Menzies and the Suez crisis
In: Politics: Australasian Political Studies Association journal, Band 3, Heft 2, S. 193-204
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In: Politics: Australasian Political Studies Association journal, Band 3, Heft 2, S. 193-204
In: International affairs, Band 40, Heft 4, S. 714-715
ISSN: 1468-2346
In: The Middle East journal, Band 20, Heft 1, S. 20
ISSN: 0026-3141
In: The Western political quarterly, Band 17, Heft 2, S. 399
ISSN: 1938-274X
In: The world today, Band 13, S. 189-199
ISSN: 0043-9134
In: International journal / Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Band 16, Heft 4, S. 327-357
ISSN: 2052-465X
In: International journal / Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Band 16, S. 327-357
ISSN: 0020-7020
In: World politics: a quarterly journal of international relations, Band 12, S. 200-224
ISSN: 0043-8871
In: World politics: a quarterly journal of international relations, Band 12, Heft 2, S. 201-224
ISSN: 1086-3338
Often as foreign policy may be the subject of partisan discussion in modern democracies, important international commitments are usually made only with support, or the expectation of support, from the great bulk of the political community. This has surely been the ordinary American and British pattern, labeled bi-partisan, non-partisan, or extra-partisan. We assume that political support extending well beyond the ranks of the party in office is essential for a successful foreign policy, and especially for a substantial military venture. Even the American decision to defend South Korea, while it was necessarily made by the Democratic administration before any apparent political consensus and while it eventually involved the United States in an unpopular war, was never in itself a partisan policy which Republicans as a group refused to support. The one outstanding recent instance of a truly partisan foreign policy is Britain's Suez action of 1956. As the significant deviant case, it provides useful insights into the process by which an alternative to the usual bi-partisan arrangement is developed and conducted. Specific questions concern the making of the Suez intervention decision, the nature of parliamentary support for this decision, the role of party loyalty in maintaining such support, and the significance of partisan opposition.
In: Foreign affairs: an American quarterly review, Band 45, Heft 3, S. 541
ISSN: 2327-7793
In: The review of politics, Band 19, Heft 4, S. 419-445
ISSN: 1748-6858
Since 1947 the major foreign policy of the United States government has been containment. This policy of creating situations of strength which would prevent the extension of Communist power and influence in the world was first proclaimed in the Truman Doctrine (March 12, 1947). The policy had been anticipated in 1946 when the battleship Missouri visited Turkey and some forty Mediterranean ports. In the course of this display the Missouri was joined by two aircraft carriers, seven cruisers, and eighteen destroyers. The early sensitivity to Soviet threats to the Middle East and its approaches, revealed in the Doctrine and that naval demonstration, was not consistently maintained at this time or later. Perhaps, indeed, American foreign policy only operates with fullest energy, when directly confronted with a serious Soviet threat. At any rate, it may be argued that for the period 1946–1955, when the Soviet Union was neither conspicuously active nor influential in the Middle East, United States policy contributed little to the solution or easing of the area's all but intractable problems. So to describe the problems is to propose a good excuse, but they were the problems, and, unfortunately, they did not wither from neglect or incantations.
In: Proceedings of the annual meeting / American Society of International Law, Band 51, S. 10-20
ISSN: 2169-1118
In: The review of politics, Band 19, S. 419-445
ISSN: 0034-6705
In: Political science quarterly: PSQ ; the journal public and international affairs, Band 80, S. 581-605
ISSN: 0032-3195