Suchergebnisse

'November 1918. Mit dem Untergang des deutschen Kaiserreiches drang die in sich gespaltene Sozialdemokratie in die zentralen politischen Schaltstellen der neugegründeten Republik vor. In den 'Parlamenten der Revolution', den beiden Reichsrätekongressen 1918/19 in Berlin wurde über die Zukunft des Deutschen Reiches gestritten, wurden die politischen Weichen für eine neue Zeit gestellt. 'Räterepublik oder parlamentarische Demokratie?', lautete die entscheidende Frage für die über 700 Delegierten der Arbeiter- und Soldatenräte des ganzen Reiches. Der Lauf der Geschichte ist weitgehend bekannt. Gleichwohl werden in der vorliegenden Untersuchung die da maligen Ereignisse aus einer anderen Perspektive, unter dem Brennglas der Methode der Kollektiven Biographik beleuchtet und damit einer neuen Sichtweise unterzogen: Fokussiert wird letztlich auf die Frage nach einer Erklärung der damals erfolgten Weichenstellungen im Spannungsfeld zwischen revolutionärem Umbruch und zeit- wie systemübergreifender Kontinuität. Analysiert werden die spannungsgeladenen Ereignisse der Rätekongresse im Hinblick auf erkennbare Zusammenhänge zwischen der kollektiven Biographie der Delegierten und ihren Entscheidungen, zwischen Sozialisation und Erfahrung einerseits und kollektivem Verhalten und politischem Handeln in stürmischen Zeiten andererseits.' (Autorenreferat)

Nation-states are no longer contained by their borders. In times of mass migration and ever more dense transnational networks, states of all sizes and all migration profiles reach out to their emigrated citizens in wholly new ways. The variety of policies that target emigrants ("emigrant policies") is so vast that it seems to have become a new state function. For example, it is well known that states are expanding citizen participation beyond the nation's boundaries through voting rights and new modalities of representation and that they are opening channels for remittance transfer and offering specific investment opportunities to returning emigrants. However, other, less studied emigrant policies, comprise the symbolic incorporation of emigrants into the nation-state (e.g. through awards celebrating emigrants' achievements); social service provisions for non-residents (e.g. health and education); and the institutional inclusion of emigrants in consultative bodies, to name just a few.
This book is the first to systematically take stock of the emigrant policies in place across 22 Latin American and Caribbean countries, as of 2015. By covering an entire geographical region and being based on rigorous data-collection, this will be a reference in a literature that has so far centered on a few specific cases. Also, our proposed definition of "emigrant policies" encompasses a wide range of policies that are aimed at emigrants beyond the "usual suspects" analyzed in the extant literature (electoral, citizenship, and economic policies), resulting in 112 different dimensions. This survey of such a broad sample of countries and policy dimensions will allow researchers to theorize and make comparisons on models of emigrant policy on a solid empirical and conceptual base.

In fast allen arabischen Staaten gibt es mittlerweile das Frauenwahlrecht. Von gleichberechtigter Teilhabe sind die Frauen aber oft weit entfernt. Das Spannungsfeld zwischen Religionsgesetz und (semi-)säkularem Staat bildet das Haupthindernis für die Umsetzung ihrer Rechte. (APuZ)

"This note casts skepticism over various hypothesis formulated by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) in reaching the conclusion that institutions cause economic development. The author has identified four major issues in the study. It lacks adequate econometric specification and relies only on, what the author termed, destiny variables. Secondly, the historical record does not support the author's theory that mortality rate determine Europeans strategy for institutions they intended to develop in the host country; thirdly, given current living standards and disease ridden environment in low and middle income countries, the claim that disease environment of early 19th century was neutral to economic development seems farfetched; finally, assuming that initial institutions caused present institutions put in question the developmental efforts of past half century and thus is more than a sweeping generalization." (author's abstract)

"Zwei Initiativen der Frauenbewegung um 1900 zeigen, wie sich Frauen intellektuelle und politische Freiräume erkämpften. Trotz großer Unterschiede zwischen diesen Initiativen in Krakau und Berlin zeigen sich ähnliche Handlungs- und Agitationsmuster. Die Akteurinnen verfolgten dieselben Ziele: Zugang zu universitärer Bildung und wissenschaftlicher Arbeit sowie das Wahlrecht für Frauen."[Autorenreferat]

