Suchergebnisse

Le dispositif institutionnel de l'Initiative Citoyenne Européenne (ICE) est extrêmement cadré. La réglementation de l'ICE prescrit le registre d'interaction dans lequel vont se placer les participants. En effet, la plupart des échanges avec la Commission se déroulent en ligne (enregistrement de la proposition, réception de la réponse, activation du système de récolte de signatures en ligne). Les contraintes juridiques et formelles qui pèsent sur les participants sont très fortes et laissent peu de place à l'expression. Certains participants qualifiant même le comportement de la Commission de « harcèlement administratif ». Les promoteurs disent se sentir obligés d'élaborer des propositions raisonnables et de se plier à des pratiques en adéquation avec la manière de fonctionner de la Commission pour pouvoir être considérés. L'audition auprès du Parlement européenne constitue le principal moment d'expression. Or, celui-ci requiert, comme de nombreuses situations dans les arènes institutionnelles européennes, d'utiliser la grammaire qui convient qui n'accepte aucunement le registre de l'émotion. L'enjeu principal est de faire la démonstration de son expertise relative à la proposition en un temps réduit et en respectant scrupuleusement les modalités imposées. Pour rencontrer leurs besoins de débats, de partage et d'expression, les promoteurs d'initiatives ont mis en place des espaces en marge du dispositif officiel, générant des débordements de la participation programmée. D'autres finalités émergent donc. Les utilisateurs de l'ICE débordent le cadre du dispositif et le redéfinissent : ils organisent des débats, des happenings, ils recherchent le soutien de parlementaires, ils rejoignent des collectifs lors de manifestations ou événements, ils injectent de la délibération en interne, ils interpellent les parlementaire via Twitter. Le cas de l'initiative Stop TTIP qui s'est auto-organisée par contestation du refus de la Commission de l'enregistrer est une forme de détournement du dispositif, de « réappropriation de la participation par les citoyens ». Ils ont converti leur « déception » et leur « indignation », tout en multipliant les moyens d'actions : ils conjuguent des actions militantes classiques du type manifestation, à une créativité, au recours à l'humour, à la mobilisation des TIC pour du médiactivisme, et à la formulation d'une contre-expertise invoquant, d'une part, une caution universitaire et, d'autre part, des exemples quotidiens et des témoignages. Ces pratiques de débordement leur permettent de donner place aux émotions. L'urgence de la situation (négociations politiques en cours concernant le traité Transatlantique) les a poussés à s'exprimer avec une virulence assez inédite dans ces cénacles. Certains acteurs ont également détourné le dispositif pour tenter de récupérer un peu d'autonomie dans l'usage : ils ont créé un logiciel de récolte de signature alternatif à celui de la Commission qui « restait sourde » à leurs demandes de modifications et ont élaboré un widget du formulaire de signature qui peut être embarqué sur tous les sites des associations supportrices d'une ICE. Par ailleurs, les affects sont d'une certaine manière mis à distance par le format campaigning que revêt l'ICE en requérant de récolter un million de signatures. Les participants se voient élaborer des messages à diffuser au grand public et des slogans pour faire mouche. La recherche de la viralité ne laisse place qu'à une certaine forme d'émotion, celle qui créera le buzz et touchera un maximum de signataires. L'enthousiasme des débuts a rapidement laissé la place à une grande déception face aux pratiques « procédurières » et « juridico-techniques » de la Commission. La plupart des promoteurs estiment qu'ils sont « méprisés » par la Commission et ne sont aucunement « considérés » comme des partenaires ratifiés, ils se sentent constamment tenus à distance. Ils estiment que leur expression est « muselée ». Après 3 ans de fonctionnement, les discours sur l'ICE sont majoritairement empreints de déception, de défiance vis-à-vis des institutions et même parfois d'une rage concernant le peu considération attribuée à la parle citoyenne au niveau européen. Au sein des comités, l'expression des états affectifs est par contre relativement courante. Ceux-ci viennent à s'exprimer en réunion sous forme des motifs de l'action, d'évaluation de ses pratiques, de ressenti personnel vis-à-vis de l' « échec » ou de reconstruction des bénéfices personnels retirés. Cette proposition est élaborée à partir d'une recherche effectuée dans le cadre d'une thèse de doctorat. Les résultats proviennent d'observations participantes réalisées durant 2 ans au sein des comités belges de deux initiatives citoyennes européennes. L'observation participante s'articule également à des entretiens, des courriels, des listes de diffusion et des observations lors d'événements institutionnels européens.

Le dispositif institutionnel de l'Initiative Citoyenne Européenne (ICE) est extrêmement cadré. La réglementation de l'ICE prescrit le registre d'interaction dans lequel vont se placer les participants. En effet, la plupart des échanges avec la Commission se déroulent en ligne (enregistrement de la proposition, réception de la réponse, activation du système de récolte de signatures en ligne). Les contraintes juridiques et formelles qui pèsent sur les participants sont très fortes et laissent peu de place à l'expression. Certains participants qualifiant même le comportement de la Commission de « harcèlement administratif ». Les promoteurs disent se sentir obligés d'élaborer des propositions raisonnables et de se plier à des pratiques en adéquation avec la manière de fonctionner de la Commission pour pouvoir être considérés. L'audition auprès du Parlement européenne constitue le principal moment d'expression. Or, celui-ci requiert, comme de nombreuses situations dans les arènes institutionnelles européennes, d'utiliser la grammaire qui convient qui n'accepte aucunement le registre de l'émotion. L'enjeu principal est de faire la démonstration de son expertise relative à la proposition en un temps réduit et en respectant scrupuleusement les modalités imposées. Pour rencontrer leurs besoins de débats, de partage et d'expression, les promoteurs d'initiatives ont mis en place des espaces en marge du dispositif officiel, générant des débordements de la participation programmée. D'autres finalités émergent donc. Les utilisateurs de l'ICE débordent le cadre du dispositif et le redéfinissent : ils organisent des débats, des happenings, ils recherchent le soutien de parlementaires, ils rejoignent des collectifs lors de manifestations ou événements, ils injectent de la délibération en interne, ils interpellent les parlementaire via Twitter. Le cas de l'initiative Stop TTIP qui s'est auto-organisée par contestation du refus de la Commission de l'enregistrer est une forme de détournement du dispositif, de « réappropriation de la participation par les citoyens ». Ils ont converti leur « déception » et leur « indignation », tout en multipliant les moyens d'actions : ils conjuguent des actions militantes classiques du type manifestation, à une créativité, au recours à l'humour, à la mobilisation des TIC pour du médiactivisme, et à la formulation d'une contre-expertise invoquant, d'une part, une caution universitaire et, d'autre part, des exemples quotidiens et des témoignages. Ces pratiques de débordement leur permettent de donner place aux émotions. L'urgence de la situation (négociations politiques en cours concernant le traité Transatlantique) les a poussés à s'exprimer avec une virulence assez inédite dans ces cénacles. Certains acteurs ont également détourné le dispositif pour tenter de récupérer un peu d'autonomie dans l'usage : ils ont créé un logiciel de récolte de signature alternatif à celui de la Commission qui « restait sourde » à leurs demandes de modifications et ont élaboré un widget du formulaire de signature qui peut être embarqué sur tous les sites des associations supportrices d'une ICE. Par ailleurs, les affects sont d'une certaine manière mis à distance par le format campaigning que revêt l'ICE en requérant de récolter un million de signatures. Les participants se voient élaborer des messages à diffuser au grand public et des slogans pour faire mouche. La recherche de la viralité ne laisse place qu'à une certaine forme d'émotion, celle qui créera le buzz et touchera un maximum de signataires. L'enthousiasme des débuts a rapidement laissé la place à une grande déception face aux pratiques « procédurières » et « juridico-techniques » de la Commission. La plupart des promoteurs estiment qu'ils sont « méprisés » par la Commission et ne sont aucunement « considérés » comme des partenaires ratifiés, ils se sentent constamment tenus à distance. Ils estiment que leur expression est « muselée ». Après 3 ans de fonctionnement, les discours sur l'ICE sont majoritairement empreints de déception, de défiance vis-à-vis des institutions et même parfois d'une rage concernant le peu considération attribuée à la parle citoyenne au niveau européen. Au sein des comités, l'expression des états affectifs est par contre relativement courante. Ceux-ci viennent à s'exprimer en réunion sous forme des motifs de l'action, d'évaluation de ses pratiques, de ressenti personnel vis-à-vis de l' « échec » ou de reconstruction des bénéfices personnels retirés. Cette proposition est élaborée à partir d'une recherche effectuée dans le cadre d'une thèse de doctorat. Les résultats proviennent d'observations participantes réalisées durant 2 ans au sein des comités belges de deux initiatives citoyennes européennes. L'observation participante s'articule également à des entretiens, des courriels, des listes de diffusion et des observations lors d'événements institutionnels européens.

The following pages are taken from a long interview (more than eight hours of footage in total) that Viviane Reding granted us in 2015 in connection with the "Pierre Werner and Europe" research project. Drawing on more than 40 years' experience in politics, Viviane Reding spoke about her career, the role of Luxembourg and Luxembourgers in the European integration process, and various key events in which she played a part. In these extracts, she discusses her role as a member of the first and second Barroso Commissions (2004-2009 and 2010-2014) and her efforts to help build an information and knowledge society in Europe, one that serves citizens and protects their rights and fundamental freedoms. Her achievements in this respect include capping mobile phone roaming charges (they were subsequently abolished in 2017), advocating for the introduction of a single emergency number (112) in all EU countries, launching the Europeana digital library, and spearheading a programme to use technological innovation for climate and energy solutions. She also describes the process of developing a Digital Agenda for Europe to improve the continent's digital competitiveness compared with the United States, China and Japan – a complex and challenging task given the context of globalisation and the divergent interests of the various stakeholders (research, industry, consumers, etc.). Finally, she mentions the reform of personal data protection that she initiated (leading to the GDPR, adopted in April 2016).

Die Einbettung intra-europäischer Investitionen in ein rechtliches Mehrebenensystem bewirkt neben der Geltung divergierender materieller Schutzstandards die Koexistenz von zur Streitbeilegung berufenen Akteuren. Die Studie untersucht ihre Beziehung aus völker- und unionsrechtlicher Perspektive. Sie arbeitet dogmatisch die EuGH-Rechtsprechung zu dem unionsrechtlichen Streitbeilegungsmonopol, der Vorlagebefugnis, der Autonomie der Unionsrechtsordnung und dem Grundsatz des gegenseitigen Vertrauens auf. Zudem geht sie unter Zugrundelegung einer Pflicht zur Gleichbehandlung von EU-Ausländern der Frage der diskriminierenden Wirkung von ISDS-Klauseln in intra-EU BIT nach und leitet anschließend ihre Unanwendbarkeit aus völkerrechtlicher Sicht her.

Henry Kissinger will be one hundred
years old in a few weeks and has published five books since he turned ninety.
Along with President Nixon, he futilely prolonged and escalated the Vietnam
War for four years when defeat was already inevitable. But he also received
the Nobel Peace Prize precisely for negotiating the ceasefire for that same
war.     His doctrine also has these two faces. On the one hand, he conceives international politics as the interaction between states seeking power. On the
other hand, he favors the balance of powers so that no one is able to fully
impose its dominance on the others.   In the academic literature, Kissinger's
approach is called "realism" and is widely accepted. The main alternative is
the so-called "liberal" approach, which trusts in the ability of institutions
to prevent wars and keep peace. From there arose the League of Nations, which
failed, and the United Nations and its specialized organizations, which have
had significant success on many issues, but are also currently showing their
insufficiency.    The most accurate postulate of the realists is that the world
is more peaceful when there are multiple powers than when there are only two,
as in the Cold War, or a single super-dominant one, as seemed to be the case with the United States after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.   The success
of the formula requires that the multilateral equilibrium could only be overthrown by an effort of a magnitude too difficult to mount. As a historical example, Kissinger has
analyzed and praised the so-called Concert of Europe that was formed, after
the defeat of Napoleon's France, by Great Britain, Russia, Prussia, Austria, and also recovered France. According to his interpretation, the Concert
"came close to constituting the government of Europe" and achieved a long
period without European-wide wars. The balance was upset by the unification of
Germany at the end of the 19th century and its consequent aggressive
expansionism, which led to the absurd and catastrophic First World War. Taking
a similar approach, Kissinger continues to praise the construction of the
European Union, which has prevented new general wars on the continent.    During
his time in government, the biggest concern was that communism would end up
dominating the world according to the domino theory, whereby the fall of a
piece like Indochina would be followed by Burma and Thailand, as well as
Indonesia (which, in fact, was very close), and from there, India, Japan, the
Middle East... That's why the Vietnam war extended to Laos and Cambodia. But
this is also the reason for the diplomatic opening to China, to break the
Sino-Soviet bloc and achieve a certain multilateral balance.    The current
interest of the discussion is that the role of the United States as the only
superpower may be less exclusive and exclusionary than it seemed. A version of
political realism in academia tends to analyze international relations "after
hegemony" as a ground for "anarchy", that is, destructive conflicts
and wars. However, the changes around the Ukrainian war can be read
as a new opportunity for multilateral cooperation.    The United States has the
initiative and many economic and military resources, but, paradoxically, it
may have a good opportunity to expand pluralism. In the new situation of
divided government between the Presidency and Congress, the most ambitious
projects in domestic policy are paralyzed, so Joe Biden can focus on foreign
policy, where he has more power, and expand multilateral cooperation.    The
European Union is beginning to develop, for the first time, a spirited common
international policy, in contrast to the dissent during the Iraq war, when the
governments of Britain and Spain were on one side and those of France and
Germany on the other. The rulers of China and India, which are rivals to each
other, have told Russia that the world is not ready for war.    This
configuration with more than three major powers points to a balance of powers
capable of avoiding polarization, since, otherwise, a coalition of two-to-one preludes conflict.     Specifically, the Group of Seven, which is the nucleus
of a latent world government, needs to work more closely with some members of
the Group of Twenty, which includes India and China, so that its decisions are widely
accepted and effective.    Negotiations between the US and the EU for the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), in which substantive
agreements had been reached, were paralyzed by Trump, and could now be
revived.    The Trans-Pacific Agreement for Economic Cooperation was also
abandoned by Trump, but the other eleven initial countries went ahead on their
own and ended up signing the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for
Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), to which China has presented its candidacy.
Many in the United States are clamoring for re-entry in what had been its own initiative.    And after the war in Ukraine, a new international structure
will have to be defined, especially for Central and Eastern Europe, in which,
as Kissinger said in a recent interview, "Russia should find a place."    Realism
shows that the seeking for power explains many things, and the balance of power
can prevent a general war. But when there is neither a single dominant power
nor a confrontation between two, "liberal" rules and institutions may be the
best mechanism for peace and multilateral cooperation.Also in Spanish in the daily La Vanguardia-click 

A particular point of contention in the current negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) carried out by the European Union and the United States is the question whether the European protected geographical indications for food should be enforced in the USA. The concern of the US Food and dairy industry is that products which have been so far produced and sold as 'Feta' or 'Gorgonzola,' may only be called 'Feta-like' or 'Gorgonzola-like' in the future. The political dispute over the protection of geographical indications in international trade law has become virulent in the negotiations in the Doha Round of the WTO (since 2001). The question asked is whether the protection of geographical indications is sufficient under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (1994). The European Union requires a certain protection reinforcement – a proposal to which the United States, Canada and Australia strongly object. The opposing positions are based on historical trends, divergent economic interests and different legal concepts. The different legal concepts in the world range from competition law to specific labelling law and to trademark law. A specific labelling law exists in the EU with a comprehensive und highly differentiated character compared to other protection concepts. It distinguishes between three categories of marks: designations of origin, geographical indications and traditional specialities guaranteed. In the case of designations of origin, all production stages have to take place in the same region (for example: 'Oscypek' smoked sheep milk cheese from Poland), 'Allgäuer Bergkäse' from Germany und 'Feta' from Greece). In the case of protected geographical indications only one production stage has to take place in a certain region (for example: 'Rogal świętomarciński,' pastry from Poznań and 'Spreewälder Gurken' from Brandenburg). In the case of traditional specialities, a guaranteed reference a certain region is not necessary, but a traditional recipe which has existed for 30 years is required. Geographical indications and traditional specialities which have been registered by the European Commission obtain EU-wide protection and are a legal interest to which not only all applicants but also all beneficiaries jointly are entitled (according to the specification of the product). Since the establishment of the European protection system, a number of judgments of the European Court of Justice have been delivered and served to resolve disputes and to clarify legal questions. Further, they also referred to the cultural differences in the production and consumption of foodstuffs. It remains to be seen how the conflict between the USA and the EU will be solved in the field of geographical indications. In this context a direct agreement on the mutual acceptance of this food regulatory regime could be obtained as full harmonization, as graded harmonization or as a flexible system of equivalence. ; Durante gli attuali negoziati svolti tra l'Unione Europea e gli Stati Uniti circa il Partenariato Transatlantico per il Commercio e gli Investimenti la tutela della denominazione di origine del prodotto alimentare costituisce un particolare punto di disaccordo: si tratta di stabilire se la tutela in oggetto, in vigore in Europa, dovrebbe essere introdotta anche negli USA. L'industria alimentare statunitense teme che i prodotti fabbricati e venduti finora sotto il nome di "Feta" o "Gorgonzola" possano essere chiamati solo prodotti "tipo Feta" o "tipo Gorgonzola". La disputa politica intorno alla protezione delle indicazioni geografiche nel commercio internazionale ha preso la forma più virulenta durante i negoziati svolti (dal 2011) a Doha nell'ambito dell'Organizzazione Mondiale del Commercio (WTO). Il dibattito riguarda la questione se le decisioni dell'Accordo sugli aspetti commerciali dei diritti di proprietà intellettuale (1994) risulteranno sufficienti nel caso di controversia circa la tutela della denominazione di origine geografica. L'Unione europea chiede che tale tutela venga introdotta, ma gli Stati Uniti, il Canada e l'Australia sono fortemente contrari a tale soluzione. Queste posizioni contrastanti derivano da fattori storici, interessi economici divergenti e diverse concezioni giuridiche, partendo da un approccio diverso nei confronti del diritto della concorrenza, per arrivare ad una particolare (specifica) legge sull'etichettatura e la legge che riguarda il marchio. Nell'Unione Europea vige una legge specifica sull'etichettatura complessa e molto diversificata rispetto ad altre concezioni di tutela. Si distinguono tre categorie di indicazioni: denominazione di origine, indicazione geografica e specialità tradizionale garantita. Nel caso della denominazione di origine tutte le fasi di produzione devono svolgersi nella stessa zona (per esempio "Oscypek", formaggio affumicato di pecora proveniente dalla Polonia), "Allgäuer Bergkäse" dalla Germania, oppure "Feta" dalla Grecia). Nel caso delle indicazioni geografiche protette, solo una delle fasi di produzione deve svolgersi in una data zona (per esempio "Rogal świętomarciński" – un cornetto tipico di Poznań oppure "Spreewälder Gurken" – cetrioli della Provincia del Brandeburgo). Nel caso delle specialità tradizionali non è necessaria una particolare zona di riferimento, ma una ricetta tradizionale che può vantarsi di almeno 30 anni di storia. Le indicazioni geografiche e le specialità tradizionali registrate dalla Commissione Europea (iscritte nel registro) vengono protette in tutta l'Unione Europea. Fin dall'inizio dell'introduzione del sistema di tutela europeo, la Corte di giustizia dell'UE ha emesso una serie di pronunce volte a risolvere le controversie e fornire chiarimenti giuridici, che allo stesso tempo si riferivano alle differenze culturali concernenti la produzione e il consumo dei prodotti alimentari. Aspettiamo di vedere come si risolverà la controversia tra l'Unione Europea e gli USA in materia di indicazioni geografiche. Al riguardo un accordo diretto sull'adozione di un sistema (regime) volto a disciplinare le questioni alimentari può assumere la forma di una piena armonizzazione, di una armonizzazione graduale oppure di un sistema flessibile di equivalenza. ; 15 ; 2 ; 175 ; 198 ; 10 ; Przegląd Prawa Rolnego

The following pages are taken from a long interview (more than eight hours of footage in total) that Viviane Reding granted us in 2015 in connection with the "Pierre Werner and Europe" research project. Drawing on more than 40 years' experience in politics, Viviane Reding spoke about her career, the role of Luxembourg and Luxembourgers in the European integration process, and various key events in which she played a part. In these extracts, she discusses her role as a member of the first and second Barroso Commissions (2004-2009 and 2010-2014) and her efforts to help build an information and knowledge society in Europe, one that serves citizens and protects their rights and fundamental freedoms. Her achievements in this respect include capping mobile phone roaming charges (they were subsequently abolished in 2017), advocating for the introduction of a single emergency number (112) in all EU countries, launching the Europeana digital library, and spearheading a programme to use technological innovation for climate and energy solutions. She also describes the process of developing a Digital Agenda for Europe to improve the continent's digital competitiveness compared with the United States, China and Japan – a complex and challenging task given the context of globalisation and the divergent interests of the various stakeholders (research, industry, consumers, etc.). Finally, she mentions the reform of personal data protection that she initiated (leading to the GDPR, adopted in April 2016).

