Suchergebnisse

Current political discussions on the relationship of technical standards to the Transatlantic, Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) concern the question whether TTIP can provide a transatlantic level playing field for technical standards, and whether this will negatively affect technical standards in the European Union (EU) and the United States (US). This piece will instead take a different view on technical standards in TTIP. It will switch the perspective to an individual one, namely to the question who decides on standards. It follows the hypothesis that steering principles on mutual recognition and harmonization of technical standards largely depend on who will be given the power to decide on conformity and level of technical standards in the TTIP. As a basis for such an institutional analysis, this piece will evaluate the leaked documents from the TTIP negotiations. The analysis follows the framework for legal institutional analysis identified in the introduction to this book. The introduction highlights that, as legal applications of regime theory and organisation theory, the acts of autonomy and power by institutions are the real subjects of legal investigation of institutionalisation. This largely reflects an approach to institutionalism voiced by Neil Komesar in the 1990ies. As a result, I will identify and map the respective decision-makers and will illustrate the potential impact of these choices on technical standard-setting.

The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) was intended to create jobs and boost the economies on both sides of the Atlantic. However, constituency support was difficult to garnish, and negotiations were frozen in late 2016, leaving their conclusion in doubt. What led to this stage? Why has an agreement been elusive? Using an array of indicators this paper argues that a major reason was the extensive and professionally structured public mobilisation campaign conducted by European civil society organisations. This shifted public opinion across Europe, which in turn impacted policy. Our research contributes to the literatures on trade, lobbying, and transatlantic relations, with relevance beyond TTIP. The paper discusses how generalised and diffused interests and public opinion are impacting an area of public policy (trade) traditionally influenced predominantly by lobbying from narrowly focused interests.

The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) was intended to create jobs and boost the economies on both sides of the Atlantic. However, constituency support was difficult to garnish, and negotiations were frozen in late 2016, leaving their conclusion in doubt. What led to this stage? Why has an agreement been elusive? Using an array of indicators this paper argues that a major reason was the extensive and professionally structured public mobilization campaign conducted by European civil society organizations (CSOs). This shifted public opinion across Europe, which in turn impacted policy. Our research contributes to the literatures on trade, lobbying, and transatlantic relations, with relevance beyond TTIP. The paper discusses how generalized and diffused interests and public opinion are impacting an area of public policy (trade) traditionally influenced predominantly by lobbying from narrowly focused interests.

An ambitious, comprehensive and high-standard trade and investment agreement between the European Union and the United States is feasible, but a key concern is whether the transatlantic trade partners will succeed in creating a meaningful agreement within the tight timeline of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations. The target of a ratified pact before a new European Commission takes office in November 2014 is an objective that is likely to conflict with the level of ambition on the substance. Regulatory congruence would require the unilateral and unconditional recognition by the TTIP partners of each other's standards, procedures and conformity assessment tests. The way forward is to create a 'living' (or progressive commitment) agreement on regulatory cooperation with a horizontal template for coherence and conformity assessment and a detailed monitoring mechanism, with implementation starting immediately for a few selected sectors. Regulatory harmonisation under TTIP may not lead to emerging markets automatically upgrading to the higher TTIP standards. Domestic priorities and the high demand from a rising price-sensitive group of consumers will likely result in a dual regulatory regime in emerging markets in the medium-term.

Several studies have analyzed the trade and output effects of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the United States and the European Union, but our paper is the first attempt to study its welfare effects. We measure the welfare effect of TTIP as the percentage of initial consumption that households would be willing to pay for TTIP in order to remain as well off with TTIP as without it. The discounted present value of the welfare gain of TTIP, which leads to the elimination of tariffs and cuts in non-tariff measures by 25%, is in the range of 1% to 4% of initial consumption, depending on the parameterization. The welfare gain increases in the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods. The bulk of the welfare gain is caused by cuts in non-tariff measures.

Several studies have analyzed the trade and output effects of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the United States and the European Union, but our paper is the first attempt to study its welfare effects. We measure the welfare effect of TTIP as the percentage of initial consumption that households would be willing to pay for TTIP in order to remain as well off with TTIP as without it. The discounted present value of the welfare gain of TTIP, which leads to the elimination of tariffs and cuts in non-tariff measures by 25%, is in the range of 1% to 4% of initial consumption, depending on the parameterization. The welfare gain increases in the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods. The bulk of the welfare gain is caused by cuts in non-tariff measures.

Several studies have analyzed the trade and output effects of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the United States and the European Union, but our paper is the first attempt to study its welfare effects. We measure the welfare effect of TTIP as the percentage of initial consumption that households would be willing to pay for TTIP in order to remain as well off with TTIP as without it. The discounted present value of the welfare gain of TTIP, which leads to the elimination of tariffs and cuts in non-tariff measures by 25%, is in the range of 1% to 4% of initial consumption, depending on the parameterization. The welfare gain increases in the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods. The bulk of the welfare gain is caused by cuts in non-tariff measures.