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Positive law is two-dimensional: it has a justice (or ideal) dimension (and requisite) and a factual (or real) dimension (and requisite). Both are essential. Hence positive law lapses when either of the two is absent. In terms of the factual requisite, law remains in place as actual norms of law (unlike mere norm-formulations), provided that a minimum degree of effectiveness is maintained; that is to say, only as long as the subjects of the law consistently and voluntarily act in accordance with such norm/s, and provided further that deviant conduct is remedied by effective coercive measures. "Norm/s" that lose the factual dimension lapse into mere norm-formulations and no longer qualify as positive law. Thus viewed, a realistic grasp of the content of law is co-dependent on actual conduct, regardless of what the norm-formulations purport positive law to entail, because the norm-formulations may have lost track of the actual state of the law. Grasping the actual content of law, including constitutional law, therefore requires not only analysing the norm-formulations of the formally recognised sources of the law, but more specifically social and political observation which may reveal the following: (1) actual behaviour that closely corresponds with a legal norm-formulation, in which case the formulations reliably happen to reflect (and by implication to describe) the actual state of law; or (2) conduct that regularly deviates from the norm-formulations (usus) by the deviators who deem themselves legally bound to act as they are acting(opinio iuris), in which case new (substituting) law has in fact come into being, without such substituting law being reflected in a new (amended) norm-formulation; or (3) large-scale but inconsistent and irregular deviant conduct where the deviators do not consider themselves legally bound to act in the various deviant ways, combined with haphazard enforcement, thus allowing deviators to get away with their transgressions. Unlike the first scenario, the purported norm (law) as reflected in the norm-formulations is in part unsettled but unlike as in the second scenario, no new norm (law) has come into being. A legal lacuna opens up - that is, an area not regulated by existing legal norms. Viewed from the perspective of the factual dimension, law, including constitutional law, is much more susceptible to the volatility of unpredictable changes and instability than what the doctrine of the rule of law and constitutional supremacy purport it to be. The doctrine holds law (and the constitution) to be formulation driven, and therefore formal-static in nature, in that the law remains essentially static until the norm-formulations (the text) are amended in terms of the prescribed amendment procedures prescribed by the constitution. Consequently, the prevalent doctrine of the rule of law and constitutional supremacy fail to account for the factual dimension which causes it (the doctrine) to obscure the inner workings of the factual dimension of law, and therefore acts as a hindrance to understanding the nature and content of (positive) law, including the constitution.

Positive law is two-dimensional: it has a justice (or ideal) dimension (and requisite) and a factual (or real) dimension (and requisite). Both are essential. Hence positive law lapses when either of the two is absent. In terms of the factual requisite, law remains in place as actual norms of law (unlike mere norm-formulations), provided that a minimum degree of effectiveness is maintained; that is to say, only as long as the subjects of the law consistently and voluntarily act in accordance with such norm/s, and provided further that deviant conduct is remedied by effective coercive measures. "Norm/s" that lose the factual dimension lapse into mere norm-formulations and no longer qualify as positive law. Thus viewed, a realistic grasp of the content of law is co-dependent on actual conduct, regardless of what the norm-formulations purport positive law to entail, because the norm-formulations may have lost track of the actual state of the law. Grasping the actual content of law, including constitutional law, therefore requires not only analysing the norm-formulations of the formally recognised sources of the law, but more specifically social and political observation which may reveal the following: (1) actual behaviour that closely corresponds with a legal norm-formulation, in which case the formulations reliably happen to reflect (and by implication to describe) the actual state of law; or (2) conduct that regularly deviates from the norm-formulations (usus) by the deviators who deem themselves legally bound to act as they are acting (opinio iuris), in which case new (substituting) law has in fact come into being, without such substituting law being reflected in a new (amended) norm-formulation; or (3) large-scale but inconsistent and irregular deviant conduct where the deviators do not consider themselves legally bound to act in the various deviant ways, combined with haphazard enforcement, thus allowing deviators to get away with their transgressions. Unlike the first scenario, the purported norm (law) as reflected in the norm-formulations is in part unsettled but unlike as in the second scenario, no new norm (law) has come into being. A legal lacuna opens up - that is, an area not regulated by existing legal norms. Viewed from the perspective of the factual dimension, law, including constitutional law, is much more susceptible to the volatility of unpredictable changes and instability than what the doctrine of the rule of law and constitutional supremacy purport it to be. The doctrine holds law (and the constitution) to be formulation driven, and therefore formal-static in nature, in that the law remains essentially static until the norm-formulations (the text) are amended in terms of the prescribed amendment procedures prescribed by the constitution. Consequently, the prevalent doctrine of the rule of law and constitutional supremacy fail to account for the factual dimension which causes it (the doctrine) to obscure the inner workings of the factual dimension of law, and therefore acts as a hindrance to understanding the nature and content of (positive) law, including the constitution.