The group of five articles forming this special section of Brill Open Law is a selection of the papers presented at the Workshop on "Global Public Goods, Global Commons, Fundamental Values: the Responses of International Economic Law," organized by the Interest Group (ig) on International Economic Law (iel) of the European Society of International Law (esil) in Naples on September 6th, 2017. The mission of the esil iel ig is to promote research in the field of International Economic Law, endorsing exchange of views among young and experienced scholars, as well as supporting debate and discussion with practitioners, lawyers and officials from international organizations and national administrations working in the fields of international trade and investments and International Financial Law. The articles appearing in this Section are all devoted to International Investment Law, the first work being the opening speech to the Naples Workshop by Professor Pavel Šturma on "Public Goods and International Investment Law: Do the New Generation of iias Better Protect Human Rights?", while the subsequent four essays are all dedicated to the recent case-law developed in international arbitration proceedings dealing with the right to water and the right to human health. Professor Šturma provides a synthetic effective reconstruction of the way in which International Investment Law now interacts with International Human Rights Law. Starting from the description of the situation in the first generation of Bilateral Investment Treaties (bits), establishing the rights of investors and the obligations of States, the author then goes on exposing the differences with human rights treaties, and analyzes the significant developments in relation to the new generation of investment treaties. The relevant clauses concerning the exceptions to investment protection, or the right to regulate of the host State, expressed by the new generation of International Investment Agreements (iias), such as the eu-Canada Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement (ceta), the now-abandoned Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (ttip), or the bit models of Norway, Canada, Austria, or the Czech Republic, are therefore considered, stressing their relevance to guide interpreters and arbitrators when having to combine investment protection with human rights. Due attention is then given to the role of private parties with reference to human rights, underlining the introduction of the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (csr) in the new iias encouraging economic operators to conduct their business in compliance with the relevant international soft law codes inspired by the principle of sustainable development – requiring that economic development be constantly combined with environmental protection and social progress. The article also emphasizes the role that the principle of systemic integration in treaty interpretation, as codified in Article 31, para. 3(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, may play when arbitrators have to combine human rights, environmental protection and bits, illustrating the relevance of the case-law of international investment disputes in order to strike a fair balance between non-economic considerations and investors' rights. The analysis by Pavel Šturma opens the door to the subsequent four articles. Professor Ursula Kriebaum, in her work on "The Right to Water Before Investment Tribunals," provides a complete overview of the case-law developed in international investment arbitration proceedings with reference to the right to water. She presents the constantly rising relevance that the human right to water has been given by the Arbitral Tribunals while discussing the respect of the investors' prerogatives enshrined in the various bits invoked by the claimants. Professor Kriebaum thus emphasizes that the Arbitrators never denied that they have an obligation to take into consideration human rights while interpreting bits. On the contrary, international awards concluded that national measures introduced in order to protect the environment against the pollution of water resources, and the termination of concessions as a consequence of inadequate performance of an investment contract on the part of the investor involved in water distribution services cannot be automatically considered as infringements of bits by the States benefitting from the foreign investments. Furthermore, Ursula Kriebaum stressed the highly relevant developments reached by the Arbitral Tribunal in the Urbaser case, where it was held in an obiter that investors have to abstain from acts which may violate the human right to water by endangering access to water. The Urbaser case is at the center of the analysis by Dr Edward Guntrip and Dr Patrick Abel. In his work on "Private Actors, Public Goods and Responsibility for the Right to Water in International Investment Law: An Analysis of Urbaser v. Argentina," Dr Guntrip considers how the Arbitral Tribunal allocated responsibility for compliance with the right to water between the host State and the foreign investor while being asked to settle the dispute over privatized water services in Greater Buenos Aires. The author underlined that the Arbitrators chose to follow the scheme defined by the un Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (cescr). Pursuant to that, human rights obligations in relation to economic, social and cultural rights, which include the right to water, have to be broken down into obligations to respect, protect and fulfil. Edward Guntrip criticizes the Tribunal's decision to limit the duties of the investor to the obligation to respect only, i.e. not to interfere with the enjoyment of the right to water. In fact, such a limitation makes the human right to water vulnerable for the right holders trying to hold a foreign investor responsible. Dr Patrick Abel manifests further perplexities on the counterclaim raised by Argentina in relation to the existence of an international investor obligation under the human right to water, for the first time accepted as possible in international investment arbitration proceedings. While stressing the importance of the novelty of the Urbaser award -i.e. the possibility of holding investors accountable for a breach of an international human rights obligation- Patrick Abel highlights the flaws in the legal reasoning of the Tribunal, which he considers unclear in the way it perceives the integration of human rights obligations as a source of international law external to the relevant bit invoked in the investment arbitration. Last but not least, Professor Pei-Kan Yang, in his article on "The Margin of Appreciation Debate over Novel Cigarette Packaging Regulations in Philipp Morris v. Uruguay," explores the legal reasoning of the Arbitrators in the case brought by the famous tobacco multinational company against the Latin-American State. The majority of the Tribunal, applying the "margin of appreciation" doctrine as originally developed by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), found that Uruguay's tobacco legislation did not violate the Switzerland – Uruguay bit as the Latin-American State enjoyed a substantial degree of discretion in choosing the regulatory means to achieve its public health objectives among various options of effective measures. Pei-Kan Yang analyzes both the majority conclusions and the dissenting opinion by Gary Born, and identifies lacunae in each of the two approaches, suggesting an adjustment of the concept of the margin of appreciation in order to better accommodate the right to regulate of the host State for public health purposes and balance it against the investor's private rights. We do hope that the proposed set of articles may represent a welcome perspective of analysis of some recent developments concerning treaties and case-law in the field of International Investment Law. Enjoy the reading!

The variety of presently occurring economic and political processes and phenomena contribute to continuous changes in world economy, affecting its subjective structure and the changes in the relations and co-dependencies between its subjects. Globalisation is undoubtedly one of such processes, as it affects the positions of countries and international organisations within global economy. It is a multidimensional process, connected to the intensifi cation of relations both on the economic grounds, resulting from accelerated fl ow of goods and services, technologies, capital, workforce, and on the political grounds. The dynamic development of globalisation has been happening under the infl uence of ICT technologies, facilitating the reduction of the costs of production factors movement and increasing their mobility. The distribution of benefi ts resultant from this process is disproportional, as it strengthens the position of some countries and regions, at the same time weakening the importance of economic and political centres functioning to date as its leaders. A growing importance of new centres can be observed on the global scene – Asian countries, including China, are coming into strength and affecting the positions of the economic powers to date, such as the European Union and the USA. A complicated pattern of economic and political relations is being formed, and it is necessary to ensure that proper balance is kept. A new global order is being introduced, resultant from these particular relations, the existing connections and interferences occurring among its actors. Apart from that, the process of globalisation facilitates the intensifi cation of the economic integration processes. The international groups aiming at strengthening their positions in the global economy, as well as their spheres of infl uence, are implementing new inter-state agreements of economic and political character, thus affecting the global structure of power and co-dependencies, together with the changes occurring within these structures. The European Union must continually take up actions to provide stability and European security in the increasingly more complicated global order. Ensuring stability in the neighbouring regions through the European Neighbourhood Policy is of particular importance. This multithreaded issue was undertaken in the research carried out by Centre of Excellence at Warsaw School of Economics – CEWSE on European Union's Security and Stability in a new Economic, Social & Geopolitical Settlement and its partners, scientists representing a wide range of scientifi c centres, including international ones. The research focuses on challenges regarding: uniting or divisive history, transformations of contemporary European countries, European culture, national cultures, innovativeness and creativity of economy, science, migration crisis, refugee crisis, the relations between the EU and the Russian Federation, the crisis in Ukraine, energy security, public security, sustainable growth, social solidarity, demographic changes, Brexit, institutional crisis in the EU, the future of the EU, and more. As a signifi cant actor in global economic and political relations, the EU holds an important economic position, intensifying the pre-existing relations with third countries, organisations and groupings. It is very active in external contacts, negotiating and forming transatlantic agreements, with Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada as an example. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), whose intended aim was to create a free trade zone between the biggest players – the EU and the USA – previously under negotiations, has been suspended for the time being. Nevertheless, talks are being held as regards deepening the relations between the EU and MERCOSUR, and creating a free trade zone. The new transatlantic agreements, signed or undergoing negotiations, surpass the traditionally accentuated trade relations, covering also the issues of investment, intellectual property rights, legal regulations and standards, as well as regulating other spheres of socio-economic life, which in turn causes the process of negotiating and fi nalising such agreements is prolonged and complicated. The EU also intensifi es its relations with the dynamically developing African continent, hoping to mark its presence there next to other, for example Chinese, investors. Another dimension of external economic and political relations are the developing alliances with Asian countries, which constitute another strategic aim of the EU. The EU undergoes transformations from its very beginning, due to both the processes of expanding and deepening. The latest expansion of the EU took place on 1st July 2013, when Croatia became a new Member State. At the same time, the process of deepening mutual relations was advancing. Thus, the structure of the EU is very dynamic. Currently, the EU is facing numerous challenges of economic, political and social character. However the common values which accompanied the establishment of this organisation and which constitute the foundation of its unity should be supported through realizing agreed-upon operations. Some countries constitute the Eurozone, while other remain outside this hub of enhanced economic co-operation. This creates the so-called "multi-speed" Europe, with diversifi ed economic dimensions, and – as highlighted in the White Paper on the future of Europe1 – the scenarios for further EU development are also diverse. The EU also shapes its external relations in the international arena, economic and political relations with non-member countries on the European continent. Actions are being taken to provide protection and security in the area, which experiences numerous confl icts and crises. After the accession of 10 new countries to the European Union, it was necessary to develop relevant forms of co-operation and relations with the organisation's neighbouring countries. One of the dimensions of implemented policy is the European Neighbourhood Policy, as the neighbouring countries, as well as those maintaining deepened relations with the EU, have been offered the opportunity to develop co-operation and mutual connections within the areas of politics, security, economy and culture. In its original formula, it put forward a list of priorities to be met by the countries covered by the Policy and which have to be included in the Action Plans for numerous key areas, including political dialogue and reforms, trade, justice system, energy, transport, information society. The neighbouring countries deepen their relations with the EU while respecting mutual values. The fi nancial support for this policy is provided by the European Neighbourhood Instrument, the introduction of which is supposed to create the framework conditions for deepening further regional co-operation, at the same time enhancing stability and security in the region2. The present publication, as a product of the research carried out, approaches the subject of the EU's role in providing security and stability in the global order, with particular focus on the Neighbourhood Policy. The hereby publication consists of four thematically integral and interconnected parts.Part 1, entitled "The Concept of European Integration and the Role of the EU in the Global Order", consists of papers concentrating on the presentation of the effects of the European integration to date and the challenges which the EU is currently facing, the issues related to the system for protection of human rights. The diversifi cation of the integration process is highlighted.The importance of the EU as a global partner is also emphasized, indicating the activities dedicated to the least-developed countries. Part 2, "The European Neighbourhood Policy: A Need for Evolution or Revolution?" concentrates around the issues regarding diverse dimensions of integration. It discusses the questions related to the mechanisms of monitoring and solving disputes within the framework of association agreements with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Attention has been paid to threats and opportunities for Europe due to new eastern neighbourhood. Institutional aspects of the transformation of the eastern countries have also been indicated, as well as its fi nancial aspects. This brings about new quality and opportunities in the context of EU cohesion policy, where new subjects have a chance to be sanctioned and obtain certain liberties. The third part, "EU Trade & Investment Policy: Engine for Growth and Job Creation?; The Economic Effects of New FTAs Generation – How to Assess Their Effects?", concerns the non-trade effects of DC-FTAs. The connections between the EU and China within the framework of multilateral WTO system have been indicated. Trade relations with MERCOSUR, integration processes in Africa have been discussed, with emphasis on the EAC – EU Economic Partnership Agreement. The trade and investment policies in the countries of the Visegrad Group have also been discussed. Nowadays, trade relations are growing in importance as compared to the past. Due to lasting, long-term co-operation, a tendency to tighten relations can be observed. The last, fourth part "The EU External Policy at a Crossroads Facing New Challenges and Threats from the East and Mediterranean Region" concentrates on the issues regarding external relations between the EU and the countries of the Mediterranean and Eastern regions. Issues related to the foreign policy of Turkey in the context of its relations with the EU are also raised in this part. The structure adopted in this publication introduces the reader to a review of the newest issues regarding mostly the external challenges facing the EU and the actions taken in order to overcome them and provide stability. Papers included in the publication refl ect their authors' own opinions and it is the authors who take full responsibility for their texts. We would like to express our gratitude to all the people and institutions who, through their expertise and fi nancial support, have contributed to the commencement of the present publication. Hereby, we would like to express our most sincere gratitude to the Jean Monnet Chair of European Union, SGH Warsaw School of Economics, University of Warsaw (Centre for Europe), University of Gdańsk (Research Centre on European Integration),University of Economics in Katowice, New Vision University, Tbilisi, Faculty of Administration and National Security of the Jacob of Paradies University in Gorzów Wielkopolski, College of Economics and Social Sciences, Warsaw University of Technology, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, the worldwide networks of the European Community Studies Association (ECSA-World), including Polish European Community Studies Association (PECSA), ECSA Moldova, ECSA Ukraine, ECSA Georgia. The present publication presents the outcomes of research and is supposed to enable the reader to identify the role of the EU in providing stability and security and shaping effective co-operation not only with the neighbouring countries, on the political and economic platform. It is also supposed to inspire further scientific research. ; Centre of Excellence at Warsaw School of Economics (CEWSE); European Commission within the Erasmus+Programme – Jean Monnet Activities.

