Tariffs, Preferential Tariff Arrangements and Tariff Escalation
In: Fishing for Coherence; The Development Dimension, S. 157-160
16700 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: Fishing for Coherence; The Development Dimension, S. 157-160
In: American economic review, Band 102, Heft 3, S. 459-465
ISSN: 1944-7981
We characterize the design of an optimal trade agreement when governments are privately informed about the value of tariff revenue. We show that the problem of designing an optimal trade agreement in this setting can be represented as an optimal delegation problem when a money burning instrument is available. In a specification with quadratic payoffs and a uniform distribution, we find that the tariff cap and the probability of binding overhang are higher when the upper bound of the support distribution is higher and when the support distribution has greater width.
SSRN
Working paper
In: Yugoslav survey: a record of facts and information ; quarterly, Band 38, Heft 3, S. 85-102
ISSN: 0044-1341
World Affairs Online
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 15, Heft 2, S. 105-134
In: The Australian economic review, Band 4, Heft 2, S. 37-42
ISSN: 1467-8462
In: Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, Band 15, S. 338-344
ISSN: 0065-0684
In: Foreign affairs, Band 11, Heft 1, S. 621
ISSN: 0015-7120
In: The annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Heft 231, S. 89-96
ISSN: 0002-7162
In: Journal of international economics, Band 32, Heft 1-2, S. 131-147
ISSN: 0022-1996
In: Political science quarterly: a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study and analysis of government, politics and international affairs ; PSQ, Band 38, Heft 2, S. 337-339
ISSN: 1538-165X