The Suez Crisis
In: France, the United States, and the Algerian War, S. 33-67
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In: France, the United States, and the Algerian War, S. 33-67
In: The RUSI journal: publication of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, Band 151, Heft 3, S. 74-78
ISSN: 1744-0378
In: International affairs, Band 66, Heft 1, S. 173-173
ISSN: 1468-2346
In: Politics: Australasian Political Studies Association journal, Band 3, Heft 2, S. 193-204
In: International affairs, Band 40, Heft 4, S. 714-715
ISSN: 1468-2346
In: The Western political quarterly, Band 17, Heft 2, S. 399
ISSN: 1938-274X
In: Foreign policy bulletin: the documentary record of United States foreign policy, Band 1, Heft 1, S. 88-88
ISSN: 1745-1302
In: International journal / Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Band 16, Heft 4, S. 327-357
ISSN: 2052-465X
This book traces the activities of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS/MI6) and the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) during the Suez Crisis, one of the most infamous episodes of British foreign policy. In doing so it identifies broader lessons not only about the events of 1956, but about the place of intelligence in strategy itself. It provides both an exploration of the relationship between intelligence and strategy at the conceptual level, and also a historical account, and strategic analysis of, the performance of the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Secret Intelligence Service during this time. Focusing on the period immediately before, during, and after the crisis, Danny Steed brings together a complete picture of intelligence story in Britain that has so far eluded comprehensive treatment in the Suez historiography. Through extensive consultation of declassified archival sources, a re-examination of often referred to sources, and the employment of oral history, this study identifies the most significant lessons about the use of intelligence revealed by the Suez Crisis
In: World politics: a quarterly journal of international relations, Band 12, Heft 2, S. 201-224
ISSN: 1086-3338
Often as foreign policy may be the subject of partisan discussion in modern democracies, important international commitments are usually made only with support, or the expectation of support, from the great bulk of the political community. This has surely been the ordinary American and British pattern, labeled bi-partisan, non-partisan, or extra-partisan. We assume that political support extending well beyond the ranks of the party in office is essential for a successful foreign policy, and especially for a substantial military venture. Even the American decision to defend South Korea, while it was necessarily made by the Democratic administration before any apparent political consensus and while it eventually involved the United States in an unpopular war, was never in itself a partisan policy which Republicans as a group refused to support. The one outstanding recent instance of a truly partisan foreign policy is Britain's Suez action of 1956. As the significant deviant case, it provides useful insights into the process by which an alternative to the usual bi-partisan arrangement is developed and conducted. Specific questions concern the making of the Suez intervention decision, the nature of parliamentary support for this decision, the role of party loyalty in maintaining such support, and the significance of partisan opposition.
In: The journal of North African studies, Band 5, Heft 2, S. 41-58
ISSN: 1743-9345
In: International affairs, Band 68, Heft 3, S. 544-544
ISSN: 1468-2346
In: International affairs, Band 67, Heft 2, S. 303-317
ISSN: 1468-2346
In: International affairs, Band 55, Heft 2, S. 226-239
ISSN: 1468-2346