Suchergebnisse

Im Kalten Krieg spielte das 1951 souverän gewordenen prowestliche Königreich Libyen für Großbritannien eine wichtige Rolle in seiner globalen Militärstrategie und der Neutralisierung des arabischen Nationalismus. Die Suez-Krise offenbarte indes die Schwäche des libyschen Regimes - eine Entwicklung, die in die Revolution von 1969 mündete - und wirkte sich entscheidend auf die britisch-libyschen Beziehungen aus. Der Autor stützt sich auf Dokumente des Public Records Office in Kew, Presseberichte und Interviews mit Mitarbeitern des Foreign Office, die zur Zeit der Suez-Krise in Libyen stationiert waren. (DÜI-Cls)

Did the Suez crisis mark the end of empire in GB & France, their submission to the political domination of the US & the beginnings of a new Europe? Or did it stimulate a rethinking & reformulation of the meaning of empire, its utility & costs? This article argues that the "retreat from empire" was not so much a simple, reflexive response to demands from below as a conscious effort by those from above to find new ways of exploiting the opportunities that the world beyond Europe offered them. Decolonization, it is argued, is best understood in terms of contemporary business thinking, ie, a conscious design on the part of managers to downsize, restructure, & reengineer the imperial project. After Suez, GB attempted to demonstrate to the Americans that maintaining their access to Middle Eastern oil was vital both strategically & economically. They attempted to persuade them that "Nasserism" was second only to communism as a danger to the Western alliance, to have them drop their anticolonialist rhetoric & support the Bagdad Pact. In order to combat the anticolonial movement, they established a colonial bloc at the UN. Assuming that the Suez crisis marked the end of empire has hidden the struggle between GB & France to redefine its meaning & has concealed the extent to which ambitious designs continued to persist in the contest to determine the future shape of a united Europe -- a struggle in which neither the British nor the French regarded themselves as pawns of the Americans in the Cold War, but rather, one in which they attempted to move the powerful new American piece around the chess board in the Middle East, Africa, & Asia. Adapted from the source document.

Did the Suez crisis mark the end of empire in Britain and France, their submission to the political domination of the United States and the beginnings of a 'new Europe'? Or did it stimulate a rethinking and reformulation of the meaning of empire, its utility and costs? This article argues that the 'retreat from empire' was not so much a simple, reflexive response to demands from below but a conscious effort by those from above to find new ways of exploiting the opportunities that the world beyond Europe offered them. Decolonisation, it is argued, is best understood in terms of contemporary business thinking, i.e. a conscious design on the part of managers to 'downsize', 'restructure', and 're‐engineer' the imperial project. And, as in the corporate world, what might appear to the naked eye as retreat and abandonment may, on closer examination, turn out to be something more ambitious, an attempt to divest the imperial enterprise of unprofitable ventures and to reinvigorate those that are deemed to have untapped potential. After Suez, Britain attempted to demonstrate to the Americans that maintaining their access to middle eastern oil was vital both strategically and economically. They attempted to persuade them that 'Nasserism' was second only to communism as a danger to the western alliance, to have them drop their 'anticolonialist' rhetoric and to support the Bagdad Pact. In order to combat the anticolonial movement they established a 'colonial' bloc at the UN. Assuming that the Suez crisis marked the end of empire has hidden the struggle between Britain and France to redefine its meaning and has concealed the extent to which ambitious designs continued to persist in the contest to determine the future shape of a 'united' Europe — a struggle in which neither the British nor the French regarded themselves as pawns of the Americans in the Cold War, but rather one in which they attempted to move the powerful new American piece around the chess board in the middle east, Africa and Asia.

Cover -- Half-Title -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- General Editor's Preface -- Acknowledgements -- 1 Introduction: Perspectives on the Withdrawal from World Power -- 2 Decline and the Politics of Retrenchment -- 3 The Return to Normalcy: Postwar British Strategy -- 4 Holding Course: The Labour Government of 1945-51 and the Struggle over Strategy -- 5 Reappraisal: The Suez Crisis and its Aftermath, 1957-60 -- 6 Setting the Stage: Longer-Term Implications of Suez -- 7 Relinquishing World Power: Britain's Financial Crises of 1966-7 -- 8 Conclusions: Politics, History, and the East of Suez Decision -- Notes -- Index.

Most accounts of the history of US & British foreign policy since 1945 neglect the role of intelligence not only in implementation but also in policymaking. A study of the influence of the CIA & MI6 in policy & operations before & after the Suez Crisis of 1956 illuminates a more complex "history" that awaits discovery. The CIA worked within an integrated system in the US Executive. It was MI6 that was the "maverick" organization, carrying out an alternative foreign policy that led to British failure in Egypt. Yet, despite the idiocy of MI6's plans, the CIA maintained cooperation with the British service during & after Suez. How to account for this "special relationship"? It was based not on emotional or cultural ties but on the CIA's pragmatic if wayward assessment that MI6 was vital to the achievement of US objectives in the Middle East. The Agency's shortsightedness was not because of Egypt & Nasser, with whom the CIA had a working relationship, but due to its obsession with intervention in Syria. Adapted from the source document.

Cover -- The Middle East between the Great Powers -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- List of Abbreviations -- Introduction -- 1 Egypt: Opening Wedge to the Middle East -- 2 Iran: Britain Loses Control over its Jewel in the Middle East -- 3 Buraimi: the Struggle for the Persian Gulf -- 4 Alliance Restored?: an Uneasy Partnership 25 June 1954 to 26 July 1956 -- 5 Suez: the Debate -- 6 Prelude to Disaster: the Suez Crisis, 26 July to 29 October 1956 -- 7 The Suez Crisis and its Aftermath: 29 October 1956 to 5 March 1957 -- 8 Britain as a Junior Partner -- 8 Britain as a Junior Partner -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index.

Introduction -- Prospect theory -- The Iranian hostage rescue mission -- The decisions about admitting the Shah -- The U-2 crisis -- The 1956 Suez crisis -- Conclusions

Incudes bibliographical references (p. 225-232) and index. ; Introduction -- Prospect theory -- The Iranian hostage rescue mission -- The decisions about admitting the Shah -- The U-2 crisis -- The 1956 Suez crisis -- Conclusions. ; Mode of access: Internet.