Suchergebnisse

During the past decade, the use of conditional cash transfer programs to increase investment in human capital has generated considerable excitement in both research and policy forums. This article surveys the existing literature, which suggests that most conditional cash transfer programs are used for essentially one of two purposes: restoring efficiency when externalities exist or improving equity by targeting resources to poor households. The programs often meet their stated objectives, but in some instances there is tension between the efficiency and equity objectives. The overall impact of a program depends on the gains and losses associated with each objective.

The large growth in disability transfer program beneficiaries and expenditures from 1965-1978 and the sizable decrease in older male labor force participation has led to public concern about both the incentive effects of and the budgetary expenditures for these programs. The Reagan administration has discussed two paths toward reducing disability benefit expenditures: removing individuals from the rolls via administrative review and reducing the generosity of benefits. These two alternative retrenchment strategies are explored in terms of both the number of beneficiaries expected to voluntarily remove themselves from the rolls if benefits are reduced and the expected economic hardships if individuals are administratively removed. Existing econometric choice modeling underlies the estimates.

This paper discusses the nature & political impact of two anti-poverty programs, Bolsa Familia in Brazil & Oportunidades in Mexico. These programs are two examples of a new brand of anti-poverty programs, known as conditional cash transfer schemes (CCTs). Under CCTs, a government gives cash to poor households in exchange for the beneficiaries fulfilling certain conditions, such as ensuring that their children maintain a given level of school attendance, bringing their children to health clinics for regular visits, etc. CCTs aim to alleviate poverty in the short-term, through the redistribution of wealth by cash transfers, & in the long-term, by building up human capital among the poor through improved education, health, & nutrition. President Luiz Ignacio Lula da Silva initiated Bolsa Familia in Brazil in 2003, & President Vicente Fox of the Partido Accion Nacional (PAN) initiated Oportunidades in Mexico in 2002. This paper investigates the relationship between the federal government & the beneficiaries of these programs, specifically aiming to uncover to what extent the programs can be used -- and are being used -- for political gain. It concludes with a comparison of the impact of the respective programs on the most recent presidential elections in Brazil & Mexico. Adapted from the source document.

This paper discusses the nature & political impact of two anti-poverty programs, Bolsa Familia in Brazil & Oportunidades in Mexico. These programs are two examples of a new brand of anti-poverty programs, known as conditional cash transfer schemes (CCTs). Under CCTs, a government gives cash to poor households in exchange for the beneficiaries fulfilling certain conditions, such as ensuring that their children maintain a given level of school attendance, bringing their children to health clinics for regular visits, etc. CCTs aim to alleviate poverty in the short-term, through the redistribution of wealth by cash transfers, & in the long-term, by building up human capital among the poor through improved education, health, & nutrition. President Luiz Ignacio Lula da Silva initiated Bolsa Familia in Brazil in 2003, & President Vicente Fox of the Partido Accion Nacional (PAN) initiated Oportunidades in Mexico in 2002. This paper investigates the relationship between the federal government & the beneficiaries of these programs, specifically aiming to uncover to what extent the programs can be used -- and are being used -- for political gain. It concludes with a comparison of the impact of the respective programs on the most recent presidential elections in Brazil & Mexico. Adapted from the source document.