The 2008 financial crisis prompted a global regulatory overhaul of over-the-counter derivative markets. The Dodd-Frank Act mandated the CFTC and SEC to issue new rules and regulations to bring the majority of the OTC derivative market out of the dark on onto regulated exchanges. Similar action was taken in the European Union and other G20 nations. There has been a push to harmonize rules for OTC derivatives across jurisdictions to make the market more efficient and eliminate regulatory arbitrage. This Comment focuses on the process for a regulated entity in the US and EU to "substitute compliance" with its home country's jurisdiction instead of complying with both sets of similar, but not identical, rules. This Comment specifically advocates for the use of uniform global identifiers in swap and security-based swap data reporting and explains the importance of uniform data when making substituted compliance comparability determinations.

Medicine, as a learned profession, has traditionally insisted that the conduct of MDs be governed by its own code of ethics. Increased government regulation of medical practice, however, has largely substituted external, governmental regulation for earlier ethical constraints. Government regulations have been imposed both in response to greater risks in the practice of medicine & in consequence of ever greater government funding of health care. Though regulations reflect a contemporary consensus on ethical attitudes, their promulgation has narrowed the exercise of the MD's independent ethical judgment. While the MD is increasingly subject to legal requirements in his practice & in such areas as informed consent, the use of human Ss in clinical research, genetic & biological research, & the management of the dying patient, his ethical sensitivity in complying with such requirements is still essential for the protection of patients. HA.

Medicine, as a learned profession, has tradi tionally insisted that the conduct of physicians be governed by its own code of professional ethics. Increased government regulation of the practice of medicine, however, has largely substituted external, governmental regulation for earlier ethical constraints. Government regulations have been imposed both in response to greater risks in the practice of medicine and in consequence of ever greater government funding of health care. Though regulations reflect a contemporary consensus on ethical attitudes, their promulgation has narrowed the exercise of the physician's independent ethical judgment. While the physician is increasingly subject to legal require ments in his practice and in such areas as informed consent, the use of human subjects in clinical research, genetic and biological research, and the management of the dying pa tient, his ethical sensitivity in complying with such require ments is still essential for the protection of patients.

Abstract:This article tries to understand the Omnibus Law on Job Creation and its relation to the Sustainable Development Goals/ SDGs as an aspect of the protection of human rights as the responsibility of the state. The research approach is a normative legal research using a hermeneutical circle analysis. The main object (material object) is the norms in UUCK and related statutes which have been amended, added, or substituted by the Law on Job Creation. The norms studied are stated in the articles of the Law on Job Creation, especially norms that deal with environment and sustainable development. Hermeneutical analysis, from the linguistic and phenomenological point of view, isused in order to find the meaning of law from the linguistic and historical point of view, and the nature of the State as the protector of citizens' human right. The findings are divided into 3 points. First, in terms of the process, this law is a tactical and political response from decision makers to complex and dynamic situations that can in fact lead to complicated derivative problems if the responses are not based on a framework based on the principles and basic values of the state. Dealing with the growth agenda in SDGs, the Law on Job Creation still calls into question whether the Law enshrines the easiness of business and full employment and decent work as human rights obligations of the state, or merely as benefits of economic growth. So it still presents both opportunities for human rights monitoring and accountability. Keywords: Omnibus Law, Job Creation, Sustainable Development Goals Abstrak:Tulisan ini mencoba untuk memahami Omnibus Law Cipta Kerja dalam kaitannya dengan Tujuan Pembangunan Berkelanjutan (Sustainable Goals/SDGs) sebagai suatu aspek dari perlindungan HAM yang merupakan tanggung jawab negara. Penelitian dilakukan dengan menggunakan pendekatan penelitian ilmu hukum normatif menggunakan analisa lingkar hermeneutika. Obyek utamanya adalah norma dalam Undang-undang Cipta Kerja dan peraturan perundang-undangan ...