Considering current political events in Ukraine, the issue of political patriotism of the younger generation is becoming increasingly relevant. Political patriotism should become the basis for the development of national security in the state. In scientific discourse researchers often equate the concept of the "political patriotism" and "civic patriotism". This study proves the difference between these concepts and the fact that civic patriotism can be a part of the political one. Young people can become both subject and object of political patriotism. In the first case, the youth acts as the bearer of active and passive suffrage, has the opportunity to promote the economic development of the state, to protect its borders and state sovereignty, to promote scientific and technological development. In the second case, young people are the object of national-patriotic education, which should become the basis for the development of their political culture and consciousness.The main tasks of the research are the next: to define concepts of "political patriotism", "civic patriotism", "ethnic patriotism"; to consider peculiarities of formation of political patriotism of young people and factors of youth activity; to find out possible consequences of manifesting of political patriotism of youth in the context of national security of the state. The study found that as young people cover the ages of 14 to 35 years, it is appropriate to consider two subgroups of young people: the first is up to 18 years and can only have partial legal capacity, the second is elder than 18 years and has full legal capacity. The first subgroup is considered as the object of national-patriotic education, and the second subgroup is regarded as an active carrier of political patriotism. For both categories of young people, the formation of a sense of political patriotism must be of a complex strategic character and serve as a fundamental aspect of the development of civil society in a country on the one hand and as a source of national security for the state on the other. At the same time, political patriotism is the young person's awareness of his/her real ability to actively participate in the political process, to defend homeland, to develop his/her territorial community. So the main task of the state is to promote the formation of a patriotically-minded citizen who is confident in his or her social security and selfrealization in his/her own country and community. ; Враховуючи сучасні політичні події в Україні, все актуальнішим постає питання політичного патріотизму молодого покоління. Саме політичний патріотизм має стати основою розвитку національної безпеки в державі. В науковому дискурсі досить часто ототожнюють поняття «політичний патріотизм» та «громадянський патріотизм». В даному дослідженні доведено відмінність цих понять і те, що громадянський патріотизм може бути частиною політичного. Молодь може бути як суб'єктом, так і об'єктом політичного патріотизму. В першому випадку вона виступає як носій активного і пасивного виборчого права, має можливість сприяти економічному розвитку держави, захищати її кордони та державний суверенітет, сприяти науково-технічному розвитку. У другому варіанті – молодь є об'єктом національно-патріотичного виховання, що має стати основою для розвитку їх політичної культури та свідомості.На початку дослідження були поставлені основні завдання – надати дефініції поняттям «політичний патріотизм», «громадянський патріотизм», «етнічний патріотизм»; розглянути особливості становлення політичного патріотизму молоді та чинники її активності; з'ясувати можливі наслідки прояву політичного патріотизму молоді в контексті національної безпеки держави. В результаті дослідження з'ясовано, що оскільки молодь охоплює людей віком від 14 до 35 років, то доречно розглядати дві підгрупи молоді: перша – до 18 років і може володіти лише частковою правоздатністю, друга – після 18 років, повністю володіє правоздатністю. Перша як раз і розглядається в контексті об'єкта національно-патріотичного виховання, а друга – як активний носій політичного патріотизму. Для обох категорій молоді формування почуття політичного патріотизму повинне мати комплексний стратегічний характер і виступає основоположним аспектом розвитку громадянського суспільства в державі з однієї сторони та джерелом національної безпеки держави з іншої. При чому політичний патріотизм – це усвідомлення молодою людиною своєї реальної здатності активно брати участь в політичному процесі, захищати свою Батьківщину, розвивати свою територіальну громаду. І головне завдання держави – сприяти формуванню патріотично налаштованого громадянина, який впевнений в своїй соціальній безпеці та можливості самореалізації в своїй країні, в своїй громаді.

