Suchergebnisse

This study examines the role of a long-standing international transparency scheme known as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in helping build trust in politicians. It presents the first known econometric investigation studying the relationship between the EITI and trust and also uses a novel instrument exploiting the variation in neighbouring countries' EITI participation to control for the endogenous nature of one's own EITI involvement. The basis of this instrument reflects on a broader literature concerning the historic influence of policy borrowing in the geographical diffusion of public policies. The results show a positive relationship between countries' EITI membership and trust in politicians. In particular, estimates offer consistent evidence of significantly improved levels of trust among members that are compliant with the EITI's transparency standards.

For a long time, Cameroon was a success story in the context of Africa's development. Unfortunately, the economic crises of the eighties and early nineties led to the failure of the development strategies that had been pursued until then, resulting in a severe deterioration of the country's economy and the living standards of the Cameroonian people (Mentan, 2003). However, this country possesses significant oil wealth which if properly managed can generate abundant revenue to boost economic growth and fund anti-poverty measures. In 2005, Cameroon adhered to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). A proper implementation of this initiative will improve transparency in the country's oil sector and support national efforts against poverty and underdevelopment. In recent years though, donor organizations have made good governance and democracy cardinal conditions for the flow of development assistance (Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen, 2003). A situation that has encouraged the proliferation of "pseudo" or "virtual" democracies across Sub-Saharan Africa (Diamond, 2002; 1999; 1996; Joseph, 1999). Is Cameroon's adherence to the EITI part of a pseudo-democratic scheme? Is it merely aimed at gaining international approval and assistance without any desire for reform? The significant problems affecting the EITI program in Cameroon seem to confirm this opinion. On the basis of the experiences and opinions expressed by the key actors in Cameroon's oil sector (interviews) and in line with previous studies (Diamond, 2002; 1999; 1996; Joseph, 1999) this thesis argues that Cameroon is an "arche-typical" virtual democracy. It then describes and explains how this mode of political organisation relates to and inhibits the efficacy of the national EITI program. The thesis ultimately suggests proposals - after identifying the various actors with the authority to initiate reforms - for a more efficient and sustainable EITI implementation in this Central African state.

The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), launched in 2002, has been promoted as an international anti-corruption tool. Several empirical evaluations on the effectiveness of the EITI scheme provide average estimates based on cross-country analysis. However, little empirical work has been conducted on individual case studies, especially in the context of Latin America. Our study uses a Synthetic Control Methodology (SCM) to measure the EITI's impact on several measures of corruption in the first five Latin American countries to join the initiative: Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Peru, and Trinidad and Tobago. The method allows us to assess the magnitude and statistical significance of the EITI's effect on perceived corruption at each stage of implementation. Our results cast doubt on how decisive the scheme has been in combatting corruption. In the vast majority of cases, participation in the scheme either had no statistically significant effect or even coincided with marginally increased corruption levels (only in very few cases it was associated with temporary minor improvements). Taken together, the results indicate that joining EITI did not lead to a substantial decrease of corruption in any of the countries under scrutiny.