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The Social Security Trust fund is set to run out in a few years. Who cares? Is the total US Federal debt $31,456,554,630,496.28, including Treasury debt held by the Social Security trust fund and other agencies?  or is it "only" $24,629,050,125,670.81 held by the public? (Source.)I've been mulling these questions over, prodded by conversations with some colleagues. The "trust fund" exists because for a while, Social Security taxes were larger than Social Security payments. Social Security used the extras to buy Treasury debt. Now there are fewer workers, more retirees and more generous benefits, so Social Security taxes are smaller than payments. Social Security sells off its "trust fund." And it seems we're in trouble when the "trust fund" runs out.  But that's not how it works at all. Treasury debt is not an asset like a stock or bond, or Uncle Scrooge's pool of gold coins. Treasury debt is a claim against future income taxes. Cashing in Treasury debt just  means paying for benefits with income taxes. The ups and downs of the trust fund just reflect a change in how we finance spending. While payroll taxes > social security spending, which was the case until 2007, then payroll taxes are financing other spending. When payroll taxes < social security spending, then income taxes or increases in debt are financing social security spending, which (graph below) was the case after 2008.* The trust fund just adds up this change over time. But exhausting the trust fund is, in this view, really irrelevant. source: CBOThat doesn't mean we can all go to sleep, for two reasons. First, when payroll taxes < Social Security outlays, and the trust fund is winding down, then income taxes or additional public debt must finance the shortfall. The government has to spend less on other things, raise income tax receipts, or borrow which means raising future taxes. And, per the graph, the numbers are not small. 1% of GDP is $230 billion. The extra strain on income taxes, other spending, or debt, happens right now, when the trust fund is positive but decreasing. Zero matters only because by law,  when the trust fund goes to zero, Social Security payments must be automatically cut to match Social Security taxes. That's the sudden drop in the graph. The program was set up as if  the trust fund were buying stocks and bonds, real assets, and would not lay claim on income tax revenues. But it was not; social security taxes were used to cover other spending, and now income taxes must start to pay social security benefits. What happens when the trust fund runs out, then?  Congress has a choice: automatically cut benefits, as shown, or change the law so that the government can pay Social Security benefits from income taxes, or, more realistically, by issuing ever more debt, until the bond vigilantes come. (Or raise payroll taxes, or reform the whole mess.) I bet on change the law. So what's the right measure of debt? It's conventional to look only at debt in public hands. But there is a case to look at the total debt, i.e. including the trust funds. Those are the total claims against the income  tax. Looking at it this way, however, one could also go on and count unfunded future social security benefits as a debt -- the present value of the difference between the two lines above, which leads to immense numbers, per Larry Kotlikoff. I have usually not considered the present value of unfunded promises as "debt," because Congress can change the payments at any time. Changing debt repayment to the public is a default, with financial and legal consequences; changing social security benefits is legislation. You can't sell your future social security benefits as you can sell your treasury debt. The trust fund is half way on this scale. What would be the consequence of a haircut or rescheduling of trust fund debt? Would that trigger something like cross-default clauses in corporate debt? I don't know. The event is unlikely anyway. The left pocket defaulting on the right pocket doesn't help pay the bills. The trust fund is certainly unlikely to run, and its debt is not used as collateral in financial transactions. As a somewhat meaningless accounting identity, it's a lot less "debt" than the debt in public hands. I think this all goes to remind us that paying off the existing debt is not the US central fiscal problem. The central problem is vast unfunded future promises. Defaulting or inflating away current debt does nothing to fund those promises. I look forward to comments on this one, especialy if there are standard views on these apparently simple questions that I'm not aware of. *In the end,  payroll taxes + income & other taxes + increase in public debt = Social Security spending + other spending. The trust fund nets out. 

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Highway Trust Fund is the principal mechanism for funding federal highway and transit programs through receipts from excise taxes charged to highway users, such as taxes on motor fuels. The Department of Treasury (Treasury) and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) each prepare estimates of future receipts for the Highway Trust Fund semiannually. Treasury's receipt estimates are combined with the Department of Transportation's (DOT) estimates of outlays to create an estimate of the Highway Trust Fund balance for the President's Budget; CBO also projects outlays to develop an estimate of the fund balance. The agencies' most recent estimates show that the Highway Account within the Highway Trust Fund could have a negative balance as early as 2009, raising concerns about whether funding for federal highway programs--which were recently authorized by the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users--will continue to be met. Consequently, Congress asked us to review and compare recent estimates made by Treasury and CBO. This testimony provides information on how (1) estimates are used to provide key information about the Highway Trust Fund, (2) the most recent Highway Trust Fund estimates--based on receipt estimates made by Treasury and CBO--compare, and (3) Treasury's and CBO's estimates compare to actual receipts for recent years."

