Suchergebnisse

This book traces the activities of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS/MI6) and the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) during the Suez Crisis, one of the most infamous episodes of British foreign policy. In doing so it identifies broader lessons not only about the events of 1956, but about the place of intelligence in strategy itself. It provides both an exploration of the relationship between intelligence and strategy at the conceptual level, and also a historical account, and strategic analysis of, the performance of the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Secret Intelligence Service during this time. Focusing on the period immediately before, during, and after the crisis, Danny Steed brings together a complete picture of intelligence story in Britain that has so far eluded comprehensive treatment in the Suez historiography. Through extensive consultation of declassified archival sources, a re-examination of often referred to sources, and the employment of oral history, this study identifies the most significant lessons about the use of intelligence revealed by the Suez Crisis

Im Kalten Krieg spielte das 1951 souverän gewordenen prowestliche Königreich Libyen für Großbritannien eine wichtige Rolle in seiner globalen Militärstrategie und der Neutralisierung des arabischen Nationalismus. Die Suez-Krise offenbarte indes die Schwäche des libyschen Regimes - eine Entwicklung, die in die Revolution von 1969 mündete - und wirkte sich entscheidend auf die britisch-libyschen Beziehungen aus. Der Autor stützt sich auf Dokumente des Public Records Office in Kew, Presseberichte und Interviews mit Mitarbeitern des Foreign Office, die zur Zeit der Suez-Krise in Libyen stationiert waren. (DÜI-Cls)

"The 1956 Suez Crisis as a Perfect Case for Crisis Research" published on by Oxford University Press.

International audience ; In 1954, Pierre Mendès France, head of the French government, sought to redefine France's policy in the Middle East in order to reinforce the country's international position. Israel, Syria and Egypt were thought to be the key countries. France and Egypt already held close economic and cultural ties but their opposition to the Baghdad Pact (Middle East Treaty Organization, later Central Treaty Organization), founded in 1955 by Turkey, Iraq, United Kingdom, Iran and Pakistan, gave common ground for further rapproachment and even development of military relations. However, what determined the French-Egyptian relations in the short term was the escalation of the Algerian war of independence. Indeed, Egypt's relations with the Algerian nationalists and the sharp divisions that arose within the French government over the question of whether to preserve military relations with Egypt and Israel at once, in combination with total disagreement between diplomats and the French defence establishment over general foreign policy goals, eventually undermined the French-Egyptian relations. By the time Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Company in the summer 1956, relations between France and Egypt had already collapsed after the Guy Mollet government silenced its opposition to the Baghdad Pact for the sake of French-British relations and intensified military relations with Israel through the secret Vermars agreement.

International audience ; In 1954, Pierre Mendès France, head of the French government, sought to redefine France's policy in the Middle East in order to reinforce the country's international position. Israel, Syria and Egypt were thought to be the key countries. France and Egypt already held close economic and cultural ties but their opposition to the Baghdad Pact (Middle East Treaty Organization, later Central Treaty Organization), founded in 1955 by Turkey, Iraq, United Kingdom, Iran and Pakistan, gave common ground for further rapproachment and even development of military relations. However, what determined the French-Egyptian relations in the short term was the escalation of the Algerian war of independence. Indeed, Egypt's relations with the Algerian nationalists and the sharp divisions that arose within the French government over the question of whether to preserve military relations with Egypt and Israel at once, in combination with total disagreement between diplomats and the French defence establishment over general foreign policy goals, eventually undermined the French-Egyptian relations. By the time Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Company in the summer 1956, relations between France and Egypt had already collapsed after the Guy Mollet government silenced its opposition to the Baghdad Pact for the sake of French-British relations and intensified military relations with Israel through the secret Vermars agreement.