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Cover -- Half-Title -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- General Editor's Preface -- Acknowledgements -- 1 Introduction: Perspectives on the Withdrawal from World Power -- 2 Decline and the Politics of Retrenchment -- 3 The Return to Normalcy: Postwar British Strategy -- 4 Holding Course: The Labour Government of 1945-51 and the Struggle over Strategy -- 5 Reappraisal: The Suez Crisis and its Aftermath, 1957-60 -- 6 Setting the Stage: Longer-Term Implications of Suez -- 7 Relinquishing World Power: Britain's Financial Crises of 1966-7 -- 8 Conclusions: Politics, History, and the East of Suez Decision -- Notes -- Index.

How do states sustain international order during crises? Drawing on the political philosophy of Lyotard and through an empirical examination of the Anglo-American international order during the 1956 Suez Crisis, Bially Mattern demonstrates that states can (and do) use representational force--a forceful but non-physical form of power exercised through language--to stabilize international identity and in turn international order.

How do states sustain international order during crises? Drawing on the political philosophy of Lyotard and through an empirical examination of the Anglo-American international order during the 1956 Suez Crisis, Bially Mattern demonstrates that states can (and do) use representational force--a forceful but non-physical form of power exercised through language--to stabilize international identity and in turn international order.

Cover -- Contents -- Foreword -- Acknowledgements -- List of Abbreviations -- Map -- Introduction -- 1 Power and Influence, 1945-58 -- Re-defining Britain's world role, 1945-51 -- Towards Atlanticism, 1946-49 -- The militarisation of the Cold War, 1949-51 -- Britain's New Look in global policy -- from Churchill to Eden, 1951-55 -- The Suez Crisis and Sandys's Defence White Paper, 1956-58 -- 2 Three Roles, 1959-64 -- The making of global policy -- Nuclear weapons, Anglo-American relations and Europe -- Britain's global commitments -- The growing dilemma,1963-64 -- 3 Labour in Charge: Reassessing Defence Priorities -- Harold Wilson's aims and objectives -- The Wilson Government in October 1964 -- Thinking ahead: the Long-Term Study Group -- The Chequers meeting, 21-22 November 1964 -- Anglo-US relations -- The Lyndon Johnson Administration looks at Britain -- The Washington Summit, 7-8 December 1964 -- The aftermath -- 4 Spreading the Butter Too Thin: Military Capabilities versus Political Commitments -- Economy in weaponry: some controversial decisions -- The TSR-2 affair until 1 February 1965 -- The decision to cancel the TSR-2, February-April 1965 -- Irreducible uncertainty: the TSR-2 affair -- The second Chequers defence debate in June 1965 -- 5 Vietnam, the Pound and Britain's Role East of Suez -- 'Getting worse everywhere': Vietnam and the world -- The American factor: defence was 'their biggest lever' -- Britain under American pressure -- The nature of the defence-pound linkage -- 6 The Decision to Withdraw from Aden and Singapore: The Defence Review, June-December 1965 -- Cutting commitments -- The Mediterranean and the Middle East -- The Far East -- The 'peculiar difficulty' in Britain's future commitments -- The Wilson-Johnson meeting in December 1965 -- 7 The Completion of the Defence Review, January-February 1966.

Cover -- The Middle East between the Great Powers -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- List of Abbreviations -- Introduction -- 1 Egypt: Opening Wedge to the Middle East -- 2 Iran: Britain Loses Control over its Jewel in the Middle East -- 3 Buraimi: the Struggle for the Persian Gulf -- 4 Alliance Restored?: an Uneasy Partnership 25 June 1954 to 26 July 1956 -- 5 Suez: the Debate -- 6 Prelude to Disaster: the Suez Crisis, 26 July to 29 October 1956 -- 7 The Suez Crisis and its Aftermath: 29 October 1956 to 5 March 1957 -- 8 Britain as a Junior Partner -- 8 Britain as a Junior Partner -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index.

Introduction -- Prospect theory -- The Iranian hostage rescue mission -- The decisions about admitting the Shah -- The U-2 crisis -- The 1956 Suez crisis -- Conclusions.

