Suchergebnisse

The adoption of government regulations instead of law number 2 of 2017 instead of law number 17 of 2013 concerning community organizations certainly creates a lot of polemic in society. The controversy gave rise to the pros and cons of the law. The community feels freedom in organizing is castrated, while on the other hand, some people agree with the new law and this has an impact on society. The result in society is an unusual social symptom to study, considering that there are so many forms of community organizations in the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. The number of kinds of community organizations, the government feels that a new regulation is needed, namely perppu number 2 of 2017 instead of law number 17 of 2013 concerning community organizations that have passed into law. With the enactment of Perppu number 2 of 2017 into law, there have been many turmoils in the community in responding to this matter, starting from those who agree and those who do not conform to the promulgation of the Perppu, but the impact in the community is not significant because the organizations legally dissolved they are illegal, they still run religious activities as they should by not violating applicable laws.Disahkannya peraturan pemerintah pengganti undang-undang nomor 2 tahun 2017 pengganti undang-undang nomor 17 tahun 2013 tentang organisasi kemasyarakatan tentunya menimbulkan banyak polemik di dalam masyarakat. Polemik tersebut memunculkan pro dan kontra tentang undang-undang tersebut. Masyarakat merasa kebebasan dalam berorganisasi terkebiri, sedangkan di sisi lain sebagian masyrakat setuju dengan aturan hukum baru tersebut dan hal inilah yang menimbulkan dampak di dalam masyrakat. Dampak di dalam masyarakat merupakan gejala sosial yang menarik untuk diteliti, mengingat begitu banyak bentuk organisasi kemasyarakatan yang ada di Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia. Banyaknya bentuk organisasi kemasyarakatan, pemerintah merasa perlu dibentuk regulasi baru yaitu perppu nomor 2 tahun 2017 pengganti undang-undang nomor 17 tahun 2013 tentang organisasi kemasyrakatan yang telah disahkan menjadi undang-undang. Dengan disahkannya perppu nomor 2 tahun 2017 menjadi undang-undang, banyak gejolak di dalam masyrakat dalam menyikapi hal tersebut, mulai dari yang setuju dan yang tidak setuju diundangkannya perppu tersebut, akan tetapi dampak di masyarakat tidak terlalu signifikan dikarenakan ormas yang mendapat sanksi pembubaran secara hukum mereka illegal, secara kegiatan keagamaan tetap mereka jalankan sebagaimana mestinya dengan tidak melanggar undang-undang yang berlaku.

Positive law is two-dimensional: it has a justice (or ideal) dimension (and requisite) and a factual (or real) dimension (and requisite). Both are essential. Hence positive law lapses when either of the two is absent. In terms of the factual requisite, law remains in place as actual norms of law (unlike mere norm-formulations), provided that a minimum degree of effectiveness is maintained; that is to say, only as long as the subjects of the law consistently and voluntarily act in accordance with such norm/s, and provided further that deviant conduct is remedied by effective coercive measures. "Norm/s" that lose the factual dimension lapse into mere norm-formulations and no longer qualify as positive law. Thus viewed, a realistic grasp of the content of law is co-dependent on actual conduct, regardless of what the norm-formulations purport positive law to entail, because the norm-formulations may have lost track of the actual state of the law. Grasping the actual content of law, including constitutional law, therefore requires not only analysing the norm-formulations of the formally recognised sources of the law, but more specifically social and political observation which may reveal the following: (1) actual behaviour that closely corresponds with a legal norm-formulation, in which case the formulations reliably happen to reflect (and by implication to describe) the actual state of law; or (2) conduct that regularly deviates from the norm-formulations (usus) by the deviators who deem themselves legally bound to act as they are acting(opinio iuris), in which case new (substituting) law has in fact come into being, without such substituting law being reflected in a new (amended) norm-formulation; or (3) large-scale but inconsistent and irregular deviant conduct where the deviators do not consider themselves legally bound to act in the various deviant ways, combined with haphazard enforcement, thus allowing deviators to get away with their transgressions. Unlike the first scenario, the purported norm (law) as reflected in the norm-formulations is in part unsettled but unlike as in the second scenario, no new norm (law) has come into being. A legal lacuna opens up - that is, an area not regulated by existing legal norms. Viewed from the perspective of the factual dimension, law, including constitutional law, is much more susceptible to the volatility of unpredictable changes and instability than what the doctrine of the rule of law and constitutional supremacy purport it to be. The doctrine holds law (and the constitution) to be formulation driven, and therefore formal-static in nature, in that the law remains essentially static until the norm-formulations (the text) are amended in terms of the prescribed amendment procedures prescribed by the constitution. Consequently, the prevalent doctrine of the rule of law and constitutional supremacy fail to account for the factual dimension which causes it (the doctrine) to obscure the inner workings of the factual dimension of law, and therefore acts as a hindrance to understanding the nature and content of (positive) law, including the constitution.