Considering current political events in Ukraine, the issue of political patriotism of the younger generation is becoming increasingly relevant. Political patriotism should become the basis for the development of national security in the state. In scientific discourse researchers often equate the concept of the "political patriotism" and "civic patriotism". This study proves the difference between these concepts and the fact that civic patriotism can be a part of the political one. Young people can become both subject and object of political patriotism. In the first case, the youth acts as the bearer of active and passive suffrage, has the opportunity to promote the economic development of the state, to protect its borders and state sovereignty, to promote scientific and technological development. In the second case, young people are the object of national-patriotic education, which should become the basis for the development of their political culture and consciousness.The main tasks of the research are the next: to define concepts of "political patriotism", "civic patriotism", "ethnic patriotism"; to consider peculiarities of formation of political patriotism of young people and factors of youth activity; to find out possible consequences of manifesting of political patriotism of youth in the context of national security of the state. The study found that as young people cover the ages of 14 to 35 years, it is appropriate to consider two subgroups of young people: the first is up to 18 years and can only have partial legal capacity, the second is elder than 18 years and has full legal capacity. The first subgroup is considered as the object of national-patriotic education, and the second subgroup is regarded as an active carrier of political patriotism. For both categories of young people, the formation of a sense of political patriotism must be of a complex strategic character and serve as a fundamental aspect of the development of civil society in a country on the one hand and as a source of national security for the state on the other. At the same time, political patriotism is the young person's awareness of his/her real ability to actively participate in the political process, to defend homeland, to develop his/her territorial community. So the main task of the state is to promote the formation of a patriotically-minded citizen who is confident in his or her social security and selfrealization in his/her own country and community. ; Враховуючи сучасні політичні події в Україні, все актуальнішим постає питання політичного патріотизму молодого покоління. Саме політичний патріотизм має стати основою розвитку національної безпеки в державі. В науковому дискурсі досить часто ототожнюють поняття «політичний патріотизм» та «громадянський патріотизм». В даному дослідженні доведено відмінність цих понять і те, що громадянський патріотизм може бути частиною політичного. Молодь може бути як суб'єктом, так і об'єктом політичного патріотизму. В першому випадку вона виступає як носій активного і пасивного виборчого права, має можливість сприяти економічному розвитку держави, захищати її кордони та державний суверенітет, сприяти науково-технічному розвитку. У другому варіанті – молодь є об'єктом національно-патріотичного виховання, що має стати основою для розвитку їх політичної культури та свідомості.На початку дослідження були поставлені основні завдання – надати дефініції поняттям «політичний патріотизм», «громадянський патріотизм», «етнічний патріотизм»; розглянути особливості становлення політичного патріотизму молоді та чинники її активності; з'ясувати можливі наслідки прояву політичного патріотизму молоді в контексті національної безпеки держави. В результаті дослідження з'ясовано, що оскільки молодь охоплює людей віком від 14 до 35 років, то доречно розглядати дві підгрупи молоді: перша – до 18 років і може володіти лише частковою правоздатністю, друга – після 18 років, повністю володіє правоздатністю. Перша як раз і розглядається в контексті об'єкта національно-патріотичного виховання, а друга – як активний носій політичного патріотизму. Для обох категорій молоді формування почуття політичного патріотизму повинне мати комплексний стратегічний характер і виступає основоположним аспектом розвитку громадянського суспільства в державі з однієї сторони та джерелом національної безпеки держави з іншої. При чому політичний патріотизм – це усвідомлення молодою людиною своєї реальної здатності активно брати участь в політичному процесі, захищати свою Батьківщину, розвивати свою територіальну громаду. І головне завдання держави – сприяти формуванню патріотично налаштованого громадянина, який впевнений в своїй соціальній безпеці та можливості самореалізації в своїй країні, в своїй громаді.

