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This paper investigates a hybrid management policy of road tolls and tradable credits in mixed road networks with both public and private roads. In the public sub-network, a tradable credit scheme is applied to mitigate traffic congestion. In the private sub-network, tolls are collected by the private company, but the toll levels and toll locations are determined by the government. The purpose of toll charge is two-fold: on the one hand, the government uses it as a tool for mitigating congestion; on the other hand, a threshold of revenue should be guaranteed for the profitability of the private company. A bi-level programming model is formulated to minimize the total travel time in the network by taking into account the user equilibrium travel behaviour and the revenue requirement of private firms. To obtain a global optimum solution, the bi-level model is transformed into an equivalent single-level mixed integer linear program that can be easily solved with commercial software. Numerical examples are provided to demonstrate the effectiveness of the developed model and the efficiency of the proposed algorithm. It is shown that the mixed management schemes can achieve favourable targets, namely, joint implementation of road tolls and tradable credits can effectively mitigate traffic congestion and meanwhile maintain reasonable revenue for the private company.

This paper considers how the implementation of a tradable credit scheme (TCS) may be used to reduce road traffic and to contribute to the formation of liveable cities and global climate change commitments. The concept of applying TCS to individual road transport is familiar to transport researchers as a measure to regulate congestion and reduce transport-related emissions. Yet, it is not a strategy currently being considered by policy makers in the UK, despite the electrification of the road vehicle fleet and the associated loss of tax revenue presenting a rare opportunity to alter the economic instruments, which apply to road traffic. We consider how transport researchers can capitalise on this unique moment in transport history to shape transport policy. Our study uses qualitative methods, including a thematic analysis of semi-structured interviews with transport stakeholders and experts, in addition to a literature review and document analysis. Data analysis is inductive, permitting the formation of new ideas about the potential benefits of TCS and the barriers to the application of TCS to real-world policy. Building upon the results of TCS experiments and the results of our analysis, we propose a novel potential form of TCS combined with road pricing to maintain government revenue, which incentivises road users to decrease road vehicle kilometres travelled and reduce pollution and congestion. The proposal contributes to the discussion on the governance of road transport and taxation.

Congestion levels have grown substantially in recent years, while the traditional economic response to congestion – road pricing – remains politically infeasible in most locations. Tradable permits are likely to be a more viable alternative, because they do not require a net financial flow from road users to the government. It is therefore the right moment to design and empirically test tradable permit schemes for managing urban mobility. This paper presents and empirically tests a complete design of a market for tradable permits, both in terms of the conceptual set-up of the market as well as its technical implementation. The design is evaluated against a number of criteria, including: transparency and containment of transaction costs, stability of permit prices in relation to the dynamic equilibrium on the mobility market and the prevention of undesirable speculation and fraud. We present evidence of the empirical functioning of this market, using the results of a conducted lab-in-the-field experiment with virtual mobility behaviour and real financial incentives.

Life Cycles of both products and services significantly consume renewable and non-renewable resources across a worldwide scale. Thus, eliciting an enormous environmental impact, that is known to disproportionately instigate crises into the socio-economic and political domains of our civilization. Therefore, Creation of Shared Value and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) have been considered by Policy makers, Public and Private Institutions. In addition to Corporate Philanthropy, CSR practices also encompass a wide spectrum of activities, including Stakeholder safety/welfare, designing sustainable products and ecological restoration to name a few which are ascertained to capital and knowledge intensive in nature. Therefore, this paper primarily structures the scope of CSR and proposes a mechanism for trading Corporate Social Responsibility credits in order to incentivize stakeholder centered business practices. Furthermore, the CSR credits trading methodology would entail similar mechanisms used by its remotely successful predecessors namely, tax incentives, tradable credits/certificates and flexible mechanisms for implementing sustainable projects. The CSR credits trading methodology is envisioned to entail a more holistic approach towards overall Sustainability when compared to Carbon Offsets/Renewable Energy Certificates which are more focused towards reducing the environmental footprint. ; The author acknowledges the contribution of MIT Portugal Program, University of Minho and Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia (FCT), Portugal (Foundation Of Science and Technology, Portugal) for the scholarship grant SFRH / BD / 33794 / ...

AbstractThe paper considers a two‐country model with international capital mobility and production‐generated cross‐border pollution. It examines the effectiveness of alternative policy combinations consisting of capital taxes and nationally or internationally tradable emissions permits in reducing global pollution. The internationally mobile capital is taxed according to three different rules, namely, capital tax exemptions, capital tax credits and capital tax deductions. Our key result is that, under certain conditions, the lowest Nash equilibrium level of global pollution is achieved with a policy mix combining either capital tax exemptions or capital tax credits with internationally, rather than nationally, tradable emission permits.