Suchergebnisse

On March 21, 1947, the House of Representatives concurred in the Senate amendments to House Joint Resolution 27, which proposed an amendment to the Constitution of the United States placing a limit on the number of terms a President may serve. The vote in the House on so important a question was amazingly small—81 ayes, 29 noes, a total of 110 votes. Objection to the vote on the ground of absence of a quorum was made and then withdrawn. The necessary vote of two-thirds was declared to have been taken, and the way was cleared for possible ratification by the legislatures of the states.The pertinent part of the proposed amendment in its final form is as follows:"No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice, and no person who has held the office of President, or acted as President for more than two years of a term to which some other person was elected President shall be elected to the office of the President more than once. But this article shall not apply to any person holding the office of President when this article was proposed by the Congress, and shall not prevent any person who may be holding the office of President, or acting as President, during the term within which this article becomes operative from holding the office of President or acting as President during the remainder of such term."Under this amendment a President might conceivably serve not to exceed ten years. The primary object of the latter part of the complicated proposal was to except President Truman from its application. In order to be valid, the proposal must be ratified within a period of seven years after its submission to the states.

PurposeCEOs' (chief executive officer) term of office may explain discretionary accruals as a result of opportunistic behavior arising during certain periods of the term of office. Therefore, CEOs, in their early years of office, have incentives to report results that meet market expectations. In turn, CEOs in their senior year may be motivated to use discretionary accruals to gain private benefits. In this scenario, corporate governance mechanisms play an important role in monitoring relationships. Hence, the purpose of this study is to verify the influence of monitoring mechanisms on the relationship between CEOs' term of office and discretionary accruals.Design/methodology/approachDescriptive statistics, multiple cross-sectional regression to estimate the accruals and regression of panel data to test the hypotheses were used. The sample comprised 195 companies listed on BM&FBovespa.FindingsThe results indicated that CEOs' long term of office has a negative impact on the level of discretionary accruals, and thus, Brazilian CEOs with a longer term of office tend to establish a certain reputation in the stock market. On the other hand, it is concluded that CEOs' intentions, in the first years of term, are positively related to the use of accruals and that the monitoring mechanisms can minimize these CEOs' opportunistic practices.Originality/valueThe results broaden the literature on corporate governance, pointing that different systems of variable remuneration may influence CEOs' willingness to manage results in their last year of term.

ABSTRACTFollowing the amendment of the 1945 Constitution, Indonesia became one of the countries that adopted presidential government system in which the presidential position is directly elected by the people. The interesting thing and is still hitherto controversial is the limitation of president's term of office for no more than two periods. Review of various literature illustrate that there is no standard exemplar to limit or not to limit the period that must be applied in a country that adheres to presidentialism. On the other hand, if it is associated with democracy, the limitation of president's period will cause contradiction especially with president's accountability in which the president is directly elected by the people. Based on this, we conducted a study using qualitative methods with descriptive approach aims at knowing how the periodisation of presidential term of office in Indonesia viewed from a democratic perspective. This article argues that the model of presidential period limitation for at maximum two periods must be carried out by adding the length of service to more than five years and requiring an interlude between the first and the second period. The modelling can anticipate the tendency of power abuse by incumbent while maintaining demos support for the legitimacy of the president.

Local governors who hold office for longer periods are thought to be more likely to collude with various groups to increase their own benefit through long-term interaction. There is no term limit for local governors in Japan, seemingly causing such collusive behavior. However, since 1987, local government at the prefecture level has begun to promulgate public information disclosure ordinances, which is anticipated to prevent collusive behavior. As of 2001, all 47 local governments have promulgated their local ordinances. This paper uses a prefecture-level dataset from 1987 and 2001 to explore whether the number of years that local governors hold office is associated with the timing of the promulgation of public information disclosure ordinances. The major finding using survival regression analysis is that the longer local governors hold office, the less likely the ordinance is promulgated. This highlights the policy implication that the term of local governors should be limited.

No. 36 in a series of 37 monographs ; "May 1947". ; "One of a series of monographs prepared . under the general coordination of the Governor's Committee on Preparatory Research for the New Jersey Constitutional Convention of 1947." ; Title from cover. ; Bibliography : leaf 11. ; Mode of access: Internet.

A constitution is the foundation of the governance of a country. Constitutions regulate the separation of the division of authority of each state institution, the length of service of the president and his deputy as well as the protection of human rights. Currently in Indonesia, there is a discourse on extending the presidential term of office to 3 terms. Responses to this discourse varied. Some argue that each period is to be made with a longer period. Meanwhile, others argue to postpone the general election on the grounds that Indonesia is still recovering from Covid-19. This research is normative legal research with statutory and case approaches, using primary and secondary legal materials collected through literature. The theory of people's sovereignty is a theory that forms the basis of democracy, in which it states that the highest power in a country is in the hands of the people. From the results of this study, changes to the term of office of the President and Vice President and the postponement of general elections are unconstitutional if they are not carried out by amending the Constitution at the will of the people.

Limiting the term of office of the head of government is an important prerequisite for realizing a democratic state life. In Indonesia, these restrictions are imposed on the President and Vice President with a term of office of 5 years and after that, they can be re-elected only for 1 term of office. Using the normative juridical method, this study shows that this choice has become a source of debate in other parts of the world, and several presidential countries have chosen different models of restrictions. In Indonesia, it has been revealed that this choice is not based on a deep conceptual debate and empirically has threatened the continuity of a principled election. As a solution, this study offers the application of the concept of a single term of office for the President and Vice President in Indonesia. This research also enriches the study of state administration in the theme of structuring the presidential system.

The main research aim of this article is an analysis of the length of the parliamentary term of office in Poland based on the analysis of legal rules. According to the art. 98 para. 1 of the Constitution, the parliamentary term of office starts on the day on which the Sejm assembles for its first sitting and ends on the day preceding the first assembly of the newly elected Sejm. Although the mentioned rule also expressly states that parliamentary term of office lasts 4 years, the length of the particular terms of office could be very different. If the parliamentary term of office is shortened, it could last even less than two months. If it is prolongated because of the introduction of the extraordinary measure, it could last approx. 5 years (in case of emergency state), or it maximal length can not be defined. Moreover, even in case of the "normal" terms of office they could have different length – slightly less than 4 years or longer than 4 years by even a few weeks. The presented considerations lead to the conclusion that there is need to make certain amendments of the rules of law concerning this area, which would ensure minimal 4 years length of the "normal" parliamentary term and regulate the organisation of the parliamentary elections after the termination of the extraordinary measure. Author analysed the legal rules basing on legal-dogmatic method and interpreted them by using such methods of their interpretation as: language-logical, teleological and systematic.