Suchergebnisse

Incudes bibliographical references (p. 225-232) and index. ; Introduction -- Prospect theory -- The Iranian hostage rescue mission -- The decisions about admitting the Shah -- The U-2 crisis -- The 1956 Suez crisis -- Conclusions. ; Mode of access: Internet.

This article provides a detailed account of a largely neglected episode of Government intervention in BBC editorial policy – over coverage of the H Bomb in 1954/5. In the light of this it then examines two other better known episodes of government intervention in BBC coverage – during the Suez crisis of 1956 and over The War Game. It argues that such episodes of deliberate government intervention tend to have been underplayed by scholars because fears of the accusation of 'conspiracy theory'. It concludes by suggesting some general features of these interventions and BBC response.

To contain Soviet influence in the world the United States had allied with many states to be able to retaliate potential communist attacks. After the founding of NATO to protect Europe and SEATO for South Asia, the Baghdad Pact was established to shield the Middle East. Its members were Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and Great Britain, just the US did not accede, despite having initiated the program and being a member of the other organizations. The paper aims to explain this American decision and shows that the United States was caught between several dilemmas and ambiguities. In the end, the negative effects of accession were seen as more serious than the positive ones and the pact was left to its fate. ; ABD dünyadaki Sovyet nüfuzunu kontrol altına almak ve potansiyel komünist saldırılara misilleme yapabilmek için birçok devletle ittifak kurmuştu. Avrupa'yı korumak için NATO'nun ve Güney Asya'yı korumak için SEATO'nun kurulmasından sonra, Bağdat Paktı Ortadoğu'yu korumak için kuruldu. Üyeleri Türkiye, Irak, İran, Pakistan ve Büyük Britanya olan Bağdat Paktını ABD kurmasına ve diğer örgütlere üye olmasına rağmen pakta üye olarak katılmamıştı. Bu makale, Amerika'nın kararının nedenlerini açıklamayı amaçlamakta ve ABD'nin çeşitli ikilemler ve belirsizlikler arasında sıkıştığını göstermektedir. ABD nin bu pakta katılması diğer bazı ülkelerin pakta katılımlarını olumlu veya olumsuz katılımın etkilemiştir. Sonuç olarak, ABD'nin pakta katılımın olumsuz etkileri olumlu olanlardan daha ciddi ve baskın olarak görüldü ve pakt kendi kaderine terk edildi.

British policy towards Cyprus has strategic, political, economic, and even socio-psychological components. All these components have been shaped by conditions at the national, regional and international levels. Against this backdrop, Britain's Cyprus policy has displayed periodical changes in line with the former's foreign/security policy and defense doctrine. For a certain period, Cyprus had been deemed militarily and politically indispensable for England in order to maintain its 'Great Power' status in the Middle East. However, post-Suez Crisis conditions eliminated the necessity to have the full sovereignty over the whole island and hence paved the way for Cyprus' independence. After 1960, Britain's Cyprus policy has been shaped by its relations with and the balance of power among the other two guarantor powers and the new hegemon of the Middle East, the U.S.

The problem of NATO's crisis during the Suez crisis in 1956 (military intervention of Britain, France and Israel to prevent the strengthening of Egypt in the Suez Canal zone) is analyzed in the paper.The author examines the position of the leading NATO countries – Britain, France and the USA – in the conflict, circumstances of involvement of Israel in the war, influence of the Soviet Union's position and the Warsaw pact, and the possibility of using of nuclear weapons.Special attention is paid to the danger of disintegration within NATO. The author ascertains reasons for the negative attitude of the USA to the military operation in the Middle East and their refusal to join the regional alliance under British leadership («the Baghdad Pact»). The USA position in the Suez crisis was conditioned by fear that as a result of the war the Middle East will be engulfed by anti-Western protests and it'll be in the hands of the Soviet Union. Washington offered a peaceful resolution of the conflict, and London and Paris sought to involve the USA in this intervention. The United States were able to ensure that NATO had not played any significant role up to the highest point of the crisis. «Dialogue of deaf-mutes» during the crisis escalated in heavy quarrel between the United States, Britain and France during the war. President Eisenhower had unwittingly set NATO on the brink of collapse. However, all this was passing behind the scenes, and the public did not notice that during the Suez crisis, NATO experienced one of the worst crises of the Cold War. ; В статье анализируется проблема кризиса НАТО в ходе Суэцкого кризиса 1956 г. (военные действия Великобритании, Франции и Израиля против усиления роли Египта в зоне Суэцкого канала и угрозы контроля со стороны Египта над поставками нефти в Западную Европу).Автор рассматривает позицию в конфликте ведущих стран НАТО – Великобритании, Франции и США, обстоятельства вовлечения в войну Израиля, а также влияние позиции Советского Союза, Варшавского пакта и возможности применения атомного оружия.Особое внимание обращено на дезинтеграционную опасность внутри НАТО. Автор выявляет причины негативного отношения США к военной операции на Ближнем Востоке и их отказа от вступления в региональный альянс под британским руководством («Багдатский пакт»). Позиция США в Суэцком кризисе определялась боязнью, что в результате войны Ближний Восток будет охвачен антизападными протестами, дестабилизируется и окажется в руках Советского Союза. Вашингтон предлагал мирное разрешение конфликта, а Лондон и Париж стремились вовлечь США в интервенцию. Соединённым Штатам удалось добиться, чтобы НАТО как институт вплоть до высшей точки кризиса не играл какой-либо значимой роли. «Диалог глухонемых» во время кризиса вылился во время войны в тяжёлую размолвку между Соединёнными Штатами, с одной стороны, и Великобританией и Францией – с другой стороны. Президент Эйзенхауэр невольно поставил НАТО на грань распада. Однако всё это проходило за кулисами, и общественность не заметила, что во время Суэцкого кризиса НАТО пережила один из тяжелейших кризисов времён холодной войны.