             Previously posted on May 10/22 and Jan 30/23            Kissinger in Washington, May 7, 2022Henry Kissinger will be one hundred years old in a few weeks and has published five books since he turned ninety. Along with President Nixon, he futilely prolonged and escalated the Vietnam War for four years when defeat was already inevitable. But he also received the Nobel Peace Prize precisely for negotiating the ceasefire for that same war.     His doctrine also has these two faces. On the one hand, he conceives international politics as the interaction between states seeking power. On the other hand, he favors the balance of powers so that no one is able to fully impose its dominance on the others.   In the academic literature, Kissinger's approach is called "realism" and is widely accepted. The main alternative is the so-called "liberal" approach, which trusts in the ability of institutions to prevent wars and keep peace. From there arose the League of Nations, which failed, and the United Nations and its specialized organizations, which have had significant success on many issues, but are also currently showing their insufficiency.    The most accurate postulate of the realists is that the world is more peaceful when there are multiple powers than when there are only two, as in the Cold War, or a single super-dominant one, as seemed to be the case with the United States after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.   The success of the formula requires that the multilateral equilibrium could only be overthrown by an effort of a magnitude too difficult to mount. As a historical example, Kissinger has analyzed and praised the so-called Concert of Europe that was formed, after the defeat of Napoleon's France, by Great Britain, Russia, Prussia, Austria, and also recovered France. According to his interpretation, the Concert "came close to constituting the government of Europe" and achieved a long period without European-wide wars. The balance was upset by the unification of Germany at the end of the 19th century and its consequent aggressive expansionism, which led to the absurd and catastrophic First World War. Taking a similar approach, Kissinger continues to praise the construction of the European Union, which has prevented new general wars on the continent.    During his time in government, the biggest concern was that communism would end up dominating the world according to the domino theory, whereby the fall of a piece like Indochina would be followed by Burma and Thailand, as well as Indonesia (which, in fact, was very close), and from there, India, Japan, the Middle East... That's why the Vietnam war extended to Laos and Cambodia. But this is also the reason for the diplomatic opening to China, to break the Sino-Soviet bloc and achieve a certain multilateral balance.    The current interest of the discussion is that the role of the United States as the only superpower may be less exclusive and exclusionary than it seemed. A version of political realism in academia tends to analyze international relations "after hegemony" as a ground for "anarchy", that is, destructive conflicts and wars. However, the changes around the Ukrainian war can be read as a new opportunity for multilateral cooperation.    The United States has the initiative and many economic and military resources, but, paradoxically, it may have a good opportunity to expand pluralism. In the new situation of divided government between the Presidency and Congress, the most ambitious projects in domestic policy are paralyzed, so Joe Biden can focus on foreign policy, where he has more power, and expand multilateral cooperation.    The European Union is beginning to develop, for the first time, a spirited common international policy, in contrast to the dissent during the Iraq war, when the governments of Britain and Spain were on one side and those of France and Germany on the other. The rulers of China and India, which are rivals to each other, have told Russia that the world is not ready for war.    This configuration with more than three major powers points to a balance of powers capable of avoiding polarization, since, otherwise, a coalition of two-to-one preludes conflict.     Specifically, the Group of Seven, which is the nucleus of a latent world government, needs to work more closely with some members of the Group of Twenty, which includes India and China, so that its decisions are widely accepted and effective.    Negotiations between the US and the EU for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), in which substantive agreements had been reached, were paralyzed by Trump, and could now be revived.    The Trans-Pacific Agreement for Economic Cooperation was also abandoned by Trump, but the other eleven initial countries went ahead on their own and ended up signing the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), to which China has presented its candidacy. Many in the United States are clamoring for re-entry in what had been its own initiative.    And after the war in Ukraine, a new international structure will have to be defined, especially for Central and Eastern Europe, in which, as Kissinger said in a recent interview, "Russia should find a place."    Realism shows that the seeking for power explains many things, and the balance of power can prevent a general war. But when there is neither a single dominant power nor a confrontation between two, "liberal" rules and institutions may be the best mechanism for peace and multilateral cooperation.Also in Spanish in the daily La Vanguardia-click       While President Biden is not clear, and sometimes he is confusing about how the war in Ukraine could end, some other voices in Washington can speak and suggest more clearly. Several of them did it a few days ago at the Financial Times Weekend Festival, which was held, for the first time outside England, at the Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts in Washington.The first surprisingly constructive intervention was from William J. Burns, the current CIA Director. Just a year ago, he came from retirement after a long career as a diplomat, and as such, in his presentation, the conversation with an FT journalist, and the dialogue with the audience, he showed a broader vision than the usual spies. When he was Ambassador in Boris Yeltsin's Moscow in the mid-1990s, Burns already felt that the NATO expansion until the borders of Russia was "premature at best, and needlessly provocative at worst." More specifically, to push for NATO membership of Ukraine and Georgia was "a serious strategic mistake that did indelible damage" –an opinion that at the time was shared by the governments of France and Germany. In an official encounter, Putin had told him that Ukraine in NATO "would be a hostile act toward Russia."Burns emphasized, of course, that there is "absolutely no justification for the invasion of Ukraine." Yet, he resumed that kind of strategic explanation while dismissing the ideological elaborations that pretend either justify or condemn the attack. In short: Russia has "pushed back" after Ukraine moved westward away from Russian influence.In his view, nevertheless, Putin miscalculated regarding the power of the Russian Army (which was sent to a "special operation" not planned by its generals), about Ukrainian resistance, and with the supposition that the West would be distracted by elections in Germany and France. He tried to explain the recent candidacies of Sweden and Finland to NATO as a deterrent against Putin's other potential attacks in the future. But the Director of the CIA did not utter a word that could be interpreted as supporting Ukraine's NATO membership.Even more thrilling was the participation of Henry Kissinger on "the new world disorder." The former Secretary of State is 99 years old this month, announced a new book of immediate publication, and for nearly one hour was focused, clear, and insightful, also in a dialogue with the audience. Kissinger started by using his academic background and remarking that the foreign policy's main priority of Russia, which is the largest country in the world, has always been to protect its huge territory from invasions. From this perspective, after the Cold War, the country's leadership was "offended" by NATO's absorption of Eastern Europe.Now –he noted— public discussion on Ukraine is all about confrontation, but by reflecting on the previous failures of the several governments he advised, he lamented that, again, nobody knows where we are going. Kissinger had already opposed Ukraine's candidacy to NATO when President Bush and Vice-president Cheney launched it in 2008. Six years later, at the Russian occupation of Crimea, he warned that Ukraine should not join either the East or the West, but it should function as "a bridge" between the two. He had predicted that otherwise, "the drift toward confrontation would accelerate."Most striking was his warning about the use of nuclear weapons. "I would not make Ukraine's membership to NATO a key issue," he remarked at the Kennedy Center. It would be "unwise to take an adversarial position," mainly because of the horrible danger of a nuclear war. His approach was certainly in contrast with that in the 1970s, of which he was reminded, when the gibberish theory of the "domino" was used to attack one country after another. Bush and Cheney still used that approach in the early 2000s to justify "preventive wars." I got the impression that with aging, intelligent people like Kissinger may feel that it is not worth trying to deceive himself again, and despite his physical frailness (or perhaps because of that), his more mature brain moves in the direction of more honest and clear thinking. His main argument was that in the past, although confrontation was addressed to "preserve the balance of power" between the US and the Soviet Union, at the same time, he also promoted agreements for nuclear arms reduction and control. Nowadays, modern technology would produce much worse destruction, so he claimed for a "new era" in which the governments should take more care about the consequences of nuclear arms and favor diplomacy above all. Kissinger reminded the audience that, in the past, nuclear countries such as the Soviet Union and the United States accepted military defeats from non-nuclear countries, such as in Vietnam and (both) in Afghanistan. Even more now, "we have to deescalate to conventional arms and learn to live with adversarial relations." Kissinger has met Putin more than twenty times and asserted that "there is still room for negotiation" with him. In Spanish in the daily La Vanguardia

El tema planteado desea provocar una reflexión sobre los efectos del capital globalizado en las relaciones del trabajo, teniendo como referencia dos grandes bloques económicos que son la UE y el Mercosur. El primero se eligió por su historia y estructura; por la fuerza económica que tiene y por ser el único modelo de formación económica que guarda la característica de una estructura no solo económica, sino también, social y jurídica. El Mercosur, tuvo la intención de ser una UE, pero está lejos de lograr una relación más armónica y fuerte entre los estados partes, tampoco mantiene una estructura política que pueda dar seguridad a los inversionistas. Sea por las políticas internas de cada país, por el alto nivel de distinción entre los gobiernos, o, quizá, por la cultura y alto grado de individualismo y necesidad que cada Estado latino tiene de mantener sus poderes y control en las sociedades que administran. La UE ya enseñó que para tener una estructura organizada y lograr relaciones más o menos armónicas entre diferentes estados y culturas, hay que sujetar su soberanía. Por eso, la necesidad de estudiar la formación y estructura de los dos bloques para poder hacer la comparación entre ellos y concluir que, aunque el Mercosur tenga la pretensión de ser la UE, está lejos de que eso ocurra y el hecho de tener una Carta Sociolaboral no hace del Mercosur un bloque preocupado con los problemas sociales y tampoco con la creación de un derecho o de reglas supranacionales y esto se ve muy evidente en aquella normativa. Por otra parte, el hecho de la UE tener una Carta de Derechos Fundamentales con fuerza jurídica no quiere decir que tenga encontrado el equilibrio entre las libertades empresariales y los derechos sociales y del trabajador. Es necesario cuestionar el por qué los estados se asocian y establecen las relaciones económicas y financieras y la respuesta está en la necesidad que tienen de desarrollo económico y de concurrencia con otros estados y este tema está ligado a lo que se denominó como globalización, fenómeno multifacético de un proceso histórico y social que se incrementó por la velocidad que le dio la tecnología. La verdad es que la globalización es un fenómeno que precede la formación de los mercados pero, la tecnología rompió definitivamente con cualquier dificultad que se pudiera tener para el establecimiento de relaciones entre los negocios firmados entre las empresas y que pudiera garantizar la movilidad de capital y la prestación de servicios. El Consenso de Washington que fija la etapa neoliberal tuvo como uno de los objetivos, sacar a los EEUU de las deudas en las que se había metido por las inversiones militares descontroladas de Reagan, que temía a la URSS y los gastos descontrolados de su gobierno. Era necesario buscar inversiones y recuperar la economía y se propuso, entre otras medidas la desregulación de la economía y de las relaciones laborales, con menor intervención del estado, hasta el punto de eliminar el estado social. Se convenció a los países en desarrollo y más pobres, que miraban desde el otro lado del océano, de la mejor vida de los europeos y de los americanos. Hay que tener en cuenta que para la América Latina, Europa siempre fue un modelo a seguir, porque fueran los Europeos sus colonizadores, por su historia, experiencia y su Estado social. Y los EEUU era la potencia económica y tecnológica lo que hice que se aceptase la propuesta de que se podría progresar sin las interferencias del Estado ya que los mercados tienen que ser libres para hacer lo que el capital desee que haga. Para eso, la tecnología era una arma fundamental y el instrumento para garantizar la velocidad de la información y de los ajustes de los negocios. El siglo XX se conoce por la productividad y el XXI por la tecnología. Las aperturas de mercado y los bloques económicos generaron una competencia desenfrenada y el debilitamiento de las empresas nacionales. Los pactos económicos firmados entre los países no lograron globalizar el mundo, pero son responsables de la transnacionalización empresarial facilitando la circulación del capital, de la mercancía y de las prestaciones de servicios. Los problemas de movilidad de trabajadores están ligados a la movilidad de capital. Los pactos internacionales entre los países producen efectos en las relaciones del trabajo y un impacto brutal en las empresas locales: flexibilización, reducción de costes, descentralización de las relaciones, vulnerabilidad de las relaciones laborales. Todavía, esos problemas no tienen importancia para los negocios económicos, justamente porque es un problema local y no global: para los pactos transnacionales no les interesan las cuestiones locales y junto con ellas los problemas de los trabajadores y sociales, hasta que esos problemas locales pasen a territorio americano o de la UE que mueven 50% del comercio mundial y acumulan 60% del PIB mundial (p. 269). Ahora los países del Sur (como dice Boaventura Santos en las Epistemologías del Sur) pasan a tener problemas que antes se decía que pasaban en los países más pobres o en desarrollo. Ahí surgen dos líneas de pensamiento para detener los efectos de la globalización: 1. Posneoliberalismo: fundado en el nacimiento de la socialdemocracia global (élites que necesitan promover sus intereses) – mezclan la socialdemocracia europea y el liberalismo new deal; 2. Contrahegemónica: vuelta su atención primordial a las luchas contra la exclusión social, redistribución de los recursos simbólicos, políticos, sociales y materiales, se hace a través de la acción colectiva global por movimientos locales, nacionales y globales; luchas nacionales o locales cuyo éxito impulsa su reproducción en otras localidades. Hechas las consideraciones generales, el capítulo 2 trata sobre los temas de la movilidad de trabajadores. Se hace la distinción entre los fenómenos de las migraciones y trabajadores fronterizos para distinguir esos movimientos que son inherentes a las personas y de las ganas que tienen de moverse, de aquello que es uno de los principales problemas para los trabajadores (y también para las empresas puesto que para ellas resulta una posibilidad de competencia desleal) que son los desplazamientos. No obstante en los pactos internacionales, excepto en la UE, nadie ha tratado este tema. Los tratados de la UE (cuya historia se explica en el capítulo 1 en una síntesis muy apretada) trataron del tema e inserieron en su estructura reglas que fueron destinadas a garantizar las 4 libertades: prestación de servicios, capitales, mercancías y personas. El TFUE trata el tema como un principio y una garantía. Los desplazamientos resultan de una libertad empresarial, pero tiene efectos sociales muy importantes, ya que la falta de regulación viabiliza la precarización de derechos de los trabajadores y de la mano de obra en general. Es importante decir que desde la formación de la CE (1951) hasta la AUE (1987) hubo un predominio económico sobre el social en la UE. La posición del TJE, hasta 1969 no conocía el tema de los derechos fundamentales y solo lo ha hecho, por la primera vez en 1969 – agnosticismo valorativo (caso Ulm x Stauder = no quiso divulgar para sus vendedores los nombres de los beneficiarios de la venta de mantequilla a precio reducido). Pero solo en 1974 (fase de la internacionalización – caso Nold que cuestiona la decisión de la Comisión Europea que impuso nuevas reglas para la venta de carbón y la empresa Nold que tenía un tamaño pequeño y negocios esencialmente particulares se quedaría con las ventas perjudicadas lo que violaba su derecho fundamental de libertad empresarial – el TJ reconoce que los derechos fundamentales son parte integrante de los principios generales del derecho y que por eso hay que garantizarlo); y en 1975 en el caso Rutili, de nacionalidad italiana y con permiso de residencia en Francia, tuvo decretada su expulsión y de su familia por el Ministerio de Interior por razones de actividades sindicales. Fue la primera vez que el TJ invocó la aplicación del CEDH que, después fue introducido en la CDFUE justo en su preámbulo, documento establecido en el seno del Consejo de Europa para la Protección de los Derechos Humanos y de las Libertades Fundamentales y que ahora desafía al TJUE al manifestarse sobre el procedimiento de intervención previa en los casos sometidos al TEDH (la cuestión de la vulneración de la estructura de la legislación europea al autorizar que un órgano ajeno a la UE examine cuestiones relativas al derecho de la UE – Dictamen 2014 TJE). Desde ahí se estudia la evolución de la jurisprudencia del TJE en los casos del enfrentamiento entre los derechos empresariales y los derechos sociales y de los trabajadores, muy evidentes en los desplazamientos y que, por la reiteración con la que se presentan, importó en la publicación de la Directiva 96/71 de 1996 (actualizada por la 2014/67 de 2014) que, lejos de armonizar los intereses, tiene un contenido económico y resulta en sentencias de contenidos que, en el origen, antes de la publicación, eran de naturaleza más social y estaba fundada en la tutela de derechos sociales (Portugaia y Rush Portuguesa) y, después, (caso Viking Laval) retrató un fuerte cambio en el entendimiento del TJ que asume una postura más económica, esto es, hay que garantizar la competencia entre las empresas aunque esto conlleve un sacrificio de los derechos sociales. Al final, se hace referencia al fallo Ammattilitto donde el TJ parece rescatar la acción sindical que había sido neutralizada por los fallos anteriores: deja claro que la acción del sindicato no puede ser obstruida por el Estado de acogida y que las empresas en el marco de una prestación transnacional de servicios, deben garantizar a los trabajadores desplazados temporalmente en su territorio las condiciones de trabajo y empleo relativas a las materias enumeradas en esa disposición. La Directiva no armoniza el contenido material de las normas imperativas de protección mínima, pero remite a los efectos de la legislación o al uso nacional del Estado miembro en cuyo territorio el trabajador se encuentre desplazado. El cierre del capítulo se hace con una consideración sobre el principio de la territorialidad que servirá como un paradigma en la interpretación a los casos que necesitan de solución cuanto a la ley aplicable a los distintos contratos de trabajo cuando firmados y ejecutados en sitios distintos; el AGCS y la OMC – este órgano internacional no tiene ninguna preocupación con las relaciones sociales o laborales y sus estrategias son puramente económicas. La OMC nació en 1995 : aborda cuestiones de mercancías , servicios y propiedad intelectual y el hecho de tener en el artículo V bis del AGCS una regla que permita la integración del mercado del trabajo entre sus miembros, no deja de tener por objetivo el deseo de ver pronto el logro de niveles cada vez más elevados de liberalización del comercio de servicios a través de rondas sucesivas de negociaciones multilaterales encaminadas a promover los intereses de todos los participantes, sobre la base de ventajas mutuas, y a lograr un equilibrio general de derechos y obligaciones, respetando debidamente al mismo tiempo los objetivos de las políticas nacionales. Cree que solo la apertura comercial y económica podría promover el crecimiento económico real, lo que contradice el último informe publicado por la ONU sobre los objetivos del desarrollo del milenio (2015) que apuesta por la mejoría de la calidad de vida de las personas en el mundo, pero de manera desigual. Ninguno de los índices económicos tienen en consideración la vulnerabilidad de la mano de obra o su precarización, ni las violaciones de derechos. Este tema es asunto de la OIT que no tiene la fuerza de contenido económico para hacer que los países y las instituciones tengan ganas de hacer cumplir sus directivas y normas. Hay que cuestionar si la OMC tendría que tener obligaciones con los derechos humanos , pues, un 84% de sus miembros firmaron el Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales de las Naciones Unidas (PIDESC) – el hecho de que los estados que crearon los organismos internacionales ratificasen pactos, no vincula que ellos tengan las mismas obligaciones convencionales de los Estados. En el mismo sentido lo tiene decidido la CEDH. Es importante estudiar el AGCS en el contexto de la prestación transnacional y nacional de servicios, pues la OMC orienta que los países tienen que tener una economía cada vez más abierta con compromisos que deben asumir los países para aumentar cada vez más el capital, que es cada vez más global, pero no responde a las 3 preguntas: desinterés por el mercado interno; limitación del poder estatal para gobernar las variables económicas; el predominio de ideologías que no privilegian al factor trabajo. Al final, el último capítulo está fundado en la posición de los Estados. Hace un repaso muy sencillo por la historia para entender la fuerte crisis de 2008 considerada por nosotros como un marco para las discusiones sobre los nuevos pactos económicos, la posición de la OIT y de la OMC. A partir de aquí, las desigualdades sociales se hundieron, siendo necesario reflexionar sobre las crisis económicas y las relaciones de trabajo en este siglo. La tecnología y la globalización tienen un efecto positivo muy fuerte: tornan el mundo más transparente. El modelo de trabajador y condiciones del trabajo ya no son los mismos. La competitividad entre las empresas y el nuevo perfil del trabajador, sumado a la movilidad del capital y la velocidad de las informaciones aumentan la tensión entre la libertad de capitales y los derechos sociales y laborales. Cuanto menos especializada es la mano de obra, mayor es el regionalismo y la fijación del trabajador a un determinado territorio. Esto aumenta los riesgos de explotación y reduce las oportunidades. El proceso ideológico formador de la libertad de mercado de empresa, favoreció el capital. Surge la necesidad de hacer el "redescubrimiento democrático del trabajo, pues el capitalismo es antidemocratico" (Boaventura), lo que nos están indicando los pactos el TTP y el TTIP, cuyas referencias que se hacen son las que se pueden encontrar, pues lo que se sabe es que se hacen a puerta cerrada y al margen del conocimiento público. La crisis en las tutelas y las relaciones del trabajo es fruto, aún, de las situaciones políticas, sociales y jurídicas de los estados y del modo como se comportan los gobiernos. Hay que retomar el concepto de soberanía, olvidado en algún momento de la historia de la globalización: el Estado tiene el poder de decisión que le es otorgado por la sociedad civil y debe preocuparse por el bienestar de su pueblo. El límite de las decisiones del Estado está en la Constitución de los estados, en los derechos sociales y fundamentales. Los Estados no pueden temer al mercado que, además depende de las administraciones y políticas de los Estados. No se trata de ignorar que el mundo está interconectado, pero no someterlo a normas económicas de organismos como la OMC – Dani Rodrik: "si los Estados son indispensables para el funcionamiento de los mercados nacionales, son también el principal obstáculo para el establecimiento de mercados globales" . Están las compañías sujetas a una paradoja: dependen de los mercados internos porque les faltan apuntalamientos institucionales fijados por ellos. Por eso funcionan en sus límites y de acuerdo con sus propias reglas. Hay que fijar algunas alternativas para la deconstrucción del sistema creado por el neoliberalismo. Son las proposiciones: 1. Hacer el análisis social del contrato de trabajo y de los impactos que provendrán de las medidas económicas en la sociedad; 2. Fijar normativas mínimas (el núcleo duro) por medio de las cuales no se permitirán negociaciones individuales: 3. Eso servirá para que los Tribunales con jurisdicción global para juzgar cuestiones globales, puedan hacer una interpretación basada en razones sociales y no con objetivos puramente económicos; 4. Programas estatales que consideren la progresividad de los derechos y que puedan garantizar las estabilidades de las relaciones; 5. Considerar que, aunque las relaciones culturales, económicas, financieras sean globales, los trabajadores siguen siendo locales; 6. Quitar poder de instituciones cono FMI, Banco Mundial y OMC y atribuirlos en mayor escala a órganos sociales como la OIT y la ONU, esto es, las orientaciones sociales deben tener el mismo contenido de fuerza que las económicas; 7. Inclusión de grupos sociales que se encuentran alijados y olvidados del sistema pero que sufren los mayores impactos de las explotaciones, como ocurre por ejemplo, con el pueblo de Amazonia; 8. Incrementar la RSE; 9. Incrementar los AMG y los sindicatos globales puesto que son una importante vía para obtener el compromiso de las empresas a nivel global. ; El tema planteado desea provocar una reflexión sobre los efectos del capital globalizado en las relaciones del trabajo, teniendo como referencia dos grandes bloques económicos que son la UE y el Mercosur. El primero se eligió por su historia y estructura; por la fuerza económica que tiene y por ser el único modelo de formación económica que guarda la característica de una estructura no solo económica, sino también, social y jurídica. El Mercosur, tuvo la intención de ser una UE, pero está lejos de lograr una relación más armónica y fuerte entre los estados partes, tampoco mantiene una estructura política que pueda dar seguridad a los inversionistas. Sea por las políticas internas de cada país, por el alto nivel de distinción entre los gobiernos, o, quizá, por la cultura y alto grado de individualismo y necesidad que cada Estado latino tiene de mantener sus poderes y control en las sociedades que administran. La UE ya enseñó que para tener una estructura organizada y lograr relaciones más o menos armónicas entre diferentes estados y culturas, hay que sujetar su soberanía. Por eso, la necesidad de estudiar la formación y estructura de los dos bloques para poder hacer la comparación entre ellos y concluir que, aunque el Mercosur tenga la pretensión de ser la UE, está lejos de que eso ocurra y el hecho de tener una Carta Sociolaboral no hace del Mercosur un bloque preocupado con los problemas sociales y tampoco con la creación de un derecho o de reglas supranacionales y esto se ve muy evidente en aquella normativa. Por otra parte, el hecho de la UE tener una Carta de Derechos Fundamentales con fuerza jurídica no quiere decir que tenga encontrado el equilibrio entre las libertades empresariales y los derechos sociales y del trabajador. Es necesario cuestionar el por qué los estados se asocian y establecen las relaciones económicas y financieras y la respuesta está en la necesidad que tienen de desarrollo económico y de concurrencia con otros estados y este tema está ligado a lo que se denominó como globalización, fenómeno multifacético de un proceso histórico y social que se incrementó por la velocidad que le dio la tecnología. La verdad es que la globalización es un fenómeno que precede la formación de los mercados pero, la tecnología rompió definitivamente con cualquier dificultad que se pudiera tener para el establecimiento de relaciones entre los negocios firmados entre las empresas y que pudiera garantizar la movilidad de capital y la prestación de servicios. El Consenso de Washington que fija la etapa neoliberal tuvo como uno de los objetivos, sacar a los EEUU de las deudas en las que se había metido por las inversiones militares descontroladas de Reagan, que temía a la URSS y los gastos descontrolados de su gobierno. Era necesario buscar inversiones y recuperar la economía y se propuso, entre otras medidas la desregulación de la economía y de las relaciones laborales, con menor intervención del estado, hasta el punto de eliminar el estado social. Se convenció a los países en desarrollo y más pobres, que miraban desde el otro lado del océano, de la mejor vida de los europeos y de los americanos. Hay que tener en cuenta que para la América Latina, Europa siempre fue un modelo a seguir, porque fueran los Europeos sus colonizadores, por su historia, experiencia y su Estado social. Y los EEUU era la potencia económica y tecnológica lo que hice que se aceptase la propuesta de que se podría progresar sin las interferencias del Estado ya que los mercados tienen que ser libres para hacer lo que el capital desee que haga. Para eso, la tecnología era una arma fundamental y el instrumento para garantizar la velocidad de la información y de los ajustes de los negocios. El siglo XX se conoce por la productividad y el XXI por la tecnología. Las aperturas de mercado y los bloques económicos generaron una competencia desenfrenada y el debilitamiento de las empresas nacionales. Los pactos económicos firmados entre los países no lograron globalizar el mundo, pero son responsables de la transnacionalización empresarial facilitando la circulación del capital, de la mercancía y de las prestaciones de servicios. Los problemas de movilidad de trabajadores están ligados a la movilidad de capital. Los pactos internacionales entre los países producen efectos en las relaciones del trabajo y un impacto brutal en las empresas locales: flexibilización, reducción de costes, descentralización de las relaciones, vulnerabilidad de las relaciones laborales. Todavía, esos problemas no tienen importancia para los negocios económicos, justamente porque es un problema local y no global: para los pactos transnacionales no les interesan las cuestiones locales y junto con ellas los problemas de los trabajadores y sociales, hasta que esos problemas locales pasen a territorio americano o de la UE que mueven 50% del comercio mundial y acumulan 60% del PIB mundial (p. 269). Ahora los países del Sur (como dice Boaventura Santos en las Epistemologías del Sur) pasan a tener problemas que antes se decía que pasaban en los países más pobres o en desarrollo. Ahí surgen dos líneas de pensamiento para detener los efectos de la globalización: 1. Posneoliberalismo: fundado en el nacimiento de la socialdemocracia global (élites que necesitan promover sus intereses) – mezclan la socialdemocracia europea y el liberalismo new deal; 2. Contrahegemónica: vuelta su atención primordial a las luchas contra la exclusión social, redistribución de los recursos simbólicos, políticos, sociales y materiales, se hace a través de la acción colectiva global por movimientos locales, nacionales y globales; luchas nacionales o locales cuyo éxito impulsa su reproducción en otras localidades. Hechas las consideraciones generales, el capítulo 2 trata sobre los temas de la movilidad de trabajadores. Se hace la distinción entre los fenómenos de las migraciones y trabajadores fronterizos para distinguir esos movimientos que son inherentes a las personas y de las ganas que tienen de moverse, de aquello que es uno de los principales problemas para los trabajadores (y también para las empresas puesto que para ellas resulta una posibilidad de competencia desleal) que son los desplazamientos. No obstante en los pactos internacionales, excepto en la UE, nadie ha tratado este tema. Los tratados de la UE (cuya historia se explica en el capítulo 1 en una síntesis muy apretada) trataron del tema e inserieron en su estructura reglas que fueron destinadas a garantizar las 4 libertades: prestación de servicios, capitales, mercancías y personas. El TFUE trata el tema como un principio y una garantía. Los desplazamientos resultan de una libertad empresarial, pero tiene efectos sociales muy importantes, ya que la falta de regulación viabiliza la precarización de derechos de los trabajadores y de la mano de obra en general. Es importante decir que desde la formación de la CE (1951) hasta la AUE (1987) hubo un predominio económico sobre el social en la UE. La posición del TJE, hasta 1969 no conocía el tema de los derechos fundamentales y solo lo ha hecho, por la primera vez en 1969 – agnosticismo valorativo (caso Ulm x Stauder = no quiso divulgar para sus vendedores los nombres de los beneficiarios de la venta de mantequilla a precio reducido). Pero solo en 1974 (fase de la internacionalización – caso Nold que cuestiona la decisión de la Comisión Europea que impuso nuevas reglas para la venta de carbón y la empresa Nold que tenía un tamaño pequeño y negocios esencialmente particulares se quedaría con las ventas perjudicadas lo que violaba su derecho fundamental de libertad empresarial – el TJ reconoce que los derechos fundamentales son parte integrante de los principios generales del derecho y que por eso hay que garantizarlo); y en 1975 en el caso Rutili, de nacionalidad italiana y con permiso de residencia en Francia, tuvo decretada su expulsión y de su familia por el Ministerio de Interior por razones de actividades sindicales. Fue la primera vez que el TJ invocó la aplicación del CEDH que, después fue introducido en la CDFUE justo en su preámbulo, documento establecido en el seno del Consejo de Europa para la Protección de los Derechos Humanos y de las Libertades Fundamentales y que ahora desafía al TJUE al manifestarse sobre el procedimiento de intervención previa en los casos sometidos al TEDH (la cuestión de la vulneración de la estructura de la legislación europea al autorizar que un órgano ajeno a la UE examine cuestiones relativas al derecho de la UE – Dictamen 2014 TJE). Desde ahí se estudia la evolución de la jurisprudencia del TJE en los casos del enfrentamiento entre los derechos empresariales y los derechos sociales y de los trabajadores, muy evidentes en los desplazamientos y que, por la reiteración con la que se presentan, importó en la publicación de la Directiva 96/71 de 1996 (actualizada por la 2014/67 de 2014) que, lejos de armonizar los intereses, tiene un contenido económico y resulta en sentencias de contenidos que, en el origen, antes de la publicación, eran de naturaleza más social y estaba fundada en la tutela de derechos sociales (Portugaia y Rush Portuguesa) y, después, (caso Viking Laval) retrató un fuerte cambio en el entendimiento del TJ que asume una postura más económica, esto es, hay que garantizar la competencia entre las empresas aunque esto conlleve un sacrificio de los derechos sociales. Al final, se hace referencia al fallo Ammattilitto donde el TJ parece rescatar la acción sindical que había sido neutralizada por los fallos anteriores: deja claro que la acción del sindicato no puede ser obstruida por el Estado de acogida y que las empresas en el marco de una prestación transnacional de servicios, deben garantizar a los trabajadores desplazados temporalmente en su territorio las condiciones de trabajo y empleo relativas a las materias enumeradas en esa disposición. La Directiva no armoniza el contenido material de las normas imperativas de protección mínima, pero remite a los efectos de la legislación o al uso nacional del Estado miembro en cuyo territorio el trabajador se encuentre desplazado. El cierre del capítulo se hace con una consideración sobre el principio de la territorialidad que servirá como un paradigma en la interpretación a los casos que necesitan de solución cuanto a la ley aplicable a los distintos contratos de trabajo cuando firmados y ejecutados en sitios distintos; el AGCS y la OMC – este órgano internacional no tiene ninguna preocupación con las relaciones sociales o laborales y sus estrategias son puramente económicas. La OMC nació en 1995 : aborda cuestiones de mercancías , servicios y propiedad intelectual y el hecho de tener en el artículo V bis del AGCS una regla que permita la integración del mercado del trabajo entre sus miembros, no deja de tener por objetivo el deseo de ver pronto el logro de niveles cada vez más elevados de liberalización del comercio de servicios a través de rondas sucesivas de negociaciones multilaterales encaminadas a promover los intereses de todos los participantes, sobre la base de ventajas mutuas, y a lograr un equilibrio general de derechos y obligaciones, respetando debidamente al mismo tiempo los objetivos de las políticas nacionales. Cree que solo la apertura comercial y económica podría promover el crecimiento económico real, lo que contradice el último informe publicado por la ONU sobre los objetivos del desarrollo del milenio (2015) que apuesta por la mejoría de la calidad de vida de las personas en el mundo, pero de manera desigual. Ninguno de los índices económicos tienen en consideración la vulnerabilidad de la mano de obra o su precarización, ni las violaciones de derechos. Este tema es asunto de la OIT que no tiene la fuerza de contenido económico para hacer que los países y las instituciones tengan ganas de hacer cumplir sus directivas y normas. Hay que cuestionar si la OMC tendría que tener obligaciones con los derechos humanos , pues, un 84% de sus miembros firmaron el Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales de las Naciones Unidas (PIDESC) – el hecho de que los estados que crearon los organismos internacionales ratificasen pactos, no vincula que ellos tengan las mismas obligaciones convencionales de los Estados. En el mismo sentido lo tiene decidido la CEDH. Es importante estudiar el AGCS en el contexto de la prestación transnacional y nacional de servicios, pues la OMC orienta que los países tienen que tener una economía cada vez más abierta con compromisos que deben asumir los países para aumentar cada vez más el capital, que es cada vez más global, pero no responde a las 3 preguntas: desinterés por el mercado interno; limitación del poder estatal para gobernar las variables económicas; el predominio de ideologías que no privilegian al factor trabajo. Al final, el último capítulo está fundado en la posición de los Estados. Hace un repaso muy sencillo por la historia para entender la fuerte crisis de 2008 considerada por nosotros como un marco para las discusiones sobre los nuevos pactos económicos, la posición de la OIT y de la OMC. A partir de aquí, las desigualdades sociales se hundieron, siendo necesario reflexionar sobre las crisis económicas y las relaciones de trabajo en este siglo. La tecnología y la globalización tienen un efecto positivo muy fuerte: tornan el mundo más transparente. El modelo de trabajador y condiciones del trabajo ya no son los mismos. La competitividad entre las empresas y el nuevo perfil del trabajador, sumado a la movilidad del capital y la velocidad de las informaciones aumentan la tensión entre la libertad de capitales y los derechos sociales y laborales. Cuanto menos especializada es la mano de obra, mayor es el regionalismo y la fijación del trabajador a un determinado territorio. Esto aumenta los riesgos de explotación y reduce las oportunidades. El proceso ideológico formador de la libertad de mercado de empresa, favoreció el capital. Surge la necesidad de hacer el "redescubrimiento democrático del trabajo, pues el capitalismo es antidemocratico" (Boaventura), lo que nos están indicando los pactos el TTP y el TTIP, cuyas referencias que se hacen son las que se pueden encontrar, pues lo que se sabe es que se hacen a puerta cerrada y al margen del conocimiento público. La crisis en las tutelas y las relaciones del trabajo es fruto, aún, de las situaciones políticas, sociales y jurídicas de los estados y del modo como se comportan los gobiernos. Hay que retomar el concepto de soberanía, olvidado en algún momento de la historia de la globalización: el Estado tiene el poder de decisión que le es otorgado por la sociedad civil y debe preocuparse por el bienestar de su pueblo. El límite de las decisiones del Estado está en la Constitución de los estados, en los derechos sociales y fundamentales. Los Estados no pueden temer al mercado que, además depende de las administraciones y políticas de los Estados. No se trata de ignorar que el mundo está interconectado, pero no someterlo a normas económicas de organismos como la OMC – Dani Rodrik: "si los Estados son indispensables para el funcionamiento de los mercados nacionales, son también el principal obstáculo para el establecimiento de mercados globales" . Están las compañías sujetas a una paradoja: dependen de los mercados internos porque les faltan apuntalamientos institucionales fijados por ellos. Por eso funcionan en sus límites y de acuerdo con sus propias reglas. Hay que fijar algunas alternativas para la deconstrucción del sistema creado por el neoliberalismo. Son las proposiciones: 1. Hacer el análisis social del contrato de trabajo y de los impactos que provendrán de las medidas económicas en la sociedad; 2. Fijar normativas mínimas (el núcleo duro) por medio de las cuales no se permitirán negociaciones individuales: 3. Eso servirá para que los Tribunales con jurisdicción global para juzgar cuestiones globales, puedan hacer una interpretación basada en razones sociales y no con objetivos puramente económicos; 4. Programas estatales que consideren la progresividad de los derechos y que puedan garantizar las estabilidades de las relaciones; 5. Considerar que, aunque las relaciones culturales, económicas, financieras sean globales, los trabajadores siguen siendo locales; 6. Quitar poder de instituciones cono FMI, Banco Mundial y OMC y atribuirlos en mayor escala a órganos sociales como la OIT y la ONU, esto es, las orientaciones sociales deben tener el mismo contenido de fuerza que las económicas; 7. Inclusión de grupos sociales que se encuentran alijados y olvidados del sistema pero que sufren los mayores impactos de las explotaciones, como ocurre por ejemplo, con el pueblo de Amazonia; 8. Incrementar la RSE; 9. Incrementar los AMG y los sindicatos globales puesto que son una importante vía para obtener el compromiso de las empresas a nivel global.

