Suchergebnisse

Intro -- TERRORISM INSURANCE -- TERRORISM INSURANCE -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- Chapter 1 TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE LEGISLATION IN 2007: ISSUE SUMMARY AND SIDE-BY-SIDE -- SUMMARY -- INTRODUCTION -- LEGISLATIVE ACTION -- Terrorism Risk Insurance Revision and Extension Act of 2007 (TRIREA, H.R. 2761) -- Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2007 (TRIPRA, S. 2285) -- Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2007 (H.R. 4299) -- Final Passage and Enactment of TRIA-Extension Legislation -- END NOTES -- Chapter 2 TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE: ISSUE ANALYSIS AND LEGISLATION -- SUMMARY -- BACKGROUND -- Insurability of Terrorism Risk -- International Experience with Terrorism Risk Insurance -- Previous U.S. Experience with "Uninsurable" Risks -- The Terrorism Insurance Market and the Economy: Post-9/11 and Pre-TRIA -- INITIAL CONGRESSIONAL ACTION -- TRIA's Original Goals and Substance -- POST-TRIA ACTIVITY -- Executive Branch -- Terrorism Insurance Market after TRIA -- Congressional Action in the 108th and 109th Congresses -- CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL ACTION -- Terrorism Risk Insurance Revision and Extension Act of 2007 (TRIREA) -- Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2007 (TRIPRA) -- END NOTES -- Chapter 3 TERRORISM INSURANCE: STATUS OF COVERAGE AVAILABILITY FOR ATTACKS INVOLVING NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL, OR RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS -- WHY GAO DID THIS STUDY -- WHAT GAO FOUND -- RESULTS IN BRIEF -- BACKGROUND -- Variation in Potential Weapons involving NBCR Materials and Examples of Prior Attacks -- Overview of State Regulation of Insurance and Workers' Compensation Insurance Providers -- MOST COMMERCIAL PROPERTY/CASUALTY INSURERS AND REINSURERS WE CONTACTED EXCLUDE OR LIMIT COVERAGE FOR NBCR RISKS, WHILE WORKERS' COMPENSATION, LIFE, AND HEALTH INSURERS GENERALLY ARE REQUIRED TO OFFER SUCH COVERAGE.

Examines terrorism insurance in light of the approaching end of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002's (TRIA's) three-year term. TRIA represents a temporary solution to the lack of such insurance in the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks. The demand for terrorism insurance is looked at. The insurability of the terrorism risk is characterized by catastrophic loss potential, dynamic uncertainty, ambiguity, and interdependencies. Alternative programs and scenarios to TRIA include a market approach, mutual insurance pools, public-private partnerships, compulsory insurance, insurance-mitigation link, and rating agencies.

Testimony issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Before September 11, insurance coverage for losses from terrorism was a normal feature of insurance contracts. The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon have changed insurers' perceptions of their risk exposure. Both insurers and reinsurers say that they do not know how much to charge for this coverage, and because they cannot predict future losses, they may exclude terrorism insurance from future contracts unless the federal government provides some guidance to the industry. Several insurance programs in the United States and other countries ensure that insurance will be available to cover risks that the private sector has been unable or unwilling to cover, including losses from catastrophic events and terrorism. For government insurance programs, the question of long-term cost and program funding needs to be addressed before any program is established. Some federal insurance programs have a statutory intent to provide subsidized coverage, while others are intended to be self-funding. Regardless of statutory intent, if federal insurance is underpriced relative to its long-run costs and the federal government pays the difference, a government subsidy results."

Testimony issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Before September 11, insurance coverage for losses from terrorism was a normal feature of insurance contracts. The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon have changed insurers' perceptions of their risk exposure. Both insurers and reinsurers say that they do not know how much to charge for this coverage and because they cannot predict future losses, they may exclude terrorism insurance from future contracts unless the federal government provides some guidance to the industry. Several insurance programs in the United States and other countries ensure that insurance will be available to cover risks that the private sector has been unable or unwilling to cover, including losses from catastrophic events and terrorism. For government insurance programs, the question of long-term cost and program funding needs to be addressed before any program is established. Some federal insurance programs have a statutory intent to provide subsidized coverage, while others are intended to be self-funding. Regardless of statutory intent, if federal insurance is underpriced relative to its long-run costs and the federal government pays the difference, a government subsidy results."

Testimony issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, insurance coverage for terrorism largely disappeared. Congress passed the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) in 2002 to help commercial property-casualty policyholders obtain terrorism insurance and give the insurance industry time to develop mechanisms to provide such insurance after the act expires on December 31, 2005. Under TRIA, the Department of Treasury (Treasury) caps insurer liability and would process claims and reimburse insurers for a large share of losses from terrorist acts that Treasury certified as meeting certain criteria. As Treasury and industry participants have operated under TRIA for more than a year, GAO was asked to assess Treasury's progress in implementing TRIA and describe how TRIA affected the terrorism insurance market."

Testimony issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, insurance coverage for terrorism largely disappeared. Congress passed the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) in 2002 to help commercial property-casualty policyholders obtain terrorism insurance and give the insurance industry time to develop mechanisms to provide such insurance after the act expires on December 31, 2005. Under TRIA, the Department of Treasury (Treasury) caps insurer liability and would process claims and reimburse insurers for a large share of losses from terrorist acts that Treasury certified as meeting certain criteria. As Treasury and industry participants have operated under TRIA for more than a year, GAO was asked to describe how TRIA affected the terrorism insurance market."

