Addresses the agenda of the July 1997 summit meeting of NATO in Madrid, including the enlargement strategy, the role of Russia, the transatlantic relationship, and NATO policy on the Mediterranean. Summary in English p. 219.
In the course of the summits among Latin America, the Caribbean, & the European Union the strategic partnership that the countries from both regions are aiming to create has become more evident. Despite some undeniable progresses, such as the association agreements with Chile & Mexico, various tasks & issues from the bi-regional agenda are still pending. The negotiations for a partnership with Mercosur countries, as well as the first steps towards an agreement with Central America & the countries from the Andean Community must reach port. At present, the biregional relationship reveals a series of problems both in the structure & format of the summits process, in the expectations of the governments involved, & in the design of the inter-regionalist notion. The increasing severance between Latin America & his European counterparts points out to the need of rethinking the relationship, which requires a renewed impetus, not only in terms of the existent structures & fora, but also as to the style of the Europe-Latin America dialogue. In the absence of deep reforms, to be implemented in the process in-between two meetings, the binding character of "summits diplomacy" could be further put into ques-tion, where one could talk of an historical relation with a wasted potential. Adapted from the source document.
At the 1994 Summit of the Americas in Miami, representatives from 34 countries agreed to establish the Free Trade Area of the Americas (ALCA) to promote economic development; the issues & activities of this organization & its convergence with the Organization of American States are described. Since 1998, 900 ACLA negotiators have been meeting quarterly in 9 groups to plan out trade integration. These negotiations, in contrast to the process of building the European Union, have hardly been visible to the public. In addition, the US has recently adopted measures that are contrary to free trade in the Americas. However, it is concluded that the net result of the ACLA process will be an improvement in the economic conditions of the hemisphere by 2005. 11 References. Adapted from the source document.
According to Covarrubias, the most important change in Mexican foreign policy toward Cuba in the last 12 years has been the abandonment of a key component of the bilateral relation -- nonintervention -- on behalf of democracy & human rights promotion. Covarrubias considers the governments of Carlos Salinas de Gortari & Ernesto Zedillo as a transition period, marked by a tension between continuity & change in Mexican foreign policy. Continuity, as expressed by the endorsement of nonintervention in Cuban affairs, was evident in the Mexican government's approach vis-a-vis the Torricelli & Helms-Burton Laws, & all through the Ibero-American Summits until 1999. Conversely, change was evident in the meetings between Mexican officials & Cuban exiles or dissidents in Cuba. Mexico's domestic context during the Zedillo's sexenio, characterized by "democratization," may explain the drive toward change -- evident also in the government's discourse by 1999. The new Mexican Cuban policy has been more evident with the Vicente Fox administration. The Mexican government has either abstained or voted in favor of resolutions inviting the Cuban government to respect human rights & civil liberties, & has adopted a language consistent with an overall foreign policy that privileges democracy & human rights promotion. In this context, the first reaction of the Cuban government was a series of messages that stressed the validity of nonintervention, but it then became more aggressive, as when Castro decided to make public a telephone conversation he had had with president Fox in relation to the Conference on Financing for Development that took place in the Mexican city of Monterrey. Covarrubias concludes that despite a visible transformation in Mexico's foreign policy, there is a line of continuity in one aspect of the bilateral relationship: Cuba still holds a symbolic value for Mexico as it represents an opportunity to promote Mexico's democratic image. Adapted from the source document.