Bertrand Badie on the Trump Moment, the Science
of Suffering, and IR between Power and Weakness



Lire en français




IR retains a traditional focus on the
game of power between states as its defining characteristic. But what, so asks Bertrand
Badie, if this means that our discipline is based on a negation of our humanity?
A giant in Francophone IR, Badie has labored to instead place human suffering
at the center of analysis of the international, by letting loose sociological
insights on a truly global empirical reality. In this Talk, Badie—amongst others—challenges the centrality of the idea of
state power, which makes little sense in a world where most of the IR agenda is
defined by issues emanating from state weakness; argues for the centrality of
suffering to a more apt IR; and uses this to contextualize the Trump Moment.




Print version (pdf) of this Talk



What is (or should be), according to
you, the biggest challenge / principal debate in current International
Relations? What is your position or answer to this challenge / in this debate?



Unquestionably, it would be the matter of change. It is time to conceptualize,
and further than that, to theorize the change that is happening in the field of
International Relations (IR). Humans have always had the feeling that they are
living in a period of upheaval, but contemporary IR is really characterized by several
landmarks that illustrate the drastic extent of change. I see at least three of
them.



The first one concerns the inclusive nature of the international system.
For the first time in the history of mankind, the international system covers
nearly the whole humanity, while the Westphalian system was an exclusively European
dynamic in which the United States of America entered to turn it into a system,
that I would call, Euro-North-American.



The second element, around which publications abound (see notably Mary
Kaldor's work, Theory Talk #30), is the deep mutation of the nature of conflict. War used to be, in
the Westphalian model, a matter of competition between powers. Today we have
the feeling that weakness is replacing power, in that power cannot any longer
function as central explanatory term of conflictual situations, which are
rather manifestations of state weakness. Think of 'failing' or 'collapsing'
states, which refers to the coming apart of nations that have been built badly
as well as the deliquescence of social ties. This new form of conflictuality
completely turns the international environment upside down and constitutes a
second indicator of transformation.



The third aspect concerns mobility. Our international system used to be
fully based on the idea of territory and boundaries, on the idea that fixity
establishes the competences of States in a very precise way. In this
perspective, the state refers to territory—as the definition given by Max Weber
states very clearly—but today this territorial notion of politics is challenged
by a full range of mobilities, composed of international flows that can be
either material, informational, or human.



These are three indicators illustrating a deep transformation of the
inner nature of IR that encourage me to speak about 'intersocial relations'
rather than 'interstate relations'. The notion of interstate relations no
longer captures the entirety of the global game. Our whole theory of IR was
based on the Westphalian model as it came out of the peace of Westphalia, as it
was confirmed by the accomplishment of the nation-state construction process
and as it dominated the historical flow of international events until the fall
of the Berlin wall.



Until the fall of the wall, all that was not related to Europe or to the
United States of America, or more precisely North-America, was simply called 'periphery',
which says enough. Today, by contrast, the periphery is central at least
regarding conflictuality. We should therefore drop our Westphalian prism and
build up new analytical tools for IR that would take these mutations as their
point of departure. Doing away with our Westphalian approach to IR would mean
questioning both our classical IR theories and questioning the practical models
of action in international politics, which means the uses of diplomacy and
warfare.





How did you arrive at where you
currently are in your thinking about International Relations?



You know when we write, when we work, we are first of all influenced by
our dissatisfaction. The classical Westphalian approach to IR, as I said
earlier, did not satisfy me as I had the feeling that it was focusing on events
that no longer had the importance that we kept giving them—for instance the arms
race, great power politics, or the traditional diplomatic negotiations—while I
was seeing, maybe this was the trigger, that the greatest part of suffering in
the world was coming from places that IR theory was not really covering.



I have always told my students that IR is the science of human suffering.
This suffering exists of course where we are—in Europe, in North America, they
exist everywhere in the world—but the greatest part is outside of the
Westphalian area, so the classical approach to IR gives a marginal and
distorted image. Africa and the Middle East seen through the Westphalian prism are
a dull image, strongly different from the extraordinary wealth, both for good and
bad, that these areas of the world have. I've also always held that in a world
where 6 to 9 million people starve to death each year, the main foci of traditional
IR were derisory. Even terrorism, to which we collectively attribute so much
importance, hardly comes near how important a challenge food security is.



My three latest books take a stand against traditional IR theories. In Diplomacy of
Connivance (2012) I tried to
show that the great power game is really a game way that is much more
integrated than we usually say and that this game plays out in all multilateral
fora. There is indeed a club, and that is precisely what I wanted to describe,
a club of powers—one which results to the detriment of less powerful members in
the international system.



