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Intro -- Contents -- Preface -- Taxes and the Economy: An Economic Analysis of the Top Tax Rates -- Since 1945( -- Summary -- Top Tax Rates Since 1945 -- Top Tax Rates and the Economy -- Saving and Investment -- Productivity Growth -- Real Per Capita GDP Growth -- Top Tax Rates and the Distribution of Income -- Concluding Remarks -- Appendix. Data and Supplemental Analysis -- End Notes -- Tax Rates and Economic Growth( -- Summary -- Short-Run Counter-Cyclical Effects versus Long-Run Growth -- Historical Comparisons of Tax Rates, Labor Supply, Savings, and Growth Rates -- Labor Force Participation -- Savings and Investment and GDP Growth -- Review of Evidence on Factors Affecting Growth -- Labor Supply6 -- Savings and Investment Response9 -- Technological Progress, Innovation, and Small Business -- Dynamic Revenue Estimating -- End Notes -- An Analysis of the "Buffett Rule"( -- Summary -- Individual Income Taxes and Payroll Taxes -- The Simple Buffett Rule -- The Buffett Rule with a Broader Measure of Income and Taxes -- Issues -- Small Business and Job Creation -- Saving and Investment -- Concluding Remarks -- Appendix. Data -- End Notes -- The 2001 and 2003 Bush Tax Cuts -- and Deficit Reduction( -- Summary -- The Economic Environment -- The Budgetary Environment -- The Bush Tax Cuts -- Revenue Cost from Extending the Bush Tax Cut Provisions -- Distributional Effects of the Bush Tax Cut Provisions -- Options Regarding the Bush Tax Cuts -- Long-Term Economic Effects of Tax -- Rate Increases -- Work Effort -- Saving and Investment -- Concluding Remarks -- Appendix. The Suits Index -- End Notes -- The Economic Effects of Capital Gains Taxation* -- Summary -- Introduction -- How Capital Gains Are Taxed -- Capital Gains Tax Rates and Tax Revenues -- Tax Rates -- Tax Revenues -- Behavioral Responses to Capital Gains Tax Rate Changes

Changes to tax rates are important fiscal events in Canada. They affect the amount of taxes that Canadian households and businesses pay to governments, and the level of economic activity by affecting incentives to work, save, and invest. Thus it is important to understand what factors cause governments to increase or reduce their tax rates.

AbstractAssessed valuations and property tax rates for 1950 show no appreciable increase for first time since World War II.

Generous income support programs as provided by European welfare states have often been blamed to reduce work incentives for lower income classes and to increase durations of unemployment. Standard studies measure work incentives based on annual income concepts. This paper analyzes how work incentives inherent in the German tax-benefit system evolve when extending the time horizon to three years (long-term). Participation tax rates are computed for 3-year periods 1995-1997 and 2005-2007 to reveal potential effects of the labor market reforms between 2003 and 2005. Results show that long-term work incentives increased even more than short-term work incentives. Particularly for middle-income individuals, this is largely explained by the abolition of earnings-related unemployment assistance. -- welfare ; work incentives ; unemployment ; unemployment insurance

This note is a reply to Professor Kennedy's criticism of the specification of my model on taxation and economic growth and my testing of the degree of homogeneity of the growth‐generating function in an earlier paper in this journal. I find that the model relating the pattern in the growth rate to the pattern in the division of the share of output is not affected by incorporating factor inputs into the model, that the function is homogeneous of degree one, and that the growth‐maximizing tax rate of about 20 percent of GDP stands, as in the original paper.

AbstractIncreased costs of municipal government are reflected in greater tax rates and increased assessments for 1948.

AbstractSalary increases for municipal employees seen as chief cause of reversal of downward trend during last several years as rates are cut in only 40 per cent of eommunities.

SUMMARYThis article is concerned with the development and empirical application of a behavioural model of government policies. A short discussion of the existing models in this field, such as reaction‐function models, voting models, and interest group models, is given. A simple model of government behaviour is presented, using the so called interest function approach. In the model a central role is allocated to the own interests of government sector workers (politicians and bureaucrats). The interests of social groups outside the government organization are taken into account by the government through factors such as mobility (probability of becoming a member of another group) and pressure through political parties or otherwise. This leads to the formulation of what is called a complex interest function for the government which is maximized to determine its behaviour. The model is applied to The Netherlands (1921‐1985). A striking outcome is that the numerical strengths of the three social groups that are actively involved in the production process, to wit government and private sector workers, and self‐employed, appear to be determinant for the overall tax rate and the relative level of government expenditure.