This article deals with terrorism and guerrilla warfare as two different forms of insurgency. It is argued that terrorism and guerrilla warfare can and should be understood as two different strategies or different strategic approaches used by insurgent groups. Five criteria are used to distinguish terrorism from guerrilla warfare. These five criteria: targets, size of operational units, control of territory, area of operations, identification signs. The article states that distinction between terrorism and guerrilla warfare is not only possible, but needed. Adapted from the source document.
The end of the Cold War showed the geostrategical transformation of the world. We could see how relations between great powers became more ethical. The main subject of the analysis is the ethical problems in realization of foreign policy. Nowadays ethical problems became more important when we see so many crises, wars, & attacks of terrorists in different places of all over the world. Especially after September 11,' 2001, international terrorism became the most threatening problem for all states. Thus, states of different geostrategy have to collaborate to reach international security. The article aims to discuss how to administrate international relations due to reach the consensus in more ethical-moral way between states with different geostrategy. The work consists of five parts, in which are discussed various aspects of ethical problems in realization of foreign policy. The analysis of different geostrategical models lets to envisage possibilities of the formation of more common global geostrategical model in the 21st century. Bargains between the greatest powers (G8) attest to the ethical reality of global policy. All states understand that security is a very important condition of reform & progress, which could be reached through the common efforts of all states. Adapted from the source document.
With the so-called war on terror launched by the USA in 2001, a new era started in one of the fields of the propaganda war -- the Internet. Ability to disseminate information to as wide as possible audience due to globality of the Internet has become a powerful mean of influence. Many Muslim politically engaged religiously motivated groups, who perceive themselves to be in the state of such war, create their own elaborate web-sites. "KavkazCenter" is just one of them. "KavkazCenter" declares itself to be a product of the Chechen Independent International Islamic Internet Agency, which was set up in 1999 in Grozny by the Chechen National Center for Strategic Research & Political Technologies. However, its content is somewhat problematic, as the site appears to have been solely a propaganda tool for the Chechen Jihadist group Riyadhu as-Salihin, led by the late Shamil Basayev, who often boasted about his organized bloody attacks, frequently against civilians. Lithuania first noticed the site in early 2003, when it started being serviced by a Lithuanian firm "Microlink Data," which at the time hosted the site on its server. Back then the Lithuanian State Security Department (SSD) declared the site to be free from terrorist propaganda & insisted it did not pose any threat to Lithuania, though it was known that the site had been earlier closed down in the USA & the UK. However, half a year later the very same SSD confiscated the server of the firm "Elneta," which at that time hosted the site, thus shutting down its operations from Lithuania. This launched a long marathon of legal deliberations going all the way up to the Constitutional Court. The case divided the Lithuanian public into two parts -- those, who considered the "KavkazCenter" to be an information agency of independence-seeking Chechen freedom fighters & those, who considered the site to contain terrorist propaganda. The "defenders" group was championed by some MPs, Soviet-era dissidents, while the "accusers" group was led by the SSD. The unfolding of the case revealed that both sides were ill-prepared to meet the challenge the site "KavkazCenter" had caused. One can argue that even state institutions were taken by surprise by it. This first of all applies to the SSD, who showed itself at its worst -- its lack of professionalism was astonishing. At the same time, gaps in legislation & by extension in the work of courts were exposed. Most journalists, who took to bashing of the SSD for presumed persecution of media on the freedom of expression grounds, displayed ignorance & lack of deeper insight into the case. The general public was left puzzled. Moreover, Russia's involvement, though often referred to in the media, has never been fully revealed. The epopee of the "KavkazCenter" in Lithuania sucked both the Lithuanian government & the general society into the whirlpool of the global information wars. And though the experience shows that most of the actors were ill-prepared or not prepared at all, the very experience is very useful -- it allowed for identifying of the weaknesses in political, legal & social life of the country. Learning from its mistakes, the society can progress & improve. It is plausible to hope that in the event of another "kavkazcentr," the Lithuanian government & non-state actors will be better informed & equipped to tackle the issue. Adapted from the source document.