Positive law is two-dimensional: it has a justice (or ideal) dimension (and requisite) and a factual (or real) dimension (and requisite). Both are essential. Hence positive law lapses when either of the two is absent. In terms of the factual requisite, law remains in place as actual norms of law (unlike mere norm-formulations), provided that a minimum degree of effectiveness is maintained; that is to say, only as long as the subjects of the law consistently and voluntarily act in accordance with such norm/s, and provided further that deviant conduct is remedied by effective coercive measures. "Norm/s" that lose the factual dimension lapse into mere norm-formulations and no longer qualify as positive law. Thus viewed, a realistic grasp of the content of law is co-dependent on actual conduct, regardless of what the norm-formulations purport positive law to entail, because the norm-formulations may have lost track of the actual state of the law. Grasping the actual content of law, including constitutional law, therefore requires not only analysing the norm-formulations of the formally recognised sources of the law, but more specifically social and political observation which may reveal the following: (1) actual behaviour that closely corresponds with a legal norm-formulation, in which case the formulations reliably happen to reflect (and by implication to describe) the actual state of law; or (2) conduct that regularly deviates from the norm-formulations (usus) by the deviators who deem themselves legally bound to act as they are acting (opinio iuris), in which case new (substituting) law has in fact come into being, without such substituting law being reflected in a new (amended) norm-formulation; or (3) large-scale but inconsistent and irregular deviant conduct where the deviators do not consider themselves legally bound to act in the various deviant ways, combined with haphazard enforcement, thus allowing deviators to get away with their transgressions. Unlike the first scenario, the purported norm (law) as reflected in the norm-formulations is in part unsettled but unlike as in the second scenario, no new norm (law) has come into being. A legal lacuna opens up - that is, an area not regulated by existing legal norms. Viewed from the perspective of the factual dimension, law, including constitutional law, is much more susceptible to the volatility of unpredictable changes and instability than what the doctrine of the rule of law and constitutional supremacy purport it to be. The doctrine holds law (and the constitution) to be formulation driven, and therefore formal-static in nature, in that the law remains essentially static until the norm-formulations (the text) are amended in terms of the prescribed amendment procedures prescribed by the constitution. Consequently, the prevalent doctrine of the rule of law and constitutional supremacy fail to account for the factual dimension which causes it (the doctrine) to obscure the inner workings of the factual dimension of law, and therefore acts as a hindrance to understanding the nature and content of (positive) law, including the constitution.

Preliminary Material -- Interpretivist Theories of Law /Nicos Stavropoulos -- How Facts Make Law /Mark Greenberg -- On the Normative Significance of Brute Facts /Ram Neta -- On Practices and the Law /Mark Greenberg -- Supervenience, Value, and Legal Content /Enrique Villanueva -- Reasons Without Values? /Mark Greenberg -- Theory, Practice and Ubiquitous Interpretation: The Basics /Martin Stone -- Law as a Reflective Practice /Scott Hershovitz -- On Reflective Practices and 'Substituting for God' /Martin Stone -- Metasemantics and Objectivity /Ori Simchen -- Can Objectivity be Grounded in Semantics? /Michael S. Moore -- A Hybrid Theory of Claim-Rights /Gopal Sreenivasan -- Is the Will Theory of Rights Superseded by the Hybrid Theory? /Horacio Spector -- In Defence of the Hybrid Theory /Gopal Sreenivasan.

Since the end of the first World War, the predominant concern of international lawyers, as of statesmen and politicians, has been the horizontal widening of universal international law in a limited but vital sphere: the establishment and strengthening of inter-state covenants and international organizations which would eliminate, or at least greatly reduce, the danger of increasingly destructive wars among the nations, by substituting for the traditional privileges of national sovereignty, i.e., war, reprisals and other acts of force applied at the discretion of the national states, covenants of restraint and methods of peaceful settlement.

The founding fifty years ago of a society to promote the establishment of international relations on the basis of law and justice was a step marking the progress that had been made at the beginning of the century in the age-long efforts to find a means of substituting reason for force in the settlement of international controversies. At that time arbitration was generally regarded as the most suitable and acceptable substitute for war. Great Britain and the United States had both heavily contributed to that conviction first by submitting to arbitration under the Jay Treaty of 1794
the numerous misunderstandings that developed in carrying out the provisions of the Peace Treaty of 1783, and then three-quarters of a century later in submitting to arbitration by the Treaty of Washington of 1871 the dangerous Alabama Claims dispute following the American Civil War.

Abstract: It is stated in the fourth amendment of 1945 constitution in Article24 C (1) that the Constitutional Court have the power to have final decision/judgment at first and last level to examine Law toward Constitution, to decidethe dispute of authority of state institutions granted by the Constitution, thedissolution of political parties, and the dispute as the results of the elections.Around this time, there are a lot of the problems, especially in the interpretationof the authority given to the Constitutional Court by the Constitution inorder to examine the Law against the Constitution, if it is associated with LawNo. 12 of 2011 on the Establishment of Regulatory of Law, article 7 (1)which states that the type and hierarchy of legislation consists of: a) Constitutionof Republic of Indonesia of 1945; b) Decree of the People's ConsultativeAssembly; c) Laws/Government Regulation substitute of Law; d)Government Regulation; e) Presidential Decree; f) Provincial Regulation; andg) Regulation of City/District. Therefore, deep analysis study about interpretationof Laws and Government Regulation of substituting law in terms oftheories of Constitutional Law is required.

AbstractBurmese colonial history suggests that a legal system cannot operate independently from the felt needs of the people who are supposed to obey the law. Despite a monopoly of force for many decades, the British failed to create a sustainable legal system in Burma. Colonial status shifted Burma's economic role from subsistence agriculture to the generation of large-scale exports. By undermining the traditional Burmese legal system and substituting Western international standards of property rights, enforceability of contracts, and an independent judiciary—all attributes of what some consider to be the "Rule of Law"—the legal system amplified and channelled destructive economic and social forces rather than containing them. This paper examines traditional Burmese law, the administration of law in British Burma, and the consequences of the new legal system for the country and its own stability. The paper concludes by suggesting lessons for Myanmar today, and for the study of the "Rule of Law."