This report describes how a person becomes covered by Survivors Insurance. It outlines the types and amounts of benefits available to survivors, eligibility for those benefits, and the benefit application process. It provides statistics on survivor beneficiaries and a legislative history of Survivors Insurance, including legislative activity in the 110th Congress.
This paper investigates the impact of survivors insurance on marital behavior. We study the 1996 Dutch reform which considerably tightened eligibility rules to survivors' benefits. Exploiting a discontinuity in date of birth eligibility to survivors insurance and using a rich and exhaustive of the Dutch population administrative dataset, we carry out a regression discontinuity design and we find no evidence of the reform on divorce probability. Exploring possible explanations for our zero-effect result, we study how labor supply responses can compensate the income drop the reform induced. We find a strong increase in the labor force participation of widows after the reform. However this response does not completely offset the decrease in income generated form the cut in survivors benefits.
This paper investigates the impact of survivors insurance on marital behavior. We study the 1996 Dutch reform which considerably tightened eligibility rules to survivors' benefits. Exploiting a discontinuity in date of birth eligibility to survivors insurance and using a rich and exhaustive of the Dutch population administrative dataset, we carry out a regression discontinuity design and we find no evidence of the reform on divorce probability. Exploring possible explanations for our zero-effect result, we study how labor supply responses can compensate the income drop the reform induced. We find a strong increase in the labor force participation of widows after the reform. However this response does not completely offset the decrease in income generated form the cut in survivors benefits.
This paper investigates the impact of survivors insurance on marital behavior. We study the 1996 Dutch reform which considerably tightened eligibility rules to survivors' benefits. Exploiting a discontinuity in date of birth eligibility to survivors insurance and using a rich and exhaustive of the Dutch population administrative dataset, we carry out a regression discontinuity design and we find no evidence of the reform on divorce probability. Exploring possible explanations for our zero-effect result, we study how labor supply responses can compensate the income drop the reform induced. We find a strong increase in the labor force participation of widows after the reform. However this response does not completely offset the decrease in income generated form the cut in survivors benefits.
Shipping list no.: 2010-0279-P. ; "Rescission: VA pamphlet 21-03-1, dated May 2006"--P. [6]. ; "March 2010." ; ".to care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow and his orphan ."--Abraham Lincoln. ; Cover title. ; Mode of access: Internet.
We combine quasi-experimental variation in spousal death and age eligibility for survivors benefits using US tax records to study the effects on American households' labor supply and the design of social security's survivors insurance. Benefit eligibility at the exact age of 60 induces sharp reductions in the labor supply of newly widowed households, highlighting the value of survivors benefits and the liquidity they provide following the shock. Among eligible widows, the spousal death event induces no increases in labor supply, suggesting little residual need to self-insure. Using theory, we underscore the program's protective insurance role and its high valuation among survivors. (JEL D12, D91, G22, G51, H55, J16, J22)
Contains pocket for documents. ; Shipping list no.: 2007-0041-P. ; "December 2005." ; ".to care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow and his orphan."--Abraham Lincoln. ; Mode of access: Internet.