Suchergebnisse

In der empirischen Untersuchung wurden DDR-Jugendlichen offene Fragen zu ihrem persönlichen Beitrag zur Sicherung des Friedens, zu den Ergebnissen des Gipfeltreffens und zu ihrer Bewertung vorgelegt. Bei diesem Bericht werden besonders behandelt: "Persönliche Beiträge der Jugendlichen im Kampf für den Frieden, Anfragen Jugendlicher zum Genfer Gipfeltreffen zwischen Gorbatschow und Reagan, Anfragen der Jugendlichen zu einzelnen Problemkreisen, Aussagen Jugendlicher zu wichtigen Ergebnissen des Treffens und zu Vorschlägen der Sowjetunion." In ihren Aussagen werden die Jugendlichen differenziert nach religiös-atheistisch, SED-Zugehörigkeit, Lehrlingen, Berufstätigen und Studenten. Der Bericht gibt eine Fülle von charakteristischen Einzelaussagen und Zitaten. (pka)

In dem als "vertrauliche Dienstsache" eingestuften Papier werden die Ergebnisse einer im November 1985 durchgeführten Befragung von 1.677 Jugendlichen in mehreren DDR-Bezirken wiedergegeben. Gefragt wurde nach den erwarteten Hauptproblemen der Menschheit im Jahr 2000. Den Hintergrund bildete das Genfer Gipfeltreffen der Staatschefs von UdSSR und USA, Gorbatschow und Reagan. In der Auswertung werden die Jugendlichen unterschieden nach atheistisch, religiös, weltanschaulich unentschieden, SED-Mitgliedschaft bzw. -Nichtmitgliedschaft, weiblich, männlich, Lehrling, berufstätig, Student. Die Studie kommt zu dem Ergebnis, daß die Frage von Krieg und Frieden unabhängig von sonstigen Ausprägungen als Hauptproblem des Jahres 2000 herausgestellt wird. Optimisten führten im Blick auf das Jahr 2000 häufiger Energie- und Rohstoffprobleme an, Pessimisten sprachen häufiger von Umweltproblemen, Überbevölkerung, Arbeitsplatzproblemen und AIDS. (pka)

Der vorliegende Beitrag befasst sich mit dem EU-USA-Gipfel vom 30. April 2007, der sich oberflächlich betrachtet in seiner Symbolik und in seinem Ergebnis nahtlos in die Abfolge der transatlantischen Gipfeltreffen der letzten Jahre eingefügt hat. Auch unter dem deutschen EU-Ratsvorsitz wurde das Hauptaugenmerk auf den Ausbau der wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen gerichtet. Im Zentrum stehen dabei immer wieder neue Initiativen, Aktionsprogramme und die Einrichtung von Expertengruppen, die auf Arbeitsebene den Wirtschaftsdialog weiter voranbringen sollen. Doch letzten Endes überdeckt die tragende Symbolik - beispielsweise die Unterzeichnung des neuen transatlantischen Luftfahrtabkommens - das Fehlen verbindlicher Zusagen in globalen Themen wie etwa der Klimapolitik. Der Autor kommt zu dem Schluss, dass ein transatlantisches Reformprogramm geschaffen werden könnte, welches sich als gestalterische Kraft im Verhältnis zwischen den USA und Europa, aber auch für die internationalen Beziehungen etablieren könnte - eine transatlantische Globalisierungsstrategie. (ICD2)

On 11 September 2006 the leaders of 38 Asian & European countries & the President of the European Commission concluded the ASEM 6 summit in Helsinki. The ASEM-Process, initiated in 1996, has often been criticised for not achieving its full agenda-setting potential in global negations in the issue-areas of trade & finance. Despite these shortcomings, the Asia-Europe Meeting seeks to brush up on its meagre contribution to global discourses by setting up a virtual secretariat as a means to mould common positions. A case in point is the Declaration on Climate Change, which is a clear indication of an improved multilateral utility of ASEM. Yet, informality & frequent clashes of European & Asian conceptions of cooperation weaken the potential negotiation power of the Asia-Europe Meeting. Adapted from the source document.