Accountability of the representatives to the represented is constrained by the heterogeneity in the issue positions of represented voters. Many gradations of homogeneity and heterogeneity can be distinguished. Accountability is almost trivial in the case of perfect homogeneity in which the represented voters agree on all issues (see Chapter 2). Accountability is relatively easy when the represented voters disagree with each other along one issue dimension, for example the socialeconomic left-right dimension, as was pointed out by Schattschneider (1960). An overarching dimension allows for a transparent political debate with opponents, who get the floor also to reframe their issue positions to increase electoral support. Giving an account of one's issue positions becomes less straightforward but remains still possible in the case of a limited number of independent overarching dimensions, for example an authoritarian-libertarian dimension in addition to a left-right dimension. A limited number of overarching issue dimensions enables the representatives to justify package deals in which political successes on one dimension are claimed in exchange for losses on another dimension. Without overarching issue dimensions in the electorate, there is no easy way to render concrete issues commensurable enough to deliver an account to defend why one would give in on any specific issue. In this chapter on the dimensionality of the European issue space we will encounter another type of heterogeneity that impedes accountability. Europeans do acknowledge basically the same underlying issue dimensions, such as leftright and Alternative/Libertarian vs. Traditional/Orthodox. The actual issue positions on these dimensions vary however systematically between Southern European, Northern European and Eastern European countries, which makes it virtually impossible to deliver one European policy that would be agreeable for all. Moreover the overarching issue dimensions depend on each other in different ways in Southern, Eastern and Northern European countries, which results in very different evaluations between countries of coalitions and package deals in which positions on for example the left-right dimension are exchanged for positions on the Alternative/Libertarian vs. Traditional/Orthodox dimension. In short, Europeans in Southern, Northern and Eastern European countries differ widely with regard to their evaluation of issue positions and their evaluation of political coalitions and political deals, although they share a common awareness of the underlying political antagonisms. The chapter is based on an assessment of the policy dimensions that underlie the specsfic issue positions of European voters with regard to 28 varied issues. We expect that the policy dimensions within European electorates are still structured by the social cleavages that originally shaped the European party landscapes. The politics of European states are the product of three revolutions: the Reformation and Counter-Reformation consolidating territorial boundaries of European states, the French Revolution causing profound separation of church and state, and finally the Industrial Revolution in which free enterprise (instead of economic protection) and workers' rights were at stake. These revolutions struck countries at different times and under different conditions causing variations among European party systems. For example, Dutch state formation in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was shaped by the power struggle between liberal, permissive Protestants and authoritarian, orthodox Calvinists ("rekkelijken" versus "preciezen"). Prolonged state formation in Southern Europe, for example, lead to generally weaker social cleavage articulation due to the overriding salience of the conflict about regime formation (Günther and Montero 2000). In Britain, the early resolution of state formation and the state-church conflict led to the predominance of the class cleavage. In other countries social class also remains important for voting behaviour (Nieuwbeerta 1996; Evans 1999). With the introduction of universal suffrage in the early twentieth century, existing cleavage structures durably froze electoral alignments and party alternatives (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 50; Krouwel 2012). Hitherto, research into the dimensionality of issue spaces has focused on the dimensions that underlie issue positions of the European political parties, for example starting from expert surveys (Benoit 2006), roll-call votes in the European Parliament (His et al. 2006), party manifesto research (Klingemann et al. 1994; Pennings 2002), or from the media coverage of the issue positions of parties (Kriesi et al. 2006). Research that focused on the policy dimensions that underlie issue positions of European voters has usually started from a small number of issue positions about which questions are asked in national and European election surveys (Klingemann et al. 1994; Van der Brug et al. 2009 (the latter authors employ expert survey data in addition)).

