Challenging orthodoxies in gender, violence, and international relations
In: Tijdschrift voor genderstudies, Band 25, Heft 2, S. 188-191
ISSN: 2352-2437
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In: Tijdschrift voor genderstudies, Band 25, Heft 2, S. 188-191
ISSN: 2352-2437
The article presents the theoretical framework that could be used in analyzing the opposition of state sovereignty and human rights in international relations. As the methodological tool is chosen the English School of international relations, which is known as a via media, a third way between realism and liberalism. The English School is generally divided into two major camps – pluralism and solidarism, distinguishable by their positions on the role of values in international society. The pluralistic variant of English School is closer to realism, and the solidarist variant – to liberalism. The main concept which represents the English School is the international society. According to the definition by H. Bull and A. Watson, international society is a "group of states (or, more generally, a group of independent political communities) which not merely form a system, in the sense that the behaviour of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others, but also have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognise their common interest in maintaining these arrangements". Pluralists and solidarists perceive the concept of international society differently. The pluralist concept of international society refers to the positivist tradition of international law. According to that tradition, international law is the law between states only and exclusively. The statement that only sovereign states can become members of the international society is of fundamental importance in the pluralist approach. The scope of pluralist international society is fairly minimal, centered on shared concerns about international order under anarchy, and thus largely confined to agreement about sovereignty, diplomacy, and non-intervention.[.].
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The article presents the theoretical framework that could be used in analyzing the opposition of state sovereignty and human rights in international relations. As the methodological tool is chosen the English School of international relations, which is known as a via media, a third way between realism and liberalism. The English School is generally divided into two major camps – pluralism and solidarism, distinguishable by their positions on the role of values in international society. The pluralistic variant of English School is closer to realism, and the solidarist variant – to liberalism. The main concept which represents the English School is the international society. According to the definition by H. Bull and A. Watson, international society is a "group of states (or, more generally, a group of independent political communities) which not merely form a system, in the sense that the behaviour of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others, but also have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognise their common interest in maintaining these arrangements". Pluralists and solidarists perceive the concept of international society differently. The pluralist concept of international society refers to the positivist tradition of international law. According to that tradition, international law is the law between states only and exclusively. The statement that only sovereign states can become members of the international society is of fundamental importance in the pluralist approach. The scope of pluralist international society is fairly minimal, centered on shared concerns about international order under anarchy, and thus largely confined to agreement about sovereignty, diplomacy, and non-intervention.[.].
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The article presents the theoretical framework that could be used in analyzing the opposition of state sovereignty and human rights in international relations. As the methodological tool is chosen the English School of international relations, which is known as a via media, a third way between realism and liberalism. The English School is generally divided into two major camps – pluralism and solidarism, distinguishable by their positions on the role of values in international society. The pluralistic variant of English School is closer to realism, and the solidarist variant – to liberalism. The main concept which represents the English School is the international society. According to the definition by H. Bull and A. Watson, international society is a "group of states (or, more generally, a group of independent political communities) which not merely form a system, in the sense that the behaviour of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others, but also have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognise their common interest in maintaining these arrangements". Pluralists and solidarists perceive the concept of international society differently. The pluralist concept of international society refers to the positivist tradition of international law. According to that tradition, international law is the law between states only and exclusively. The statement that only sovereign states can become members of the international society is of fundamental importance in the pluralist approach. The scope of pluralist international society is fairly minimal, centered on shared concerns about international order under anarchy, and thus largely confined to agreement about sovereignty, diplomacy, and non-intervention.[.].
BASE
Independence and liberty of cyberspace enabled inception of new kind mass media. Internet based news organization no longer needed to obey national laws and acknowledge states' superiority in international political communication. News organizations, like Google, Facebook, Twitter, Wikileaks, etc., have emerged as mighty actors in the international communicative activities. They are being driven by self-interests, which not necessary conform sovereign states' interests. The development of new kind mass media are not being determined by national laws or other offline rules. This study determined the role of self-ruling mass media in the international political communication. Also, this work showed that emergence of new kind mass media have caused substantial decline of sovereign states' power in international political communication.