Die Suez-Krise von 1956 gilt als Geburtsstunde des klassischen Peacekeeping. Bei der Schaffung der UN-Blauhelme spielten Kanada und sein Außenminister Lester B. Pearson, der hierfür den Friedensnobelpreis erhielt, eine entscheidende Rolle. Im Gegensatz zur retrospektiven Betrachtung war zeitgenössisch in Kanada die Regierungspolitik höchst umstritten. Der Aufsatz analysiert, in wieweit die nationale Debatte von 1956 den Keim für die positiv besetzte Erinnerung legte. Die kanadische Regierung wandte sich in der Krise bewusst gegen die britische Position. Dieser Schritt wurde als Verrat am Mutterland und als Angriff auf die nationale Identität begriffen. Leitartikel, Leserbriefe und Briefe an Pearson geben einen Einblick in die Schärfe des Konfliktes. Langfristig setzte sich ein nationales Selbstverständnis durch, das sich von Großbritannien löste. Seit der Suez-Krise eng mit der Suche nach einer postkolonialen Identität verknüpft, avancierte das kanadische Peacekeeping zu einer Institution, die in Innen- und Außenpolitik kanadische Werte repräsentierte. Die Verbindung zwischen kanadischem Selbstverständnis und Peacekeeping führte zu einer konstanten Unterstützung der UN-Blauhelmeinsätze im 20. Jahrhundert. ; The Suez Crisis is seen as the cradle of classical peacekeeping. Canada and its then foreign minister Lester B. Pearson played a major role in establishing the UN blue helmets. As a result, Pearson won the Nobel Peace Prize. At the time, the Government′s policy was severely critized in Canada. The article explores whether there were aspects within the 1956 national debate which later helped to shape the positive opinion of Canada′s role held today . During the crisis, the Canadian Government consciously challenged the British position. This step was seen as a betrayal of the mother country and as an attack on national identity. Editorials, letters to the editor and letters to Pearson document the depth of the conflict. In the long run, however, national identity became detached from Great Britain. Canadian peacekeeping, which since the Suez Crisis was closely linked to the search for a post-colonial identity, became an institution which domestically and externally represented Canadian values. The connection between Canadian identity and peacekeeping led to continuous support of UN blue helmets′ operations in the 20th century.