In Le Temps des humiliés ('the
era of the humiliated', 2014), I tried to crystallize what the classical theory
could not express, which is domination seen through the lens of the dominated,
humiliation as felt by the humiliated, violence as experienced by the
desperate. For instance, even if we look at powers as accomplished as China
today—sharing the first place with the USA in terms of GDP—we have to admit
that their historical experience of humiliation constitutes a huge source of inspiration
when it comes to the elaboration of its foreign policy.



And then, in my last book Nous ne
sommes plus seuls au monde ('we are no longer alone in the world', 2016), this
critique was even more explicit. We are writing an IR that encompasses only about
one billion of human beings, while forgetting all the others. Today it is
simply no longer true that these old powers are setting the international
agenda. Global politics today is written by the little, the weak, the dominated;
often with recourse to extreme forms of violence, but this needs to be analyzed
and understood, which would mean to totally change the IR theory.



We should not forget that in large part, IR theory was a given as the USA
triumphed in 1945. The well-known 'great power politics' that dominates
traditional IR theory, inaugurated by Morgenthau and supported by so many others,
described what was true at that time: the ability of American power to set us
free from the Nazi monster. Today the challenge is strongly different, and it
is by the way meaningful that two of the greatest American internationalist
political scientists, Robert Keohane (TheoryTalk #9) and Ned Lebow (Theory Talk #53),
have both written books that elude to the end of this global order
(respectively After Hegemony and Goodbye Hegemony). Well what interests
me is exactly to dig into what comes after hegemony.





What would a student
need to become a specialist in International Relations or understand the world
in a global way?



First of all, I would advise them to rename their science, as I said
earlier, and to call it intersocial relations. The future of what we call IR
comes down to the ability to understand the extremely rich, multiple and
diversified interactions that are happening among and across the world's
societies. It does not mean that we have to completely abandon the state-centric
perspective, but rather dethrone states from the middle of this multiplicity of
actors in order to realize how very often these states are powerless when faced
with these different actors. That would be my first advice.



My second advice would be to look
ahead and not back. Do not let yourself be dominated by the Westphalian model,
and to try to build up what we need—since almost nothing has been done yet
today to construct this post-Westphalian, meta-Westphalian model. Beyond power,
there are things that we still misidentify or overlook while they are the driving
forces of today's and tomorrow's IR. From this point of view, sociology could
prove particularly useful. I consider, for instance, that Émile Durkheim is a very important inspiration to understand the
world today. Here is an author to study and to apply to IR.



The third advice that I would give them would be to not forget that IR
or intersocial relations are indeed the sciences of human suffering. We should
be able to place suffering at the core of the thinking. We've lost far too much
time staring at power, now it is time to move on to place human suffering at
the center. Why? First of all because it is ethically better; maybe will we be
able to learn from it? But also because in today's actual international
politics suffering is more proactive than power, which is not necessarily
optimistic but if recognized, would allow us a better questioning of new forms
of conflictuality. Perhaps unfortunately, the international agenda is no longer
fixed with canons, but with tears. Maybe this is the key point on which we
should concentrate our reflection.



Your insistence on placing suffering at the center of
IR scholarship seems to place you firmly alongside those who recognize "grievance" ratherthan "greed" as a central logic of international politics. What do you make of this parallel?



You are right: the idea of grievance, of recrimination, is a structuring
logic of the international game today. We did not see it coming for two
reasons. First of all because our traditional analysis of international
politics presupposed a unity of time, as if the African time, the Chinese time,
the Indian time and the European time where all identical. Yet this is
completely wrong because we, in our European culture, have not understood that
before Westphalia there were
political models, political histories, that profoundly marked the people that would
then shape contemporary politics. Remember that China is 4000 years of empire,
remember that precolonial Africa was composed of kingdoms, empires,
civilizations, philosophies, arts... Remember that India also is multi-millenary.
The Westphalian time came to totally deny and crush this temporality, this
historicity, almost in a negationist way, which means that, in the spirit of
those who were defending the Westphalian model, only this model was associated
to the Renaissance; and that the age of enlightenment and reason with a big R
had a calling to reformat the world as if it were a hard drive. This was a
senseless bet, a bet for which our European ancestors who led it had excuses
because at that time we did not know all these histories, at that time we did
not have all the knowledge we today have of the other and thus we simply
resolved it, through the negation of alterity. Yet, IR ought on the contrary aspire
to the accomplishment of alterity. Inevitably, all those who saw themselves
denied their historicity, over several centuries and even several millenaries,
accumulated a feeling of recrimination, of particularly deep grievances.



The second element is that all of this happened in a context of
disequilibrium of power resources, linked to different factors that reflected
indeed the fact that at a given moment of time western powers were both
literally and figuratively better armed than other societies. Abovementioned negation
of alterity was mapped onto, and amplified, by the forceful imposition of a
multilateral system that turned into the worst situation, into a proclaimed
hierarchy of cultures; as a result and there were, as Jules Ferry put it in the France
of the 19th century, 'races'; as in, 'We have the obligation to
educate inferior races'. It is not the beginning of history, but it is the
beginning of a history of humiliation. And through subsequent waves of globalization,
this humiliation has turned into a central nerve running through international
life. A nerve that has been used by both the powerful, who made a tool out of
humiliating the others to better dominate them (think here of the opium wars, colonization)
and simultaneously a nerve that fed the reaction of mobilization in the extra-Westphalian
world by those that had to stand up against those who were humiliating them. So
you see how it truly lies at the basis of IR. In my mind, it became a forceful paradigm,
it explains everything, even though others factors continue to weigh in on
actual dynamics.



In order to appreciate all this, we need a sociological approach, which
has for me two aspects. Both these aspects must be considered together for the
approach to be well understood. The first one is a timeless aspect, which is to
consider that everywhere and in all eras politics is a social product. Politics
cannot be understood as somehow outside society. This I would say contradicts the
majority of IR scholars, who believe excessively in the autonomy of politics
and of the state—even if only for analytical purposes. The second element of
this sociological approach is the historical or temporal component. That is
what I was talking about earlier: with globalization the social fabric strongly
progressed compared to the political fabric, and considering that intersocial
relations grew, we need a sociological approach to understand them.





Do you think that the Trump period constitutes a
fundamental break with the conduct of IR?



Trump himself maybe not, but what he represents certainly. If we look at
the USA today we see, since the new millennium, three models succeeding each
other. After 11-09 there was a time of neo-conservatism where globalization was
considered by American leaders as a means or maybe a chance to universalize the
American model, willingly or not. By force, as was the case in Iraq in 2003.
This model failed.



This lead to a second model which I would describe as a liberal model,
neo-liberal, incarnated by Obama who learnt from the lessons of the failure of neo-conservatism,
and had the courage to question the hypothesis hitherto considered as indisputable
of American leadership in the world, and who considered that the USA could win
only through soft power or smart power or free-trade. That is the reason why
Obama was just a little bit interventionist and was counting a lot on the TTIP
and on all these transregional agreements.



With Trump we arrive at a third model, one that I would call
neo-nationalist, that looks at globalization in a different way. In his perspective,
globalization constitutes a chance to satisfy the national American interests. The
idea of the national comes back after a long interlude of a globalizing vision.
It does not mean that we are not interventionist anymore. What happened in
Syria proves it. It means that we will intervene not according to the needs of
globalization but rather to American interests. It is about sharing a strong
and powerful image of the USA on the one hand and on the other serving the
concrete interests of the American people and nation.



This neo-nationalist model is not defended only by Trump, that is the
reason why I was saying that we should not consider Trump individually. We find
it exactly the same way with Putin. We find it by many other world leaders,
such as Erdogan or Duterte or Victor Orbán—really different figures—or Marshal
Sissi in Egypt.



We find it as well in attitudes, for instance Brexit in Great Britain, in
right-wing neo-populism in Europe: Ms. Le Pen, Mr. Wilders...  or in a certain left-wing neo-populism as
Mélenchon in France. It is in the air, seeming almost a passing fad. But it
constitutes perhaps a double rupture within IR. First of all because since the
emergence of globalization, let's say around the 70's, the national interest as
a thought category was bit by bit replaced with approaches in terms of collective
goods. Today by contrast we witness the abandonment of this image of collective
goods for a return to the national interest. This is very clear in Trump's renouncing
of the COP21 of Paris. At the same time, second, this constitutes some form of the
rehabilitation of the idea of power, which again seeps into the language of IR.




You know the IR scholar is not a neutral person, we have to use our science
towards positive action and for the definition of sound public policies. Going
against the idea of collective goods, casting doubt on the ideas of human
security, environmental security, food security, and sanitary security is
extremely dangerous because the composition of national interests and egoism
will never converge to a globally coherent policy. It is the weak that will
suffer first.



And the same time that power is reinstated as a driving principle of IR
praxis, the paradox is that great powers are becoming more and more powerless. If
we look only since 1989, and ask, when did state power ever triumph in IR?
Where did the strongest ever find a battleship enabling him to resolve a
problem to his benefit and according to his goals? Never. Not in Somalia, not
in Afghanistan, not in Iraq, not in Syria, not in Palestine. Nowhere. Not in
Sahel, not in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Nowhere. So I am a little
worried, indeed, about this naive and old-fashioned rehabilitation of state
power.





Can we say that globalization, or rather the ambition of
integration at either the European or global scale, has failed? Can today be
considered a good moment to bury of the idea of integration?



I do not like burials, it is not an expression that I would use, but
your question is very pertinent. For around twenty years I have been saying and
teaching that regional integration constituted an intermediary and realistic
level of adaptation between the era of the nation state and that of globalization,
which means that I believed for a long time that regional integration was the
final step towards a global governance of the world.



I thought for a long time that what was not possible at the global
scale, a global government, was possible at the regional level and this would already
strongly simplify the world map and thus go in the way of this adhesion to the
collective dimension required by globalization. Nevertheless, not only Europe
suffers a setback, but all the regional constructions in the world are in a
similar situation. Mr. Trump openly shoves the NAFTA agreement, MERCOSUR is
down as every State that is composing it has recriminations against it, and we
could extend the list… All the forms of integration that have been set by
Chavez around his Bolivian ideal have ceased to exist; Africa progresses very
slowly in terms of regional integration; the Arab Maghreb Union, which is an
essential device, totally failed. Thus indeed the situation does not look good.



In the case of Europe there is a double phenomenon: on the one hand,
there is this really grave failure due to the secession of Great Britain from
Europe, and then there is a general malaise of the European model. Brexit is
really rare, if you look at the contemporary history of IR it is simply
unprecedented that a state shuts the door on a regional or global organization.
As far as I remember, it only happened a few times before, with Indonesia in
the UN in 1964, which lasted only 19 months. It happened with Morocco with the
African Union and Morocco is currently reintegrating in it. This British
situation came as a thunderbolt, worsened by the fact that paradoxically it is
not so much because of regional integration that the British voted against the
European Union. It was more from an anti-migration, xenophobic and nationalist
(in reference to that nationalism trend that I was earlier talking about)
perspective and what is dramatic is that we can clearly see that the
nationalist sentiment is really attacking the inner principles of regional
integration.



I was saying that in the European case there are internal problems which
run even deeper than the British defection, and I will underline at least two
of them. First of all there is a democratic deficit of Europe, meaning that
Europe was not able to match electoral spaces with the ones where decisions get
made; people still vote at the national level while the decisions are taken in
Brussels. In consequence, democratic control over these decisions is extremely
weak. How to resolve this equation? And here the breakdown is total since very
few people are coming up with suggestions. The other factor of this crisis is,
according to me, the fact that Europe has been built with success after World
War II in a progressive way around association and indeed, Durkheim proved it,
the integrative logic makes sense. Unity makes strength and it did make
strength once in Europe to prevent war, a third World War, and secondly to
encourage the reconstruction of European countries where economy was totally
collapsed. This time is now over and it is the fault of Europe to not have
known how to recontextualize itself, to react to the new contexts.



Paying one more time tribute to Durkheim who guessed it right, Durkheim
said that there are two ways of constructing social ties: around association
and around solidarity. I think that the time of association is now over, we
should enter in the time of solidarity, which does not consist in saying 'We
Germans are associated with Greece', but rather 'We Germans are joined together
with Greece because we know that if Greece collapses, in a long term
perspective, we will suffer the consequences'. Thus this idea of fundamental
unity is an idea that has been a little bit overlooked, abandoned by the
Europeans and now they find themselves in a complete paralysis.





Is the decolonization period still having an impact on
contemporary IR?



Oh totally, totally. I would first say because it is a major event in
the field of IR, which made the World switch from 51 sovereign States of the UN
in 1945 to 193 today but above all, a very aggravating circumstance, is that
this decolonization has been a complete failure and this failure weighs
enormously on international politics.



It has been a failure because decolonization assumed the format of copying
the western state model in countries that were accessing independence, while
this model was not necessarily adapted, which provoked a proliferation of
failed states, and these collapsed states had a terrible effect on IR.



Secondly because decolonization should have led to the enrichment and to
the substantial modification of multilateralism, by creating new institutions
able to take charge of new challenges resulting from decolonization. Yet,
except the creation of UNCTAD in 1964 and of
UNDP in 1965, there have been very little innovations in terms of global governance.
Thus global governance remains dominated by what I earlier called 'the club',
which means the great powers from the north, and this is very dysfunctional for
the management of contemporary crises. Then also because the ancient colonial
powers happen to find new forms of domination that did somehow complicate the
international game. Thus in fact decolonization is a daily aspect of the crisis
that the international system faces today.





In conclusion, which question should we have asked? In
other terms, which question have we forgot?



I found your questions very pertinent as it allowed the discussion of themes
that I consider essentials. Now, the big problem that makes me worry is the
great gap between the analysts and the actors in IR. I am not saying that the
analysts understood everything, far from it, but I think that IR theorists are
very conscious of some of these transformations I have mentioned. If you look
at some great authors such as James Rosenau, Ned Lebow or Robert Keohane, to
name just a few—there are way more—they all contributed to the reconstruction
of IR.



What truly strikes me is the autism of political actors, they think that
they are still at the time of the Congress of Vienna and that is an
extraordinary source of tension. Thus as long as this spirit of change does not
reach political actors, maybe Barack Obama was the first one to enter this game
and then the parenthesis was closed, as long as there will not be this move
towards the discovery of a new world, maybe as well through the inclusion in
our reflection about the international fabric such partners as China, it is not
normal that this very powerful China does not have any choice but to share the
paradigm and the model of action proper to occidental diplomacy, as long as we
would not have done this precise effort, well, we will remain in the negation
of the human, and that is the essential problem today, we are unable to
understand that at the end there is just one unity, which is the human being.



I had the chance to visit 105 countries and everywhere I met the same
men and the same women, with their pain, with their happiness, their hardship,
their joy, their sorrow, their needs that were everywhere identical. As long as
we will not understand that, well, we will be living in a world that is in total
contradiction with what it is truly and essentially. We will live in a world of
artifice and thus a world of violence.



Related links  



Read Badie's
The Arab Spring: A starting point (SER
Études 2011) here
(pdf)



Print version (pdf) of this Talk

Bertrand Badie sur le moment Trump, la science de la souffrance, et les RI
entre puissance et faiblesse

read in English






La discipline de RI se focalise traditionnellement sur l'enjeu de pouvoir
entre états. Mais, s'interroge Bertrand Badie, est-ce que cela veut dire que
notre discipline est basée sur la négation de notre humanité ? Un géant
dans les RI françaises, Badie a œuvré pour remplacer le pouvoir et pour mettre
la souffrance au cœur de l'analyse de l'international, en appliquant des idées
sociologiques sur une réalité véritablement globale. Dans ce Talk, Badie, entre autres, défie la
centralité de l'idée de pouvoir, qui a peu de sens dans un monde où la plupart
de l'agenda international est défini par des défis qu'émanent de la faiblesse ;
défend la centralité de la souffrance pour une discipline de RI plus adaptée ;
et utilise ces idées de base pour contextualiser le Moment Trump.




Quel est selon vous actuellement le plus grand défi ou débat dans le
domaine des Relations Internationales ? Quelle est votre position vis-à-vis de
cet ou ces enjeu(x) ?



Incontestablement, c'est la question du
changement. C'est à dire que le moment est venu de conceptualiser, et au-delà
même, de théoriser le changement qui s'effectue dans les Relations
Internationales (RI). On a toujours le sentiment qu'on vit une période de
changement, mais concernant les RI nous avons plusieurs repères qui montrent
l'effectivité du changement. J'en vois au moins trois.



Le premier, c'est la nature inclusive
du système international. Pour la première fois dans l'Histoire de l'humanité
le système international couvre la quasi-totalité de l'humanité, alors que le
système Westphalien était un système Européen dans lequel les Etats-Unis sont
entrés pour en faire un système, je dirais, euro-nord-américain.



Deuxième élément, et plusieurs ouvrages
déjà ont permis de le montrer, il y a une mutation profonde de la nature du
conflit. La guerre était autrefois, dans le modèle Westphalien, une affaire de
compétition de puissance. Aujourd'hui on a le sentiment que la faiblesse
remplace la puissance, c'est à dire la puissance n'est plus explicative des
situations belligènes, que l'on doit trouver davantage dans les manifestations
de faiblesse : que ce soit les « collapsing states », c'est à dire le
déchirement des Nations souvent mal ou hâtivement construites ou encore la
déliquescence des liens sociaux. Cette nouvelle conflictualité vient
complètement bouleverser la donne internationale et constitue un deuxième
marqueur de transformation.



Le troisième axe, c'est ce que
j'appellerais la mobilité. Tout notre système international reposait sur l'idée
de territoire et de frontière, sur l'idée de fixité marquant de manière très
précise les compétences des Etats. L'Etat renvoie au territoire, comme la
définition donnée par Max Weber l'indique très clairement, alors qu'aujourd'hui
le territoire est défié par toute une série de mobilités, c'est à dire de flux transnationaux
: qu'il s'agisse de flux commerciaux, de flux d'informations ou de flux humains
à travers notamment toutes les diverses formes de migrations.



Donc voilà au moins trois indicateurs
objectifs d'une transformation profonde de la nature même des RI qui m'incitent
d'abord à parler plus volontiers désormais de « relations intersociales »
plus que de « relations interétatiques ». Les relations entre Etats
ne saturent plus le jeu mondial et ça amène à considérer que toute notre
théorie des RI reposait sur le modèle Westphalien tel qu'il est issu de la paix
de Westphalie, tel qu'il a été confirmé par l'accomplissement du travail de
construction des Etats-Nations et tel qu'il a dominé l'actualité internationale
jusqu'à la chute du Mur. Jusqu'à la chute du Mur, ce qui ne relevait pas de l'Europe
et des Etats-Unis, et de l'Amérique du Nord disons plus exactement, était nommé
périphérique, ce qui en dit long. Aujourd'hui la périphérie est centrale au
moins du point de vue de la conflictualité, donc il faut abandonner notre
grammaire Westphalienne et construire un nouveau guide d'analyse des RI qui
tienne compte de ces mutations. Supprimer notre grammaire Westphalienne des RI,
c'est remettre en cause notre théorie classique des RI et c'est remettre en
cause aussi les modèles pratiques d'action en politique internationale, c'est à
dire l'ordinaire de la diplomatie.





Comment est-ce que vous êtes arrivé dans votre pensée autour les Relations
Internationales ?