The article presents an innovative fusion of the approaches to specific features of "State Defiance" second stage and as of its consequence factor the EuroMaidan`s phenomenon as well as their mutual impact on the main historical events and fundamental problems in Ukraine after president Yanukovich's ousting. The first sign of drastic changes in political architecture of Ukraine was expressed in the thesis that power may be also fought for peoples' craving for social legitimate trust but not only by means of universal suffrage. The Maidan's Eurorevolution is a Revolution of Human Dignity. The Maidan in Kyiv is a new generation Maidan of the second decade in the XXI-st century. Still it is after the European values. It is a reforming factor of obsolete system and is a conflict inside the society but not that traditional one of opposition vs high-ranking state authorities. A new type of ethics has just started forming a new sociality in the country. The time of ruling of transparty corruption over almost a quarter of the century marked a visible sign of "state defiance." Due to that, incorrigibility the newly formed political elites have to avoid the extremes of society's reunifying shortcomings and disintegration as well as ethical apathy and false community. To the definite essentials among the EuroMaidan's attainments one may attribute the rising requirements for the new figures in politics. However, these are not to be simple doers of the deliberately assigned tasks. The figures in need have to stand primarily for the abilities that drastically change the rules in the political games and the original system of state power fraudulently imposed by former high-ranking state authorities. The EuroMaidan may also be accounted for its polyvectorial nature not only as a critical model to be followed but foremost to be consolidated at a remarkable pace for true democratic legitimacy. After changes in setting up priorities over "state defiance" category one registers emergence of the unexpected "Russian-speaking Ukrainian nationalism". The essentials of such an oxymoron picks up the pace as an ideological stream and instinctive political movement with full colors of special sort of firm patriotism born in the Central and Southeast regions of Ukraine. As the critical reason for its coming up serves the perfidious annexation of Crimea by Russia and her illegal "invention" of the so-called terroristic "DPR" and "LPR". It takes root as a special ethnic and political variety and embraces alternative to the traditional "Western nationalism". In a certain sense, the oxymoron may be practiced in defining as "civil nationalism". ; Розглядаються специфічні риси другого етапу феномена «держави всупереч» та його наслідкового чинника – Євромайдану, а також їх обопільний вплив на перебіг історичних подій в Україні після відлучення від президенства адміністрації Януковича. Першою ознакою змін всієї політичної архітектоніки в Україні стала теза про те, що влада виборюється насамперед легітимністю довіри народу, а не тільки виборами. Єврореволюція на Майдані є революція людської гідності. Євромайдан у Києві – це Майдан нового покоління українців другої декади ХХІст. і стояв він за Європейські цінності. Він є також чинником реформування системи, що вичерпала себе – це конфлікт суспільства, а не опозиції зі владою. На ньому почала формуватись соціальність, що будується на засадах етики нового типу. Безроздільне правління латентної системи транспартійної корупції протягом майже чверті століття було однією з вражаючих рис категорії «держави всупереч». Тому нові політичні еліти, що з'являються, обов'язково мають уникати конструкцій, які роз'єднують суспільство, роблять його дезінтегрованою, апатичною, етнічною спільністю. Одне з важливих досягнень Євромайдану може атрибуватись як запит на нових людей у політиці, але не просто виконавців, а на тих, хто, головним чином, принципово виступає за зміну правил гри та всієї системи влади. Євромайдан можна вважати яскравим прикладом не тільки різноформатного діалогу, а головне і дійсної демократичної легітимності. Після зміни пріоритетних позицій категорії «держави всупереч» однією з найбільших несподіванок Євромайдану стала поява зовсім неочікуваного тренду, який можна інтерпретувати як «український націоналізм російськомовного походження». Такий політичний оксіморон починає виникати як ідеологічна течія і оформлюватись в певний політичний рух, що має специфічне забарвлення, заснований на досить стійкому патріотизмі, зародженому в російськомовних регіонах і розташованих в центральній та південно-східній частині України. Базовими причинами його виникнення є анексія Криму з боку Росії, а також створення нею незаконних терористичних формувань ДНР і ЛНР. Оксіморон являє собою особливий етно-політичний різновид, що виступає в якості альтернативи традиційному т.зв. «західному націоналізму». Певним чином цей інноваційний феномен можна також розглядати у значенні «громадянський націоналізм».