Lambros Flitouris, The Suez Crisis and the Greek-French Relations The Suez crisis in 1956 constitutes an important point in the development of the international relations at the period of the cold war. 1956 is a landmark year for the appointment of the Arabic nationalism as a basic constitutive element of the anti-colonialist wave that convulsed the world. During this period, the relations of Greece with the states involved in the crisis were to a large extent precarious. The anti-imperialists tones of Nasser found impression in the Greek common opinion that was exceptionally irritated from the EOKA's fight in Cyprus. In the present article we examine one particular aspect of the crisis: the relations of Greece with France. The agreements of economic collaboration that was achieved by Markezinis in 1953 signalled a new era in the activation of French capital in Greece. In combination with the big cultural tradition that Prance had in the country but also with the crisis in the relations of Greece with the UK because of the Cypriot question, the French factor in Greece acquired a great importance. However, the French diplomacy followed the policy of London and because of this the relations between Greece and France faced their more important post-war crisis. The Greek common opinion also turned against France, while the French diplomacy lost a great opportunity to strengthen her place in Greece. In the sector of economic relations and cultural exchanges befell a period of algidity with extensions in the Greek internal political life. The crisis of the period 1956-1958 constituted a negative parenthesis in the traditionally good relations between Athens and Paris, while it could be characterized as an adjacent negative result of the anti-colonial struggle and the Cypriot affair. ; Lambros Flitouris, The Suez Crisis and the Greek-French RelationsThe Suez crisis in 1956 constitutes an important point in the development of the international relations at the period of the cold war. 1956 is a landmark year for the appointment of the Arabic nationalism as a basic constitutive element of the anti-colonialist wave that convulsed the world. During this period, the relations of Greece with the states involved in the crisis were to a large extent precarious. The anti-imperialists tones of Nasser found impression in the Greek common opinion that was exceptionally irritated from the EOKA's fight in Cyprus. In the present article we examine one particular aspect of the crisis: the relations of Greece with France. The agreements of economic collaboration that was achieved by Markezinis in 1953 signalled a new era in the activation of French capital in Greece. In combination with the big cultural tradition that Prance had in the country but also with the crisis in the relations of Greece with the UK because of the Cypriot question, the French factor in Greece acquired a great importance. However, the French diplomacy followed the policy of London and because of this the relations between Greece and France faced their more important post-war crisis. The Greek common opinion also turned against France, while the French diplomacy lost a great opportunity to strengthen her place in Greece. In the sector of economic relations and cultural exchanges befell a period of algidity with extensions in the Greek internal political life. The crisis of the period 1956-1958 constituted a negative parenthesis in the traditionally good relations between Athens and Paris, while it could be characterized as an adjacent negative result of the anti-colonial struggle and the Cypriot affair.

When Tate's modern British galleries reopened, refurbished and rehung, in 1957, the gallery's Director John Rothenstein was entering the twilight of his career, yet within the new hang he introduced innovative approaches to display. This paper examines Rothenstein's innovations and discusses his continued use of nationhood as an organising principle for displaying Tate's permanent collection, revealing how it engaged with contemporary society and politics, including the Suez Crisis and questions of post-imperial national identity.

This article is a study on dignity and the politics of dignity in postcolonial Egypt, and focuses on the historicity and socioeconomic background of two events: the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis during the rise of post-independence nationalism and the 2011 Egyptian Revolution during the Arab Spring. This study reviews the importance of the concept of dignity in philosophy and the social sciences, specifically pertaining to the development and postcolonial need for dignity and recognition, which the author terms 'dignition.' The central question here is how the conception of dignity has evolved between the two events and what the implications are for the consequent understanding of dignity.

В статье анализируется проблема кризиса НАТО в ходе Суэцкого кризиса 1956 г. (военные действия Великобритании, Франции и Израиля против усиления роли Египта в зоне Суэцкого канала и угрозы контроля со стороны Египта над поставками нефти в Западную Европу). Автор рассматривает позицию в конфликте ведущих стран НАТО Великобритании, Франции и США, обстоятельства вовлечения в войну Израиля, а также влияние позиции Советского Союза, Варшавского пакта и возможности применения атомного оружия. Особое внимание обращено на дезинтеграционную опасность внутри НАТО. Автор выявляет причины негативного отношения США к военной операции на Ближнем Востоке и их отказа от вступления в региональный альянс под британским руководством («Багдатский пакт»). Позиция США в Суэцком кризисе определялась боязнью, что в результате войны Ближний Восток будет охвачен антизападными протестами, дестабилизируется и окажется в руках Советского Союза. Вашингтон предлагал мирное разрешение конфликта, а Лондон и Париж стремились вовлечь США в интервенцию. Соединённым Штатам удалось добиться, чтобы НАТО как институт вплоть до высшей точки кризиса не играл какой-либо значимой роли. «Диалог глухонемых» во время кризиса вылился во время войны в тяжёлую размолвку между Соединёнными Штатами, с одной стороны, и Великобританией и Францией с другой стороны. Президент Эйзенхауэр невольно поставил НАТО на грань распада. Однако всё это проходило за кулисами, и общественность не заметила, что во время Суэцкого кризиса НАТО пережила один из тяжелейших кризисов времён холодной войны. ; The problem of NATO''s crisis during the Suez crisis in 1956 (military intervention of Britain, France and Israel to prevent the strengthening of Egypt in the Suez Canal zone) is analyzed in the paper. The author examines the position of the leading NATO countries Britain, France and the USA in the conflict, circumstances of involvement of Israel in the war, influence of the Soviet Union's position and the Warsaw pact, and the possibility of using of nuclear weapons. Special attention is paid to the danger of disintegration within NATO. The author ascertains reasons for the negative attitude of the USA to the military operation in the Middle East and their refusal to join the regional alliance under British leadership («the Baghdad Pact»). The USA position in the Suez crisis was conditioned by fear that as a result of the war the Middle East will be engulfed by anti-Western protests and it'll be in the hands of the Soviet Union. Washington offered a peaceful resolution of the conflict, and London and Paris sought to involve the USA in this intervention. The United States were able to ensure that NATO had not played any significant role up to the highest point of the crisis. «Dialogue of deaf-mutes» during the crisis escalated in heavy quarrel between the United States, Britain and France during the war. President Eisenhower had unwittingly set NATO on the brink of collapse. However, all this was passing behind the scenes, and the public did not notice that during the Suez crisis, NATO experienced one of the worst crises of the Cold War.