This report details sources of funding for the Aquatic Resources Trust Fund's two accounts - the Sport Fish Restoration Account and the Boat Safety Account - and summarizes the various programs and activities receiving funding from the trust fund.

Claims — Compensation for displacement — Mauritius-United Kingdom Treaty, 1982 — Islands of the Chagos Archipelago separated from Mauritius to form part of the British Indian Ocean Territory — Ilois people removed from the Chagos Archipelago to Mauritius — Trust fund for the promotion of the economic and social welfare of the displaced Ilois and the Ilois community — Whether Board of Trustees had obligation to pay compensation to members of the Ilois community — Ilois Trust Fund Act 1982Relationship of international law and municipal law — Treaties — Whether conferring rights upon individuals — Chagos Archipelago Agreement, 1982 between Mauritius and the United Kingdom — Whether creating right enforceable by individual in courts of MauritiusStates — Independence — British Colony of Mauritius — Preparation for independence in 1968 — Territory of the Chagos Archipelago separated from Mauritius — Displacement of Ilois people — Agreement for full settlement of claims — United Kingdom making available £4 million — Mauritius undertaking to establish and administer Ilois Trust Fund — Whether claim of member of Ilois community to be against Mauritius — The law of Mauritius

This entry has been realised in the framework of the H2020-MSCA-RISE-2018 project "LoGov - Local Government and the Changing Urban-Rural Interplay". LoGov aims to provide solutions for local governments that address the fundamental challenges resulting from urbanisation. To address this complex issue, 18 partners from 17 countries and six continents share their expertise and knowledge in the realms of public law, political science, and public administration. LoGov identifies, evaluates, compares, and shares innovative practices that cope with the impact of changing urban-rural relations in five major local government areas: (1) local responsibilities and public services, (2) local financial arrangements, (3) structure of local government, (4) intergovernmental relations of local governments, and (5) people's participation in local decision-making. The present entry addresses local financial arrangements in Argentina. The entry forms part of the LoGov Report on Argentina. To access the full version of the report on Argentina, other practices regarding local financial arrangements and to receive more information about the project, please visit: https://www.logov-rise.eu/. This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 823961.

This report discusses the Federal Trust Funds and Budget. It also discusses about Status of Largest Trust Funds, Bankruptcy and Insolvency, Longer-Term Status of Trust Funds and Economic Effects of Trust Funds.

This report explains current Social Security trust fund investment practices and briefly describes the issues involved in changing how the trust funds are invested.

Testimony issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "This testimony summarizes previous GAO work that identified gaps in information needed to reconcile Individual Indian Moneys (IIM) trust accounts, and the rationale that led GAO to suggest that the Department of the Interior seek alternatives to reconciliation, such as a negotiated agreement. Congress established an Indian trust fund account reconciliation requirement in the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1987 in response to tribal concerns that (1) Interior had not consistently provided them with statements on their account balances, (2) their trust fund accounts had never been reconciled, and (3) Interior planned to contract with a third party for management of trust fund accounts. There are many obstacles that will complicate Interior's ability to document the amount and source of funds deposited to, managed in, and disbursed from their IIM accounts. Interior's July 2002 report enumerates among those obstacles known discrepancies in the balances, at the trust fund level, reported by Treasury and Interior, as well as the potential for (1) errors in the electronic accounting system data, (2) missing paper transaction records, and (3) missing land ownership information and revenue instruments."

Testimony issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Congress established an Indian trust fund account reconciliation requirement in 1987 in response to tribes' concerns that the Department of the Interior had not consistently provided them with statements on their account balances, their trust fund accounts had never been reconciled, and Interior planned to contract with a third party to manage the accounts. Congress required that the accounts be audited and reconciled before the Bureau of Indian Affairs transferred funds to a third party. Interior's fiscal year 1990 appropriations act added a requirement that the accounts be reconciled to the earliest possible date and that Interior obtain an independent certification of the reconciliation work. The American Indian Trust Fund Management Reform Act of 1994 required Interior to provide tribes with reconciled account statements as of September 30, 1995. To fulfill these requirements, Interior contracted with two major independent public accounting firms, one to reconcile the trust accounts and the other to do an independent certification of the reconciliation. When Interior's reconciliation project was completed in January 1996, each tribe was provided a report that included unreconciled account statements with schedules of proposed adjustments based on results for each year of the five-year reconciliation. Later that year, GAO reported shortcomings in Interior's reconciliation project. As of May 1997, Interior had provided reconciliation reports to 310 tribes, 51 of which disputed the reconciliation results, and 41 of which accepted the results. Of the remaining 218 tribes, 47 had requested more time to consider the results, and 171 had not responded to the reconciliation results. Although Interior made a massive effort to reconcile tribal accounts during its reconciliation project, missing records and systems limitations made a full reconciliation impossible."