《基本法》雖然承諾香港循序漸進達致行政和立法機關雙普選,但回歸至今,民主政制不單停滯不前,更有倒退跡象。儘管制度沒有很大變遷,北京政府多次以不同理由拖延民主改革訴求,但親政府陣營卻逐漸擴大組織力量,降低反對派的挑戰可能,使選舉制度的競爭性降低。 ; 本文旨在探討,威權政府下舉行的選舉,究竟是促進、還是阻礙民主轉型。一般威權政府下的選舉並不穩定,反對派有可能透過不斷舉行的選舉挑戰政權,推動民主轉型。香港卻恰恰相反,反對派的不但分裂,動員能力亦逐漸降低。本文希望證明,威權主義下的選舉不一定對反對派有利,只要政權能夠鞏固選舉能力,籠絡不同社會界別孤立反對勢力,足以使反對派難以透過直接選舉推動民主。重複選舉亦不一定為反對派帶來好處,長年處於選舉威權,不但使反對派的動員能力降低,也會因策略分歧而導致路線之爭,形成轉型疲勞的局面。 ; 研究分為三部分,第一部分將檢視回歸以來選舉制度的變遷及結果,說明回歸後的選舉制度,越來越不利反對派生存。第二、三部分將探討回歸後親政府陣營及反對派的發展,當親政府陣營擴張及善理主從網絡,反對派則逐漸分裂,甚至因策略分歧互相攻訐,使反對派從選舉獲得的資源和挑戰政權的機會越來越少。 ; Basic Law has stipulated that Hong Kong will have universal suffrage gradually for legislative and executive branch. Despite that, after the handover from Britain, Chinese government has deferred democratization and suppressed opposition's urge. Besides, the pro-government coalition has established hegemony in electoral arena, which is impossible for opposition to compete with. The competitiveness of the stunned electoral politics has been further decreased. ; This article aimed to discuss whether the election hold under electoral authoritarianism is beneficial to democratization. According to hybrid regime researches, continuing elections, despite partially, create opportunities for oppositions to challenge the ruling coalition and install democratic virtues. Hong Kong is suffering from another way. Decreasing mobilization power, splitting opposition forces has shadowed democratic movement. The article aimed to suggest that provided the ruling coalition has ability to increase mobilization power and co-opting political elites, opposition loses opportunity structure to implement democratic process. They have to encounter demobilization and internal struggle within transition fatigue environment. ; There are three parts in the research. Firstly, I evaluate electoral reform and the result of repeating elections after handover. It is suggested that opposition becomes difficult to survive. The second and third sections would discuss the development of ruling elite and opposition from 1997-2012. When the ruling elite ...

English: The political participation of foreigners is a central aspect of inclusion policies in the state and is acquiring an increasingly important in the debate on immigration. Over the past few days we have seen a succession of proposals on the recognition to foreigners the right to vote, bringing to the attention of public opinion the issue of political rights of foreigners. In Europe the situation is quite diverse. In the field there are no specific Community regulatory provisions but only a large number of documents are not legally binding, as politically significant, in favor of an extension of suffrage to foreigners long-residents. The process of European integration and the related processing of European citizenship could have favored the gradual affirmation of citizenship cd of residence. Instead, European citizenship, in an attempt to draw a demos transnazionale1, then substantially stiffened the gap between citizens and non-EU. The exercise of electoral rights within the EU, in fact, is connected to the possession of European citizenship, being dual, it requires a national of a Member State and residence in one of the States. For some time, however, in several European countries immigrants can participate in local elections; among them: after only six months of residence in Ireland (1963); after three years in Sweden (since 1975 and also for the referendum). They have gradually conformed to this case in Denmark in 1981, the Netherlands in 1983, Norway in 1993, Finland in 1995 and Luxembourg in 2003. In 2004, Belgium passed a regulation that provides for the recognition of the right to vote in local elections to foreigners after five years of residence, and subject to a declaration of commitment to the principles of democracy. In Italy, in the absence of a state law, they have proliferated different local experiences, with the consequence of a very diverse practice and the uncertain legal boundaries. Right in our country the question of voting rights at the local foreigners binds to two aspects: on the one hand the increasing importance of integration policies in the management of migration flows more and more structured and consistent, and the other, the increasing role more relevant local government in taking on the delivery of basic social services, in particular following the reform of Title V of the Constitution by the Constitutional Law n. 3/2001. Italian:La partecipazione politica degli stranieri rappresenta un aspetto centrale delle politiche di inclusione nello Stato e va acquisendo un peso sempre maggiore nel dibattito in materia di immigrazione. Nel corso degli ultimi tempi si sono susseguite diverse proposte circa il riconoscimento agli