This analysis re-instates the importance of the 1958 British intervention in Jordan within the study of Anglo-American relations and the revisionist literature on Suez. It does so by challenging the idea of British subservience to American foreign policy after the 1956 crisis, and it reveals two key lessons learnt by London: that Britain's economy, power, and influence were in decline and that Britain could no longer intervene in the Middle East without American support. Having learnt these lessons, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan proved to be a shrewd political actor who used the opportunity of the Jordan intervention to turn the policy of the Dwight Eisenhower Administration to British ends, regaining Britain's maximum power and prestige for the minimum loss of resources.

Para analisar a percepção de Aron acerca das crises transatlânticas entre 1945 e 1966, o foco deve ser posto sobre três "pommes de discorde" principais durante este período – a questão do rearmamento alemão (1945-1954), a crise do Suez (1956), o Grande Debate Nuclear (1959-1964). Aron foi desde o início favorável ao rearmamento da Alemanha, apesar da longa relutância oficial francesa, principalmente porque o considerou inevitável para a defesa militar da Europa, e porque tratar a Alemanha como um verdadeiro aliado era a melhor maneira de evitar que a Alemanha ficasse mais perto da URSS para obter a reunificação. Isso porque finalmente, após longa hesitação, apoiou a CED, opondo-se assim a de Gaulle. O Suez alargou realmente a abertura entre Aron e de Gaulle, e no caso de Aron esta discrepância é enraizada na análise muito profunda não somente do papel da França no jogo transatlântico, mas também da natureza das armas nucleares. Aron extraiu da crise do Suez diversas lições: 1 – "a aliança não escrita entre os dois super-poderes contra a Guerra Total" era mais importante, sob o ponto de vista e prática dos EU, do que a solidariedade com aliados europeus. 2 – A estratégia massiva de retaliação deixa o oeste desarmado face "às ameaças secundárias" nas suas fronteiras. 3 – As armas atómicas não seriam suficientes para restaurar o poder anterior de França ou da Grã-Bretanha: um esforço europeu é necessário. Durante o Grande Debate Nuclear, a nova política militar francesa, oficialmente expressa por de Gaulle no seu discurso na Ecole Militaire em Novembro 1959, colidiu directamente na renovada estratégia e política militar de Kennedy e McNamara. Aron tentou jogar o papel de um ombudsman entre Kennedy e de Gaulle, em vão: se ele achava a doutrina militar Francesa da "Força de frappe" anacrónica, e apoiava a estratégia da "resposta flexível" de McNamara que restaurou a relação clausewitziana entre estratégia e política, advogou também a partilha de tecnologia nuclear pelos EU com os seus aliados. De facto, Aron como de Gaulle perseguiu a vontade de restaurar a independência estratégica da Europa, na sua mente, o melhor meio para alcançar um dia um acordo negoc iado e a reuni f i cação do Ve lho Cont inent e . Mas e s t e obj e t ivo pareceu-lhe alcançável somente a médio-longo prazo, e antes através da unificação europeia do que por estratégias puramente nacionais.

The essay considers whether a non-partisan Intergovernmental Organization (IGO) with standing military capability would be an effective way to address some of the recurring problems of recent UN peacekeeping missions and whether such an IGO would be an effective tool to bring the world a step closer to global security and peace. In considering this question the essay looks at UN military missions in the Suez Crisis, Haiti, Rwanda and Bosnia, examines whether they were successes or failures and why and considers (in the case of Rwanda and Bosnia) what happens when a UN mission's purpose is not mirrored in its Rules of Engagement.