Concerned that the unavailability of terrorism insurance would impede economic recovery and hinder growth after the 9/11 attacks, Congress passed the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA). TRIA will sunset at the end of 2007 unless Congress takes further action. This book examines the implications of allowing TRIA to expire and of enhancements aimed at improving the availability and affordability of insurance for nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological (NBCR) attacks. The analysis takes a systematic approach to addressing the deep uncertainties that underlie the market for terror

In our article we consider insurance as a means of allocating terrorism risk. Terrorism poses a significant challenge for insurers worldwide. In terms of possible losses it fits into the same category as earthquakes and hurricanes. Yet as a result of the uncertainty surrounding these risks private markets face significant difficulties in providing insurance for it. In the insurance industry costly risk bearing can explain the supply of capacity risks. Corporate risk management theory provides reasons why transaction costs can motivate firms to purchase insurance. In the context of these tightly connected theories we derive models for both the supply of terrorism reinsurance and the demand for terrorism insurance. Using two datasets from the German terrorism insurer we estimate models on how corporations in Germany employ government sponsored insurance to manage their terrorism risk and on the factors that determine the supply for private market terrorism reinsurance.

Testimony issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "In the closing months of last year, insurers claimed that they could not afford to continue providing coverage for potential terrorism losses. Considerable debate has taken place on what the federal government can do to keep commercial insurance companies involved in providing terrorism insurance, even without the protection that they normally receive from reinsurance. Insurance companies are withdrawing from the market because they believe that neither the frequency nor the magnitude of future terrorist losses can be estimated. Insurance coverage for terroris is disappearing, particularly for large businesses and those perceived to be at some risk. This withdrawal is happening fastest among reinsurers. Because the insurers' withdrawal has been gradual, the extent of the potential economic consequences is still unclear. What is clear is that without terrorism insurance, terrorist attacks would dramatically increase direct losses to businesses, employees, and lenders. Furthermore, the government's ability to intervene after a future terrorist attack may be hampered by its lack of claims-processing and payments systems. Even without actual terrorist attacks, some properties and businesses have been unable to find terrorism coverage at any price. These problems are likely to increase as more insurance contracts come up for renewal during the coming year. The resulting economic drag could slow economic recovery and growth."

Intro -- TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE ANALYSES AND PROSPECTS -- TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE ANALYSES AND PROSPECTS -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- Chapter 1 TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE: ISSUE ANALYSIS AND OVERVIEW OF CURRENT PROGRAM -- SUMMARY -- INTRODUCTION -- THE TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE ACT OF 2002 REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2013 (H.R. 508) -- Specifics of the Current TRIA Program -- COVERAGE FOR NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, AND RADIOLOGICAL TERRORISM -- BACKGROUND ON TERRORISM INSURANCE -- Insurability of Terrorism Risk -- International Experience with Terrorism Risk Insurance -- Previous U.S. Experience with "Uninsurable" Risks -- THE TERRORISM INSURANCE MARKET -- Post-9/11 and Pre-TRIA -- After TRIA -- EVOLUTION OF TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE LAWS -- End Notes -- Chapter 2 TESTIMONY OF ROBERT P. HARTWIG, PRESIDENT, INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE. HEARING ON ''TRIA AT TEN YEARS: THE FUTURE OF THE TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE PROGRAM'' -- SUMMARY OF IMPACTS ON THE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 TERRORIST ATTACK ON INSURERS AND INSURANCE MARKETS -- Terrorism Exclusions and Price Shocks in the Wake of the 9/11 Attack -- Changes in the Terrorism Threat Landscape and Impacts on Terrorism Insurance Markets -- Absence of Successful Attacks Does Not Imply Terrorism Risk is Inconsequential -- THE FEDERAL ROLE: IMPACT OF TRIA IN MAINTAINING INSURANCE MARKET STABILITY -- Evidence from Other Countries: Terrorism Risk Insurance Programs Abroad -- OBSTACLES TO INSURING LOSSES ARISING FROM ACTS OF TERRORISM -- THE SUCCESS OF THE TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE PROGRAM -- Availability and Affordability -- Capacity -- FACTORS THAT COULD INFLUENCE GREATER PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION IN THE TERRORISM INSURANCE MARKETPLACE -- Long-Term Extension or Permanence of a Terrorism Risk Insurance Program -- Pooling Proposal -- SUMMARY -- End Notes

Nine OECD countries presently have national terrorism insurance programs based on some type of public-private risk sharing. While such arrangements have helped provide the necessary insurance capacity in the post-September 11, 2001 era, little is known about the effect of such governmental intervention on terrorism insurance markets. This paper focuses on the United States, where the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA) provides insurers with no cost federal reinsurance up to an industry-wide loss of $100 billion. We present an empirical analysis to compare how insurers' diversification behavior varies between property coverage (no governmental intervention) and terrorism coverage (with government intervention). We find evidence that insurers in the U.S. are much less diversified for terrorism coverage than they are for property lines of coverage. We interpret these findings as tentative evidence for moral hazard caused by the governmental intervention under TRIA. [Copyright Elsevier B.V.]

"This study tracks the progress of the various initiatives that eventually turned into the federal terrorism insurance law and also examines the market impact of the revisions on related industries. Intuitively, of course, insurance companies would be most directly affected by any new federal initiatives. Our study goes beyond that to also look at the effect on some of the major purchasers of insurance coverage, including airlines, banks and utility companies." (p.42)