stranieri del diritto di voto, riportando all'attenzione della pubblica opinione il tema dei diritti politici degli stranieri. A livello europeo la situazione appare piuttosto diversificata. In materia non esistono specifici dispositivi normativi comunitari ma solo una nutrita serie di atti non giuridicamente vincolanti, per quanto politicamente rilevanti, in favore di un'estensione del suffragio agli stranieri lungo-residenti. Il processo di integrazione comunitaria e la connessa elaborazione della cittadinanza europea avrebbe potuto favorire la graduale affermazione di una cittadinanza c.d. di residenza. Invece, la cittadinanza europea, nel tentativo di disegnare un demos transnazionale1, ha poi nella sostanza irrigidito le distanze tra cittadini comunitari ed extracomunitari. L'esercizio dei diritti elettorali all'interno del territorio dell'UE, infatti, è connesso al possesso della cittadinanza europea che, essendo duale, presuppone la cittadinanza di uno Stato membro e alla residenza in uno degli Stati. Da tempo, peraltro, in diversi Paesi europei gli immigrati possono partecipare alle elezioni locali; tra questi: dopo solo 6 mesi di residenza in Irlanda (dal 1963); dopo tre anni in Svezia (dal 1975 e anche per i referendum). Si sono via via uniformati a tale esempio la Danimarca nel 1981, l'Olanda nel 1983, la Norvegia nel 1993, la Finlandia nel 1995 e il Lussemburgo nel 2003. Nel 2004 il Belgio ha approvato una disciplina che prevede il riconoscimento del diritto di voto amministrativo agli stranieri dopo cinque anni di residenza e subordinatamente a una dichiarazione di adesione ai principi della democrazia. In Italia, in assenza di una legge dello Stato, sono proliferate differenti esperienze locali, con la conseguenza di una prassi molto variegata e dagli incerti contorni giuridici. Proprio nel nostro Paese la questione del diritto di voto a livello locale degli stranieri si lega a due aspetti: da un lato l'importanza crescente delle politiche di integrazione nella gestione di flussi migratori sempre più strutturati e consistenti, e dall'altro il ruolo sempre più rilevante delle amministrazioni locali nel farsi carico dell'erogazione di servizi sociali fondamentali, in particolare a seguito della riforma del Titolo V della Costituzione ad opera della Legge costituzionale n. 3/2001.

The term res publica (literally "thing of the people") was coined by the Romans to translate the Greek word politeia, which, as we know, referred to a political community organised in accordance with certain principles, amongst which the notion of the "good life" (as against exclusively private interests) was paramount. This ideal also came to be known as political virtue. To achieve it, it was necessary to combine the best of each "constitutional" type and avoid their worst aspects (tyranny, oligarchy and ochlocracy). Hence, the term acquired from the Greeks a sense of being a "mixed" and "balanced" system. Anyone that was entitled to citizenship could participate in the governance of the "public thing". This implied the institutionalization of open debate and confrontation between interested parties as a way of achieving the consensus necessary to ensure that man the political animal, who fought with words and reason, prevailed over his "natural" counterpart. These premises lie at the heart of the project which is now being presented under the title of Res Publica: Citizenship and Political Representation in Portugal, 1820-1926. The fact that it is integrated into the centenary commemorations of the establishment of the Republic in Portugal is significant, as it was the idea of revolution – with its promise of rupture and change – that inspired it. However, it has also sought to explore events that could be considered the precursor of democratization in the history of Portugal, namely the vintista, setembrista and patuleia revolutions. It is true that the republican regime was opposed to the monarchic. However, although the thesis that monarchy would inevitably lead to tyranny had held sway for centuries, it had also been long believed that the monarchic system could be as "politically virtuous" as a republic (in the strict sense of the word) provided that power was not concentrated in the hands of a single individual. Moreover, various historical experiments had shown that republics could also degenerate into Caesarism and different kinds of despotism. Thus, when absolutism began to be overturned in continental Europe in the name of the natural rights of man and the new social pact theories, initiating the difficult process of (written) constitutionalization, the monarchic principle began to be qualified as a "monarchy hedged by republican institutions", a situation in which not