Canadians have been comfortably living with the myth of Canada as a peacekeeping nation since the Suez Crisis of 1956. The myth is so compelling that many, too many, actually insist that our current role in Afghanistan is peacekeeping in the Pearsonian tradition. Faced with this durable myth the restructure, expansion and reequipping of our Army is made all the more politically challenging. Of all the countries in the world that would benefit from maintaining "an Army afloat", Canada stands at the head of the list. Paradoxically, unification and integration foisted on the Canadian Forces in the 70s has stood in the way of this imaginative development.

The article examines Soviet-Egyptian relations from the beginning of 1957 (the completion of the Suez crisis) to the Autumn 1961, when the XXII Congress of the CPSU took place.The Egyptian vector of Soviet foreign policy is sufficiently studied in modern historiography. Soviet-Egyptian relations were the object of study of such researchers as A. Vasilyev, A. Fursenko, Y. Primakov, S. Sinayskiy, M. Gat, J. D. Glassmen, R .Ginat, I. Ginor and others. However, today far from all aspects of the problem are examined, especially concerning 1957-1961. The purpose of this article is to fill in the some gaps in modern historiography. We need to highlight the Egyptian factor in the policy of the USSR regarding the Syrian, Iraqi and Lebanese crises of 1957-1958; the supply of arms to the Arab States during that period; economic and cultural cooperation between countries.The aim of the article is analysis the policy of the Soviet Union regarding Egypt from the end of the Suez crisis, which radically strengthened the interaction between the two powers, until the XXII Congress of the CPSU (October 1961), which fixed the final normalization of Soviet-Egyptian relations.After the Suez crisis, the USSR significantly expanded the range of cooperation with Egypt. The aim of the Soviet Union was to consolidate and strengthen its influence in the Arab world on the wave of propaganda success after the Suez crisis. In general, the Khrushchev leadership managed to achieve the set tasks. Moscow focused on exporting arms and expanding economic assistance.Because of the emerging of the United Arab Republic and the Panarabist and anti-communist policy of the Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser in the late 1950s, the ideological contradictions between the two states had worsened. Despite ideological disagreements with the President of the United Arab Republic, during the series of Middle Eastern crises of 1957-1958, the Kremlin invariably took the side of Arab nationalists to protect them from the actions of other states. The volume of military and financial and technical assistance to Cairo has also steadily increased, despite any ideological contradictions. Due to the new wave of "socialist" transformations in Egypt, the disintegration of the UAR and the beginning of the persecution of Communists and Kurds in the Iraq, the disagreements gradually came to naught, was recorded by the 22nd CPSU Congress in October 1961. ; В статье рассматриваются советско-египетские отношения со времени завершения Суэцкого кризиса по осень 1961 г. В указанный период бурно развивалось сотрудничество СССР и Египта в военной, экономической и технической сферах. Из-за образования Объединенной Арабской Республики в 1958 г. и роста панарабистской и антикоммунистической повестки со стороны египетского лидера Гамаля Абделя Насера в конце 1950-х гг. обострились идеологические противоречия между двумя государствами. Но благодаря новой волне «социалистических» преобразований в Египте, распаду ОАР и началу преследований коммунистов и курдов в «революционном» Ираке разногласия постепенно сошли на нет, что и зафиксировал XXII съезд КПСС в октябре 1961 г. Египет превратился в главный плацдарм советского влияния на Ближнем Востоке. ; У статті розглядаються радянсько-єгипетські відносини з часу завершення Суецької кризи до осені 1961 р. У зазначений період бурхливо розвивалося співробітництво СРСР і Єгипту у військовій, економічній і технічній сферах. Через утворення Об'єднаної Арабської Республіки 1958 р. і зростання панарабістської та антикомуністичної риторики з боку єгипетського лідера Гамаля Абделя Насера наприкінці 1950-х рр. загострилися ідеологічні протиріччя між двома державами. Але завдяки новій хвилі "соціалістичних" перетворень у Єгипті, розпаду ОАР і початку переслідувань комуністів і курдів у "революційному" Іраку розбіжності поступово зійшли нанівець, що й зафіксував XXII з'їзд КПРС у жовтні 1961 р. Єгипет перетворився на головний плацдарм радянського впливу на Близькому Сході.