Vous savez souvent quand on écrit,
quand on travaille, on est d'abord influencé par son insatisfaction. C'est à
dire que la théorie classique Westphalienne des RI, comme je l'ai dit tout à
l'heure, ne me satisfaisait pas parce que j'avais l'impression qu'elle
focalisait sur des évènements qui n'avaient plus l'importance qu'on continuait
à leur prêter, par exemple la course aux armement, les relations entre
puissances ou les négociations diplomatiques traditionnelles alors que je
voyais, peut-être est-ce là l'élément déclenchant, que l'essentiel des
souffrances dans le monde venait d'espaces que ne couvrait pas réellement la
théorie des RI.



J'ai toujours dit à mes étudiants que
les RI c'était la science des souffrances humaines. Ces souffrances bien sûr
elles existent chez nous, elles existent en Europe, elles existent en Amérique
du Nord, elles existent partout dans le monde mais l'essentiel des souffrances
se situe hors champ westphalien et du coup l'analyse classique des RI en
donnait une image tout d'abord marginale et déformée. L'Afrique ou le Moyen
Orient vus au prisme du système Westphalien avaient une allure aplatie qui ne
correspondait en rien à l'extraordinaire richesse, en bien et en mal, de ces
régions du monde. Je considérais aussi que dans un monde où 6 à 9 millions
d'individus meurent de faim chaque année, les grands agendas des RI classiques
étaient dérisoires. Même le terrorisme, auquel on donne tant d'importance, a
des scores dérisoires par rapport à ceux de l'insécurité alimentaire.



Mes trois derniers livres sont trois
cris de révolte contre la théorie classique des RI. La diplomatie de
connivence est un livre dans lequel j'ai essayé de montrer qu'en réalité le
jeu des puissances était un jeu beaucoup plus intégré qu'on ne le dit et
renvoyant souvent à de fausses conflictualités. Il y a bien un club, et c'est
ça que j'essayais de décrire, un club de puissants.



Le Temps des humiliés était là
pour mettre en scène justement ce que la théorie classique ne savait pas
exprimer, c'est à dire la domination vue du côté des dominés, l'humiliation vue
du côté des humiliés, la violence vue du côté des désespérés. Même si on
regarde des puissances aussi accomplies que la Chine aujourd'hui, première ex
aequo avec les Etats-Unis en PIB, il faut bien admettre que la mémoire de
l'humiliation constitue pour la Chine une source énorme d'inspiration et
d'élaboration de son actuelle politique étrangère.



Et puis, dans mon dernier livre Nous
ne sommes plus seuls au monde, là le cri était encore plus direct, c'est à
dire nous sommes en train d'écrire les RI qui concernent un gros milliard
d'êtres humains en oubliant tous les autres et aujourd'hui ce ne sont pas ces
vieilles puissances qui font l'agenda international. Il est écrit à
l'initiative du petit, du faible, du dominé, avec bien entendu des recours à
des formes de violences extrêmes, mais qu'il faut essayer d'analyser et de
comprendre, donc totalement renverser la théorie des RI.



Il ne faut pas oublier que l'essentiel
de la théorie des RI nous a été livré par les Etats-Unis triomphants en 1945.
Le fameux « power politics » qui domine la théorie classique des RI,
inaugurée par Morgenthau et porté par tellement d'autres, mettait en scène ce
qui était vrai à l'époque, c'est à dire la capacité de la puissance américaine
de nous délivrer du monstre nazi. Aujourd'hui l'enjeu il est tout autre, et
c'est d'ailleurs significatif que deux des plus grands politistes
internationalistes américains, Robert Keohane (Theory Talk #9) et Ned Lebow (TheoryTalk #53), aient écrit
le premier un livre qui s'appelle After hegemony et le second Goodbye
hegemony. Et bien justement, moi ce qui m'intéresse c'est de voir ce qu'il
y a après l'hégémonie.





Une question maintenant pour les étudiants qui aspireraient à se
spécialiser dans le domaine des RI : quels conseils ?



D'abord je leur conseillerais de
débaptiser leur science, comme je le disais tout à l'heure, et de l'appeler
relations intersociales, c'est à dire que l'avenir de ce que nous nous appelons
les Relations Internationales se trouve dans la capacité de comprendre les
interactions extrêmement riches, multiples et diversifiées qui s'opèrent entre
les sociétés du monde. Ce qui ne veut pas dire de complètement abandonner la
piste des Etats, mais replacer les Etats au milieu de cette multiplicité
d'acteurs pour constater souvent l'impuissance de ces États face à ces acteurs
nouveaux. Ce serait mon premier conseil.



Mon deuxième conseil c'est regarder
devant eux et non derrière eux, c'est à dire ne pas se laisser dominer par le
modèle westphalien et essayer de bâtir ce dont nous avons besoin parce que
presque rien n'a été fait encore aujourd'hui pour bâtir ce modèle
post-westphalien, méta-westphalien. Au-delà de la puissance il y a des choses
que l'on identifie encore mal et qui sont le moteur des RI. De ce point de vue-là,
l'aide de la sociologie est particulièrement précieuse car si nous sommes dans
des relations intersociales, évidemment, la sociologie a un rôle très important
à jouer. J'ai considéré, dans ma contribution au The return of the theorists que Durkheim est une source très importante d'inspiration
pour comprendre le monde aujourd'hui. Voilà un auteur à étudier et à appliquer
aux RI.



Le troisième conseil que je leur
donnerais c'est de ne pas oublier qu'effectivement les « RI » ou les
relations intersociales sont les sciences de la souffrance humaine. Il faut
savoir remettre la souffrance au centre de la réflexion. On a trop perdu de
temps à analyser la puissance, il est temps maintenant de se mettre du côté de
la souffrance. Pourquoi ? D'abord parce que éthiquement c'est meilleur,
peut-être pourra-t-on en tirer alors des enseignements pratiques ? Mais aussi
pour une deuxième raison, c'est que dans les nouvelles RI la souffrance est
plus proactive que la puissance, ce qui n'est pas forcément optimiste mais qui
permet notamment de mieux s'interroger sur les formes nouvelles de
conflictualité. Hélas ce n'est plus avec des canons que l'on écrit l'agenda
international, mais c'est avec des larmes. C'est peut-être là qu'il y a un
effort important à consentir sur le plan de la réflexion.





Dans Le temps des humiliés, vous proposez une lecture durkheimienne
des RI dont l'accent est surtout mis sur le « grievance » qui
s'oppose à une autre logique : celle du « greed ». Que pensez-vous de
ce parallèle ?



« Greed » on peut le traduire
par accaparement, captation. En réalité vous avez raison, l'idée de grievance,
de récrimination, le mot est parfait aussi en français, est une idée très
structurante du jeu international. On ne l'a pas vu venir pour deux raisons.
D'abord parce que notre analyse classique des RI supposait une unité de temps,
comme si le temps africain, le temps chinois, le temps indien et le temps
européen étaient identiques. Or ceci est complètement faux parce que nous dans
notre culture européenne nous n'avons pas compris qu'avant Westphalie il y
avait des modèles politiques, des histoires qui avaient profondément marqué les
peuples qui les avaient alors façonnés. Pensez que la Chine c'est 4000 ans
d'empire, pensez que l'Afrique avant la colonisation c'était des royaumes, des
empires, des civilisations, un art, des productions artistiques. Pensez que
l'Inde aussi est multimillénaire. Le temps Westphalien est venu totalement nier
et écraser cette temporalité, cette historicité, presque sur un mode
négationniste, c'est à dire que dans l'esprit de ceux qui étaient porteurs du
modèle Westphalien seul ce modèle associé à la Renaissance et au Siècle des
Lumières et à la Raison avec un grand R avait vocation à formater le monde. Or,
c'était un pari insensé, un pari pour lequel nos ancêtres Européens qui l'ont
mené avaient des excuses parce qu'à l'époque on connaissait mal ces Histoires,
à l'époque on n'avait pas cette connaissance de l'autre et de l'altérité donc
on a réglé ça au plus simple, c'est à dire à partir de la négation de
l'altérité. Or les RI c'est au contraire l'accomplissement de l'altérité. Donc,
inévitablement tous ceux qui se sont vus nier dans leur historicité sur
plusieurs siècles et même plusieurs millénaires ont accumulé un ressentiment de
récrimination, de grievance particulièrement fort.



Le deuxième élément c'est que tout ceci
s'est opéré dans un contexte de déséquilibre des ressources de puissance, lié à
différents facteurs qui faisaient qu'effectivement à un moment donné du temps
les puissances occidentales étaient mieux armées au sens propre, au sens
figuré, que les autres sociétés. Donc cette négation de l'altérité a été
aggravée par l'imposition d'un système multilatéral de force qui s'est traduit
de la pire des façons, c'est à dire à partir d'une hiérarchie proclamée des
cultures, donc voilà il y avait comme disait Jules Ferry, en France au
XIXe siècle, les « races », « Nous avons l'obligation d'éduquer les races inférieures ».
C'est le début d'une Histoire, c'est le début de l'Histoire de l'humiliation et
comme au même moment la mondialisation venait à se faire, cette humiliation est
devenue le nerf de la vie international. Un nerf qui a été utilisé autant par
les puissants, qui en ont fait un instrument, c'est à dire où on va humilier
les autres pour mieux les dominer (guerres de l'Opium,
la colonisation) et en même temps un nerf qui a irrigué la réaction
mobilisatrice de ce monde extra-westphalien qui pour exister a eu besoin de
s'affirmer contre ceux qui les humiliaient. Donc vous voyez c'est vraiment la
trame des nouvelles RI. Dans mon
esprit c'est devenu un paradigme, ça explique tout même si d'autres facteurs
continuent à expliquer parallèlement.



Et pour apprécier cela on a besoin d'une
approche sociologique, ce que pour moi a
deux fonctions. Ces deux fonctions il faut les avoir en tête toutes les
deux pour bien comprendre ce qu'elle veut dire. La première c'est une fonction
intemporelle, c'est à dire considérer que partout et de tout temps le politique
est un produit social, donc ne peut pas être compris hors de la société, ce qui
n'était pas forcément la posture de certains et même de, je dirais, la majorité
des analystes qui croyaient de manière excessive à une autonomie du politique
et de l'Etat. La deuxième composante de cette approche sociologique est une
composante temporelle historique. Ce que je vous disais tout à l'heure : avec
la mondialisation le social a beaucoup progressé en propre par rapport au
politique et les relations intersociales, ayant grandi, on a besoin d'une
approche sociologique pour les comprendre.





Est-ce que vous pensez que « le moment Trump » constitue une
rupture fondamentale avec la conduite des RI ?



Trump en soi peut-être pas, ce qu'il
représente certainement. C'est à dire si on regarde les Etats-Unis on voit,
depuis le changement de millénaire, trois modèles se succéder. Vous avez eu au
lendemain du 11 Septembre un temps néo-conservateur où la mondialisation était
considérée par les dirigeants Américains comme un moyen ou peut-être une chance
d'universaliser le modèle américain de gré ou de force. De force comme ce fut
le cas par exemple en Irak en 2003. Ce modèle a échoué.



Cela a amené un deuxième modèle qui
est, je dirais, un modèle libéral, néo-libéral, incarné par Obama qui tirant
les leçons de l'échec du néo-conservatisme, a eu le courage de remettre en
cause l'hypothèse jugée jusque-là indiscutable d'un leadership américain et
considéré que les Etats-Unis ne pouvaient gagner aujourd'hui qu'à travers le
soft power ou le smart power ou le libre échangisme. C'est la raison pour
laquelle Obama se faisait très peu interventionniste et misait beaucoup sur le
TTIP, sur tous ces accords transrégionaux.



Avec Trump est arrivé un troisième
modèle, que j'appellerais néo-nationaliste, qui considère la mondialisation
mais de façon différente. La mondialisation est ramenée dans son esprit à une
chance donnée de satisfaire les intérêts nationaux américains, l'idée de « national
interest » rejaillit après ce long temps de vision globalisante. Ca ne
veut pas dire qu'on n'est pas interventionniste. Ce qui s'est passé en Syrie le
démontre. Ça veut dire qu'on interviendra non pas en fonction des besoins de la
mondialisation mais en fonction des intérêts des Etats-Unis. Il s'agit de
montrer l'image des Etats-Unis forts, puissants et d'autre part de servir les
intérêts concrets du peuple américain et de la nation américaine.



Ce modèle néo-nationaliste n'est pas
porté par Trump tout seul, c'est la raison pour laquelle je disais qu'il ne
faut pas prendre Trump isolément. On le retrouve exactement de la même manière
chez Poutine. On le retrouve chez quantité d'autres dirigeants du monde, comme
par exemple Erdogan ou Duterte ou Victor Orbán, donc des personnages aussi
différents, ou le Maréchal Sissi en Egypte.



On le retrouve dans des postures : le
Brexit en Grande-Bretagne, ce néo-populisme de droite en Europe : Mme Le Pen,
Mr Wilders, voire un certain néo-populisme de gauche comme Mélenchon en France.
Bref il est dans l'air du temps, c'est presque un effet de mode et il constitue
peut-être une double rupture dans les RI.



D'abord parce que depuis l'avènement de
la mondialisation, les années 70 disons en gros même si la mondialisation n'est
pas née à un jour précis, on avait un peu laissé de côté l'idée d'intérêt
national pour raisonner en termes de biens collectifs. Là c'est un abandon des
biens collectifs et un retour vers l'intérêt national. On le voit bien, l'un
des actes de Trump a été de dire que la COP21 de Paris doit être reconsidérée.
Et puis c'est une certaine forme aussi de réhabilitation de la force, qui
redevient le langage des RI.



Voilà deux bonnes raisons d'abord de
compléter notre science positive pour comprendre cette nouvelle tentation mais
aussi pour s'en inquiéter. Vous savez l'internationaliste ce n'est pas
quelqu'un de neutre, c'est aussi quelqu'un qui doit mettre sa science au
service de l'action et de la définition des politiques publiques. Aller à
l'encontre de l'idée de biens communs, c'est à dire à nouveau jeter un doute
sur l'idée de sécurité humaine, de sécurité environnementale, de sécurité
alimentaire, de sécurité sanitaire c'est extrêmement dangereux car ce n'est
jamais la composition des intérêts et des égoïsmes nationaux qui fera une
politique globalement cohérente. C'est le faible qui en pâtira le premier.



La deuxième raison c'est ce paradoxe à
un moment où l'on voit que la puissance est de plus en plus impuissante, j'ai
fait tout un livre là-dessus, de réhabiliter la force. Or regardez, ne
serait-ce que depuis 1989, où la force a-t-elle triomphé sur le plan des RI ?
Où donc le plus fort a gagné la bataille qui lui a permis de résoudre le problème
à son avantage ou conformément à ses objectifs ? Jamais. Ni en Somalie, ni en
Afghanistan, ni en Irak, ni en Syrie, ni en Palestine. Nulle part. Ni au Sahel,
ni en République Démocratique du Congo. Nulle part. Donc je suis un peu
inquiet, effectivement, de cette réhabilitation naïve et ringarde de la force.





Peut-on considérer que l'idée de la mondialisation, ou plutôt de l'ambition
intégratrice, aurait échoué ? Devrait-on enterrer l'idée d'intégration
régionale ou mondiale ?



Je n'aime pas les enterrements, ce
n'est pas un terme que j'emploierai, mais votre question est très pertinente.
Pendant près de vingt ans j'ai enseigné que l'intégration régionale c'était
l'échelon intermédiaire et réaliste entre le temps des nations et le temps de
la globalisation, c'est à dire j'ai longtemps cru que l'intégration régionale
était l'antichambre d'une gouvernance globale du monde.



J'ai longtemps cru que ce qui n'était
pas possible à l'échelle mondiale, à un gouvernement mondial, pouvait l'être
au  niveau régional et déjà simplifier de
beaucoup la carte du monde et donc de progresser vers cette adhésion au
collectif que commande la mondialisation. Or non seulement l'Europe est en
échec, vous avez raison de le dire, mais toutes les constructions régionales
dans le monde sont en échec. Alors Mr. Trump bouscule ouvertement le NAFTA
ALENA, le MERCOSUR est en panne chaque Etat qui le compose a des récriminations
à son encontre, on pourrait continuer l'énumération… Toutes les formes
d'intégration que Chavez avait mis en place autour de son idéal bolivarien
n'existent plus, l'Afrique ne progresse que très très très lentement en matière
d'intégration régionale : l'Union du Maghreb Arabe, qui est quand même un
dispositif essentiel, a totalement échoué. Donc effectivement la conjoncture
n'est pas bonne.



Pour l'Europe le phénomène est double :
d'une part il y a cet échec très grave du départ de la Grande Bretagne de
l'Europe et puis il y a un malaise général du modèle européen. Alors, le départ
de la Grande Bretagne c'est très grave parce que c'est très rare si vous
regardez l'Histoire contemporaine des RI qu'un Etat claque la porte d'une
organisation régionale ou mondiale. C'est arrivé avec l'Indonésie aux Nations
Unies en 1964, ça n'a duré que 19 mois. C'est arrivé pour le Maroc au sein de
l'Union Africaine et le Maroc est actuellement en voie de réintégration. Donc
ce fait Britannique claque comme un coup de tonnerre, aggravé par le fait que
paradoxalement ce n'est pas tant sur l'idée d'intégration régionale que les
Britanniques ont voté contre l'UE. C'est beaucoup plus dans un réflexe
anti-migratoire, xénophobe, nationaliste (correspondant à cet élan de
nationalisme que je décrivais tout à l'heure) et donc ce qui est dramatique
c'est que l'on voit bien que cet ère du temps nationaliste vient réellement
attaquer les principes même de l'intégration régionale.



Alors je disais que pour l'Europe il y
a des problèmes internes encore plus profonds que la défection Britannique,
j'en vois au moins deux.



D'abord il y a un échec démocratique de
l'Europe, c'est à dire l'Europe n'a pas su faire coïncider les espaces
d'élection et les espaces de décisions, le peuple vote au niveau national et
les décisions se prennent à Bruxelles. Du coup, le contrôle démocratique sur
les décisions est extrêmement faible. Comment résoudre cette équation ? Et là
la panne est complète car personne ne propose de solutions.



L'autre élément à mon avis composant de
cette crise, c'est que l'Europe a été construite avec succès au lendemain de la
Seconde Guerre Mondiale de manière progressive sur le maître mot d'association
et effectivement, Durkheim l'a montré, la logique d'intégration associative
fait sens. C'est à dire l'union fait la force et l'union a fait la force en son
temps en Europe pour empêcher la guerre premièrement, c'est à dire une
troisième guerre européenne au XXe siècle, et deuxièmement pour favoriser la
reconstruction de pays européens dont l'économie s'était totalement effondrée.
Ce temps-là est terminé et la faute de l'Europe c'est de ne pas avoir su se
contextualiser, c'est à dire réagir aux contextes nouveaux.



Rendant à nouveau hommage à Durkheim
qui avait vu juste, Durkheim avait dit il y a deux façons de construire le lien
social : autour de l'association et autour de la solidarité. Je pense que le
temps de l'association est terminé, on doit entrer dans le temps de la
solidarité, c'est à dire la solidarité consiste à dire non pas « Nous
Allemands nous nous associons à la Grèce » mais « Nous Allemands
sommes solidaires de la Grèce car nous savons que si la Grèce s'effondre, à
terme, nous en subirons les conséquences ». Donc cette idée d'unité
fondamentale est une idée qui a été un peu snobée, abandonnée par les Européens
et maintenant ils se trouvent dans une situation de paralysie complète.