even the king was exempt from isonomy. This context justifies the time frame chosen here, as it captures the various changes and continuities that run through it. Having rejected the imperative mandate and the reinstatement of the model of corporative representation (which did not mean that, in new contexts, this might not be revived, or that the second chamber established by the Constitutional Charter of 1826 might not be given another lease of life), a new power base was convened: national sovereignty, a precept that would be shared by the monarchic constitutions of 1822 and 1838, and by the republican one of 1911. This followed the French example (manifested in the monarchic constitution of 1791 and in the Spanish constitution of 1812), as not even republicans entertained a tradition of republicanism based upon popular sovereignty. This enables us to better understand the rejection of direct democracy and universal suffrage, and also the long incapacitation (concerning voting and standing for office) of the vast body of "passive" citizens, justified by "enlightened", property- and gender-based criteria. Although the republicans had promised in the propaganda phase to alter this situation, they ultimately failed to do so. Indeed, throughout the whole period under analysis, the realisation of the potential of national sovereignty was mediated above all by the individual citizen through his choice of representatives. However, this representation was indirect and took place at national level, in the hope that action would be motivated not by particular local interests but by the common good, as dictated by reason. This was considered the only way for the law to be virtuous, a requirement that was also manifested in the separation and balance of powers. As sovereignty was postulated as single and indivisible, so would be the nation that gave it soul and the State that embodied it. Although these characteristics were common to foreign paradigms of reference, in Portugal, the constitutionalization process also sought to nationalise the idea of Empire. Indeed, this had been the overriding purpose of the 1822 Constitution, and it persisted, even after the loss of Brazil, until decolonization. Then, the dream of a single nation stretching from the Minho to Timor finally came to an end.

In Deutschland wird immer gewählt. Wenn nicht eine Bundestagswahl ansteht, naht doch schon die nächste Landtagswahl. Dabei werden die Landesparlamente trotz mancher Gemeinsamkeit nach unterschiedlichen rechtlichen Vorgaben gewählt, die in der öffentlichen Wahrnehmung, aber auch der Wahlrechtsforschung nicht immer ausreichend zur Kenntnis genommen werden. Der Band widmet sich daher dem Wahlrecht der deutschen Länder, das – nach einer Einführung in die theoretischen und historischen Grundlagen sowie die grundgesetzlichen Vorgaben – in 16 Einzelkapiteln dargestellt wird. Er bildet die wissenschaftliche Grundlage für einen Vergleich der Wahlsysteme auf Länderebene. Die Landeswahlgesetze erscheinen dabei nicht als bloßer "Abklatsch" des Bundeswahlrechts, sondern als selbständige Rechtsmaterien mit eigenen Strukturentscheidungen und Akzentsetzungen. Zur Sprache kommen auch politisch brisante Reformvorhaben wie die Absenkung des Wahlalters oder die sogenannte Parité-Gesetzgebung. Mit Beiträgen von Prof. Dr. Tristan Barczak, LL.M.; Dr. Henner Gött, LL.M.; Lukas Christoph Gundling, M.A.; Dorothea Heilmann; Dr. Patrick Hilbert; Laura Jung, MJur, Maître en droit; Benjamin Jungkind; Dr. Roman Kaiser; Dr. Manuel Kollmann, Dr. Stefan Lenz, Dr. Stefan Martini; Michael Meier; Dr. Fabian Michl, LL.M.; Nadja Reimold; Christina Schulz, LL.M.; Dr. Thomas Spitzlei; Victor Struzina

"Although extensive research on National Socialist voting behavior has been conducted on a national as well as an international scale, a critical view of the results show that today's knowledge of NSDAP voters has not yet reached a sufficient empirical foundation. A far-reaching consensus on the social and economic situation, party political background and personal motivations of NSDAP voters still relies on a fragmentary, incomplete basis. Particularly the German research landscape needs to catch up with the progress of the international academic community working on NSDAP voting behavior. Two errors are characteristic and frequent in historical election research: the error of 'arbitrary' selection and the error of naive disaggregation. Both lead to a mix of social-statistic correlations with individual correlations resulting in intuitive interpretations that are often unfounded. A closer look on statistical data and the application of methods used in modern election research would help to avoid common false conclusion." (author's abstract)