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Independence and liberty of cyberspace enabled inception of new kind mass media. Internet based news organization no longer needed to obey national laws and acknowledge states' superiority in international political communication. News organizations, like Google, Facebook, Twitter, Wikileaks, etc., have emerged as mighty actors in the international communicative activities. They are being driven by self-interests, which not necessary conform sovereign states' interests. The development of new kind mass media are not being determined by national laws or other offline rules. This study determined the role of self-ruling mass media in the international political communication. Also, this work showed that emergence of new kind mass media have caused substantial decline of sovereign states' power in international political communication.
BASE
Independence and liberty of cyberspace enabled inception of new kind mass media. Internet based news organization no longer needed to obey national laws and acknowledge states' superiority in international political communication. News organizations, like Google, Facebook, Twitter, Wikileaks, etc., have emerged as mighty actors in the international communicative activities. They are being driven by self-interests, which not necessary conform sovereign states' interests. The development of new kind mass media are not being determined by national laws or other offline rules. This study determined the role of self-ruling mass media in the international political communication. Also, this work showed that emergence of new kind mass media have caused substantial decline of sovereign states' power in international political communication.
BASE
In the second part, misconceptions of realism after the Cold War are analysed. It is shown that the shifts in content of contemporary realist theories are path-dependent and rooted in "Waltz paradox". The paradox led to three different modes of realist enterprise: (i) conservative reaction; (ii) "middle way"; and (iii) radical reaction. These stages purport the gradually increasing deviation from the original descriptive principles of realism. Conservative reaction is based on a false assumption that states can follow rational winning strategies. Middle-way "realists" (mis)treat the political struggle for power only as an outgrowth of specific circumstances. More and more of them follow the liberal agenda, trying to find and neutralise the "irrational factors", and thereby secure the rational (universally acceptable) political outcomes. Finally, radical reaction means reconstruction of realism as an entirely prescriptive discourse and moral guidelines for peaceful accommodation and liberal political order. The implications of these theoretical changes are exemplitied by discussing standard "realistic" explanations of US foreign policy after the Cold War. It is shown that none of today's "realist" approaches is realistic enough to grasp the operation of the principles once known to realism. The findings of this research challenge the false truths about the relation between political realism, scientific IR enterprise and political practice.
BASE
In the second part, misconceptions of realism after the Cold War are analysed. It is shown that the shifts in content of contemporary realist theories are path-dependent and rooted in "Waltz paradox". The paradox led to three different modes of realist enterprise: (i) conservative reaction; (ii) "middle way"; and (iii) radical reaction. These stages purport the gradually increasing deviation from the original descriptive principles of realism. Conservative reaction is based on a false assumption that states can follow rational winning strategies. Middle-way "realists" (mis)treat the political struggle for power only as an outgrowth of specific circumstances. More and more of them follow the liberal agenda, trying to find and neutralise the "irrational factors", and thereby secure the rational (universally acceptable) political outcomes. Finally, radical reaction means reconstruction of realism as an entirely prescriptive discourse and moral guidelines for peaceful accommodation and liberal political order. The implications of these theoretical changes are exemplitied by discussing standard "realistic" explanations of US foreign policy after the Cold War. It is shown that none of today's "realist" approaches is realistic enough to grasp the operation of the principles once known to realism. The findings of this research challenge the false truths about the relation between political realism, scientific IR enterprise and political practice.