Est-ce que la période de décolonisation laisse encore des traces au niveau
des RI contemporaines ?



Ah totalement, totalement. Je dirais
d'abord parce que c'est un événement majeur des RI, qui a quand même fait
passer le monde de 51 Etats Souverains membres des Nations Unies en 1945 à 193
aujourd'hui mais surtout, circonstance très aggravante, c'est que cette
décolonisation a été complètement ratée et que l'échec de la décolonisation
pèse énormément sur les RI.



Elle a été ratée parce que la
décolonisation a conduit à copier le modèle étatique occidental dans les pays
qui accédaient à l'indépendance, alors que ce modèle n'était pas forcément
adapté, ce qui a provoqué une prolifération de failed States, et ces collapsed
States ont eu un effet effroyable sur les RI.



Deuxièmement parce que la
décolonisation aurait dû conduire à un enrichissement et en tous les cas à une
modification substantielle du multilatéralisme en créant de nouvelles
institutions capables de prendre en charge les défis nouveaux issus de la
décolonisation. Or, à part la création de la CNUCED
en 1964 et du PNUD en 1965, il y a eu très peu d'innovations sur le plan de la
gouvernance mondiale. Donc la gouvernance mondiale reste dominée par ce que
j'appelais tout à l'heure le club, c'est à dire les puissances du Nord et ceci
est très dysfonctionnel dans la gestion des crises contemporaines. Puis enfin
parce que les anciennes puissances coloniales sont amenées à trouver des formes
nouvelles de domination qui ont en quelques sorte compliqué le jeu
international. Donc effectivement la décolonisation c'est l'ordinaire des
crises que rencontre le système international aujourd'hui.





Question finale : quel autre souci vous inquiète dans les RI
contemporaines ?



J'ai trouvé que votre questionnement
était très pertinent parce qu'il permettait de toucher aux thèmes que je tiens
pour essentiels. Maintenant, si vous voulez, le grand problème qui moi
m'inquiète c'est le formidable décalage qu'il y a entre les analystes et les
acteurs. Je ne dis pas que les analystes ont tout compris, loin de là, mais je
crois que les analystes sont très conscients de ces transformations. Si vous
prenez les grands auteurs comme James Rosenau, Ned Lebow, comme Robert Keohane,
juste quelques-uns il y en aurait beaucoup d'autres, ils ont tous apporté une
pierre à la reconstruction de l'édifice des RI.



Moi ce qui me frappe, c'est l'autisme
des acteurs politiques, c'est à dire ils se croient encore à l'époque du
Congrès de Vienne et ça c'est source de tension absolument extraordinaire. Donc
tant que ce parfum de changement n'aura pas touché les acteurs politiques,
peut-être que Barack Obama était le premier à commencer à entrer dans ce jeu et
puis la parenthèse s'est refermée, tant donc qu'il n'y aura pas ce mouvement
vers la découverte d'un nouveau monde, peut-être aussi en intégrant dans notre
réflexion sur l'international des partenaires comme la Chine, ce n'est quand
même pas normal que cette Chine si puissante n'ait d'autre choix finalement que
de se rallier au paradigme et au modèle d'action propre à la diplomatie
occidentale, tant qu'on n'aura pas fait cet effort là et bien on sera encore
dans la négation de l'humain, et c'est ça le problème essentiel aujourd'hui,
c'est que nous n'arrivons pas à comprendre qu'au bout de tout ça il y a une
seule unité qui est l'être humain.



J'ai eu la chance de visiter 105 pays
et partout j'ai rencontré les mêmes hommes et les mêmes femmes, avec leurs
souffrances, avec leurs bonheurs, leurs malheurs, leurs joies, leurs peines,
leurs besoins qui étaient partout absolument identiques. Tant qu'on n'aura pas
compris cela, et bien je crois que l'on vivra dans un monde qui est en
contradiction totale avec ce qu'il est vraiment et essentiellement. On vivra dans
un monde d'artifice et donc dans un monde de violence.



Lire plus



·       Lire Badie's Printemps Arabe : un commencement (SER
Études 2011) ici
(pdf)

·       Lire Badie's Pour une sociologie historique de la
négotiation (préface de Négociations
internationales) ici
(pdf)



