thesis aims to advance our knowledge on headquarters' involvement in managing its subsidiaries. Within the administrative role, I examine coordination and control activities, and within the entrepreneurial role, I examine the process of developing and implementing management innovations and facilitating factors. The thesis draws on a single longitudinal case study of the development and implementation of a new performance management practice by a European MNC within the construction industry. During the fieldwork, I gathered empirical material from observations and interviews as well as secondary data. While this thesis has been carried out as a single case study, the outcome of the thesis is presented in four separate papers, exploring headquarters' involvement in coordination, control and innovation activities. This thesis contributes to the literature on headquarters' involvement in managing subsidiaries by suggesting a collaborative approach to subsidiary engagement and participation that addresses 1) the issue of subsidiary demotivation by feeling degraded to an implementer, 2) the suitability issue by reducing the risk of mismatch between new headquarters integration and innovation activities and subsidiary contexts. Combining headquarters' and subsidiaries' stocks of perspectives and knowledge helps transcend the spatial, cultural, institutional and political boundaries between headquarters and subsidiaries. ; At the time of the doctoral defense, the following papers were unpublished and had a status as follows: Paper 1: Submitted. Paper 2: Manuscript. Paper 3: Manuscript. Paper 4: Submitted.

Julia Maurer offers the first comprehensive conceptual and empirical approach to the relationships between foreign subsidiaries. She develops a novel framework for the analysis of intersubsidiary relationships and applies it to the large-scale plant engineering industry. The empirical study confirms that an MNC's strategic orientation has a considerable impact on its intersubsidiary relationships

AbstractHow much of lobbying activities disclosed under the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) actually represent foreign clients? What are their interests? By identifying the global ultimate owners of all corporate clients filing with the LDA, I find that majority‐owned subsidiaries of foreign multinational corporations (MNCs) account for nearly 20% of corporate lobbying spending in 2015–2016. This amount is comparable to the entire foreign lobbying spending reported under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA). Domestic subsidiaries of foreign MNCs are also found to lobby more frequently and spend more lobbying than American multinationals, after controlling for firm size, industry, and PAC contributions. These subsidiaries actively lobby on issue areas that clearly benefit their foreign parents. The findings suggest that foreign MNCs may actively influence U.S. policies through their domestic subsidiaries, and that the FARA captures only part of foreign lobbying in the United States.

The Mondragon worker-owned and worker-governed cooperatives are an example of the struggle that some alternative work organizations face when dealing with the external pressures of competing in the global economy while at the same time endeavouring to retain their long-held values of workplace democracy. This article analyses the Mondragon cooperative-multinationals with regard to their subsidiaries in China at a time when the cooperatives are undergoing deep internal and external transformations. The study centres on the characteristics of governance and working conditions at the Mondragon subsidiaries in the Kunshan Industrial Park near Shanghai. The article asks whether, from the perspective of China and Chinese workers, there are any substantial differences between the Chinese subsidiaries of Mondragon and those of conventional multinationals. Overall, it concludes that while there are significant challenges inherent in extending the democratic and participative model of the parent cooperatives to their subsidiaries, there are also indications that if the cooperatives can muster the political will to act in accordance with their stated principles, they could potentially become a real if modest force for change in the labour relations of developing economies.

International audience ; Manuscript Type: Empirical Research Question/Issue: This study examines the conditions under which foreign subsidiaries maintain active boards of directors. Active boards are in this study defined as boards which perform tasks beyond fulfilling local legal requirements. We focus on both monitoring and service roles. Research Findings/Insights: Based on a sample of 83 foreign subsidiaries operating in Belgium with headquarters in 14 different countries, we find that a foreign subsidiary is more likely to maintain an active board if it is a world mandate subsidiary, which has worldwide responsibility for a product line and performs a broad scope of value-added activities. Moreover, a foreign subsidiary is more likely to maintain an active board if it is larger relative to the multinational enterprise (MNE), if it has a higher level of local responsiveness, and if its past performance is poorer. Additionally, the presence of an active board in a foreign subsidiary is related to other control mechanisms deployed in the subsidiary. Theoretical/Academic Implications: Our results highlight the conditions under which foreign subsidiaries are likely to maintain active boards. Moreover, we provide empirical evidence that agency theory and resource dependence theory are relevant and complementary in the analysis of active boards in foreign subsidiaries. Practitioner/policy Implications: This study suggests that an active board may be a control mechanism to govern foreign subsidiaries and an instrument to deal with the external environment. Corporate governance regulators may consider developing governance recommendations that emphasize the importance of subsidiary boards in the oversight of foreign subsidiaries.