BASE
In the second part, misconceptions of realism after the Cold War are analysed. It is shown that the shifts in content of contemporary realist theories are path-dependent and rooted in "Waltz paradox". The paradox led to three different modes of realist enterprise: (i) conservative reaction; (ii) "middle way"; and (iii) radical reaction. These stages purport the gradually increasing deviation from the original descriptive principles of realism. Conservative reaction is based on a false assumption that states can follow rational winning strategies. Middle-way "realists" (mis)treat the political struggle for power only as an outgrowth of specific circumstances. More and more of them follow the liberal agenda, trying to find and neutralise the "irrational factors", and thereby secure the rational (universally acceptable) political outcomes. Finally, radical reaction means reconstruction of realism as an entirely prescriptive discourse and moral guidelines for peaceful accommodation and liberal political order. The implications of these theoretical changes are exemplitied by discussing standard "realistic" explanations of US foreign policy after the Cold War. It is shown that none of today's "realist" approaches is realistic enough to grasp the operation of the principles once known to realism. The findings of this research challenge the false truths about the relation between political realism, scientific IR enterprise and political practice.
BASE
In the second part, misconceptions of realism after the Cold War are analysed. It is shown that the shifts in content of contemporary realist theories are path-dependent and rooted in "Waltz paradox". The paradox led to three different modes of realist enterprise: (i) conservative reaction; (ii) "middle way"; and (iii) radical reaction. These stages purport the gradually increasing deviation from the original descriptive principles of realism. Conservative reaction is based on a false assumption that states can follow rational winning strategies. Middle-way "realists" (mis)treat the political struggle for power only as an outgrowth of specific circumstances. More and more of them follow the liberal agenda, trying to find and neutralise the "irrational factors", and thereby secure the rational (universally acceptable) political outcomes. Finally, radical reaction means reconstruction of realism as an entirely prescriptive discourse and moral guidelines for peaceful accommodation and liberal political order. The implications of these theoretical changes are exemplitied by discussing standard "realistic" explanations of US foreign policy after the Cold War. It is shown that none of today's "realist" approaches is realistic enough to grasp the operation of the principles once known to realism. The findings of this research challenge the false truths about the relation between political realism, scientific IR enterprise and political practice.
BASE
Civil-military relations in Lithuania have serious deficiencies, which have appeared because of the simulation of a recommended Western model of civilian control. After regaining Independence, Lithuania had the difficult task of creating its armed forces and system of national defence following the Western model. At the same time we had to implement two political programs: to create functio-ning armed forces and a institutional-legal system of democratic civil-military control. However, this control is not only proper laws and functioning institutions. Equally, an important role must be given to intellectual reflection, which enables the posing of questions such as: what is war; how is the character of war changing; how does this affect Lithuanian defence policies and the perception of threats? Raising such questions inside the armed forces and in wider political and civil society is an essential condition for having effective and flexible civilian control over the military.
BASE
Civil-military relations in Lithuania have serious deficiencies, which have appeared because of the simulation of a recommended Western model of civilian control. After regaining Independence, Lithuania had the difficult task of creating its armed forces and system of national defence following the Western model. At the same time we had to implement two political programs: to create functio-ning armed forces and a institutional-legal system of democratic civil-military control. However, this control is not only proper laws and functioning institutions. Equally, an important role must be given to intellectual reflection, which enables the posing of questions such as: what is war; how is the character of war changing; how does this affect Lithuanian defence policies and the perception of threats? Raising such questions inside the armed forces and in wider political and civil society is an essential condition for having effective and flexible civilian control over the military.
BASE
Civil-military relations in Lithuania have serious deficiencies, which have appeared because of the simulation of a recommended Western model of civilian control. After regaining Independence, Lithuania had the difficult task of creating its armed forces and system of national defence following the Western model. At the same time we had to implement two political programs: to create functio-ning armed forces and a institutional-legal system of democratic civil-military control. However, this control is not only proper laws and functioning institutions. Equally, an important role must be given to intellectual reflection, which enables the posing of questions such as: what is war; how is the character of war changing; how does this affect Lithuanian defence policies and the perception of threats? Raising such questions inside the armed forces and in wider political and civil society is an essential condition for having effective and flexible civilian control over the military.
BASE