On 11 September 2006 the leaders of 38 Asian and European countries and the President of
the European Commission concluded the ASEM 6 summit in Helsinki. The ASEM-Process,
initiated in 1996, has often been criticised for not achieving its full agenda-setting potential
in global negations in the issue-areas of trade and finance. Despite these shortcomings, the
Asia-Europe Meeting seeks to brush up on its meagre contribution to global discourses by
setting up a virtual secretariat as a means to mould common positions. A case in point is
the Declaration on Climate Change, which is a clear indication of an improved multilateral
utility of ASEM. Yet, informality and frequent clashes of European and Asian conceptions
of cooperation weaken the potential negotiation power of the Asia-Europe Meeting.

Whether Japan was initiator or coordinator of the Group of Eight (G-8) summit meeting held in Okinawa, Japan, July 21-23, 2000; preparations for the meeting, Japan's proposals regarding transfer of information technology to countries lacking it and prevention of conflicts, and conclusions reached by the meeting on these and other matters. Matters discussed include cancellation of debts of developing countries, the World Trade Organization (WTO), how to halt the spread of infectious diseases, international organized crime, Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) II and III between the US and Russia, and international terrorism.

With the Prague summit meeting NATO has now started its transformation process in the triad new members - new capabilities - new relations. Besides the historic decision to admit seven additional states as members and the announcement to intensify the relations to the Partnership-for-Peace nations, the heads of state and government have declared their readiness to adapt the military capabilities of the alliance to the requirements of the enlarged task spectrum, inter alia in the worldwide fight against terrorism, both structurally and by way of modernization. Apart from the reform of "Military Command Arrangements" and the creation of a "NATO Response Force" it includes primarily the sweeping modernisation of the armed forces in certain selected areas.(Europäische Sicherheit / SWP)

Discusses the opening of membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to Eastern European countries and the security issues involved for all states in the Euro-Atlantic area; 4 articles. Summaries in English p. 223-4. Topics include the offer of membership made to the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland at the NATO summit meeting in Madrid, Spain, July 8, 1997; changes in the Russian policy towards and relations with NATO since 1993; whether German policies of support for NATO enlargement and for promotion of stability through democratization represent conflicting priorities.

Examines the extent to which arms control measures have been enforced worldwide in recent years; status of international conventions, proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and nuclear testing by India and Pakistan as the latest stage in their dispute over Kashmir; 5 articles. Summaries in English. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1996, which the US Senate has so far refused to ratify; the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, of which a revised form was signed by 30 states at the summit meeting of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Istambul, Turkey, Dec. 1999; the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) to which a compliance protocol is being negotiated.

During the four years up to the NATO Madrid summit meeting, the Russian policy towards NATO has evolved from an uncompromising negation of the eastward extension of the latter to a dialogue over reshaping the relations between Russia & the alliance. The contemporary Russian debate over NATO is characterized by further differentiation of discourses. The endorsement of the Founding Act on the Relations between Russia & NATO has strengthened cooperative trends in the Russian policy. Against the background of the planned second wave of extension, the relations between Russia & NATO appear to be anything but settled. Prospects for a more intensive & dense cooperation are hindered by the continued controversy over the extension. Adapted from the source document.

Michael Jochum ; Inhaltsverzeichnis ; Volltext // Exemplar mit der Signatur: München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek -- Diss. 96.6028

The visit of Alexej Adshubej, "Izvestia" chief editor and son-in-law of Nikita Khrushchev, to West Germany in July 1964 has been the subject of much speculation. Taking place before the proposed summit meeting between Krushchev and Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, it appeared to mark the beginning of German rapprochement with the communists in an attempt to seek German unification, prevented only by Krushchev's fall in October 1964. New sources now available in both West and East German archives prove this assumption as completely unfounded. Neither the West nor the USSR was willing to endanger its prevailing interest in detente by taking the initiative in tackling the German question. Indeed, neither the Western Alliance nor the East European communist governments supported the idea of German unity. Adshubej's mission was a personal move by Khrushchev meant to give his policy of co-existence a decisive boost. Instead, this action only reenforced opposition at home and caused discord within the Eastern camp and in East Berlin. (Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte / FUB)