This book, by experts in Anglo-American-Canadian relations, examines North Atlantic triangle diplomacy from the Alaska boundary dispute to the Suez Crisis of 1956, providing an up-to-date assessment of this important configuration of powers in twentieth-century international history

(...) Boutros Gali, B.: Peacekeeping : past, present, and future. - S. 11-14 Korany, B.: Peace keeping and the 50th anniversary of the Suez crisis. - S. 16-21 Khalil, A.T.: A paper by ambassador Ahmed Tawfik Khalil. - S. 22-30 Martin, J.: 1956: The Canadian origins of United Nations peacekeeping. - S. 31-47 Badawi, A.H.: A paper presented by ambassador Abdel Halim Badawi. - S. 49-53 Mérand, F.: Is Europe back in the Middle East?. - S. 54-57 Elaraby, N.: The challenges of modern peacekeeping : theory and practice. - S. 61-69 Dawson, G.: "Canada and Somalia : assessment of the Somalia intervention of 1992-93 and its lessons for Afghanistan. - S. 70-80 Heinbecker, P.: Ten reflections on peacekeeping. - S. 81-93 (...)

Allied intervention -- Appeasement -- Bolshevik Revolution -- British entry into World War I -- Collapse of the Habsburgs -- Collapse of the Soviet Union -- Collapse of tsarist Russia -- Collapse of Yugoslavia -- Colonialism -- Concert of Europe -- Decolonization -- Disarmament -- Eastern Europe after World War I -- Eclipse of Europe -- Fall of France -- Finland after 1945 -- France after 1945 -- French fascism -- Hitler's rise to power -- Independent foreign policy -- Lend-Lease and the Societ Union -- Modernization -- Monarchy -- Operation Barbarossa -- Outbreak of World War I -- Russia in World War I -- Second Thrity Years' War -- Soviet Union as an ally -- Soviet-Western Cooperation after 1945 -- Suez crisis -- Terrorism -- Total war -- Totalitarianism -- United States as a European power -- United States and Western Europe -- Velvet Revolutions -- Versailles Treaty -- Vichy France -- World War I peace settlement -- World War II alliances.

Presidents often assemble ad hoc groups of advisers to help them make decisions during foreign policy crises. These advisers may include the holders of the traditional foreign policy positions--secretaries of state and defense--as well as others from within and without the executive branch. It has never been clear what role these groups play in the development of policy. In this landmark study, Patrick Haney examines how these crisis decision groups were structured and how they performed the tasks of providing information, advice, and analysis to the president. From this, Haney investigates the links between a president's crisis management structure and the decision-making process that took place during a foreign policy crisis. Haney employs case studies to examine the different ways presidents from Truman through Bush used crisis decision-making groups to help manage foreign policy crises. He looks at the role of these groups in handling the Berlin blockade in 1948, the Suez Crisis in 1956, the Tet offensive in 1968, the Yom Kippur War in 1973, and the Panama invasion in 1989, among other crises. He extends our understanding of the organization, management and behavior of the decision-making groups presidents assemble during foreign policy crises. This book will appeal to scholars of the American presidency and American foreign policy. Patrick Haney is Assistant Professor of Political Science, Miami University of Ohio

Britain was arguably the single greatest catalyst and beneficiary of UN peacekeeping operations during the post-war period. This book analyses the reasons for this, including the post-colonial conflicts which Britain handed the UN and its determination to ensure that peacekeeping evolved in a manner compatible with UK national interests. Despite initial ambivalence about letting the UN run military operations, Britain repeatedly used the organization, to shed colonial responsibilities, save face, share policing burdens, and stabilise conflicts in sensitive regions. This comprehensive survey first examines UK experience with antecedents of UN operations, notably 19th century colonial policing and missions set up under the League of Nations. It then analyses British efforts to influence, contain and exploit individual UN operations, including the Emergency Force established following the Suez Crisis (1956-67), the force in the Congo (1960-64), and the enduring operation in Cyprus (1967-). Also covered are several instances when British Governments preferred to intervene unilaterally, including in Jordan and Kuwait. One of the main contributions of the book is the detailed analysis of internal UK Government and UN files, which the author uses to reconstruct the policy making process. The book also sheds light on the peacekeeping policies of certain other key states, particularly the US and USSR. Finally, the account addresses some issues of contemporary relevance, including the tension between neutrality and impartiality, peacekeeping in a semi-permissive environment, and the use of force.