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1. Introduction Biodiesel (BD) is a liquid biofuel that is defined as a fatty acid methyl ester fulfilling standards such as the ones set by European (EN 14214) and the American (ASTM 6751) regulations. BD is obtained by the transesterification (Scheme 1.1) or alcoholysis of natural triglycerides contained in vegetable oils, animal fats, waste fats and greases, waste cooking oils (WCO) or side-stream products of refined edible oil production with short-chain alcohols, usually methanol or ethanol and using an alkaline homogeneous catalyst (Perego and Ricci, 2012). Scheme 1.1. Transesterification reaction. BD presents several advantages over petroleum-based diesel such as: biodegradability, lower particulate and common air pollutants (CO, SOx emissions, unburned hydrocarbons) emissions, absence of aromatics and a closed CO2 cycle. Refined, low acidity oilseeds (e.g. those derived from sunflower, soy, rapeseed, etc.) may be easily converted into BD, but their exploitation significantly raises the production costs, resulting in a biofuel that is uncompetitive with the petroleum-based diesel (Santori et al., 2012; Lotero et al., 2005). Moreover, the use of the aforementioned oils generated a hot debate about a possible food vs. fuel conflict, i.e. about the risk of diverting farmland or crops at the expense of food supply. It is so highly desirable to produce BD from crops specifically selected for their high productivity and low water requirements (Bianchi et al., 2011; Pirola et al., 2011), or from low-cost feedstock such as used frying oils (Boffito et al., 2012a) and animal fats (Bianchi et al., 2010). The value of these second generation biofuels, i.e. produced from crop and forest residues and from non-food energy crops, is acknowledged by the European Community, which states in its RED directive (European Union, RED Directive 2009/28/EC): ''For the purposes of demonstrating compliance with national renewable energy obligations […], the contribution made by biofuels produced from wastes, residues, non-food cellulosic material, and ligno-cellulosic material shall be considered to be twice that made by other biofuels''. However, the presence of free fatty acids in the feedstock, occurring in particular in the case of not refined oils, causes the formation of soaps as a consequence of the reaction with the alkaline catalyst. This hinders the contact between reagents and the catalyst and makes difficult the products separation. Many methods have been proposed to eliminate FFA during or prior to transesterification (Pirola et al., 2011; Santori et al., 2012). Among these the FFA pre-esterification method is a very interesting approach to lower the acidity since it allows to lower the acid value as well as to obtain methyl esters already in this preliminary step (Boffito et al., 2012a, 2012b; 2012c Bianchi et al., 2010, 2011; Pirola et al., 2010, 2011). Aims of the work The aims of this work are framed in the context of the entire biodiesel production chain, ranging from the choice of the raw material, through its standardization to the actual biodiesel production. The objectives can be therefore summarized as follows: Assessing the potential of some vegetable or waste oils for biodiesel production by their characterization, deacidification and final transformation into biodiesel; To test different ion exchange resins and sulphated inorganic systems as catalysts in the FFA esterification; To assess the use of ultrasound to assist the sol-gel synthesis of inorganic sulphated oxides to be used as catalysts in the FFA esterification reaction; To assess the use of sonochemical techniques such as ultrasound and microwave to promote both the FFA esterification and transesterification reaction. 2. Experimental details 2.1 Catalysts In this work, three kinds of acid ion exchange resins were used as catalysts for the FFA esterification: Amberlyst®15 (A15), Amberlyst®46 (A46) (Dow Chemical) and Purolite®D5081 (D5081). Their characteristic features are given in Tab. 2.1. Various sulphated inorganic catalysts, namely sulphated zirconia, sulphated zirconia+titania and sulphated tin oxide were synthesized using different techniques. Further details will be given as the results inherent to these catalysts will be presented. Catalyst A15 A46 D5081 Physical form opaque beads Type Macroreticular Matrix Styrene-DVB Cross-linking degree medium medium high Functional group -SO3H Functionalization internal external external external Form dry wet wet Surface area (m2 g-1) 53 75 514a Ave. Dp (Ǻ) 300 235 37a Total Vp (ccg-1) 0.40 0.15 0.47 Declared Acidity (meq H+g-1) 4.7 0.43 0.90-1.1 Measured acidity (meq H+g-1) 4.2 0.60 1.0 Moisture content (%wt) 1.6 26-36 55-59 Shipping weight (g l-1) 610 600 1310a Max. operating temp (K) 393 393 403 Tab. 2.1. Features of the ion exchange resins used as catalysts. The acidity of all the catalysts was determined by ion exchange followed by pH determination as described elsewhere (López et al., 2007; Boffito et al., 2012a; 2012b). Specific surface areas were determined by BET (Brunauer, Emmett and Teller, 1938) and pores sizes distribution with BJH method (Barrett, Joyner and Halenda, 1951). XRD, XPS SEM-EDX and HR-TEM analyses were performed in the case of catalysts obtained with the use of ultrasound (Boffito et al. 2012a). Qualitative analyses of Lewis and Brønsted acid sites by absorption of a basic probe followed by FTIR analyses was also carried out for this class of catalysts (Boffito et al, 2012a). 2.2 Characterization of the oils Oils were characterized for what concerns acidity (by acid-base titrations) as reported by Boffito et al. (2012a, 2012b; 2012c), iodine value (Hannus method (EN 14111:2003)), saponification value (ASTM D5558), peroxide value and composition by GC analyses of the methyl ester yielded by the esterification and transesterification. Cetane number and theoretical values of the same properties were determined using equations already reported elsewhere (Winayanuwattikun et al., 2008). 2.3 Esterification and transesterification reactions In Tab. 2.2, the conditions adopted in both the conventional and sonochemically-assisted esterification are reported. For all these experiments a temperature of 336 K was adopted. Vials were used to test the sulphated inorganic oxides, while Carberry reactor (confined catalyst) (Boffito et al., 201c) was used just for the FFA esterification of cooking oil. Rector oil (+ FFA) (g) MeOH (g) catalyst amount vial 21 3.4 5%wt/gFFA sulphated inorganic catalysts slurry 100 16 - 10 g ion exchange resins - 5%wt/gF FA sulphated inorganic catalysts Carberry 300 48 10 g (5 g in each basket) Tab. 2.2. Free fatty acids esterification reaction conditions for conventional and sonochemically-assisted experiments. All the sonochemically-assisted experiments were performed in a slurry reactor. FFA conversions were determined by acid-base titrations of oil samples withdrawn from the reactors at pre-established times and calculated as follows: "FFA conversion (%)=" (〖"FFA" 〗_"t=0" "-" 〖"FFA" 〗_"t" )/〖"FFA" 〗_"t=0" " x 100" In Tab. 2.3, the conditions of both the conventional and ultrasound (US)-assisted transesterification are reported. KOH and CH3ONa were used for conventional experiments, while just KOH for the US-assisted experiments. The BD yield was determined by GC (FID) analysis of the methyl esters. Method Reactor Step gMeOH/100 goil gKOH/100 goil Temp. (K) Time (min) traditional batch step 1 20 1.0 333 90 step 2 5.0 0.50 60 US-assisted batch step 1 20 1.0 313, 333 30 US-assisted continuos step 1 20 1.0 338 30 Tab. 2.3. Transesterification reaction conditions. 3. Results and Discussion 3.1 Characterization and deacidification of different oils by ion exchange resins: assessment of the potential for biodiesel production In Tab. 3.1 the results of the characterization of the oils utilized in this work are displayed. The value in parentheses indicate the theoretical value of the properties, calculated basing on the acidic composition. The acidity of all the oils exceeds 0.5%wt (~0.5 mgKOH/g), i.e. the acidity limit recommended by both the European normative (EN 14214) and American standard ASTM 6751 on biodiesel (BD). The iodine value (IV) is regulated by the EN 14214, which poses an upper limit of 120 gI2/100 g. The number of saturated fatty chains in the fuel determines its behaviour at low temperatures, influencing parameters such as the cloud point, the CFPP (cold filter plugging point) and the freezing point (Winayanuwattikun et al., 2008). The IV are in most of the cases similar to the ones calculated theoretically. When the experimental IV differs from the theoretical one, it is in most of the cases underestimated. This can be explained considering the peroxide numbers (PN), which indicates the concentration of O2 bound to the fatty alkyl chains and is therefore an index of the conservation state of oil. Oils with high IV usually have a high concentration of peroxides, whereas fats with low IV have a relatively low concentration of peroxides at the start of rancidity (King et al., 1933). Moreover, although PN is not specified in the current BD fuel standards, it may affect cetane number (CN), a parameter that is regulated by the standards concerning BD fuel. Increasing PN increases CN, altering the ignition delay time. Saponification number (SN) is an index of the number of the fatty alkyl chains that can be saponified. The long chain fatty acids have a low SN because they have a relatively fewer number of carboxylic functional groups per mass unit of fat compared to short chain fatty acids. In most of the cases the experimental SN are lower than the ones calculated theoretically. This can be explained always considering the PN, indicating a high concentration of oxygen bound to the fatty alkyl chains. Oil Acidity (%wt) IV1 (gI2/ 100 g) PN2 (meqO2 /kg) SN3 (mg KOH/g) CN4 Fatty acids composition (%wt) animal fat (lard)* 5.87 51 2.3 199 62.3 n.d. soybean* 5.24 138 3.8 201 42.4 n.d. tobacco1 1.68 143 (149) 21.9 199 (202) 41.6 (39.8) C14:0 (2.0) C16:0 (8.3) C18:0 (1.5) C18:1 (12.0) C18:2 (75.3) C18:3 (0.6) C20:0 (0.1) C22:0 (0.2) sunflower* 3.79 126 3.7 199 45.4 n.d. WSO5 0.50 118 (129) 71.3 187 (200) 48.9 (44.6) C16:0 (6.9) C18:0 (0.9) C18:1 (40.1) C18:2 (50.9) C18:3 (0,3) C20:0 (0.1) C20:1 (0.4) C22:0 (0.4) palm 2.71 54.0 (53.0) 12.3 201 (208) 61.3 (60.6) 16:0 (43.9) 18:0 (5.6) 18:1 (40.5) 18:2 (8.6) WCO6 2.10 53.9 (50.7) 11.0 212 (196) 59.9 (62.7) C16:0 (38.8) C18:0 (4.1) C18:1 (47.9) C18:2 (4.2) WCO:CRO =3:1 2.12 69.0 (75.5) 30.1 200 (212) 58.1 (55.1) C16:0 (30.1) C18:0 (3.1) C18:1 (51.9) C18:2 (12.0) C18:3 (2.%) C20:0 (0.2) C22:0 (0.1) WCO:CRO =1:1 2.19 76.8 (90.7) 51.3 188 (203) 58.1 (52.8) C16:0 (21.5) C18:0 (2.1) C18:1 (55.8) C18:2 (14.7) C18:3 (5.1) C20:0 (0.8) C22:0 (0.1) WCO:CRO =1:3 2.24 84.5 (104) 62.4 177 (202) 58.1 (49.9) 14:0 (0.1) 16:0 (14.7) 16:1 (0.7) 18:0 (6.85) 18:1 (40.0) 18:2 (37.0) 18:3 (0.25) 20:0 (0.25) 22:0 (0.15) rapeseed (CRO7) 2.20 118 (123) 71.6 165 (200) 52.8 (45.9) C16:0 (4.1) C18:0 (0.1) C18:1 (63.7) C18:2 (20.2) C18:3 (10.2) C20:0 (1.5) C22:0 (0.2) rapeseed* 4.17-5.12 108 (107) 3.5 203 (200) 48.9 (49.5) C16:0 (7.6) C18:0 (1.3) C18:1 (64.5) C18:2 (23.7) C18:3 (2.4) C20:0 (0.5) Brassica juncea 0.74 109 (110) 178 (185) 52.4 (51.1) C16:0 (2.4) C18:0 (1.1) C18:1 (19.9) C18:2 (19.2) C18:3 (10.9) C20:0 (7.2) C20:1 (1.7) C22:0 (0.9) C22:1 (34.8) 24:0 (1.9) safflower 1.75 139 48.9 170 47.1 n.d. WCO: tobacco2 =1:1 4.34 119 (112) 56.0 191 (203) 48.1 (48.0) C16:0 (22.5) C18:0 (3.2) C18:1 (32.0) C18:2 (42.1) C18:3 (0.2) tobacco2 6.17 141 (151) 33.4 183 (201) 44.4 (39.5) C16:0 (8.7) C18:0 (1.6) C18:1 (12.8) C18:2 (76.0) C18:3 (0.7) C20:0 (0.1) C22:0 (0.1) 1Iodine value; 2Peroxide number; 3Saponification number; 4Cetane number; 5Winterized sunflower oil, 6Waste cooking oil; 7Crude rapeseed oil; * refined, commercial oils acidified with pure oleic acid up to the indicated value. Tab. 3.1. Results of the characterization of the oils. The results of the FFA esterification performed on the different oils are given in Fig. 3.1. Fig. 3.1. Results of the FFA esterification reaction on different oils. The dotted line represents a FFA concentration equal to 0.5%wt, i.e. the limit required by both the European and American directives on BD fuel and to perform the transesterification reaction avoiding excessive soaps formation. The FFA esterification method is able to lower the acidity of most of the oils using the ion exchange resins A46 and D5081 as catalysts in the adopted reaction conditions. High conversion was obtained with A15 at the first use of the catalyst, but then its catalytic activity drastically drops after each cycle. The total loss of activity was estimated to be around 30% within the 5 cycles (results not shown for the sake of brevity). A possible explanation concerning this loss of activity may be related to the adsorption of the H2O yielded by the esterification on the internal active sites, which makes them unavailable for catalysis. When H2O molecules are formed inside the pores, they are unable to give internal retro-diffusion due to their strong interaction with H+ sites and form an aqueous phase inside the pores. The formation of this phase prevents FFA from reaching internal active sites due to repulsive effects. What appears to influence the FFA conversion is the refinement degree of the oil. WCO is in fact harder to process in comparison to refined oils (Bianchi et al., 2010; Boffito et al., 2012c), probably due to its higher viscosity which results in limitations to the mass transfer of the reagents towards the catalyst. Indeed, the required acidity limit is not achieved within 6 hours of reaction. A FFA concentration lower than 0.5%wt is not achieved also in the case of WCO mixture 3:1 with CRO and 1:1 with tobacco oil and in the case of the second stock of tobacco oil (tobacco2). This is attributable to the very low quality of these feedstocks due to the waste nature of the oil itself, in the case of WCO, or to the poor conservation conditions in the case of tobacco oilseed. In this latter case, the low FFA conversion was also ascribed to the presence of phospholipids, responsible for the deactivation of the catalyst. BD yields ranging from 90.0 to 95.0 and from 95.0 to 99.9% were obtained from deacidified raw oils using KOH and NaOCH3 as a catalyst, respectively. In Fig. 3.2, the comparison between A46 and D5081 at different temperatures and in absence of drying pretreatment (wet catalyst) is displayed. As expected, D5081 performs better than A46 in all the adopted conditions. Nevertheless, the maximum conversion within a reaction time of 6 hours is not achieved by any of the catalysts both operating at 318 K and in the absence of drying pretreatment. A more detailed study on the FFA esterification of WCO and its blends with rapeseed oil and gasoline was carried out. In Tab. 3.2 a list of all the experiments performed with WCO is reported together with the FFA conversion achieved in each case, while in Fig. 3.3 the influence of the viscosity of the blends of WCO is shown. Fig. 3.2. Comparison between the catalysts. D5081 and A46 at a) different catalysts amounts and b) temperatures and treatments. The results show that Carberry reactor is unsuitable for FFA esterification since a good contact between reagents and catalyst is not achieved due to its confinement. A15 deactivated very rapidly, while A46 and D5081 maintained their excellent performance during all the cycles of use due to the reasons already highlighted previously. The blends of WCO and CRO show an increase of the reaction rate proportional to the content of the CRO, that is attributable to the decreases viscosity (Fig. 3.3), being all the blend characterized by the same initial acidity. Also the use of diesel as a solvent resulted in a beneficial effect for the FFA esterification reaction, contributing to the higher reaction rate. Feedstock %wtFFAt=0 Reactor Cat. gcat/100 goil gcat/100 g feedstock Number of cat. re-uses FFA conv. (%), 1st use, 6 hr 1 WCO 2.10 Carberry A15 3.3 3.3 6 15.4 2 WCO 2.10 slurry A15 10 10 6 71.7 3 WCO 2.10 Carberry A46 3.3 3.3 6 7.7 4 WCO 2.10 slurry A46 10 10 6 62.0 5 WCO 2.10 slurry D5081 10 10 6 63.7 6 CRO 2.20 slurry A46 10 10 10 95.9 7 CRO 2.20 slurry D5081 10 10 10 93.7 8 WCO 2.10 slurry A46 10 10 0 62.0 9 WCO 75 CRO 25 2.12 7.5 71.3 10 WCO 50 CRO 50 2.19 5.0 79.9 11 WCO 25 CRO 75 2.24 2.5 86.1 12 CRO 2.20 10 95.9 13 WCO 75 DIESEL 25 1.74 7.5 76.8 14 WCO 50 DIESEL 50 1.17 5.0 58.7 15 WCO 25 DIESEL 75 0.65 2.5 40.4 16 WCO 25 DIESEL 75 (higher FFA input) 2.44 2.5 63.5 Tab. 3.2. Experiments performed with waste cooking oil. . Fig. 3.3. FFA conversions and viscosities of the blend of WCO with rapeseed oil. 3.2. Sulphated inorganic oxides as catalysts for the free fatty acid esterification: conventional and ultrasound assisted synthesis Conventional syntheses In Tab. 3.3, the list of all the catalyst synthesized with conventional techniques is reported together with the results of the characterization. Catalyst Composition Prep. method precursors T calc. SSA (m2g-1) Vp (cm3g-1) meq H+g-1 1 SZ1 SO42-/ZrO2 one-pot sol-gel ZTNP1, (NH4)2SO4 893 K O2 107 0.09 0.90 2a SZ2a SO42-/ZrO2 two-pots sol-gel ZTNP, H2SO4 893 K 102 0.10 0.11 2b SZ2b SO42-/ZrO2 two-pots sol-gel ZTNP, H2SO4 653 K 110 0.10 0.12 3 SZ3 SO42-/ZrO2 Physical mixing ZrOCl2.8H2O (NH4)2SO4 873 K 81 0.11 1.3 4 SZ4 Zr(SO4)2/SiO2 Impregnation Zr(SO4)2.4H2O SiO2 873 K 331 0.08 1.4 5 SZ5 Zr(SO4)2/Al2O3 Impregnation Zr(SO4)2.4H2O Al2O3 873 K 151 0.09 0.67 6 ZS Zr(SO4)2.4H2O (commercial) - - - 13 0.12 9.6 7 STTO_0 SO42-/SnO2 Physical mixing + impregnation SnO2 TiO2 P25 H2SO4 773 K 16.8 0.10 3.15 8 STTO_5 SO42-/95%SnO2-5%TiO2 773 K 15.9 0.11 3.43 9 STTO_10 SO42-/ 90%SnO2-10%TiO2 773 K 16.5 0.09 5.07 10 STTO_15 SO42-/ 85%SnO2-15%TiO2 773 K 14.9 0.11 7.13 11 STTO_20 SO42-/ 80%SnO2-20%TiO2 773 K 16.9 0.09 7.33 Tab. 3.3. Sulphated inorganic catalysts synthesized with conventional techniques. The FFA conversions of the sulphated Zr-based systems are provided in Fig. 3.4a and show that Zr-based sulphated systems do not provide a satisfactory performance in the FFA esterification, probably due to their low acid sites concentration related to their high SSA. Even if catalysts such as SZ3 and SZ4 exhibit higher acidity compared to other catalysts, it is essential that this acidity is located mainly on the catalyst surface to be effectively reached by the FFA molecules, as in the case of ZS. In Figure 3.4b, the results of the FFA esterification tests of the sulphated Sn-Ti systems are shown. Other conditions being equal, these catalysts perform better than the sulphated Zr-based systems just described. This is more likely due to the higher acidity along with a lower surface area. With increasing the TiO2 content, the acidity increases as well. This might be ascribable to the charge imbalance resulting from the heteroatoms linkage for the generation of acid centres, (Kataota and Dumesic, 1988). As a consequence, the activity increases with the TiO2 content along with the acidity of the samples. For the sake of clarity, in Fig. 3.4c the FFA esterification conversion is represented as a function of the number of active sites per unit of surface area of the samples. Ultrasound- assisted synthesis In Tab. 3.4, the list of all the catalyst synthesized with conventional techniques is reported together with the results of the characterization. Samples SZ and SZT refer to catalysts obtained with traditional sol-gel method, while samples termed USZT refer to US-obtained sulphated 80%ZrO2-20%TiO2. The name is followed by the US power, by the length of US pulses and by the molar ratio of water over precursors. For example, USZT_40_0.1_30 indicates a sample obtained with 40% of the maximum US power, on for 0.1 seconds (pulse length) and off for 0.9 seconds, using a water/ZTNP+TTIP molar ratio equal to 30. SZT was also calcined at 773 K for 6 hours, employing the same heating rate. This sample is reported as SZT_773_6h in entry 2a. Further details about the preparation can be found in a recent study (Boffito et al., 2012b). Entry Catalyst Acid capacity (meq H+/g) SSA (m2g-1) Vp (cm3g-1) Ave. BJH Dp (nm) Zr:Ti weight ratio S/(Zr+Ti) atomic ratio 1 SZ 0.30 107 0.20 6.0 100 0.090 2 SZT 0.79 152 0.19 5.0 79:21 0.085 2a SZT_773_6h 0.21 131 0.20 5.0 n.d.1 n.d 3 USZT_20_1_30 0.92 41.7 0.12 12.5 80:20 0.095 4 USZT_40_0.1_30 1.03 47.9 0.11 9.5 81:19 0.067 5 USZT_40_0.3_30 1.99 232 0.27 4.5 81:19 0.11 6 USZT_40_0.5_7.5 1.70 210 0.20 5.0 78:22 0.086 7 USZT_40_0.5_15 2.02 220 0.20 5.0 80:20 0.13 8 USZT_40_0.5_30 2.17 153 0.20 5.0 78:22 0.12 9 USZT_40_0.5_60 0.36 28.1 0.10 10 79:21 0.092 10 USZT_40_0.7_30 1.86 151 0.16 5.0 78:22 0.11 11 USZT_40_1_15 3.06 211 0.09 7.0 80:20 0.15 12 USZT_40_1_30 1.56 44.1 0.09 7.0 80:20 0.17 Tab. 3.4. Sulphated inorganic Zr-Ti systems synthesized with ultrasound-assisted sol-gel technique. Some of the results of the characterizations are displayed in Tab. 3.4. The results of the catalytic tests are shown in Fig. 3.5 a, b and c. In Fig. 3.5a and 3.5b the FFA conversions are reported for the samples synthesized using the same or different H2O/precursors ratio, respectively. Fig. 3.5. FFA conversions of sulphated inorganic Zr-Ti systems synthesized with ultrasound-assisted sol-gel for a) the same amount of H2O, b) different amount of H2O used in the sol-gel synthesis, c) in function of the meq of H+/g of catalyst Both the addition of TiO2 and the use of US during the synthesis are able to improve the properties of the catalysts and therefore the catalytic performance in the FFA esterification. The addition of TiO2 is able to increase the Brønsted acidity and, as a consequence, the catalytic activity (compare entries 1 and 2 in Tab. 3.4). The improvement in the properties of the catalysts due the use of US is probably caused by the effects generated by acoustic cavitation. Acoustic cavitation is the growth of bubble nuclei followed by the implosive collapse of bubbles in solution as a consequence of the applied sound field. This collapse generates transient hot-spots with local temperatures and pressures of several thousand K and hundreds of atmospheres, respectively (Sehgal et al., 1979). Very high speed jets (up to 100 m/s) are also formed. As documented by Suslick and Doktycz (Suslick and Doktycz, 1990), in the presence of an extended surface, such as the surface of a catalyst, the formation of the bubbles occurs at the liquid-solid interface and, as a consequence of their implosion, the high speed jets are directed towards the surface. The use of sonication in the synthesis of catalysts can therefore improve the nucleation production rate (i.e. sol-gel reaction production rate) and the production of surface defects and deformations with the formation of brittle powders (Suslick and Doktycz, 1990). For the samples obtained with the US pulses with on/off ratio from 0.3/0.7 on, the conversion does not increase much more compared to the one achieved with the sample obtained via traditional sol-gel synthesis. Their conversion is in fact comparable (see samples USZ_40_0.3_30, USZ_40_0.5_30, USZ_40_0.7_30 and SZT in Fig. 3.5a. The similarity in the catalytic performance of these catalysts may be ascribable to the fact that they are characterized by comparable values of SSA (entries 2, 5, 8, 10 in Tab. 3.4) and, in the case of the catalysts obtained with pulses, also by comparable acidities (entries 5, 8, 10 in Tab. 3.4). A high SSA may in fact be disadvantageous for the catalysis of the reaction here studied for the reasons already highlighted in the previous sections. The best catalytic performance is reached by the sample USZT_40_1_30, i.e. the one obtained using continuous US at higher power. This catalyst results in fact in a doubled catalytic activity with respect to the samples prepared either with the traditional synthesis or with the use of pulsed US. In spite the acidity of this catalyst is lower than that of the samples obtained with the US pulses, it is characterized by a rather low surface area (entry 12 in Tab. 3.4) that can be associated with a localization of the active sites mainly on its outer surface. As evidenced by the FTIR measurements (not reported for the sake of brevity), it is also important to highlight, that only in the case of the USZT_40_1_30 sample, a not negligible number of medium-strong Lewis acid sites is present at the surface, together with a high number of strong Brønsted acid centres. The XRD patterns of the samples were typical of amorphous systems, due to the low calcination temperatures. Samples calcined for a long time (SZT_773_6h) exhibit almost no catalytic activity (results not reported for the sake of brevity). This catalytic behaviour might be ascribable to the loss of part of the sulphates occurred during the calcinations step that result also in a very low acid capacity (see Tab. 3.4). For the sake of clarity, in Fig. 3.5c the FFA conversions as a function of the concentration of the acid sites normalized to the surface area are reported for the most significant samples. For what concerns how the water/precursors ratio affects the catalysts acidity, some general observations can be made: increasing it up to a certain amount increases the H+ concentration (compare entries from 6 to 9 and 11 to 12 in Tab. 3.4) because the rate of the hydrolysis and the number of H2O molecules that can be chemically bounded increases. Nevertheless, increasing the water/precursor ratio over a certain amount (30 for pulsed and 15 for continuous US, entries 8 and 11 in Tab. 3.4, respectively), seems to have a negative effect on the acidity concentration. In fact, the risk of the extraction of acid groups by the excess of water increases as well and the US power density decreases. 3.3 Sonochemically-assisted esterification and transesterification Esterification In Tab. 3.5 a list of the sonochemically-assisted esterification experiments is displayed together with the final acidities achieved after 4 hours of reaction. The reactor used for these experiments, provided with both an US horn (20 kHz) and a MW emitter (2450 MHz) is described elsewhere in detail (Ragaini et al., 2012). Standard calorimetric measurements were carried out to measure the actual emitted power (Suslick and Lorimer, 1989). Considering entries from 1 to 6 (rapeseed oil with high acidity), a final acidity lower than 0.5%wt is achieved within 4 hours operating at the conventional temperature of 336 K with all the methods, while this does not happen operating at lower temperatures. In particular, the lowest acidity is achieved at 336 K with MW. Considering entries from 7 to 12, inherent to the raw tobacco oilseed, final acidities lower than 0.5%wt are achieved only with the use of US. It is remarkable that at the temperature of 293 K the FFA esterification reaction rate results 6X faster than the conventional process at the same temperature. In the case of the rapeseed oil with low acidity (entries from 13 to 20), the use of MW increases the FFA conversion at 293 K and 313 K but not at 336 K. Moreover, the higher the applied power, the higher the FFA conversion. Oil Initial acidity (%wt) Cat. Technique Temp. (K) Emitted power (W) Tthermostat (K) Final acidity (%wt), 4 hr 1 Rapeseed oil (5)* 4.2-5.0 A46 conventional 313 - 315 1.18 2 336 338 0.50 3 ultrasound 313 38.5 293 0.55 4 336 313 0.48 5 microwaves 313 61.4 293 0.69 6 336 313 0.32 7 Tobacco 1.17 A46 conventional 293 - 293 0.97 8 313 315 0.55 9 336 338 0.45 10 ultrasound 293 38.5 277 0.48 11 313 293 0.46 12 336 313 0.30 13 Rapeseed oil (2)* 2.0-2.3 D5081 conventional 293 - 277 0.82 14 313 315 0.44 15 336 338 0.25 16 microwaves 293 31.7 277 0.73 17 313 31.7 293 0.34 18 61.4 293 0.37 19 336 31.7 313 0.29 20 61.4 313 0.25 Tab. 3.5. Sonochemically-assisted esterification experiments. The positive effects of acoustic-cavitation in liquid-solid systems are ascribable to the asymmetric collapse of the bubbles in the vicinity of the solid surface. When a cavitation bubble collapses violently near a solid surface, liquid jets are produced and high-speed jets of liquid are driven into the surface of a particle. These jets and shock waves improve both the liquid–solid and liquid-liquid mass transfer (Mason and Lorimer, 1988). MW is considered as a non-conventional heating system: when MW pass through a material with a dipole moment, the molecules composing the material try to align with the electric field (Mingos et al., 1997). Polar molecules have stronger interactions with the electric field. Polar ends of the molecules tend in fact to align themselves and oscillate in step with the oscillating electric field. Collisions and friction between the moving molecules results in heating (Toukoniitty et al., 2005). The increase of the FFA conversion as the power increases may be attributed to the fact that more power is delivered to the system and, therefore, the enhanced temperature effects caused by electromagnetic irradiation are increased with respect to lower powers. Differently the reason why a too high power was detrimental at the temperature of 336 K could be accounted for by two factors: i) the acoustic cavitation is enhanced at lower temperatures due to the higher amount of gas dissolved; ii) possible generation of too high temperatures inside the reaction medium that could have caused the removal of methanol from the system through constant evaporation or pyrolysis. Transesterification Transesterification experiments were performed on rapeseed oil both in batch and continuous mode. For the batch experiments two kinds of reactors were used: a traditional reaction vessel and a Rosett cell reactor, both with two ultrasound horns with different tip diameters (13 and 20 mm), and operating powers. A Rosett cell is a reactor designed to promote hydrodynamic cavitation through its typical loops placed at the bottom of vessel. Sonicators used in this work were provided by Synetude Company (Chambery, France). In Fig. 3.6, results from the conventional and the US-assisted batch experiments are compared. The US methods allows to attain very high yields in much shorter times than the traditional method and using less reagents (see Tab. 2.3) in just one step. The beneficial effects given by the US are attributable to the generation of acoustic cavitation inside the reaction medium leading to the phenomena already described in the case of esterification reaction. In particular, with the use of the Rosett cell reactor, BD yields of 96.5% (dotted lined) are achieved after 10 minutes of reaction. This is likely due to the combined approach exploiting acoustic cavitation along with hydrodynamic cavitation, which is able to provide a very efficient mixing inside the system. The use of the Rosett cell reactor provided transesterification reaction rates up to 15X faster than the conventional process. Continuous experiments were performed using two tubular reactors with different volumes (0.070 L at 35 KHz and 0.700 L at 20 kHz) and different US powers (19.3 and 68.3 W, respectively). The volume of the treated reagents was varied to obtain the same power density in both the reactors. Results are presented in Fig. 3.7. BD yields higher than 96.5% were obtained in the case of the small reactor within a reaction time of ~5 minutes. It is remarkable that BD yields higher than 90% were obtained using pulsed US (2 seconds on, 2 seconds off) after only 18 seconds, corresponding to just one passage in the reactor. In this case the transesterification reaction rate was 300X faster than the conventional process. The beneficial effects of pulses for the reactivity of the transesterification have been extensively reported (Chand et al., 2010; Kumar et al., 2010). In particular, as reported by Chand, when pulses are adopted, excessive heating of the reaction medium is not promoted, so preventing the loss of the gases dissolved in the system that are necessary for the acoustic cavitation to occur. Moreover, excessive heating during the transesterification reaction might lead to evaporation followed by pyrolysis of methanol and its subsequent removal from the reaction environment. 4. Conclusions As a conclusion to this work, some final remarks can be claimed: Feedstocks with a high potential for biodiesel (BD) production are Brassica juncea oilseed, which can be used as feedstock for BD100, Carthamus tinctorus, tobacco, animal fat and waste cooking oil to be used in BD blends with other oils or in diesel blends. However, blending different oils among them or with diesel already during the free fatty acids (FFA) esterification reaction may increase the reaction rate due to the lowered viscosity. Free fatty acids esterification over acid ion exchange resins in slurry reactors remains the preferred method of oils deacidification due to the optimal contact between the reagents and the catalyst and the good durability over time. The final high BD yields obtained for the oils de-acidified with the pre-esterification method over sulphonic ion exchange resins demonstrate its effectiveness in lowering the acidity and the possibility of obtaining high quality biodiesel from the selected feedstocks. Surface acidity and specific surface area of sulphated inorganic systems can be increased by both adding TiO2 and using ultrasound (US) in precise experimental conditions to assist the sol-gel synthesis of the catalysts. Changing the experimental conditions of US during the sol-gel synthesis makes also possible to tune the properties of the catalysts. In spite of not satisfying FFA conversions were obtained, US-assisted sol-gel synthesis turns out to be an extremely interesting method to obtain catalysts with high acidity and surface area. Both US and microwaves (MW) enhanced the FFA esterification reaction rate at temperatures lower than the one used conventionally (336 K). The positive effects of US are attributable to the phenomena generated inside the reaction medium by the acoustic cavitation, while MW are able to generate temperature effects localized in the proximity of the catalyst surface and to increase MeOH-oil solubility. US-assisted transesterification reaction is much faster than conventional transesterification: BD yields higher than 96.5% were achieved in most of the cases within 10 minutes of reaction, whereas the conventional method requires 150 minutes, besides higher reagents amount and higher temperatures. 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